

# FAST Update

## DRC/Kivu region

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### Quarterly Risk Assessment

April to June 2003

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
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## Country Stability and Relative Forceful Actions



Average number of reported events per month: 115


Indicator description: see appendix

## Risk Assessment:

- As shown in the graph above, the sharp decline in the stability index after April corresponds to a steady rise in forceful actions from both opposition forces and the Rwanda-backed Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie/Goma (RCD-Goma). Among these, the Mai-Mai militias (some of which are allied to the RCD/Goma) are the principal vector of human rights violations in North- and South-Kivu, with the so-called Mudundu 40, a pro-Rwandan dissident militia, identified as the worst aggressor.
- The on-and-off engagements between the Mai-Mai rebel factions and the RCD-Goma rebels, regularly backed by Rwandan units, have caused untold casualties among civilians in South-Kivu. Rising tensions in North-Kivu between the predominantly Nande Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Kisangani-Mouvement de liberation (RCD/K/ML) of Mbusa Nyamwesi and the RCD-Goma have been similarly severe.
- Much of the turmoil in North-Kivu is linked to the bitter Hema-Lendu struggle going on in Ituri. Rwandan support for the predominantly Hema Union des Patriots Congolais (UPC) of Thomas Lubanga, provided by the RCD/Goma, implies free access for the UPC to Bunia via Beni and Butembo. A major military effort is now under way to capture these two towns currently under control of the RCD/K/ML, supported by Kinshasa.
- Meanwhile, the RCD-Goma seeks to consolidate its hold over Uvira in South-Kivu and other localities through tactical alliances with dissident Mai-Mai factions, such as Mudundu 40.
- In both North- and South-Kivu the activities of pro Rwandan allies is encountering considerable resistance from other Mai-Mai factions and the population at large.
- Further adding to the existing tension is the RCD's refusal to join the transition government in Kinshasa unless it receives control of the armed forces.
- Unless a solution is found for the Ituri crisis and a compromise reached to bring the RCD into the transition government in Kinshasa, there is little likelihood that the Kivu region will experience a decrease in tension. Ultimately, much will depend on Rwanda's willingness to give up its protectorate over the region. In the absence of strong diplomatic pressure from the international community such changes are not expected in the near future.

René Lemarchand

## Relative Civil and Government Direct Actions



Average number of reported events per month: 115


Indicator description: see appendix

## Risk Assessment:

- North-Kivu has been the scene of rising Civil Direct Actions in April and May, with the organization of protest marches in Beni and Butembo against the occupation by Rwandan troops of several localities north of Goma (Bunyatenge and Muganga). Part of these manifestations were also directed against the Mission des Nations Unies au Congo (Monuc), which is increasingly blamed for its lack of responsibility.
- From April onwards there has been a sharp increase in government Direct Actions due to the sustained efforts of the RCD and Rwandan army to infiltrate and seize control of key localities in the north, culminating with the capture of Lubero by the RCD-Goma in June. In South-Kivu Rwandan troops and their RCD ally attacked several localities in and around Ngweshe, killing scores of civilians.
- Although the renewed offensive of the RCD-Goma in North- and South-Kivu is said to be directed against the so-called "negative forces" i.e. Interahamwe and ex-Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR), a more realistic assessment points to different motives: the consolidation of military posture on the ground in order to negotiate entry into the transition government from a position of strength. This is in line with the position of the Kagame government, whose long term objective is to exercise political control over both North- and South-Kivu, and Ituri as well.
- Rwanda is increasingly committed to find local allies and to that end to diversify its sources of support. There is no evidence that this can prevent its local clients from committing grave human rights violations, or for that matter to prevent them from turning against each other.
- It is unlikely that Civil Direct Actions will diminish in scale or intensity in the months ahead. Given the sustained present effort of the RCD-Goma now under way to expand its spheres of influence through the region and beyond (Ituri), one can safely predict that civil society elements will seek every opportunity to oppose, harass and retaliate against those whom they see as collaborators with the Rwandan occupants.

René Lemarchand

## Relative Civil and Government Forceful Actions




Average number of reported events per month: 115  
Indicator description: see appendix

**Risk Assessment:**

- The level of Civil Forceful Actions, ranging from theft or destruction of private property, acts of vandalism to murder of civilians, remains high throughout the Kivu region. Responsibility for such acts lies partly with the "negative forces" (Interahamwe), as much as with uncontrolled Mai-Mai militias and with the armed wing of the RCD-Goma.
- Banditry reigns in many parts of the Kivus, and it is at times difficult to tell whether human rights violations are politically or economically motivated. Government Forceful Actions involve the same types of abuses in addition to the systematic slaughter of civilians, and here the responsibility lies squarely with the RCD and its local allies.
- Government Forceful Actions cover a broad spectrum of abuses but none are more bitterly resented than the massacre of civilian populations on the pretext that they are supportive of "negative forces". The worst offenders have been the Mudundu 40 militias, the armed wing of the RCD-Goma and the local defense forces affiliated to the pro-Rwanda Tous Pour le Developpement (TPD).
- Also guilty of many human rights violations are the Nande militias affiliated to the RCD/K/ML of Mbusa Nyamwesi.
- Nothing, however, comes anywhere near the scale of the massacres of Hema by Lendu and vice-versa in Ituri, which caused the deaths of an estimated 15,000 people since the beginning of the year, for which Uganda and Rwanda, each supporting different factions, bear a heavy responsibility.
- The capture of Lubero by the RCD-Goma in North-Kivu may well be the first phase of a large scale offensive aiming at destroying the military bases of the RCD/K/ML in Beni and Butembo. If so there is reason to believe that the stage is set for another bloodbath in North-Kivu, with Rwanda acting as external patron of the RCD-Goma. This in turn could cause Uganda to jump into the fray.
- Whether the Ituri-based Monuc can expand its mandate to prevent the worst from happening in North-Kivu remains doubtful.

René Lemarchand

### Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict and Cooperation



Average number of reported events per month: 115


Indicator description: see appendix

#### Risk Assessment:

- The difference between the average levels of Domestic Conflict and Domestic Cooperation is well captured in the graph above: whatever few steps were taken by civil society sectors to promote peace e.g., by the Groupe Lotus and the Pole Institute through their reports and recommendations, and by the Churches have had little influence on the course of events.
- If anything, the level of conflict has risen substantially since May, while domestic efforts at peace-making have declined. High hopes raised by the withdrawal of the Rwandan army following the Pretoria accords (July 2002) have all but vanished as renewed evidence of the return of Rwandan troops in the Kivu region emerges.
- In part the inefficiency of domestic peace initiatives demonstrates how little weight civil society carries vis-à-vis the key actors in the regional conflict (Rwanda and Uganda, along with their respective client-movements). This is not surprising, considering that civil society in itself is deeply politicized. However, the primary cause is the absence of the political will to seek a peaceful solution.
- The dynamics of the conflict are such that the pleas of civil society are of little consequence compared to the attractiveness of the huge profits derived from the looting of natural resources. The conflict in the Kivu is increasingly driven by fierce competition for access to gold, diamonds, coltan or timber, all of which translate into cold cash for the purchase of arms and the recruitment of child soldiers. The political dimension of warlordism is inextricably bound to the enormous economic benefits accruing from the looting of Kivu's natural resources.
- The gap between domestic peace efforts and the intensity of conflict is likely to widen in months ahead unless the former are effectively bolstered by international peace initiatives, accompanied by credible sanctions. Engaging external actors in supporting the quest for peace will remain the key to implement sustainable peace in the region.

René Lemarchand

## Goldstein Average International Conflict and Cooperation



Average number of reported events per month: 115

Indicator description: see appendix

**Risk Assessment:**

- The same discrepancy between levels of International Cooperation and Conflict as between domestic levels of conflict and cooperation emerges from the graph above.
- On June 19, three days after a UN Security Council mission completed its six-nation-African visit aimed at resolving the conflicts in the Great Lakes, the RCD-Goma fought its way into Lubero, killing scores of civilians. On June 6 a team of international observers known as the International Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT) criticized delays in the formation of a government of national unity in Kinshasa, but it remains to be seen whether the RCD's decision to rejoin the talks will translate into a coherent government.
- Only with the arrival of a UN authorized multinational peace-keeping force in Ituri, in early June, did the efforts of the international community take concrete form. But this will not resolve the Hema-Lendu conflict, or bring to an end the involvement of external actors in the conflict.
- The less than impressive performance of the international community is related in part to the fact that it does too little too late (as in Ituri), or simply refuses to do anything (as with regard to Rwandan involvement in the looting of resources in the Kivus), or implements the wrong policy (as when the five ambassadors accredited to Kinshasa representing the permanent members of the Security Council urged Ugandan troops to immediately withdraw from Ituri, thereby creating the political void that led to the killings between Hema and Lendu).
- There is simply no will on the part of the international community to invest financially, militarily, and politically in a concrete, sustained peace-keeping operation because of too many vested interests involved in the resource-based war going on in the Kivus (including Western interests).
- Only by strengthening the mandate of the Monuc, increasing its capabilities, and by allowing the multinational UN force, operating under Chapter 7 of the Charter, to expand its field operations from Ituri to North- and South-Kivu could the international community make a difference in the never-ending quest for peace in the Great Lakes. On each of these counts, however, the prospects for sustained and effective international cooperation seem very distant.

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## Appendix: Description of indicators used | Page 8

Variable Name	Description / Definition
All Actions	WEIS categories: a count of all coded events with cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEIS cue categories).
Direct Actions	Direct Actions are <b>conflictive events</b> that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target.
Relative Direct Actions	<b>Proportion</b> of Direct Actions compared to All Actions (WEIS-Categories). Direct Actions are <b>conflictive events</b> that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target.
Relative Forceful Actions	<b>Proportion</b> of Forceful Action events compared to All Direct Actions. The indicator Forceful Actions depicts all reported <b>uses of physical force</b> by any actor. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.

Civil Sector	
All Civil Events	A Count of all coded events belonging to the WEIS cue categories (1 to 22) plus an additional 11 IDEA event forms. This event count is limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors.
Relative Civil Direct Actions	<b>Proportion</b> of Civil Direct Actions compared to All Civil Actions. Civil Direct Actions are <b>conflictive events</b> that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct actions limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors.
Relative Civil Forceful Actions	<b>Proportion</b> of Civil Forceful Action events compared to All Civil Direct Actions. The Indicator Civil Forceful Actions depicts all reported <b>uses of physical force</b> by non-governmental, or civil sector actors. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.

Government Sector	
All Government Actions	A Count of all coded events belonging to the WEIS cue categories (1 to 22), that involve only the political sector, or government actors.
Relative Government Direct Actions	<b>Proportion</b> of Government Direct Actions compared to All Government Actions. Government Direct Actions are <b>conflictive events</b> that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors.
Relative Government Forceful Actions	<b>Proportion</b> of Government Forceful Action events compared to All Government Direct Actions. The Indicator Government Forceful Actions depicts all reported <b>uses of physical force</b> by political, or government sector actors. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.
Conflict Carrying Capacity	The Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. The CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability.
Country Stability	The country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country.

Goldstein	
Goldstein	Goldstein indicators are used to display <b>Proportions</b> of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a Goldstein rating (value), ranging from -10 (extreme conflict) to 10 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations.
Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict	The Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the <b>negative</b> Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).
Goldstein Average Domestic Cooperation	The Goldstein Average Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events).
Goldstein Average International Conflict	The Goldstein Average International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the <b>negative</b> Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).
Goldstein Average International Cooperation	The Goldstein Average International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative international events).

**Who are we?**

FAST (German acronym for "Early Analysis of Tensions and Fact-finding") is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, Switzerland. In 1998 the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations.

**What do we want?**

FAST aims to enhance political decision makers' ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding.

**How do we work?**

FAST uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. The centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural Survival (PONSACS) at Harvard University. The logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. These values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. The quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, FAST sets up its own local information networks (LINs) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). A unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. For qualitative data analysis, FAST contracts internationally renowned country experts.

**What are our products?**

FAST products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers' needs. The standard product ("FAST Update") consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. As the time-series of collected data grow, FAST analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. FAST Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer.

**Which countries do we monitor?**

**Africa:** Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kivu region, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia

**Asia:** Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

**Europe:** Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro

**Middle East:** Palestine