

FAST Update

DRC/Kivu region

Quarterly Risk Assessment
March to May 2004

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
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Country Stability and Relative Forceful Actions




Risk Assessment:

- During the last months the Kivu region has experienced renewed tensions between the Kinshasa-based coalition government and the provincial authorities. Already in mid-February - despite the impression of growing stability - Bukavu, the capital of South-Kivu, was the scene of serious clashes between "dissident" and "loyalist" officers, which flared up again on a far more dangerous scale on May 26.
- The presence of thousands of MONUC troops on the ground did little to stop the violence, thus raising serious questions about its efficacy as a peace-keeping force.
- The central issue facing the transition government is how to assert its authority in eastern Congo in the face of the challenge posed by Rwanda-backed rebel soldiers. What happened in Bukavu in May is a dramatic illustration of the continuing tug-of-war between the central government and the strong men in the provinces: by refusing to accept Kinshasa's choice of the commanding officer of the 10th military region, General Jules Mutebusi, a Munyamulenge with close ties to Kigali, took the fateful step that led to the bloody confrontation of late May and early June, resulting in some 60 people dead, countless wounded and widespread looting of property.
- In this latest crisis the future of the transition in the DRC is at stake. Unless a compromise of sorts is found to restore the authority of the Congolese state in the Kivu region, the likelihood of a third war is not to be excluded.
- Much will depend on the attitude of Rwanda, and the willingness of the international community to bring pressure to bear on both Rwanda and its provincial allies.

Remark: Due to the latest crisis in Bukavu our local information network had to suspend its work for FAST. Thus all events that happened since the end of May couldn't be considered in the above and following graphs. We would like to ask for your understanding.


Relative Government and Civil Forceful Actions



Risk Assessment:


- There has been a significant rise in Relative Civil Forceful Actions in North and South Kivu as Hutu militias stepped up their military activities since April (i.e. Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda [FDLR] and Interahamwe). Kigali has responded by sending more troops to South Kivu, causing a heightening of tension with the local population. Virtually every faction, including the FDLR, is involved in sexual violence. In the Fizi region alone (South Kivu) some 600 persons were raped, according to Médecins sans frontières.
- The most worrying events, however, have taken place in Bukavu, in late May, when dissident elements of the RCD-Goma army fought the loyalist units of General Mbusa Mabe, head of the 10th military region.
- The roots of violence in the region stem from a variety of factors: (a) the threats posed to Rwanda and Rwanda's friends in the Kivu by the FDLR, (b) from the social unrest caused by the entry of Rwandan troops in South Kivu, presumably to deal with such threats, and (c), last but not least, from the growing tension between Kinshasa and the RCD hard-liners – military and civilians – over the nominations of commanding officers to the 10th military region.
- Meanwhile, murder and rape are the scourge of the civilian populations. The worst offenders are Mai-Mai militias, Interahamwe and FDLR troops. During the Bukavu crisis, however, a number of soldiers on the RCD side of the rebellion were involved in looting, rape and theft.
- There are few reasons for optimism about the future. Given that neither Kinshasa nor Kigali have the capacity to deal with the militias - in some instances they are even aiding them militarily - things are likely to get worse for the civilian populations before they get any better.

Goldstein Average Domestic and International Conflict

**Risk Assessment:**

- As shown by the graphs above, there has been a steady rise in rates of Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict while International Conflict has tended to recede. The latter, however, should have picked up sharply in the wake of the Bukavu crisis at the end of May.
- In April fighting erupted in North Kivu between Interahamwe militias and Congolese soldiers of the 8th military region; the Interahamwe then crossed into Rwanda where they were intercepted by Rwandan forces. Rwanda responded to this violation of its national territory promptly. In subsequent weeks a significant number of Rwandan troops thus crossed into North and South Kivu. It is believed that the same soldiers were instrumental in supporting the Bukavu rebellion. Hence the rising chorus of accusations directed against Rwanda by the Congolese populations: Rwanda is widely seen by Congolese officials and non-officials alike as posing a mortal threat to the delicate coalition so painfully stitched together in Kinshasa.
- As always in the Great Lakes, there is a close interconnection between domestic and international conflict. Where domestic strife spills over across boundaries, and threatens the security of the neighboring state, there is every reason to expect retaliatory action. Which is what happened when elements of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) crossed into the Kivu after the infiltration of Interahamwe into Rwanda.
- Although there is no irrefutable evidence that RPA troops joined the dissident Banyamulenge officers in Bukavu, the mere fact that they were suspected of doing so was enough to ratchet up tension between Kigali and Kinshasa.
- The inability or unwillingness of the MONUC to thwart the armed insurrection casts doubts on its future role as a peace-keeping force. Unless it is assisted by a professional, well-trained force along the lines of Artemis in Bunia, there is little reason to expect a significant lessening of tension in the region in months ahead.

Goldstein Average Domestic and International Cooperation



Risk Assessment:

- Indices of Goldstein Average Domestic and International Cooperation are equally unimpressive, but neither can be dismissed as non-existent. The mere fact that a coalition government was able to materialize is no small feat. The underlying tensions between the representative of RCD interests in Kinshasa, Vice-President Azarias Ruberwa, and the RCD hard-liners in Bukavu and Goma, did not seem to threaten the future of the transition to democracy – at least not until the latest escalation in Bukavu.
- Kinshasa did what little it could to neutralize pockets of Interahamwe and FDLR militias (on April 27 RDC troops were reported to have killed 39 Hutu rebels), and when things threatened to get out of hand between Rwanda and the RDC the latter's foreign minister, Antoine Ghonda, did not hesitate to engage in a dialogue with his counterpart in Kigali, Charles Murigande. Thus on May 28, in the wake of growing evidence of RPA troops coming into South Kivu, an RDC delegation headed by Ghonda met with their Rwandan interlocutors in Kigali to "rapidly undertake the normalization of (their) relations". The failure of the talks to defuse tensions probably encouraged the RCD strongman, General Jules Mutebusi, to seize power in Bukavu on May 30. The movement of the RCD troops under the passive gaze of the MONUC must have been received in Kigali not without any satisfaction.
- At the level of the international community little has been done to engage in concerted action to strengthen the RDC transition. While there is no denying the efforts of Western ambassadors, through the Comité International d'Accompagnement de la Transition (CIAT), to help iron out differences among coalition members, their laissez-faire attitude towards Rwanda is puzzling, and to most Congolese a source of considerable irritation.
- With its appalling performance throughout the Bukavu crisis by doing nothing to prevent the mutinous troops of General Mutebusi from seizing power, MONUC has cast irreparable discredit upon itself. More importantly, it has unwittingly contributed to further weaken the Congolese state in the one region of the country where its authority is most vulnerable to Rwandan maneuverings.
- It is becoming increasingly clear to most observers that the RDC transition is heavily compromised by the Bukavu crisis, and more specifically by Rwanda's continued meddling in the internal affairs of North and South Kivu. As long as the international community is unwilling to take appropriate sanctions against the victim-state-turned-oppressor at home, and imperialist abroad, the prospects for a multi-party democracy in the RDC will remain extremely distant.

Appendix : Description of indicators used | Page 7

Variable Name	Description / Definition
Direct Actions	Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target.
Forceful Actions	The indicator Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.
Relative Forceful Actions	Proportion of Forceful Action events compared to All Direct Actions. The indicator Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.

Civil Sector	
Civil Direct Actions	Civil Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors.
Civil Forceful Actions	The Indicator Civil Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by non-governmental, or civil sector actors. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.
Relative Civil Forceful Actions	Proportion of Civil Forceful Action events compared to All Civil Direct Actions. The Indicator Civil Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by non-governmental, or civil sector actors. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.

Government Sector	
Government Direct Actions	Government Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors.
Government Forceful Actions	The Indicator Government Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by political, or government sector actors. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.
Relative Government Forceful Actions	Proportion of Government Forceful Action events compared to All Government Direct Actions. The Indicator Government Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by political, or government sector actors. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.
Conflict Carrying Capacity	The Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. The CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability.
Country Stability	The country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country.

Goldstein	
Goldstein	Goldstein indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a Goldstein rating (value), ranging from -10 (extreme conflict) to 10 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations.
Goldstein Average	The Goldstein Average indicator is a cumulative average of all events that are classified with a positive or negative value by Goldstein's conflict/cooperation scale. The indicator displays the mean of the conflict/cooperation event values, excluding all zero value events.
Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict	The Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).

Appendix : Description of indicators used | Page 8

Variable Name	Description / Definition
Goldstein Average Domestic Cooperation	The Goldstein Average Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events).
Goldstein Average International Conflict	The Goldstein Average International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).
Goldstein Average International Cooperation	The Goldstein Average International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative international events).

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Who are we?

FAST (German acronym for “Early Analysis of Tensions and Fact-finding”) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, Switzerland. In 1998 the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations.

What do we want?

FAST aims to enhance political decision makers’ ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding.

How do we work?

FAST uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. The centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural Survival (PONSACS) at Harvard University. The logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. These values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. The quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, FAST sets up its own local information networks (LINS) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). A unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. For qualitative data analysis, FAST contracts internationally renowned country experts.

What are our products?

FAST products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers’ needs. The standard product (“FAST Update”) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. As the time-series of collected data grow, FAST analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. FAST Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer.

Which countries do we monitor?

Africa: Angola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia

Asia: Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro

Middle East: Palestine