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K O F F

Conflict Dimensions of International Assistance to Refugees from Syria in Lebanon

A Discussion Paper

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Overview of Key Issues and Implications for International Assistance to Refugees from Syria in Lebanon

	Key Issues	Implications for Assistance
 <p>Policy</p>	<p>The international aid architecture responding to the Syrian refugee crisis is managed <i>around</i> the Lebanese government in direct cooperation with non-state actors on the ground. There are signs that the current aid architecture contributes to strengthening Lebanese system failures, such as patterns of clientelism and political patronage.</p> <hr/> <p>International assistance to Lebanon operates in a fragile context where host communities lack the services that are provided to what is likely a long-term protracted refugee population, leading to reinforced perceptions of economic injustice between local communities.</p>	<p>Agreements on longer-term aid modalities as well as the harmonization of international with local assistance programs requires a strengthened commitment to political dialogue of the international community with Lebanese governmental bodies and key international and local political figures. Proactive outreach to and inclusion of 'non like-minded' actors, in particular the Arab donors, is necessary to bridge existing cleavages and gaps.</p> <hr/> <p>There is a requirement to reconfigure all international assistance programs so as to address Lebanon's factors of fragility. This includes but is not limited to the adoption of integrated human security strategies, based on a broader vulnerability definition that targets Lebanese communities in a transparent way.</p>
 <p>Institution</p>	<p>Local recipient communities associate external assistance with political objectives. Although the operations of implementing agencies might be guided by principles of impartiality and neutrality, the distinction between humanitarian and political action in the field is blurred.</p> <hr/> <p>International assistance is delivered in the presence of a myriad of actors working with selected communities based on motives that are not primarily humanitarian in nature.</p>	<p>Impartiality and neutrality are created by active measures taken at the institutional level. They require conscious decisions with regards to the programming, in particular the systematic consideration of political dimensions relating to the selection of the area of operation, program development, staff, suppliers, and donors.</p> <hr/> <p>Institutional policies should specify the mode of coordination of assistance programs with political and religious actors on the ground.</p>
 <p>Program</p>	<p>Sustaining the availability of local community capacities will be a key resource to cope with future refugee needs. International assistance should avoid creating reverse incentives and substitution effects, as well as tensions between refugees and hosts.</p> <hr/> <p>Networks of humanitarian assistance in Lebanon operate in parallel of rebels, arms and supply chains into Syria.</p>	<p>There is a need for a systematic conduct and sharing of tailored conflict analyses, as well as collection of sector-specific best practices for conflict-sensitive operational strategies, with a special focus on unconditional cash programs, shelter, and employment creation programs.</p> <hr/> <p>Beneficiary screening mechanisms are required to monitor the use and transfer of services delivered in the field.</p>
 <p>Individual</p>	<p>Staff and stakeholders are likely to hold implicit or explicit political preferences or sectarian loyalties.</p>	<p>It requires a personal commitment of the organisation's leadership to introduce and monitor the operational application of 'do no harm' principles.</p>

1. Background: Refugees from Syria in a Fragile Lebanon

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of people who have fled the on-going violence in Syria reached one million in March 2013. In Lebanon, the number of refugees registered or in the process of registration with UNHCR now amounts to 408'000¹. Within a matter of months, the total population of Lebanon of only four million has swelled by 10%. At the current rate of exodus and expecting the Lebanese border to Syria to remain open, the projected number of refugees will reach one million at the end of 2013 in Lebanon alone. Despite substantial international humanitarian support, the influx of refugees from Syria into neighbouring countries exceeds the capacity of aid agencies by far: of the one billion USD appealed by UNHCR, only 31% were received to date². As a result, vulnerability of both refugee and host communities in Lebanon reaches alarming levels.

At the same time, the rifts within the Lebanese political establishment have rapidly deepened over the past two years, mirroring some of the major fault lines of the Syrian conflict. Mounting tensions have sparked demonstrations and inter-communal clashes throughout the country, and the presence of refugees from Syria inevitably adds to Lebanon's instability. In March 2013, the Lebanese government collapsed, fuelling fears that Lebanon's precarious equilibrium – balancing the interests of 17 officially recognized religious sects – could soon be at the verge of collapse³.

At the conjunction of escalating humanitarian needs and instability, there is an inevitable political dimension attached to aid delivery. With no end to the Syrian crisis in sight, the likely future scenario for international assistance to Lebanon is a highly fragile context in which aid programs interact with protracted and intensifying communal tensions.

2. Fragility and Conflict Sensitivity: Rationale

International best practice for engagement in fragile and conflict-affected contexts requires the adaptation of conventional aid instruments to ensure that assistance is effective and conflict-sensitive. These recognized international benchmarks, as elaborated in the OECD/DAC's 10 principles⁴ and The New Deal⁵ necessitate strategic and systematic engagement with the political dimensions of the context in which assistance is delivered to maximise the positive impact and minimise unintentional harm. While adhering to basic principles of neutrality and impartiality, humanitarian operations are nevertheless part of a broader context in which power relations, decision-making processes and the distribution of resources are negotiated.

This discussion paper explores a selected number of key areas of potential interaction of international assistance provided to refugees from Syria with conflict dynamics in Lebanon. In doing so, it focuses on international assistance delivered *inside Lebanon* and does not cover aid programs destined for Syria or other neighbouring countries. It aims to facilitate a discussion among policy makers and international aid practitioners with a view to explore necessary steps for the adaptation of aid instruments in Lebanon's fragile context. Data collection for this paper included field visits and consultations with representatives from the Lebanese government, donors, international aid agencies, local civil society and NGOs, as well as academics in Lebanon between 18 February and 5 March 2013.

¹ Syria Regional Refugee Response, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122> (last accessed 9 April 2013). In addition, 33'000 Palestine refugees from Syria found shelter in Lebanon: <http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1686> (last accessed 26 March 2013), with assistance falling under the mandate of UNRWA, not UNHCR.

² Syria Regional Refugee Response. *Funding Requirements*, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php> (updated 15 March 2013, last accessed 26 March 2013).

³ The Economist (2013) *Be Careful*. <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21574532-lebanons-delicate-sectarian-system-danger-falling-apart-be-careful> 30 March 2013.

⁴ See OECD/DAC (2007) *The 10 Fragile States Principles*: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/incafi/effectiveengagementinfragilestates.htm>

⁵ See *New Deal – Building Peaceful States* (2011): <http://www.newdeal4peace.org/>

3. Key Drivers of Conflict Interacting with International Assistance

The complex web of deepening fault lines in Lebanon as a result of the Syrian crisis has been ably discussed elsewhere⁶. International assistance to Lebanon, even if essentially humanitarian in nature, overlaps with key issues of conflict pertaining to the functioning of the Lebanese state and society, such as longer-term legitimate politics, security, and ensuring livelihoods. For the purpose of this discussion paper, a limited number of key drivers of conflict were selected based on their potential to interact with international assistance programs to refugees from Syria in Lebanon.

A Patrons Abroad: The Divided International Community

Lebanon has a long history of local factions seeking alignment with and support from external actors – and vice versa. This inter-dependence in the competition for geostrategic, political, economic and cultural influence has an accelerating effect on Lebanese conflict dynamics on the ground. The current rifts within the Lebanese political establishment largely mirror the main fault lines of the Syrian conflict. An extension of political interests at stake in Syria, such as competing external-local alliances have been reinforced in Lebanon to the extent that today the ‘international’ can hardly be distinguished from the ‘local’. Financial support to selected local constituencies is part and parcel of such networks of political patronage, and service delivery to those in need is a key component to secure both livelihood and political allegiances. International assistance in past Lebanese emergencies has not been immune to such patterns of political patronage⁷.

Observed Interactions with International Assistance

The previous government of Prime Minister Najib Mikati in office until March 2013, represented a coalition of political actors sympathizing or actively supporting the Assad regime in Syria. Conversely, the overwhelming majority of refugees arriving in Lebanon relate to forces aligned with the opposition to the Assad regime. In this context, the Lebanese government has been repeatedly criticized for its bias in managing the refugee assistance⁸. At the same time, Western donor countries as well as Gulf states sympathizing with opposition forces in Syria have been reluctant to disburse substantial funds to the Lebanese government, officially citing concerns over governmental mismanagement and corruption. As a result, *the international aid architecture created for the management of the Syrian refugee assistance in Lebanon, including the channelling of significant funds for humanitarian purposes, is managed around the Lebanese government in direct cooperation with non-state actors on the ground.*

The minimal consensus of the deeply divided Lebanese political actors to date consists in preserving the country’s stability by distancing itself from the Syrian conflict, a modus operandi called ‘dissociation policy’ agreed in June 2012. This political paradigm of abstention has also framed the Lebanese government’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Only in December 2012, nearly two years into the crisis, did the government present its ‘Response of the Government of Lebanon to Crisis of the Syrian Displaced Families’ and appealed to the international community for USD\$370 million to meet the expenses of hosting Syrian refugees⁹. Prior governmental efforts to coordinate and organize

⁶ See for example International Crisis Group (2012). *A Precarious Balancing Act: Lebanon and the Syrian Conflict*. Middle East Report No 132. 22 November 2012. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/lebanon/132-a-precarious-balancing-act-lebanon-and-the-syrian-conflict.aspx> as well as monthly updates: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-database.aspx?CountryIDs=%7bB88F968D-7344-46FF-B440-9B24224EB6ED%7d>

⁷ For a detailed analysis of the political difficulties in the post-war reconstruction process after the Israeli-Hezbollah war in 2006 see Christine Sylva Hamieh and Roger Mac Ginty (2010). A very political reconstruction: governance and reconstruction in Lebanon after the 2006 war. In: *Disasters*, Volume 34, Issue Supplement s1, pages S103–S123, January 2010.

⁸ Abu Faour Denies Bias in Aid to Refugees. *The Daily Star*, 27 December 2012. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Dec-27/199969-abu-faour-denies-bias-in-aid-to-refugees.ashx#axzz2OeUfPaAX>

⁹ *United Nations Syria Regional Response Plan, January – June 2013*: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/uploads/SyriaRRP.pdf> and *Lebanon Asks for \$370 Million Aid for Syrian Refugees at Donor Conference* Naharnet, 30 January 2013: <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/70184-lebanon-asks-for-370-million-aid-for-syrian-refugees-at-donor-conference>

international aid had been minimal. The weak position and political fragmentation in the Lebanese government has both delayed and complicated the humanitarian response to the refugees from Syria. The ensuing operational vacuum on the ground created room for power plays among international and national non-state actors, Lebanese political parties as well as charities operating with large amounts of donations from obscure private donors. International support to Lebanon is therefore only loosely coordinated with and neither operationally managed nor systematically supervised by Lebanese governmental bodies. Resulting challenges in the coordination of aid programs are not the focus of this study but would appear to have a significant influence on the effectiveness of the international response. *At the same time, international assistance is now delivered in the presence of a myriad of actors working with selected communities based on motives that are neither purely nor primarily humanitarian in nature.*

B Mobilization of Confessional and Community Ties

The cross-border community ties between Lebanese and Syrians are an important element for the current relative peace that is kept in Lebanon. Extensive social and kinship networks have been in place previous to the outbreak of hostilities in Syria, positively and negatively reinforced by the Syrian political and military presence in Lebanon during the Lebanese civil war and until 2005, as well as decades of commercial activity and labour migration. However, the Lebanese civil war (1975 – 1990) has cemented confessional cleavages in Lebanon, a fact mirrored in the sectarian-based system of governance as well as in the complex mosaic of geographic segregation of the population. The presence and performance of the Lebanese government as law enforcer and service provider have been weak for many decades. The primary allocation of legitimacy among local stakeholders is therefore likely not to the state, but to local community leaders. In this context, the presence of roughly 400'000 Palestinians gathered in refugee camps throughout the country for more than six decades has equally far-reaching implications for international programming options. Against the background of persistent humanitarian, political and security concerns pertaining to the Palestinian refugee presence, there is a basic consensus among political actors that Lebanon cannot handle additional refugee camps.

Observed Interactions with International Assistance

Current migration patterns of refugees from Syria are not random but based on confessional and social ties that coincide with political sympathies and result in (perceived) social and physical safety provided by affiliated clans and communities. The fact that 27% of refugees from Syria are hosted in private homes, and 60% are renting apartments without assistance¹⁰, is likely a result of the enabling capacities of existing networks. *Sustaining the availability of local community capacities will be a key resource to cope with future refugee needs.*

In Lebanon's dysfunctional, community-based system of governance, international assistance on the ground inevitably negotiates operations with municipalities or other forms of local authorities representing specific political/confessional networks. At the same time, local partner organisations/local NGOs often belong to a specific political/confessional coalition. It is therefore of importance to note that the majority of refugees from Syria arriving in Lebanon over the past two years are Sunni sympathizing with opposition forces to the Assad regime in Syria. They have settled mainly in the Northern region of Lebanon and in the Western Beqaa, predominantly in villages that are aligned with the pro-Western March 14th alliance, or inside the Palestinian refugee camps. Political, sectarian and community ties therefore overlap with the geographical distribution

¹⁰ UNHCR Lebanon 2012. Shelter Sectoral Note. Beirut, 15 January 2013.

<http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=1384.pdf&name=Final%20Shelter%20Sectoral%20Note%2015%20Jan%202013.pdf>

of refugees in Lebanon. As a result, and in accordance with established vulnerability criteria, international aid delivery to refugees has de facto overwhelmingly been servicing the Sunni dominated pro-opposition constituency of the Syrian conflict. Not surprisingly, aid practitioners report incidents of service delivery accompanied by political messages, beneficiary selection based on their political/sectarian belonging, as well as political mobilization occurring in aid distribution centres. Against the background of the deepening societal cleavages, it is not surprising that local recipient communities associate external assistance with political objectives – a perception that applies to (often criticized) Arab but equally to Western governmental and non-governmental actors. *While the operations of implementing agencies might be strictly guided by principles of impartiality and neutrality, the distinction between humanitarian and political action is not an automatic given in the Lebanese context but one that is pro-actively created by an institution.*

Furthermore, press reports suggest that members of the Free Syrian Army are among the refugees in Lebanon. Some local analysts suggest that Lebanese ground is being used for political networking, intelligence gathering and the organisation of military operations inside Syria. Similarly, there is indication of humanitarian resources being transferred into Syria through Lebanon. In this context, it cannot be ignored that in addition to clandestine operations of some of the Arab states, Western humanitarian donor countries, such as the U.K., France and the U.S., publicly consider (acknowledging) the delivery of arms to opposition groups to the Syrian regime. The consequences of a potential merging of humanitarian and security programs are not investigated in this discussion paper but would be of serious concern. In the context of the consultations for this paper, there was indication of *networks of humanitarian aid operating in parallel to rebels, arms and supply chains into Syria.*

C Perceptions of Reinforced Economic Injustice

Lebanese inequality levels are comparable to the average of other countries in the Middle East and North Africa¹¹. The region of Akkar in North Lebanon hosts 20.7 per cent of Lebanon's population but 46 per cent of the extremely poor population. The extremely poor households are also over-represented in the Bekaa governorates.

Observed Interactions with International Assistance

The majority of refugees from Syria are currently hosted in the poorest and most disadvantaged areas of Lebanon, relying on services by host communities living in poverty themselves. Unequal treatment between host and refugee communities has therefore caused increasing tensions. Services provided for free to refugees from Syria but leaving out Lebanese host communities clearly risk exacerbating perceived or real inequalities. Of specific sensitivity are cash payments for rent/shelter to refugees from Syria, in particular in cases where cash is transferred to refugees with no particular attention being paid to the costs incurring to host families. At the same time, existing Lebanese government programs targeting Lebanese families under the poverty line operate in the same geographical areas, but according to different modalities. Due to political sensitivities related to cash payments in Lebanon, governmental programs provide waivers for fees that would incur for service consumption (e.g. health, education). Cash for rent programs by international agencies are reported to have set precedence and high expectations among Lebanese host communities that cannot be met by the government's programs. Of equal sensitivity are job creation programs targeting Syrian refugees with the aim of reducing long-term dependency on aid. Syrians have been worked as labourers in Lebanon for decades, competing for low-wage jobs mainly in the domains of construction and agriculture. Against the background of high Lebanese unemployment in poor areas,


¹¹ Poverty, Growth and Income Distribution in Lebanon. International Poverty Centre Country Study 13, January 2008. <http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCCountryStudy13.pdf>

the perception that Syrian workers are dumping wages, put the Lebanese labour market under pressure, and are additionally serviced by the international community's livelihood programs, is widespread. It must be understood that *international assistance in Lebanon operates in a tense context where host communities lack the very services that are provided to what is likely a long-term protracted refugee population.*

4. Key Issues to Respond to Fragility in Lebanon

Fragility and conflict sensitivity issues commonly occur on four levels: (A) Policy; (B) Institution; (C) Operational/Programming; and (D) Individual/Personal. The graph (see illustration below) shows that in a fragile situation, there are distinct roles and responsibilities for political, development and humanitarian actors, effectively requiring an integrated response of the aid system as well as a conceptual harmonisation of strategies on all four levels.

(A) Policy Level



The international aid architecture created for the management of the Syrian refugee assistance in Lebanon, including the channelling of significant funds for humanitarian purposes, is managed around the Lebanese government in direct cooperation with non-state actors on the ground.

The international community operates today largely independent of Lebanese governmental and ministerial oversight. In doing so, local non-state actors such as implementing partners and community representatives on the ground are empowered in their role as service providers. As a long-term side-effect, this will inevitably contribute to further reduce the little legitimacy that is still left of governmental authority in Lebanon. There are therefore signs that the current aid architecture contributes to strengthening the very patterns of clientelism and political patronage that are elements of the Lebanese system failures.

Legitimate Politics: The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States emphasises the need for a concerted effort in support of 'legitimate politics'. Given the inter-related security and development concerns in the context of the Syrian refugee operation in Lebanon, this would therefore require a pro-active role for the international community's political actors and a mandate for a sustained political dialogue with Lebanese governmental bodies and key international and local political actors. Key issues on this agenda are the negotiation of longer-term aid modalities as well as the harmonization of assistance programs between international and Lebanese governmental bodies.

Reaching out to the 'non like-minded': On this higher level of political dialogue, a genuine commitment to addressing fragility in Lebanon (see below) would mean that Western political actors will eventually have to reach out to 'non like-minded' international actors, in particular the Arab donors. The development of broader aid coordination mechanisms is very unlikely to succeed without a concerted effort to bridge international cleavages.


International assistance in Lebanon operates in a fragile context where host communities lack the services that are provided to what is likely a long-term protracted refugee population.

There can be little doubt that the current emergency response to refugees from Syria will turn into a longer-term operation intractably linked to addressing Lebanon's fragility. As a result, the conventional adaptation of aid instruments on the continuum from emergency response and humanitarian assistance to early recovery and development is insufficient.

Integrated Human Security Strategies: In light of the current political instability and community tensions, effective programming will inevitably have to adapt to human security and peacebuilding standards. The systematic integration of Lebanese communities into the service delivery is only the first and most obvious programming step to be taken in this regard. A

strategic commitment to addressing Lebanon's stability in the medium and longer term will include a broader definition of vulnerability, as well as the conceptual adaptation of all assistance programs to address key factors of fragility. Improved political will for institutional cooperation among some of the major international agencies is a basic pre-condition for this process to succeed.

(B) Institutional Level



Significant international efforts are devoted to the development of new policy addressing the nexus between poverty and conflict. The standards on fragility and conflict sensitivity are among the latest benchmarks emerging from these debates. Best practices are disseminated widely and are, sometimes uncritically, incorporated into the official discourse of donors and implementing agencies. In reality, there is a widening gap between the strategic policy level and the operationalization of these policies into institutional practices. In complex emergencies, such institutional gaps are revealed, often in the form of a lack of conceptual clarity combined with frantic activity of aid practitioners overwhelmed by the operational urgency

on the ground. Best conflict sensitivity practice is then relegated to the back end of the priority list. In the Lebanese context, institutional adaptations in response to fragility and conflict sensitivity standards should take into account on the following issues:

The distinction between humanitarian and political action is not an automatic given in the Lebanese context but one that is pro-actively created by the institution.


The principles of impartiality and neutrality are a basic requirement for a conflict-sensitive approach in the current context to avoid perceptions of favouritism. Conflict-sensitive policies are created at the institutional level of an organisation and require conscious choices with regards to institutional and operational aspects of the programming.

Selection of Area of Operation, Staff, Suppliers and Donors: As a result of the major funding gaps, many donors and implementing organisations are re-shifting aid portfolios away from previous locations and activities targeting the Lebanese population towards Syrian refugees. While the selection of project locations should be needs based, it is of equal importance to take into consideration existing political fault-lines so as to actively ensure impartiality of service delivery. Active monitoring systems to assess beneficiary services on the ground should be mainstreamed into programming with institutional guidance. It is also on an institutional level that conscious choices are made with regards to diversity and representation when contracting staff and suppliers. In the current political climate and against the background of competing alliances, implementing agencies will need to invest into the institutional transparency of financial flows and evaluate donor support based on their commitment to impartiality and their broader political engagement in the Syrian conflict.

International assistance is delivered in the presence of a myriad of actors working with selected communities based on motives that are neither purely nor primarily humanitarian in nature.

Coordination: There are concerns that the dominant strategy of implementing agencies to delegate beneficiary selection to Lebanese municipalities as a democratically elected body will not provide the necessary safeguards to ensure impartiality, due to the municipalities' sectarian/political affiliation and the channelling of resources that is attached to these positions. It will be equally necessary for institutions to establish guidelines for the coordination with political and religious actors on the ground (such as referral mechanisms, how to prevent implicit or explicit political and religious messages attached to service delivery).

(C) Operational/Program Level



The bulk of interaction between international assistance and the fault lines of the local context takes place during the implementation in the field. At the level of the program/project design and during its operational execution, there is significant scope for conflict-sensitive programming so as to avoid unintended negative side effects and to strengthen the positive potential of a program to contribute to social cohesion. Guidelines for conflict-sensitive programming on the operational/program level are well developed and widely available¹². In the context of international assistance to refugees from Syria in Lebanon, implementing agencies will have to develop specific conflict analyses tailored to their operational context, thereby taking into

account the mosaic of local Lebanese and Syrian particularities. The following points can serve as signposts for the development of a conflict-sensitive practice on the operational/program level¹³:

Sustaining the availability of local community capacities is a key resource to cope with future refugee needs.

As refugees continue to arrive in Lebanon in high numbers, host communities are reaching the limits of their capacity and willingness to offer hospitality. Of particular importance on the operational/program level is the observation that some of the current program strategies may discourage host communities from continuing their hospitality by creating reverse incentives and substitution effects, as well as tensions between host and refugee communities.

Beneficiary Selection: There now is a general understanding among aid practitioners that Lebanese beneficiaries must be integrated into international service delivery to Syrian refugees. While vulnerability criteria might be relatively transparent with regards to refugees from Syria, the systematic integration of Lebanese communities into the service delivery programs will bring up important questions with regards to the operational application of impartiality and the criteria that are applied for their selection.

Shelter Strategy: Program strategies involving 'cash for rent' are favoured by implementing agencies for practicality reasons, but they have important conflict sensitivity dimensions attached. Tensions occur when cash transfers are made directly and exclusively to refugees without taking into account costs that occur to families and communities hosting them. A coordinated shelter strategy would have to systematically include conflict sensitivity considerations, in particular when evaluating the feasibility of a national rollout of unconditional cash programmes to vulnerable refugees from Syria. Shelter strategies should be assessed with a special focus on how they impact power relations between refugees and hosts, and what options there are for shelter programs to contribute to social cohesion in local communities.

Health and Social Services: As a result of specific programming modalities, international assistance has also become the source of open tensions, including the escalation of conflict and violence against staff. Health services provided by international aid agencies for free to refugees from Syria but at (sometimes significant) cost to Lebanese hosts are perceived as unequal treatment.

Employment: Of particular importance is the conflict potential inherent in the creation of employment and longer-term livelihood initiatives. International assistance programs will have to design job creation programs that are mutually beneficial to refugees from Syria and Lebanese (such as, for example, employing Syrians for Syrian service provision in education and health care or the creation of Lebanese businesses that employ a certain percentage of

¹² For further information see swisspeace factsheet:

http://koff.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/koff/Publications/KOFF_Factsheet_Conflictsensitivity_Sept2012.pdf

¹³ Detailed recommendations for programming to prevent tensions and improve the quality of services to refugees from Syria in Lebanon were published by Beyond Reform and Development. Available here: http://www.beyondrd.com/?page_id=964


Syrian refugees) while maintaining the temporary nature of such measures so as to avoid the perception that job creation is a means to integrate the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon on a long-term basis.

Conflict Analysis Dissemination: It is usually beyond the capacity of implementing agencies to conduct conflict sensitivity analyses on a case-by-case basis. To this end, international coordination bodies are advised to encourage sector and area specific conflict sensitivity assessments and actively contribute to the sharing of local conflict analyses and best practices, as well as the development and monitoring of conflict sensitivity indicators¹⁴.

Networks of humanitarian aid operate in parallel of rebels, arms and supply chains into Syria.

Vetting: There is a risk of aid being abused for the purpose of warfare as well as (perceived) overlaps of humanitarian networks with arms and supply chains into Syria. Best conflict sensitivity practice on an operational level requires the screening of beneficiaries as well as the monitoring of aid delivery so as to avoid abuse of resources for military purposes on either side of the conflict lines.

(D) Individual Level



Organisational reputation – in particular neutrality and impartiality – is ultimately created as a result of direct interaction between individuals. Conflict-sensitive policy will remain ineffective unless it is applied by staff members in their daily actions in the field, in coordinating bodies or at headquarters. At the individual level, conflict sensitivity starts with genuine self-inspection and acknowledgement of personal preferences and loyalties, perceptions and attitudes, behaviours and messages. In the Lebanese context, the uneasy reality is that staff and stakeholders are likely to hold implicit or explicit political preferences or sectarian loyalties. Yet, aid practitioners generally prefer to maintain silence about the extent to which such individual characteristics influence professional decision-making processes. The application of the ‘do no harm’ principles would require to the introduction of an open and transparent organisational mechanism to examine such questions in a systematic way. Most importantly, however, it would require a personal commitment of the organisation’s leadership to apply in reality the ‘do no harm’ principles that are so widely trained and narrated on paper.

Operational adaptations: These could include, for instance, the building of personal skills and capacity of staff to understand and apply the ‘do no harm’ principles in their daily work, the adaptation of the organisation’s recruitment policy, or the development and monitoring of conflict-sensitive messaging for international and local staff as well as the organisation’s implementing partners.

¹⁴ For instructions on the development of a conflict analysis, see: http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/sites/default/files/RP_Chapter2.pdf