

FAST Update

Burundi

Quarterly Risk Assessment
April to June 2003

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Contents

<u>Country Stability and Relative Forceful Actions</u>	<u>3</u>
<u>Relative Civil and Government Direct Actions</u>	<u>4</u>
<u>Relative Civil and Government Forceful Actions</u>	<u>5</u>
<u>Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict and Cooperation</u>	<u>6</u>
<u>Goldstein Average International Conflict and Cooperation</u>	<u>7</u>
<u>Appendix: Description of indicators used</u>	<u>8</u>
<u>The FAST Early Warning System</u>	<u>9</u>

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
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Country Stability and Relative Forceful Actions




Average number of reported events per month: 112
Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- The peaceful transfer of presidential power from the Tutsi Pierre Buyoya to the Hutu Domitien Ndayizeye on May 1st has improved the prospects for stability, along with the arrival in Bujumbura of the first units of an African peace-keeping force. Nevertheless, rebel-instigated violence and military repression, both causing untold casualties among civilians, show no sign of tapering off. As the graphs above demonstrates, the modest rise in the stability index following the May 1st change in presidential power has been accompanied by only a slight decline in the level of Relative Forceful Actions.
- The dynamics of violence no longer reflect a straight Hutu-Tutsi split. There are profound divisions among both Hutu and Tutsi. Breakaway factions of Hutu rebel movements are frequently fighting each other, while the predominantly Tutsi army is consistently targeting Hutu elements. Regional and local ties cut across divisions between moderates and radicals, and among parties.
- Although some Hutu rebel factions have joined the government, others, such as Pierre Nkurunziza's Conseil national pour la Defense de la Democratie/Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie (CNDD-FDD), and Agaton Rwasa's Forces Nationales de Liberation (FNL), are adamantly committed to the use of force. Since they are well provided with sophisticated weaponry and could deploy thousands of troops near the capital, they constitute the gravest threat to Burundi's future stability.
- The second of the two 18-month transition periods enshrined in the Arusha accords has gotten off to a good start, but much remains to be done before peace can be fully restored. The most urgent need is to bring the FNL and CNDD-FDD rebels to the negotiating table.
- So far, however, all negotiation efforts have been in vain. The presence of a Hutu in the presidential chair is no guarantee that the many issues left pending in the Arusha accords (including the restructuring of the army) will be dealt with promptly and effectively. Whether the multi-national African peace-keeping force can ensure peace and stability long enough for President Ndayizeye to tackle the Arusha agenda is critical.

René Lemarchand

Relative Civil and Government Direct Actions



Average number of reported events per month: 112


Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- The high level of rebel activity recorded after March have continued unabatedly through June, while military counter-insurgency engagements have picked up significantly in April, declining only slightly in the following weeks.
- Thousands of people have fled Ruyigi and Kanyasha, most directly affected by rebel attacks. Fighting between the army and CNDD-FDD rebels erupted in Kayanza, Rutana and Makamba provinces, causing many casualties. Ambushes of government public transport vehicles were reported in Mwishangana and Rumonge. Food riots erupted in Rutana and Bujumbura.
- Adding to these tensions, tens of thousands of refugees from eastern Congo entered Burundi in April and May. In many parts of the country security conditions make it impossible for aid workers to reach localities most in need of assistance.
- While the transfer of power to a Hutu president is seen as a major step forward, there is a total disconnection between the formal agreements reached by politicians and the sentiment of the rural masses. Despair and poverty are the daily lot of the peasant populations, who bear the brunt of rebel attacks and military repression.
- The situation is exploited by rebel faction leaders to step up their recruitment efforts, in turn leading to further insecurity and bloodshed. The large number of internally displaced people as well as the thousands of returnees from neighboring refugee camps in Tanzania provide ideal recruiting grounds for rebel bands. Failure by the new government to attend to the needs of the rural population inevitably plays into the hands of the FNL and CNDD-CDD rebel factions.
- Short of a negotiated agreement with the CNDD-FDD and FNL leaders, rebel attacks will continue and draw the army into brutally repressive operations.
- Insistence of the CNDD-FDD leader, Pierre Nkurunziza, that a new "charter of transition" for peace be negotiated in order to allow for "suitable elections" is unlikely to meet the approval of the government. The presence of a Tutsi hardliner as Vice-President, Alphonse Kadege, does not bode well for a negotiated solution to the crisis.

René Lemarchand

Relative Civil and Government Forceful Actions




Average number of reported events per month: 112
Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- A noticeable rise in Government and Civil Forceful Actions can be noted after March. This came in the wake of violent rebel attacks in late April in Bujumbura Rural, Kayanza and Bubanza provinces. Thousands of panic-stricken civilians fled the combat zones, adding huge numbers to the already saturated IDP camps.
- Regardless of the graph may suggest, Government and Civil Forceful Actions continued throughout May. On the 5th of this month the army launched a major offensive against CNDD-FDD rebels in the central and northern provinces, and on May 22 intense fighting erupted between the army and FNL rebels in Kabezi commune, some 20km south of Bujumbura.
- Intra-rebel fighting has also been reported in Kayanza, pitting one CNDD-FDD faction against the other. While sabotage operations have been directed against the Rwegura hydro-electric plant, rebel bands continue to hold the rural populations at ransom, looting cattle, cash and vehicles.
- The timing of rebel attacks seems designed to coincide with the transfer of power agreed upon in Arusha in order to intensify divisions within the government and ultimately block the advent of power of the new president.
- Intra-rebel rifts have contributed to the riots, with the dominant wings eager to demonstrate their military superiority. Nonetheless, there is unanimity among rebel leaders that the transfer of power to Ndayizeye is a meaningless change of power, since it continues to rest with the all-Tutsi army.
- The army, meanwhile, is determined to meet force with counterforce. A vicious circle is thus set in motion whereby violence becomes endemic, causing untold impacts on civilians. The trend is in the direction of an increased polarization of society, playing into the hands of extremists within and outside the government.
- The government is largely impotent in the face of this exacerbation of civil violence. Whether or not the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) can bring about greater stability to the country remains unclear. Neither its mandate nor its manpower capabilities seems sufficient to ensure a significant drop in the levels of violence.
- Although it is still too early to pass judgment on the performance of the new government, there are reasons to doubt that it will succeed where its predecessor failed, that is, in negotiating a cease-fire with rebel factions.

René Lemarchand

Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict and Cooperation



Average number of reported events per month: 112


Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- As shown in the above graph, there is a wide gap between average levels of Domestic Conflict and Cooperation. The aggregated average of rebel attacks and government counter-attacks remained fairly constant, while there has been a slight increase in cooperative efforts in June.
- The meeting between government officials and CNDD-FDD rebels in Dar-es-Salaam in early March failed to yield the expected results. In early June there was another meeting at the same place which again ended without any agreement.
- Meanwhile, the FNL stubbornly refused to engage in peace talks. However, since his appointment Ndayizeye has taken the lead to rekindle negotiations, making it clear to all rebel factions that the door is open for them to participate in the government.
- The CNDD-FDD leader, Nkurunziza, bears much of the blame for the collapse of the Dar-es-Salaam negotiations. His insistence of the need to renegotiate the Arusha accords is a non-starter.
- As for the FNL, after having been excluded from Arusha talks, it strongly opposes negotiations with a Hutu president. According to his spokesman Pasteur Habonimana, the movement will only negotiate with vice-president Kadege "if he comes as a Tutsi and not as the vice-president".
- The tough stance of both movements is further encouraged by the persistent split between radicals and moderates. The return to Bujumbura in February of the two "dissident" moderates, Jean-Bosco Ndayikengkuriye (CNDD-FDD) and Alain Mugabarbona (FNL), has left the remaining rebel leadership in the hands of extremist elements for whom concessions to the government are tantamount to treason.
- Only through a drastic shrinking of their bases of support and sources of cash and equipment will the rebel leadership agree to a deal with the government. However, this is unlikely to happen any time soon given the sympathy for their cause generated by government repression, their easy access to refugee camps, and the military assistance they are believed to receive from Interahamwe elements from Rwanda. Their capacity to unleash violence at any time and place of their own choosing shows no sign of abating.

René Lemarchand

Goldstein Average International Conflict and Cooperation



Average number of reported events per month: 112
Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- International cooperation towards peace has gone through many ups and downs over the last few months, reflecting in part the piecemeal nature of these initiatives, in part the impotence of international actors in the face of the complexity of regional issues, and their inability to impose effective pressure to bear on domestic actors.
- The most encouraging sign so far has been the arrival of a multinational African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in Bujumbura, which will ultimately comprise 2,870 troops from three countries (South Africa, Mozambique, and Ethiopia).
- June brought another positive sign: the decision of Presidents Ndayizeye and Kagame to support peace efforts in Burundi and the DRC. The recent visit of UN Security Council members to the region, was another effort to kick start regional peace initiatives. Ominously, just as the UN mission completed its visit on June 19, an announcement that the Rwanda-backed RCD had successfully fought its way into Lubero in north Kivu came in.
- In high contrast with international peace initiatives, regional turbulence has not ceased. "Soldiers without borders" – from Rwanda and Burundi – are deeply involved in eastern Congo, with Burundi and Rwandan troops providing significant auxiliary support to the RCD military wing. Similarly, there is evidence of much the same kind of cooperative ties among rebels from Rwanda and Burundi, with Interahamwe elements fighting side by side with FNL troops.
- A major unknown in the international equation is the role of Tanzania. While acting as a facilitator during the Dar-es-Salaam negotiations, its inability – or unwillingness – to prevent rebel elements from infiltrating refugee camps is a major source of concern. Adding to this is the failure of the international community to clearly recognize the importance of the regional dimensions of the conflict in Burundi and how it impacts on neighboring states.
- Pro forma exhortations from the UN Security Council, the UN Commission on Human Rights, the African Union, and the European Union are not enough to bring about effective international cooperation on peace issues. The cooperation and good will of regional actors, most notably Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania, is of critical importance in bolstering peace efforts. Judging by past experience, there is little likelihood that such cooperation will be forthcoming in the near future.

René Lemarchand

Appendix: Description of indicators used | Page 8

Variable Name	Description / Definition
All Events	IDEA categories: a count of all coded events with WEIS cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEIS cue categories) plus an additional 11 IDEA event cue categories (Event type: 'other').
Direct Actions	Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target.
Relative Direct Actions	Proportion of Direct Actions compared to All Actions (WEIS-Categories). Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target.
Relative Forceful Actions	Proportion of Forceful Action events compared to All Direct Actions. The indicator Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.

Civil Sector	
All Civil Actions	A Count of all coded events belonging to the WEIS cue categories (1 to 22), that involve only non-governmental, or civil sector actors.
Relative Civil Direct Actions	Proportion of Civil Direct Actions compared to All Civil Actions. Civil Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors.
Relative Civil Forceful Actions	Proportion of Civil Forceful Action events compared to All Civil Direct Actions. The Indicator Civil Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by non-governmental, or civil sector actors. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.

Government Sector	
All Government Actions	A Count of all coded events belonging to the WEIS cue categories (1 to 22), that involve only the political sector, or government actors.
Relative Government Direct Actions	Proportion of Government Direct Actions compared to All Government Actions. Government Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors.
Relative Government Forceful Actions	Proportion of Government Forceful Action events compared to All Government Direct Actions. The Indicator Government Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by political, or government sector actors. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.
Conflict Carrying Capacity	The Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. The CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability.
Country Stability	The country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country.

Appendix: Description of indicators used | Page 9

Variable Name	Description / Definition
Goldstein	
Goldstein	Goldstein indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a Goldstein rating (value), ranging from -10 (extreme conflict) to 10 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations.
Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict	The Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).
Goldstein Average Domestic Cooperation	The Goldstein Average Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events).
Goldstein Average International Conflict	The Goldstein Average International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).
Goldstein Average International Cooperation	The Goldstein Average International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative international events).

Who are we?

FAST (German acronym for “Early Analysis of Tensions and Fact-finding”) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, Switzerland. In 1998 the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations.

What do we want?

FAST aims to enhance political decision makers’ ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding.

How do we work?

FAST uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. The centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural Survival (PONSACS) at Harvard University. The logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. These values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. The quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, FAST sets up its own local information networks (LINs) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). A unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. For qualitative data analysis, FAST contracts internationally renowned country experts.

What are our products?

FAST products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers' needs. The standard product (“FAST Update”) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. As the time-series of collected data grow, FAST analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. FAST Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer.

Which countries do we monitor?

Africa: Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kivu region, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia

Asia: Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro

Middle East: Palestine