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Summary

Switzerland is committed to developing a whole-of-government approach for engagements in conflict regions and fragile states. This commitment is expressed in Switzerland’s decision to host the 3C Conference in Geneva in March 2009. As a background paper for this conference, this report aims to contribute to the reflection within and outside of the Swiss Federal Administration on the “whole-of-government approach” (WGA) (i.e., the use of networks across agencies to increase the effectiveness of engagements in fragile states). It does so by focusing on the experiences of the various agencies of the Swiss Federal Administration engaged in Sudan from 2005–2008.

The findings of this report are drawn from interviews with approximately 25 policy-makers working on Sudan in Berne as well as in Khartoum and Juba.

Perceptions of a WGA: A coherent Swiss approach is necessary because in Sudan, the work of all Swiss Federal agencies is perceived as “Swiss”. The successes and failures of any one Swiss Federal agency influence the work of the other Swiss Federal agencies. There is therefore an inherent interest in coordination and mutual assistance towards enhancing the overall performance of all agencies. Furthermore, a WGA allows the exploitation of synergies, e.g., through information-sharing, joint analysis, activities that complement each other, and sharing the costs of infrastructure. On the other hand, concerns were expressed that a WGA can be misused as an excuse to interfere in and instrumentalize other agencies for goals outside their mandate; it can lead to a diffusion of responsibility and a confusion of roles; and it can lead to additional bureaucratization and excessive coordination costs.

Lessons and challenges: There are promising examples of coordination and information-sharing both in the field and in Berne. However, there is no clearly formulated overall Swiss Sudan strategy yet, even if there are broadly defined goals, such as peace promotion and humanitarian aid. Instead, strategies are developed at the agency level. The decentralized nature of the Swiss Federal system is not conducive to a top-down strategic orientation of Swiss policy. The advantage of such a system, however, is that it is based on consensus and inter-agency dialog, rather than imposing top-down decisions. While it takes longer to develop, it is more likely to last, and is generally supported by more people in the Administration.

Some of the key recommendations are:

Clarity interface, roles, and responsibilities: The interface, roles, and responsibilities between various agencies should be clarified even further.

Fill the “conflict prevention” and “peacebuilding” gap: The gap in the Swiss Federal Administration regarding “conflict prevention in fragile states” and “peacebuilding” should be filled by adapting and expanding the mandates of the various agencies. Additional resources and expertise are needed for this task.

Adapt mandates within agencies: An enhanced Swiss WGA requires clarification and adaptation of strategies and mandates within the various agencies, as inter-agency cooperation is conditioned by these strategies and mandates.

Develop a Sudan strategy: Greater coherence of Swiss Federal policy and activities in Sudan is necessary between agencies, but also over time, building on what has been achieved. The development of a Sudan strategy that sets priorities and ensures continuity is important, especially if Switzerland increases its engagement in Sudan.

Deal with negative aspects of a WGA: Potential negative aspects of a (misunderstood) whole-of-government approach have to be dealt with, e.g., increased coordination costs, a diffusion of responsibility, or a confusion of roles.

Make the advantages of a decentralized “whole-of-government” known: Elements of a decentralized, consensus-oriented political system could possibly benefit the “whole-of-government” approach of other countries that are more strongly shaped by leadership personalities. Coordination and coherence do not necessarily come only from top-down leadership, but can also grow from inter-agency dialog, joint task forces, and coordination meetings, even if such processes take time.

1 http://www.3c-conference2009.ch/

1. Introduction

A WGA is defined as “one where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government’s agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives.” Switzerland’s engagements in Sudan were not initiated with a WGA in mind. The only truly inter-departmental project between the Swiss Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) was inter-departmental by default due to the legal constraints of Swiss military law. Nevertheless, with the increase in the number of Swiss Federal agencies involved in Sudan since 2006, steps were undertaken to increase the coordination between them. The goal of this working paper is to learn from these experiences. This document is a summary of a longer, internal paper. In particular, the objectives of this paper are to contribute to the Swiss reflection on the WGA and to provide background information for the 3C Conference 2009, in particular as input for the planned operational “Recommendations” and “Commitments” that will complement the 3C Roadmap in an annex.

Approach: To fulfill these aims, the existing documentation of the Swiss Federal Administration’s engagement in Sudan during the period 2005–2008 was reviewed. In addition, interviews were carried out in January 2009 with approximately 25 staff involved in Sudan in the period 2005–2008, at the field level, as well as at the operational and policy making level in Berne.

Structure of the paper: First, a brief overview of the context of the Swiss engagement in Sudan is given in order to show why Switzerland is involved in Sudan, and how the various Swiss Federal agencies were involved. Second, a few actual experiences of how various Swiss Federal agencies interacted in Sudan are presented. Third, in the conclusions, we will discuss what other actors can learn from Switzerland’s experiences.

2. Switzerland’s Sudan Engagements

Why is Switzerland engaged in Sudan, when did it become involved, and what are key goals?

2.1 Swiss Rationale and Goals

Sudan is the site of one of the largest humanitarian crises of the 20th and 21st centuries: Approximately two million people were killed in the second North-South war; an estimated 300,000 were killed in the Darfur war, and more than 2 million people are internally displaced. Therefore, Switzerland’s engagement in Sudan is both idealistic and based on self-interest. By being an effective actor in Sudan, Switzerland not only carries its share of the global responsibility for dealing with such crises, it is also helping to ensure that these crises do not affect Switzerland via organized crime, diseases, terrorism, forced migration, etc. Furthermore, involvement in Sudan is seen as a way for Switzerland to enhance its collaboration with other countries.

The two goals most frequently cited by Swiss policy-makers are:

1. To promote peace and thereby avoid the spread of conflicts that could negatively affect Switzerland.
2. To translate into practice the Swiss tradition of humanitarian aid and good offices, which are codified in the constitution and in various bills and are in line with international humanitarian law and other legal principles.

The post-Cold War developments provide the background for increasing Swiss involvement in peace promotion activities: First, as a result of the Rwanda genocide and the demise of apartheid in South Africa, Switzerland realized in the 1990s that a “non-political”, purely economic, humanitarian, or technical development approach was not enough. Second, there was a shift from passive neutrality to a more active interpretation of neutrality.

There are two main criteria for Switzerland to become engaged in a country like Sudan: First, to have a comparative advantage (supply side); second, to fill a “niche” with this comparative advantage (demand side). Sudan was one of the first countries where Switzerland became involved with peace promotion activities. In part,


this occurred through the opportunities that arose thanks to the contacts of Ambassador Josef Bucher, Special Representative on Conflict Issues and former Swiss ambassador to Libya and Kenya.3 Sudan is not a key area for Swiss foreign policy, yet Switzerland’s engagement in Sudan seems relatively broad-based and sustainable.

In summary, the goals of Swiss Federal agencies in Sudan involve the alleviation of suffering of people affected by armed conflict, recovery and development of the Sudanese society, promotion of peace and prevention of armed conflict, and representation of Swiss interests in Sudan. From a Swiss domestic point of view as regards incoming migration, the main interest is to maintain good relations with the Sudanese authorities as a way of securing information and repatriation. Economically, there is a debt question pending, and some Swiss firms have invested in Sudan – an investment that could increase in the future. For a full overview of the goals and activities of Swiss Federal agencies, see the table in Annex 2.

2.2 Timeline

Switzerland has been engaged in Sudan since 1994 in the field of humanitarian aid and later peace promotion. As part of peace promotion, the House of Nationalities (traditional leaders’ forums in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains) were supported by Political Division IV “Human Security” of the FDFA (PDIV) from 2000 onwards. The Nuba Mountains ceasefire negotiations in 2002 and the participation with a mediator in the negotiations leading to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 were milestones.4 The Swiss seconded a high-level expert to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), who acted as Chief of the Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC) from 2005-2006. From 2005 onwards, the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation–Regional Cooperation (SDR-RC) explored options for engagement, but kept this at a low level. Instead, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation–Humanitarian Aid (SDC-HA) continued to bear the costs of a relatively large-scale program in Southern Sudan and opened a field office in Juba in mid-2006. In 2006, Switzerland became engaged in the peace process between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Uganda, mediated by the government of Southern Sudan. DDPS got operationally engaged in Security Sector Reform (SSR) in 2008. Since 2007, Switzerland has been represented by a full-fledged ambassador in Khartoum.

For a long time, the Swiss focused on the South-South and South-North relations. From 2003 onwards, the SDC-HA became engaged in Darfur and opened a representation in Khartoum, due to the scale of the humanitarian crisis, but also because local Swiss NGO partners with better access to affected populations than other actors were already active in Darfur. Switzerland was briefly involved in the Darfur Abuja negotiations in 2005/2006, and from 2007 onwards collaborated with the UN/African Union (AU) Joint Mediation Support Team on peace promotion in Darfur. For a full overview of Swiss Federal agencies involved in Sudan, see the table in Annex 2.

3. Examples of Agency Interactions

This section examines concrete examples of agency interaction. We will examine two examples where aspects of a WGA worked, and one case where it could have been used, but was not.

3.1 Security Sector Reform in South Sudan

With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005, the political situation in Sudan changed. A Swiss mediator was involved in the three-year process that led to the CPA. Various options for Swiss engagement in the implementation phase were explored, e.g., development cooperation, local governance, humanitarian aid, and implementation of the CPA at the political level. So far, during the implementation phase, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the National Congress Party have not accepted mediation offers from any third party, although the involvement of third parties in other functions has been accepted: One example is the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, which performs a monitoring function. Prior to the CPA, Swiss humanitarian aid in Southern Sudan

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4 Ibid.
had been steered from Nairobi until mid 2006. With the CPA, it was possible to shift the SDC-HA office to Southern Sudan in order to be closer to the SDC-HA projects and its partners, as well as the Sudanese authorities and donor coordination bodies, and to help build up the young state. Various Swiss Federal agencies became involved with the newly established Swiss office in Juba in 2007/2008. On the invitation of the FDFA, five generals of the SPLA visited Switzerland early 2005. Their main interest was to learn about the Swiss militia system as a possible model for reorganizing the SPLA. It was not the first time that the DDPS had been involved with the Sudan. Already in 2002, Ambassador Bucher had worked with three officers from the DDPS in his mediation team on the Nuba Mountains ceasefire negotiations. Following the 2005 visit, the DDPS began to explore the possibilities of becoming engaged in SSR in South Sudan.

A joint exploration mission of the DDPS and the FDFA occurred in mid-2005. For the DDPS, it was a pilot project, and there were many hurdles within the DDPS to be overcome before winning approval, most pertaining to the reluctance to deploy Swiss troops in foreign countries. Nevertheless, one of the explicit tasks of the Swiss Armed Forces is their contribution to international peace support.5 The project was seen as a chance to do this and gain experience and participate in international burden-sharing for such tasks. However, there are legal constraints to any DDPS projects abroad. Swiss military law does not allow military personnel to work on such missions unless covered by an OSCE or UN mandate. As UNMIS does not have an explicit focus on Security Sector Reform (SSR), this path was blocked. Under present military law, the armed forces are also banned from training non-Swiss nationals abroad. By spring 2007, it was therefore clear that the DDPS mission could not be carried out under Swiss military law, but had to be implemented as a civilian mission according to the “Federal Act on measures to promote civilian peacebuilding and reinforcement of human rights” (19 December 2003). Under this act, the DDPS was legally required to acquire FDFA support for its activities. At the same time, there was also a strong demand from the FDFA for the DDPS to become involved in SSR in Southern Sudan. By necessity, therefore, the DDPS involved all relevant other Swiss Federal agencies from the start.

All agencies of the FDFA were basically in favor of a DDPS engagement. However, when it came to the details, reservations were expressed. The two key concerns on the part of the FDFA were: First, the SDC-HA was concerned about the neutrality of humanitarian aid. It was unclear, for example, how the Sudanese would perceive the Swiss humanitarian actors if SPLA soldiers in uniform were to walk through the SDC-HA office to visit the DDPS. Second, there were concerns about how the DDPS engagement would effect the FDFA’s engagement as regards peace policy, e.g., if the SPLA were supported in training for combat activities. This included all operational and tactical training. These problems were surmounted by agreeing that the FDFA had overall responsibility for Swiss policy in Sudan (a decision taken by the Federal Council in spring 2007, i.e., at the highest decision making level), including the SSR project in Juba. This meant that the DDPS would only send civilian experts (no uniforms), and that decisions related to the DDPS SSR project would be made by consensus with the relevant agencies of the FDFA. Furthermore, it meant that they would restrict themselves to training SPLA in “soft” policy-related issues such as SSR and International Humanitarian Law. Nevertheless, the DDPS covered the costs of the SSR project and was in charge of the operational activities.

Preparations for the involvement of the DDPS took time (from the first serious statement of intent in mid-2006 to the start of the project on the ground in Juba in March 2008) and were complicated, not least of all because it was a pilot project. Nevertheless, cooperation in the field between DDPS and SDC-HA staff was better than expected. Some simple examples illustrate the benefits of having a WGA on the ground: The head of the Juba office, a SDC-HA staff member, was in charge of security for all Swiss staff in Southern Sudan. Through the DDPS, he had contacts to SPLA security experts (i.e., three-star generals) that were useful for his annual security assessment and to whom he would not otherwise have had access. On the other hand, Switzerland as a donor was involved in various donor working groups involving the government of South Sudan, including in the one related to security issues. The DDPS did not know of this working group, but gained access to it through the SDC-HA staff. Here, a unique

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5 Swiss Code of Military Law article 1, paragraph 4 and article 66, http://www.VBS.admin.ch/
opportunity to affect the policy level presented itself. The SDC-HA and DDPS staff also represented each other at official occasions if necessary because the one or the other heads were absent.

The Juba office is planning a new “Swiss compound”. Here, costs can be minimized by sharing resources. Not all agencies need to have their own secretary, radio operator, etc. It is also planned for SDC-HA and DDPS to have the same kind of vehicles to minimize maintenance costs.

3.2 Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains: Tribal Leaders

In the Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, PDIV developed a “House of Nationalities” project, which aims to support the development of forums for tribal leaders to deal with inter-tribal tensions. Inter-tribal South-South conflicts led to tens of thousands of deaths during the war. These latent tensions could pop up again unless they are channeled by constructive conflict management systems. From the beginning in 2000, the project aimed to support Southern Sudan in anticipation of the day of peace with the North. The logic was that without South-South governance structures, the elites in the South or the North could easily “divide and rule” by exploiting the latent inter-tribal tensions within the South. Tribal leader forums could also be the basis for a second chamber in the government of South Sudan. The informal nature of politics in fragile states calls for responses that build on these structures and develop them, rather than imposing models of Western democratic institutions.

The PDIV project is an inherently political, multi-track, and long-term effort. As it does not deal explicitly with armed conflict, it could also become a long-term governance project together with SDC, following a “continuum” logic (from a humanitarian and peacemaking response via early recovery to development). While the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) contributed to the launching of the tribal leaders’ project, it did not, in the end, take over the project. Two reasons seemed to have played a role for this: First, the project was judged to be too politically sensitive; second, and most importantly, Sudan is not an SDC special program and it is thus difficult to use development funds in Sudan. At the moment, it is not possible for SDC-HA to take over such long-term governance programs either: They cannot tie in the funds for so long, and they do not consider governance and rule-of-law programs part of their mandate (even though recovery does in principle include such activities). Furthermore, they do not have qualified staff for such tasks.

PDIV is continuing with this project. However, this experience illustrates a missed opportunity to use a WGA to expand a peacebuilding engagement in a post-peace agreement environment.

3.3 The LRA-Uganda Process

Due to the Swiss involvement in the CPA negotiations, Riek Machar, vice president of the government of South Sudan, asked the Swiss FDFA for support in mediating the peace process between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda. The request was: 1) to support the mediation effort with process design; 2) to maintain contact with the Democratic Republic of the Congo to foster regional support for peace negotiations; and 3) to keep contact with the International Criminal Court (ICC), to keep the ICC informed about the process, and keep Riek Machar informed about the ICC. The question arose, however, whether the indictment of five of the LRA leaders (only three of whom were still alive in December 2008) by the ICC might pose a problem for the Swiss involvement. Legally, the situation was clear: Switzerland could not be part of a process if it entailed granting an amnesty to the LRA leaders for war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. If negotiations on this topic were to commence, the Swiss would have to leave the process.

What was less clear at the time, however, was to what extent it was permissible to talk with people indicted by the ICC. There was some pressure from advocacy groups to avoid all contacts with such people, as such relations might appear to legitimize them and detract from the need to arrest them and try them in The Hague. Switzerland argued that it was not simply possible to go and arrest them, and that therefore, the possible benefits for the wider population in Northern Uganda outweighed the risks of talking to alleged war criminals. Switzerland did not want to

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become involved in the LRA negotiations on its own, so the Austrian government was approached and agreed to join. Later, Denmark contributed an SSR expert. Even later the US, Norway, Sweden, the EU, and the UN also became involved. The go-ahead was given by Federal Councillor Micheline Calmy-Rey – an example of top-level leadership in a politically delicate matter. Switzerland was a pioneer in this regard, and subsequent developments indicated that Switzerland was on the right track.

The question within the Swiss FDFA, therefore, was not so much a legal, but rather a political one. What were the political implications if Switzerland supported a peace process involving actors indicted by the ICC, while Switzerland was a fervent supporter of the ICC? Initially, there were certain inter-agency differences on these questions. Contacts between PDIV and the ICC clarified the situation to the degree that the ICC was not explicitly opposed to the process as long as it did not let the indicted LRA leaders “off the hook”. Even if the final document was never signed by the LRA leader, it is broadly recognized that the humanitarian situation of some several hundreds of thousands of people in North Uganda could be improved. The use of the “complementarity clause” in the (unsigned) peace agreement is seen as a model for peace-justice questions in future peace negotiations.

4. Conclusions

What lessons from the Swiss experience are potentially also relevant for other actors?

Political will: The Swiss Federal system shows the strengths and weaknesses of a decentralized system regarding political guidance and leadership. It is slower, less clear at times, but more consensus-oriented and supported by a broad segment of the Swiss Federal staff and the Swiss population once it has developed. The development of a WGA has to strike a balance between clear leadership on the one hand, and consultations, teamwork, and open discussions and debate on the other. In short, top-down and bottom-up approaches have to be combined.

Multiple actors and levels: The horizontal dimension of coordination and communication between the field and the headquarters is often more challenging than the vertical dimension between various agencies at the same level. “Roaming” staff based partly in the field and partly at headquarters can help to overcome this gap. Other agencies should be informed about new projects and activities as early as possible, especially if the action has implications for their work. Beyond individuals, agencies have to come in at the right time with the right kind of activities and staff to manage them. Key moments that demand inter-agency consultation and coordination include: The decision to open an office (where and with whom?); milestones in planning cycles; the decision to withdraw from certain regions or sectors and activities; the decision to come in (see the DDPS SSR case); the decision to expand operations or not (see the case of the Southern Sudanese tribal leaders).

Organizational structures: A whole-of-government approach seems to call for stronger top-down leadership to ensure coherence. In many cases, this is needed. However, the Swiss experience also shows the advantages of decentralized systems and coordination between organizational structures at the same hierarchy level. In such constellations, the power of argument is more likely to be used than the power of hierarchy. The outcome is likely to be more along the lines of “soft” law.

Joint analysis and joint objectives: The analytical tool of one agency should not be imposed on the other agencies, but it can be adapted and expanded, taking into consideration the various relevant humanitarian, developmental, security, conflict sensitivity, economic, and migration dimensions.

Regional/National partners: Any external assistance should avoid falling prey to international standardization processes that do not take into consideration the local and national situation. A profound understanding of the informal nature of fragile states is also needed to tailor a response to a given situation. This also requires using people who know the country well. Switzerland used experts and ambassadors that knew Arabic and had some connection to Sudan (e.g., who had lived in the country for years).

Integrated planning: Integrated planning instruments and strategies are needed, but they will never replace the “soft” dimensions of human relations. In the context of fragile states, human relations are the key to change. Thus, integrated planning in a changing environment re-
quires a continuity of staff, a clear handover when they change, and sufficient focus on the informal dimensions of politics.

**Incentive structure:** Budgetary and information-sharing incentives can be developed. On the budgetary level, incentives for cooperation include agency budgets that are separate, but have more inter-agency flexibility, and/or separate budgets with greater inter-agency transparency and consultation, and joint budgets. On the information level, incentives to share include reciprocity, giving credit to the various actors, and ensuring confidentiality where necessary.

**Information and communication:** Information-sharing, for example within the format of the Sudan Task Force, should not be restricted to facts about what each agency is doing, but should also include explaining the reasoning for a given course of action as a way to get the other agencies on board. A balance is needed between integrated, centralized information systems on the one hand, and flexible, informal, and ad-hoc communication systems on the other hand. Useful information-sharing and communication is voluntary; it should be fostered through incentive structures, rather than being enforced in a top-down manner. Joint activities (e.g., a workshop on how to organize training activities in difficult contexts) and “time-outs” are just as important as formulated strategy meetings.

**Human resources:** Careful staff recruitment for key positions with leadership functions, as well as for field staff in difficult environments, is of crucial importance. Important aspects to consider include: A multi-disciplinary background; good knowledge of the peacebuilding agenda; in-depth knowledge of the context; and social skills. Field teams need to be chosen so that the various members complement one another and work well together. Structures need to be established that allow for flexibility, mobility, and continuity of staff between agencies (e.g., staff should not be disadvantaged when returning to the “mother agency”). Inter-agency or intra-team consultation on key posts may be useful. A culture of using inter-personal mediation within and between teams could help to increase efficiency and save enormous human and financial resources. Continuous and specific training of staff is necessary. Joint training across agencies can also help to improve coherence.

**Funding:** Joint pooled funding and “multi-donor trust funds” are the way forward. However, this procedure only works when clear and participatory governance structures are in place, or else agencies will not contribute (see also the point above on incentive structures). The formulation of the bills for ODA is also a key factor: They should more explicitly articulate the role of each agency (humanitarian aid, development, peace promotion, etc.) and specify how they are to contribute to dealing with conflict and fragile situations. They should envisage special arrangements, funding, and management mechanisms to respond to such situations. The cycles of when the Bills’ to the Parliament are developed and decided on should also be aligned. Furthermore, if agencies could be brought to coordinate their budget-planning cycles, that would be conducive to joint budgetary planning.

**International coordination:** “Groups of friends” and consultation mechanisms need to be combined with clear lead roles and responsibilities. Cooperative efforts are made easier by giving credit to the various actors, and through acknowledgement of the comparative advantages of actors. Perseverance in the engagement of a country (e.g., Switzerland has been involved in Sudan since 1994) is essential for having an impact. Such endurance also helps to identify international comparative advantages.
### Annex 1: Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>Assessment and Evaluation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDPS</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sport</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>UN Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPIL</td>
<td>Directorate of Public International Law (FDFA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDFA</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOM</td>
<td>Federal Office for Migration (Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP))</td>
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<tr>
<td>GONU</td>
<td>Sudanese Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GOSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR D</td>
<td>International Relations Defense (DDPS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDII</td>
<td>Political Affairs Division II: Africa/Middle East (FDFA)</td>
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<td>PDIII</td>
<td>Political Affairs Division III &quot;The UN and Other International Organizations&quot; (FDFA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDIV</td>
<td>Political Affairs Division IV Human Security (FDFA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDV</td>
<td>Political Affairs Division V “Culture, Education and Science”</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (FDFA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDC-HA</td>
<td>SDC Humanitarian Aid (FDFA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC-RC</td>
<td>SDC Regional Cooperation (FDFA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECO</td>
<td>State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (Federal Department of Economic Affairs (DEA))</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIS/</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sudan. UN / African Union Mission in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>WGA</td>
<td>whole-of-government approach</td>
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## Annex 2: Agencies of the Swiss Government Working in and on Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>F DFA/ SDC-HA</th>
<th>F DFA/ SDC-RC</th>
<th>F DFA/PDV</th>
<th>F DFA/PDIV</th>
<th>F DFA/PDII</th>
<th>F DFA/PDIII</th>
<th>F DFA/PDIV</th>
<th>DDPS / IR D</th>
<th>FDJP/FOM</th>
<th>DEA/SECO</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation</td>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Peace promotion and Human Rights</td>
<td>UN coordination</td>
<td>Bilateral relations / Embassy</td>
<td>International law</td>
<td>International military engagements</td>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Economic relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective:</td>
<td>Providing protection and assistance to meet humanitarian and recovery needs of civilians affected by armed conflict in Sudan</td>
<td>Contribute to the recovery and development of the Sudanese society</td>
<td>Preserve cultural heritage of Sudan</td>
<td>Promote peace and prevent armed conflict in Sudan</td>
<td>Strengthen and coordinate Swiss policy within the United Nations</td>
<td>Represent Switzerland in Sudan</td>
<td>Ensure international legal compatibility of Swiss policy in Sudan</td>
<td>Contribute to the reform of the security sector in South Sudan and to Mine Action in Sudan</td>
<td>Economic relations between Switzerland and Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement since</td>
<td>1994 (South) 2003 (Darfur)</td>
<td>- 2005</td>
<td>1994 (South-North) 2005 (Darfur)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Ambassador since 2007</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2005 (Mine Action) March 2008 (SSR)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field activities in 2007</td>
<td>- Protection of IDPs, refugees (ICRC, UNHCR, OCHA, TdH), - Food and livelihood security (WFP, ACF, VSF), - Access to safe water (UNICEF, Medair), - Access to basic health care (MSF, MSF, Medair), - Support return, reintegration of IDPs, refugees</td>
<td>- UN radio (Fondation Hirondelle), - Veterinary medicine (Food and livelihood security (Vétérinaires sans frontières) - Map project (University of Bern)</td>
<td>Museum in Kerma</td>
<td>- Gurttong, since 2002</td>
<td>- House of nationalities / conference of traditional leaders</td>
<td>- De-mining</td>
<td>- Support to the mediation and peace process</td>
<td>- CPA implementation (AEC)</td>
<td>UN peacekeeping missions, UNMIS, UNAMID</td>
<td>- Bern-based coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas</td>
<td>Northern Bhar el-Gazal (South Sudan), Darfur, Southern Kordofan</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Kerma, North Sudan</td>
<td>South Sudan/Juba, Darfur</td>
<td>South-North Sudan and Darfur</td>
<td>Based in Khartoum, responsibility for whole country</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Juba (South Sudan)</td>
<td>South Kordofan</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Towards a Swiss “Whole of Government”
Approach in Sudan: 2005-2008

Simon J A Mason (CSS), David Lanz (swisspeace)

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