

# FAST Update

## Angola

---

**Quarterly Risk Assessment**  
January to February 2004

T

S

A

E

**Contents**


Country Stability and Relative Conflictual Actions	3
Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict and Cooperation	4
Goldstein Average International Conflict and Cooperation	5
Appendix: Description of indicators used	6
The FAST Early Warning System	7

FAST Update Subscription: [www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription\\_form.asp](http://www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp)

Contact FAST:  
Phone: +41 31 330 12 02  
Fax: +41 31 330 12 13  
<mailto:FAST@swisspeace.ch>  
[www.swisspeace.org/fast](http://www.swisspeace.org/fast)

Country Expert:  
[João Gomes Porto](#)

## Country Stability and Relative Conflictual Actions




Average number of reported events per month: 116

Indicator descriptions see Appendix

## Risk Assessment:

- While Country Stability remained at a high level throughout 2003, a significant decline was observed during January and February 2004. This decline is partly due to a further increase in Conflictual Actions during the period considered. A number of issues account for this increase:
- The process of 'normalization', through which the Government of Angola (GoA) is extending state administration structures throughout the country is increasingly seen as the extension of MPLA's structures to rural areas. This party-political approach to the extension of state administration has been marked by intimidation and harassment of opposition party members in several provinces, most recently in Huila, Huambo and Malange, indicating a worrying tendency towards an uncooperative approach to multi-party politics in the country.
- UNITA has increased its criticism of GoA policy towards the reintegration of former combatants, seen as crucial for the maintenance of the stability of the country, denouncing that support to the vast majority of former combatants (approximately 105,000) has been largely deficient.
- In an effort to curb illegal diamond exploitation, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) began a 'cleansing operation' against foreign diamond diggers in December 2003. GoA figures indicate that 587 illegal foreign diamond prospectors were detained and repatriated from Bié province alone. However, a Congolese NGO claims that close to 10,000 illegal Congolese miners have been subjected to serious human right abuses by the FAA and expelled from Angola in January.
- The rise in conflictual actions is also a consequence of a riot in February between a group of civilians and the police in Cafunfo, Lunda Norte, which led to controversy over the number of deaths.
- The number of landmine accidents has increased, largely a consequence of the unusual heavy rains. The inaccessibility of large areas for humanitarian agencies, coupled with severe crop losses as a result of the rains, may return several thousand people to an emergency situation. In addition, continued lack of funding for humanitarian partners has hampered emergency humanitarian efforts for the millions of Angolans who have returned to their areas of origin.
- The announcement of the GoA that elections will not be feasible before the end of 2006, before the new Constitution is approved, state administration restored so as to allow for voter registration, infrastructure rehabilitated and de-mining efforts stepped up, provoked intense criticism by opposition parties and civil society, likely to increase in the coming months.
- While the extension of central administration structures is critical for the gradual normalization of the country, this must be done in a transparent manner, and abide by the provisions of Angola's Constitution. State structures are not party structures and should therefore not be presented as such. The use of MPLA flags in local administration buildings, for example, must be strongly discouraged. At a time when all political parties in Angola, but particularly the MPLA and UNITA are focused on enlarging their support base and membership in the Provinces, respect for political diversity must be observed, representing the best guarantee that the next elections will largely be free and fair, as well as peaceful.

## Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict and Cooperation



Average number of reported events per month: 116  
Indicator descriptions see Appendix

**Risk Assessment:**

- The Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict curve, which has been largely volatile throughout 2003, indicates an increase in January and February 2004. More important is the widening gap between the Average Domestic Conflict and Cooperation curves. In fact, the latter has sharply decreased in January and February, reaching the lowest level since the end of the war.
- Although UNITA has not withdrawn from the GURN, its level of cooperation with the GoA has gradually deteriorated. Lack of funds, the postponement of elections, the harassment of UNITA sympathizers and supporters in the provinces by MPLA members or sympathizers (allegedly by the JMPLA, the youth wing of the party and Civil Defense Units), the lack of adequate support to the thousands of former combatants, have led UNITA to strongly voice its discontent, stepping up its opposition to the GoA, internally and externally. The 'condominium' that characterized relations between the two parties since the end of the war has reached its lowest point, and the 'politics of consensus' in Angola is gradually reaching its end.
- The gap between the ruling party MPLA and opposition parties has widened substantially, and is likely to continue to widen in the months to come. The postponement of elections is seen by opposition parties and civil society as a plot of the GoA/MPLA to secure victory. Faced with the overwhelming capabilities of the MPLA, particularly as regards access and resources, opposition parties feel they are not given the same opportunities.
- The on-going conflict in the Cabinda enclave has also contributed to the high levels of Domestic Conflict occurrence. Reports of continued human rights abuses by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and of enduring combat in the province (denied by the GoA), have led to strong civil society criticism of the GoA. Although the FAA's Chief of Staff has declared that the situation is under control, Cabindan human-rights activists fear that the situation will deteriorate even further. On a positive note, however, a joint inter-agency and government mission to assess the humanitarian situation in Cabinda was organized during February.
- The proliferation and easy access to small arms in Angola (estimates by the National Police point to more than 3 million small arms and light weapons in civilian hands) may be considered largely to blame for the increase in crime throughout the country.
- In the non-governmental sector, the announcement by the GoA that NGOs working in Angola will have to submit detailed reports of their activities and strictly adhere to national labor laws and other regulations has provoked some level of concern among civil society organizations, which fear that the arbitrary nature of law enforcement in the country may now be directed against them.
- On a positive note, the GoA approved the Poverty Strategy Reduction Paper at the end of January, although the document is still open for comments by the international community.

## Goldstein Average International Conflict and Cooperation



Average number of reported events per month: 116

Indicator descriptions see Appendix

**Risk Assessment:**

- The highly volatile behavior of the Average International Conflict and Cooperation curves continues, with a sharp increase in the International Conflict curve during the period under analysis in contrast to the decrease in International Cooperation.
- As pointed out in previous risk assessments, this reveals the continuing dichotomy of the GoA international conflictive and cooperative relations.
- The pressure exerted by the IMF and several international NGOs for good governance, particularly for transparency, accountability and budgetary control in the oil sector, continues to affect Angola's cooperative international relations. In fact, one of the obstacles to more donor support for reconstruction is the lack of an agreement between the GoA and the IMF. Most recently, Human Rights Watch, in a report mostly based on unpublished IMF data, accused the GoA of consistently having mismanaged revenues to the tune of \$4 billion from 1997 to 2002, provoking a sharp reaction by the GoA and international condemnation.
- The outlook for Angola's international relations is nevertheless a positive one. Relations with the Bretton Woods institutions seem to be now on the right track. According to the IMF, the GoA announced its participation in a general statistical data dissemination system. In addition, at the end of February, a delegation led by Aguinaldo Jaime (minister-councillor to the Prime Minister) to the IMF and the World Bank, announced that it was discussing the terms of reference for a formal accord between the country and the IMF. Furthermore, a number of donors have recently awarded Angola with important donations: the European Commission with Euro 91 million to boost the social services sector and the World Bank has also announced that it will release US\$33 million for the reintegration of former combatants.
- On the regional level, Angola's international relations continue to be mainly characterized as cooperative. The GoA donated US\$500,000 to the transition government of Guine-Bissau; the speakers of Parliament of Angola and S. Tome e Principe signed on 27 February a cooperation protocol aimed at establishing a mixed parliamentary commission for the next four years; Angola and the Ivory Coast are discussing bilateral cooperation in education.
- Angola is also increasingly participating in continental level organizations (such as the African Union) and initiatives (NEPAD), and is steadily strengthening its links with the SADC sub-region. Recent pronouncements by the Minister of Defense as well as the Chief of Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) of Angola's willingness to participate actively in peacekeeping missions in Africa are evidence of this. In fact, Angola has made public that its first peacekeeping mission will be in the Ivory Coast. In the absence of any meaningful steps (and even intentions) concerning the restructuring (read downsizing) of Angola's massive 120,000-150,000 strong army, the government's intention to use it in the promotion of peace and stability is a positive development.

## Appendix : Description of indicators used | Page 6

Variable Name	Description / Definition
Conflict Carrying Capacity	The Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. The CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability.
Country Stability	The country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country.
Conflictual	Proportion of all actions belonging to all conflictive categories reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize, and force to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEIS cue categories).

Goldstein	
Goldstein	Goldstein indicators are used to display <b>Proportions</b> of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a Goldstein rating (value), ranging from -10 (extreme conflict) to 10 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations.
Goldstein Average	The Goldstein Average indicator is a cumulative average of all events that are classified with a positive or <b>negative</b> value by Goldstein's conflict/cooperation scale. The indicator displays the mean of the conflict/cooperation event values, excluding all zero value events.
Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict	The Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the <b>negative</b> Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).
Goldstein Average Domestic Cooperation	The Goldstein Average Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events).
Goldstein Average International Conflict	The Goldstein Average International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the <b>negative</b> Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).
Goldstein Average International Cooperation	The Goldstein Average International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative international events).

**Who are we?**

FAST (German acronym for “Early Analysis of Tensions and Fact-finding”) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, Switzerland. In 1998 the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations.

**What do we want?**

FAST aims to enhance political decision makers’ ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding.

**How do we work?**

FAST uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. The centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural Survival (PONSACS) at Harvard University. The logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. These values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. The quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, FAST sets up its own local information networks (LINS) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). A unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. For qualitative data analysis, FAST contracts internationally renowned country experts.

**What are our products?**

FAST products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers’ needs. The standard product (“FAST Update”) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. As the time-series of collected data grow, FAST analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. FAST Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer.

**Which countries do we monitor?**

**Africa:** Angola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia

**Asia:** Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

**Europe:** Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro

**Middle East:** Palestine