

FAST Update

DRC/Kivu region

Quarterly Risk Assessment
September to November 2003

T

S

A

E

Contents


Country Stability and Relative Forceful Actions	3
Relative Civil and Government Direct Actions	4
Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict and Cooperation	5
Goldstein Average International Conflict and Cooperation	6
Appendix: Description of indicators used	7
The FAST Early Warning System	9

FAST Update Subscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp

Contact FAST:
 Phone: +41 31 330 12 19
 Fax: +41 31 330 12 13
 FAST@swisspeace.ch
www.swisspeace.org/fast

Country Expert:
René Lemarchand


Country Stability and Relative Forceful Actions



Risk Assessment:

- Over the last few months North Kivu has been the scene of violent confrontations between the militias of Governor Eugene Serufuli, appointed by the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma (RCD-Goma), and those of Eric Paluku, representing the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Mouvement de Liberation (RCD-ML) in North Kivu-Beni.
- However, as illustrates the concomitant lowering of Relative Forceful Actions and rising Country Stability curves for the month of November, there are positive trends in North Kivu as well as in South Kivu. With the reconciliation of the two rival governors of North Kivu, marked by an official ceremony on October 30, there are indications that life is on the mend for the people of this war-ravaged province. There are similarly encouraging signs in South Kivu. Since the appointment by Kinshasa of General Nyabiyolwa as the head of the military region of South Kivu a number of bilateral accords have been signed between the newly integrated Congolese army and Mai-Mai militias.
- The gradual consolidation of authority in the hands of the Kinshasa-based transitional government is a key element behind these moves towards greater regional stability. Especially important has been the integration of separate armed factions into the new Congolese army, the Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo (FARDC), and the division of the country into 10 military regions headed for the most part by commanders originating from other areas.
- Another point to mention is the general weakening of the RCD-Goma army as a result of internal dissidences and battlefield casualties. It is worth noting, however, that three high ranking officers serving in the army of the RCD-Goma pointedly refused to be present in Kinshasa at the formal inauguration of the FARDC, thus raising doubts about the loyalty of the Rwanda-backed faction to the transitional government.
- The prospects for stability are brighter today than at any time since the outbreak of Congo's second civil war in August 1998. But much will depend on the capacity of the newly formed transitional government to effectively govern the country. It should not be forgotten that three out of four vice-presidencies are presently in the hands of President Kabila's former opponents, and that Vice-President Azarias Ruberwa, leader of the Rwanda-backed RCD-Goma, is responsible for the defence and security portfolios as one of the four vice-presidents.

Relative Civil and Government Direct Actions




Average number of reported events per month: 116

Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- As shown by the dramatic drop in Relative Government Direct Actions between June and November, the provincial governments of North and South Kivu have made a sustained effort towards peace and reconciliation.
- Nevertheless, South Kivu remained the scene of chronic confrontations between Mai-Mai elements and the RCD armed forces. Through much of September the vicinity of Bukavu was described by local observers as subject to "the law of the jungle", marked by incursions of Interahamwe into neighboring villages and violent encounters between Mai-Mai and RDC troops on the road from Bunyakiri to Shabunda. Rebels from Burundi, mostly from the FDD and FNL, were largely responsible for the growing climate of insecurity near Uvira and Fizi. No decline in the level of civil violence was reported until the end of October.
- Much of the credit concerning the marked improvement in the security situation since October goes to the provincial authorities for initiating significant steps towards reconciliation. The growing pressure exercised by the MONUC on local combatants also helped.
- By the same token, the turnaround in Ituri provided a powerful demonstration effect for local actors: the vigorous action undertaken by the EU-sponsored multinational forces to restore a modicum of peace in and around Bunia did not go unheeded by potential trouble makers, and helped persuade the provincial authorities that there was no alternative to reconciliation.
- The prospects for a continued lowering of tension are distinctly more promising in North Kivu than in South Kivu, where Mai-Mai militias, Interahamwe and residual actors from the Burundi rebellion are a potential source of instability. Therefore, among the many factors shaping the future of the region, the willingness of the Rwanda and Burundi authorities to cooperate with Kinshasa will be of decisive importance.

Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict and Cooperation




Average number of reported events per month: 116

Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- For both North and South Kivu Domestic Conflict and Cooperation are taking place at two different levels: between or among provincial actors, and between them and the Kinshasa-based transitional government. To further complicate matters the behavior of provincial actors is crucially influenced by external actors, such as Rwanda and Burundi. Since October the trend in North Kivu has been towards growing cooperation between the two rival governors (Eugene Serufuli and Eric Paluku) as well as between them and local rebel movements.
- Although South Kivu did not face the problem of a two-headed governorship, Governor Xavier Chirugangu has had to deal with serious difficulties in trying to come to terms with local insurgents since many of them are Hutu rebels from Rwanda or Burundi. Nonetheless, there has been a significant lowering of tension under his watch following the appointment of David Padiri Bulenda, a prominent Mai-Mai warlord, to a high-ranking position in the Congolese army, with responsibility for one of the country's 10 military regions.
- The DRC Interior Minister, Theophile Mbemba, and the head of the MONUC, William Swing, played a significant role in brokering the cooperation agreement between the RCD-Goma and the RCD-ML, and in persuading the rival governors to work together. Present at the ceremony on October 30, William Swing called it "a wonderful moment for the people of North Kivu". Minister Mbemba added: "There are no more RCD-Goma forces or RCD-ML forces. We now have a unified national army".
- This is where South Kivu is different: there is no unified army as yet. Despite all the efforts of the newly appointed regional military commander to bring local militias under a unified command, some are still reluctant to lay down their arms as they fear punishment or, in the case of Interahamwe and FDD elements, forced repatriation to Rwanda or Burundi.
- There are strong indications that cooperation will take precedence over conflict in the months ahead, both in terms of the provincial authorities vis-à-vis local rebel forces, and each of them in relation to the transitional government of the DRC. Pockets of insurrection and civil violence will nonetheless persist in many parts of South Kivu until an effective unified command of the newly established Congolese army will finally come into being.

Goldstein Average International Conflict and Cooperation



Risk Assessment:

- As shown by the rising level of Average International Cooperation after October, serious steps have been taken by the international community to put pressure on local actors and external interveners to live up to their obligations.
- A turning point was the visit to Kigali of the Congolese Minister for Cooperation, Mbusa Nyamwesi, on November 15, to reaffirm the commitment of his government to disarm and repatriate Interahamwe elements affiliated to the Forces Armees Democratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda (FADLR). This came shortly after Kigali had bitterly criticized the Kinshasa authorities for their failure to take proper steps to bring FADLR elements under control. On November 15, a group of 103 Hutu fighters returned to Kigali, along with a key figure of the FADLR, Paul Rwarakabije.
- At the same time some 700 people associated with Mai-Mai militias were demobilized in Kindu by the MONUC, in cooperation with forces of the seventh military region of the unified Congolese army.
- The combined pressure of the United States, the UN and members of the Great Lakes Regional Initiative, notably South Africa, played a major role in bringing about the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of Rwandan and Mai-Mai militias and at the same time restraining external interveners, i.e. Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. On his visit to Kinshasa in November, John Shattuck, former Under Secretary of State for Human Rights and Democracy under President Clinton, bluntly stated that "to combat terrorism means preventing Museveni, Kagame and Buyoya from being a nuisance".
- The MONUC, meanwhile, assumed a more pro-active stance in pushing the DDR program, while Thabo Mbeki hosted the summit on the UN Third Party Verification Mechanism (established on July 30, 2002, following the agreement between Rwanda and the Congo concerning the withdrawal of Rwandan troops and the dismantling of the Interahamwe and ex-Forces Armees Rwandaises) and on this occasion reiterated his hope that "this repatriation process should be finalized as soon as possible, not exceeding 12 months".
- International efforts to bring about peace in eastern Congo are more promising today than at any other time since 1998. Still, much remains to be done to carry through the DDR process and to achieve the full integration of Mai-Mai militias into the new Congolese army. Most urgently effective sanctions need to be put in place by the international community to stop the plunder of gold, diamonds and coltan, or else face the possibility of a resumption of bloodshed throughout the region.

Appendix : Descripton of indicators used | Page 7

Variable Name	Description / Definition
All Events	IDEA categories: a count of all coded events with WEIS cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEIS cue categories) plus an additional 11 IDEA event cue categories (Event type: 'other').
Direct Actions	Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct actions regardless of origin or target.
Forceful Actions	The indicator Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.

Civil Sector	
Civil Direct Actions	Civil Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors.
Civil Forceful Actions	The Indicator Civil Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by non-governmental, or civil sector actors. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.
Relative Civil Forceful Actions	Proportion of Civil Forceful Action events compared to All Civil Direct Actions. The Indicator Civil Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by non-governmental, or civil sector actors. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.

Government Sector	
Government Direct Actions	Government Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors.
Government Forceful Actions	The Indicator Government Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by political, or government sector actors. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.
Relative Government Forceful Actions	Proportion of Government Forceful Action events compared to All Government Direct Actions. The Indicator Government Forceful Actions depicts all reported uses of physical force by political, or government sector actors. This includes non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement.
Country Stability	The country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country.

Goldstein	
Goldstein	Goldstein indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a Goldstein rating (value), ranging from -10 (extreme conflict) to 10 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations.
Goldstein Average	The Goldstein Average indicator is a cumulative average of all events that are classified with a positive or negative value by Goldstein's conflict/cooperation scale. The indicator displays the mean of the conflict/cooperation event values, excluding all zero value events.
Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict	The Goldstein Average Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).

Appendix : Descripton of indicators used | Page 8

Variable Name	Description / Definition
Goldstein Average Domestic Cooperation	The Goldstein Average Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events).
Goldstein Average International Conflict	The Goldstein Average International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (Goldstein) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative Goldstein values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).
Goldstein Average International Cooperation	The Goldstein Average International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (Goldstein) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive Goldstein values divided by the total number of cooperative international events).

S

A

E

Who are we?

FAST (German acronym for “Early Analysis of Tensions and Fact-finding”) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, Switzerland. In 1998 the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations.

What do we want?

FAST aims to enhance political decision makers’ ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding.

How do we work?

FAST uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. The centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural Survival (PONSACS) at Harvard University. The logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. These values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. The quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, FAST sets up its own local information networks (LINS) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). A unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. For qualitative data analysis, FAST contracts internationally renowned country experts.

What are our products?

FAST products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers’ needs. The standard product (“FAST Update”) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. As the time-series of collected data grow, FAST analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. FAST Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer.

Which countries do we monitor?

Africa: Angola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia

Asia: Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro

Middle East: Palestine