

FAST Update

Burundi

Semi-annual Risk Assessment
November 2004 to April 2005

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Contents


Country Stability and Relative Conflictual Actions	3
Relative Government and Non-Government Direct Actions	5
IDEA Average International and Domestic Cooperation	7
Appendix: Description of indicators used	9
The FAST International Early Warning Program	10

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Country Stability and Relative Conflictual Actions



Average number of reported events per month: 121
Indicator description: see appendix


Risk Assessment:

- As shown by the divergent trends of the Country Stability index and Relative Conflictual Actions, the prospects for stability improved at the end of the year, only to decline slightly in March following a period of considerable confusion over the election time-table. After a six-month extension of the transition period to allow for the holding of general elections in March and April 2005, the election calendar has once again been modified. At the request of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), and following a one-day Regional Summit on Burundi, held in Entebbe under the chairmanship of President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, on April 22, the participants agreed to extend the transition period to August 26, 2005. As the calendar now stands communal elections will be held in May, legislative elections in June and July, and presidential elections in August. Local elections at the hill level will be held in September.
- The new time-table was immediately challenged by Terence Nsanze, the Tutsi leader of a minor but highly vocal party, *Alliance Burundo-Africaine pour le Salut* (ABAS), who declared the change in the electoral calendar "unconstitutional". He also criticized the deadlines for the candidates to register for the communal elections, saying they were too short, as well as the CENI's decision to use party symbols on the ballots, which he said would "mislead the voters".
- Of greater concern for many aspiring politicians, both Hutu and Tutsi, are allegations that Domitien Ndayizeye is contemplating amending the constitution to enable him to run for the presidency in August, after the end of his mandate as transitional president. Meanwhile a bitter wrangle has developed between Ndayizeye and Pierre Nkurunziza, Minister for Good Governance and former leader of the rebel movement *Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (CNDD-FDD) over his refusal to appoint Nkurunziza's candidate to the post of the Minister of Interior, following the death in March of the previous CNDD-FDD incumbent, Simon Nyandwi. On April 26, a spokesman for Nkurunziza said the CNDD-FDD ministers would suspend their participation in cabinet meetings until the dispute was settled to their satisfaction.
- Nkurunziza's "dissidence" is not the only portent of instability. An even greater risk stems from the shortcomings of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion program (DDR). Formally under the supervision of the *National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration* (NCDRR), the program, funded to the tune of \$ 33 million from the World Bank, and \$ 45 million from the regional members of the *Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program* (MDRP), is intended to run over a four-year period. Out of a total of some 26,000 ex-rebels, distributed among 11 pre-cantonment sites, 7,282 were reportedly demobilized since December of last year.
- To the slow pace of the process, must be added the appalling conditions prevailing in some of the camps. Three ex-combatants were reported to have died of hunger in February. The most frequent

complaints have to do with inadequate food supply, overcrowding, and health conditions. Under such circumstances it is hardly surprising if many of the candidates for demobilization prefer to retool themselves into armed bandits.

- Just how many have chosen to make a career in armed banditry is impossible to tell. But if the recent upsurge in armed robberies, ambushes, and theft of private property are any index, this is in large part due to the failure of the NCDRR to effectively come to grips with the implementation of the DRR program.
- Perhaps the greatest risk posed by the forthcoming elections lies in the relative ease with which defeated candidates could mobilize support among former rebels. If contested by former rebel leaders, like Nkurunziza, the outcome of the elections could serve as a pretext for another round of violence. Another unknown concerns the as yet undetermined status of Agaton Rwasa's *Forces Nationales pour la Libération* (FNL), the only rebel movement still committed to an armed struggle. Exploratory talks are currently being held in Tanzania between Rwasa and Tanzania President Benjamin Mkapa, aimed at the integration of the FNL in the peace process. Whether the FNL can metamorphose into a political party in time to participate in the elections remains unclear.

Relative Government and Non-Government Direct Actions



Average number of reported events per month: 121
Indicator description: see appendix


Risk Assessment:

- As registered in the graph above there has been a steady rise in Non-Government Direct Actions over the last few months, matched by a corresponding trend in Government Direct Actions. Behind this growing unrest lie a variety of factors and circumstances, some having to do with disagreements about the new electoral calendar, others with FNL's long-standing commitment to violence, others still with the growing social tensions engendered by the failure of the DDR process to meet the expectations of the ex-combatants.
- Illustrative of the range of demands, protests, and violent incidents characteristic of the pre-electoral climate are the following recent events:
 - On April 28, as he was about to hold a press conference to explain the new electoral calendar, CENI president Paul Ngaramba was physically assaulted by representatives of opposition parties and had to cancel the event.
 - On April 24, according to communal administrator Louis Niyonzima, "the FNL launched a large-scale attack on Gatumba", 16 kilometers east of Bujumbura, killing two civilians, two soldiers, two policemen, and seriously wounding five people. This was the first attack against Gatumba since the slaughter of some 150 Banyamulenge refugees by the FNL on August 13, 2004.
 - On January 23 some unidentified gunmen shot dead the governor of Kayanza, Isaie Bigirimana; at about the same time and in the same province 15 shops were looted by gunmen in military uniforms.
 - On November 19, 2004, ex-combatants from five former rebel groups expressed their discontent over the conditions in the pre-cantonment sites: inadequate food, overcrowding, lack of mosquito nets, etc.
 - On November 3 President Ndayizeye said armed robberies were responsible for the death of 300 people in the past three months.
 - On November 8 a Batwa NGO, *Unissons-nous pour la protection des Batwa*, demanded equal access to land, education and health; again, on March 29 sixty Twa staged a sit-in in front of the residence of the provincial governor of Cibitoke to protest against efforts to expel them from their ancestral lands.
- It is not a matter of coincidence that the resurgence of indiscriminate attacks by the FNL occurs at a time when its leader is showing interest in a negotiated solution: the FNL strategy is to demonstrate its nuisance capacity in hopes that it will reinforce its negotiating position vis-à-vis the Ndayizeye government. With the elections around the corner it is easy to see why Rwaswa should have second

thoughts about being the only armed faction left out of the peace process; on the other hand, many in the government are likely to object to a negotiated solution with the man who bears a major responsibility in the deaths of thousands of civilians.

- Contributing to rising civil unrest are the countless abuses committed by ex-rebel soldiers, and the inability of the UN mission in Burundi (ONUB) to fully exercise its mandate to protect civilians throughout the country. The slow pace at which demobilization is proceeding, the inadequacy of living conditions in the camps, the failure of the NCDRR to meet its obligations vis-à-vis those ex-combatants who will not be part of the new integrated army, the National Defence Force (NDF), help explain the growing involvement of former rebels in criminal activities. An estimated 3,000 child soldiers are included in the demobilization program: how exactly their reintegration in society is being planned remains unclear.
- In contrast to what could be seen during the 1993 pre-electoral period there is no evidence of a rigid and all-embracing Hutu-Tutsi split separating one camp from the other. The divisions among the 35 parties registered to participate in the elections evidently transcend the Hutu-Tutsi divide, and thus make it most unlikely that the contest will be fought along ethnic lines. Furthermore, the obligation for parties to include a mixed slate of candidates in their electoral lists makes such an occurrence all the more remote. Nonetheless, there are ethnic "radicals" at both ends of the political spectrum who could conceivably encourage the rise of ethnic militancy during the campaign. On the Tutsi side, for example, we find the so-called *Accord cadre pour l'Etat de droit*, and on the Hutu side there are fringe elements in the CNDD-FDD who could also qualify as radical Hutu. Given the power-sharing formula in the constitution, the legal requirements concerning the registration of parties, and the sheer multiplicity of contestants, a re-enactment of the 1993 scenario seems very unlikely. Ethnic violence, however, is not the only form of unrest experienced by the people of Burundi; as the date of the elections enters their field of vision, so does the possibility that factional violence might become an instrument of political mobilization. Only the future will tell.

IDEA Average Domestic and International Cooperation



Average number of reported events per month: 121
Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- Both at the international and domestic levels Burundi exhibits a remarkable degree of cooperation. On several issues, ranging from the re-examination of the electoral calendar to the DDR process and the poverty reduction program set in motion by the IMF, occasional disagreements did not preclude a willingness to engage in dialogue and accommodation. Consider the following:
 - On several occasions the poor performance of the CENI in pushing through the adoption of the electoral code by parliament prompted the UN and EU Special Envoys to voice their dismay, but once the need to find a way out of the impasse became clear there was total agreement among participants to the emergency regional summit on Burundi (Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia), on April 22, to postpone the elections.
 - Although the DDR process is not moving as fast as might have been expected, the UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) is cooperating fully with the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) to accelerate the rate of disarmament and the installation of cantonment sites. There appears to be considerable give and take as well among the various components of the JCC, i.e. the National Defence Force (NDF) and the various armed factions in charge of overseeing the implementation of the Joint Operations Plan (JOP) and Technical Forces Agreement (TFA) adopted by the JCC on June 17, 2004. According to this plan, after the designation of pre-assembly areas, ex-combatants are to be moved to cantonment sites, then to disarmament corridors, and finally to integration and demobilization areas.
 - The government has complied with the request of the IMF in putting together an interim poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) intended to reduce poverty by stabilizing the economy, promoting recovery, revitalizing the delivery of public services and raising the rate of real GDP growth to at least 5 per cent.
 - Bilateral relations with Rwanda are improving, as shown by the decision of senior Burundi and Rwanda officials to refuse refugee status to an estimated 7,200 Rwandans who found asylum in northern Burundi, presumably because they feared death threats by testifying before *gacaca* courts. However, a request by Rwanda that all Rwandans be extradited was rejected by Burundi, saying only those whose names figured on Rwanda's list of génocidaires would be forced to return.
 - In March the Ministers of water and natural resources from Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania met in Kigali to work out the details of a cooperation agreement to build a \$ 100 million hydroelectric power station at Rusomo on the Akagera River.
 - Since the beginning of the year thousands of refugees from Tanzania have been repatriated to their homeland, with the full cooperation of the local administrators, and UNHCR officials.

- This climate of good will is in stark contrast with the sense of crisis provoked by the Gatumba killings in August of last year. It reflects the renewed pressure of the international community to encourage efforts towards peace. The month of November saw the visit of the UN Security Council's Central African Mission, headed by France's UN Ambassador Marc de la Sablière, and the International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes, in Dar es Salaam, attended by eleven Heads of state, including Burundi President Ndayizeye, all of them signatories of the final Declaration of commitment to end the conflict in the Great Lakes. Perhaps even more significant was the appointment of Carolyn McAskie as Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Burundi, and Chairperson of the Implementation and Monitoring Committee (IMC) of the Arusha Accords. McAskie breathed a new life into the IMC, and brought to her mission more zeal and determination than any of her predecessors.
- Overall, the sustained efforts of the international community on behalf of the peace process have contributed in no small way to keep the transition on track. Despite all the setbacks encountered in fixing a deadline for the elections, and the continuing problems with the FLN rebellion, the odds are that Burundi may finally turn the page on its violent past. Yet the biggest challenge – the holding of multi-party elections in a context of extreme poverty, considerable political fragmentation and residual factional tensions – is yet to come.

Appendix : Description of indicators used | Page 9

Variable Name	Description / Definition
All Events	IDEA categories: a count of all coded events with WEIS cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEIS cue categories) plus an additional 11 IDEA event cue categories (Event type: 'other').
Civil Sector	
Relative Civil Direct Actions	Proportion of Civil Direct Actions compared to All Events. Civil Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors.
Government Sector	
Relative Government Direct Actions	Proportion of Government Direct Actions compared to All Events. Government Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors.
Conflict Carrying Capacity	The Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. The CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. The index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability.
Country Stability	The country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country.
Conflictual	Proportion of all actions belonging to all conflictive categories reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize, and force to All Events.
IDEA Scale	
IDEA	IDEA indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a IDEA rating (value), ranging from -7 (extreme conflict) to 13 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations.
Average Domestic Cooperation	The Average Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (IDEA) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive IDEA values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events).
Average International Cooperation	The Average International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (IDEA) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive IDEA values divided by the total number of cooperative international events).

Who are we?

FAST International is the early warning program of swisspeace, based in Berne, Switzerland. The program is funded and utilized by an international consortium of development agencies consisting of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

What do we want?

FAST International aims at enhancing political decision makers' ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner so that coherent political strategies can be formulated to either prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or identify windows of opportunity for peacebuilding.

How do we work?

FAST International uses both qualitative and quantitative methods, with the mix of methods being determined in each case by customer needs. The centerpiece of FAST International is the collection of single cooperative and conflictive events by means of a web-based software, applied by local staff using a coding scheme called IDEA (Integrated Data for Event Analysis), which is based on the WEIS (World Interaction Survey) coding scheme. The monitoring by FAST International is done independently from Western media coverage, thus providing for a constant influx of information. This information is collected by FAST International's own Local Information Networks (LINs). The quantitative empirical analysis is based on composed indicators developed within the IDEA framework. Since even the most profound quantitative analysis requires interpretation, FAST International cooperates with renowned country/area experts.

What are our products?

FAST International offers different early warning products tailored to customer needs. The only standard product available to the general public is the FAST Update, which provides the reader with an overview of developments on a semi-annual basis. It consists of three to five tension barometers (graphs), displaying cooperative and conflictive developments, which are analyzed by FAST's country/area experts on the basis of specific indicators. Whenever major changes occur in one of the countries or regions under scrutiny, FAST releases Special Updates, which follow the structure of the regular FAST Updates. FAST Updates are available in either hard copy, in electronic form on the respective country page or by subscription.

Which countries do we monitor?

Africa: Angola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia
Asia: Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
Europe: Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russian Federation/North Caucasus region