

FAST Update

DRC/Kivu region

Quarterly Risk Assessment
September to November 2004

T

S

A

E

Contents


Country Stability and Relative Conflictual Actions	3
IDEA Average Domestic Conflict and Cooperation	4
Relative Government and Civil Direct Actions	5
IDEA Average International Conflict and Cooperation	6
Appendix: Description of indicators used	7
The FAST Early Warning System	8

FAST Update Subscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp

Contact FAST Desk Officer
Phone: +27 12 346 9545
Fax: +27 12 460 0997
<mailto:FAST@swisspeace.ch>
www.swisspeace.org/fast

Country Expert:
[René Lemarchand](#)

Country Stability and Relative Conflictual Actions




Average number of reported events per month: 123

Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- The prospects for stability in the Kivu region are as bleak as ever. After threatening to send troops to the Kivus unless the Kinshasa government took effective steps to disarm Hutu militias, Kagame's warning appears to have become reality. Nonetheless, there is still considerable controversy and confusion about the facts of the invasion. According to a MONUC observer, some one hundred soldiers of the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF) were sighted in Rutshuru and elsewhere in North Kivu. Unconfirmed reports from Congolese observers indicate that in a number of localities in Rutshuru, Masisi and Lubero, some 200 km north of Goma, houses have been looted and torched, causing thousands to flee. President Kabila responded by sending 10,000 additional troops to North Kivu, and calling on the UN Security Council to impose sanctions.
- Rwanda's justification for the invasion is the failure of the Kinshasa government to disarm the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), an estimated 30,000-strong Hutu militia consisting of ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) and *interahamwe*. Only a small number – approximately 7,000 – have been repatriated to Rwanda. Although the disarmament of Hutu rebels is the responsibility of the UN peacekeeping force in the Congo (MONUC), its performance on that score is less than impressive. More telling still, while supposed to be protecting civilian lives, MONUC has done nothing to interpose itself between the invaders and the local population, let alone repulse the invaders. Although there is merit to Rwanda's claims that FDLR militias have yet to be neutralized, whether they pose a security threat to Kigali is very doubtful. Other motives include Kagame's desire to retain free access to the Kivu's mineral wealth, to extend support to his client faction in the Congo, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), and more generally to create additional problems for the Congolese as they prepare the ground for multi-party elections in July 2005.
- The RCD, however, is deeply split between moderates and pro-Rwandans, and Kagame's latest move is unlikely to bring them closer together. Significantly, the RCD representative in the transition government, Vice-President Azerias Ruberwa, has openly condemned the Rwandan invasion. Nonetheless, there can be little question that this latest example of Rwandan "imperialism", cloaked in the guise of noble intentions, will have a profoundly negative impact on relations between ethnic Tutsi, also known as Banyamulenge, and the Congolese.
- These events bode ill for the stability of the region. The net result has been to strengthen suspicions among Congolese that the RCD is a Trojan horse manipulated by Rwanda to serve its "imperial" designs. To conclude, however, that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is on the brink of a crisis similar to that of 1998, when a full scale war erupted between Rwanda and the RDC, seems unwarranted. The international community would probably not tolerate a replay of 1998. What is beyond question is that the latest developments have significantly increased the enmity between ethnic Tutsi and Congolese and raised further doubts about the prospects of a successful transition to multiparty democracy.


IDEA Average Domestic Conflict and Cooperation



Risk Assessment:

- As the curves above make clear, a wide gap separates the levels of Domestic Conflict and the degree of Domestic Cooperation needed to prevent such conflict from escalating. The only significant, though short-lived, example of domestic cooperation occurred in October, when the military commanders of the 10th and 8th military regions, Budja Mabe and Obed Rwibasira, agreed to stop fighting each other through proxy factions. Obed, an ethnic Tutsi from North Kivu, has since been detained in Kinshasa on grounds of disloyalty to the Kabila regime. Although conflict was rife throughout the region long before the Rwandan invasion, it has now reached a new peak of intensity. While local Hutu militias are reported to have joined hands with Congolese troops to resist the Rwandan invaders, tension is mounting between the Banyamulenge and the Congolese population, and between pro-Rwandan and moderate factions within the RCD.
- The present crisis has crystallized many of the tensions already present in the region. Following the abortive coup of Bukavu in June, fears that the Banyamulenge community might become the principal target of revenge killings found a sad confirmation in the Gatumba (Burundi) massacre. It is well to remember that the two key actors behind the events of Bukavu, Colonel Mutebutsi and General Nkunda, are respectively a Munyamulenge from South Kivu and an ethnic Tutsi from North Kivu, and that the latter served in the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) before joining the RCD in Goma. It is little wonder, then, that the Tutsi communities indigenous to the RDC are commonly seen by many Congolese as Rwanda's fifth column in eastern Congo. Anyone suspected of Rwandan sympathies is fair game for Hutu militias, which is why many ethnic Tutsi feel that their lives are at risk, regardless of whether or not they approve of Kagame's policies.
- The failure of MONUC to make significant headway in terms of DDR has further increased Banyamulenge fears that they might be targeted by FDLR elements. This said, the task of disarming some 20,000 FDLR, spread out in many localities and most of them determined to resist all attempts to take away their weapons, is a daunting challenge. Whether MONUC has the capacity to carry out this task without causing major bloodshed (as happened in a similar context in 2002 in the Katanga) and thus bringing further discredit upon itself, is very doubtful.
- What makes the present crisis potentially dangerous is that it has permeated civil society and the provincial administration. Ethnic and national identities have been radicalized as never before. The prospects for domestic cooperation are very dim indeed. Rwanda has re-ignited a conflict which seriously threatens the transition and whose repercussions go far beyond regional boundaries.

Relative Government and Civil Direct Actions




Average number of reported events per month: 123

Indicator description: see appendix

Risk Assessment:

- After a decline in October there was an increase in Government and Civil Direct Actions in November following the threat of a Rwandan invasion.
- Since early November some twenty people have been killed in Goma over a period of several days, including six officers recently arrived from Kinshasa, one physician, a lawyer and several members of civil society organizations. The killers have been neither arrested nor identified, but there is widespread suspicion among Congolese observers that the murders were the work of army men under the command of General Obed Rwibasira, possibly assisted by elements of Local Defence Forces loyal to Governor Serufu, a Hutu well known for his Rwandan sympathies. Protest marches were organized by students and civic leaders in Bukavu and Goma, leading to further bloodshed. Two protesters were reported killed in Goma and several wounded, following a particularly brutal repression by General Obed Rwibasira. More recently, on 9 December, Goma became the scene of another round of violence, when some 4,000 rwandophones (Kinyarwanda speakers) assembled near the university campus to protest against Kabila's decision to send troops to the Kivus, in turn prompting another massive counter-demonstration of so-called "native" Congolese, led by students. Four people were killed in the course of these demonstrations, including two students. Although the newspaper *La Référence Plus*, published in Kinshasa, speculates that 95 per cent of the rwandophone protesters came from Gisenyi, in Rwanda, just how many were Rwandan citizens is impossible to determine. Meanwhile a number of recently integrated Mai-Mai elements have flatly refused to leave the army to join the police force, as requested by General Budja Mabe, head of the 10th military region. Following the Rwandan invasion bitter fighting has been reported in Walikale between Mai-Mai and FDLR elements on the one hand, and Rwandan troops on the other, causing many casualties as well as a massive exodus of villagers to South Kivu.
- According to local informants, the killings that took place in Goma in November were intended to silence potential protesters in anticipation of the Rwandan invasion. However, targeted eliminations have been part of a well established pattern, with responsibility shared by both sides. Thus before the Bukavu coup last June several Banyamulenge were murdered by Congolese extremists, giving a semblance of justification to Colonel Mutebutsi that he had taken power in order to prevent a genocide of Banyamulenge.
- In any event, what is becoming increasingly clear, and as the 9 December protest marches in Goma dramatically illustrate, is that North Kivu has emerged as the epicentre of an ongoing struggle between RCD extremists, on the one hand, and Hutu militias and their Congolese allies on the other.
- In the wake of the Rwandan invasion the potential for further civil violence has increased exponentially, threatening to drive an ever deeper wedge in civil society organizations. A climate of profound insecurity reigns in North and South Kivu. Forceful action by government troops may result in continuing violent confrontations between regional military commanders loyal to Kinshasa and dissident elements of the RCD armed forces allied to Rwanda. The prospects for free and fair elections in 2005 have never been more distant.

IDEA Average International Conflict and Cooperation



Risk Assessment:

- MONUC's inaction in the face of Rwanda's invasion is a stark reminder of how little effective international cooperation exists in dealing with the conflict in eastern Congo. Despite the presence of an additional 5,900 peacekeepers sent to the Kivu to bolster the 10,800 already on the ground, no military action was taken to repulse the invaders. It is with reason that the *Economist* of 4 December wonders "Is this the world's least effective UN peacekeeping force?" In late November, in response to Kagame's warning that he would strike at the "negative forces" inside the DRC if necessary, the Kinshasa-based International Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT) issued pro forma admonitions but did nothing to deter the invaders. The European Union did not fare much better: doing its best not to antagonize Kagame, it cautiously refrained from condemning the invasion. Equally prudent was the reaction of the UN Security Council, warning Rwanda to refrain from carrying out its threat. International observers have consistently misread the auguries: at the conclusion of his tour of the region, only days before the invasion, the head of the UN Security Council delegation, Jean-Marc de la Sablière, averred that the overall situation in the Great Lakes was "encouraging". Just as ironic was the statement made by Kofi Annan on 21 November, at the end of the Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes: "Leaders who have been divided for most of the last decade have come together for peace... People of the region now have every reason to hope". Days after the conference issued a formal declaration of commitment to end conflict in Africa's Great Lakes, signed by 11 heads of state, Rwanda invaded one neighbour, and severed diplomatic relations with another, Uganda.
- The surprisingly low-key response of the international community is in sharp contrast with the dire warnings issued by several civil society organizations. As early as October, in a statement to the Belgian Minister of Foreign affairs, the Société civile du Sud-Kivu underscored the danger of "foreign armed bands coming into the region, of which the most virulent come from Rwanda". The same concern has been voiced time and again by European and international NGOs. Recently the Réseau européen des ONG pour l'Afrique Centrale (Eurac) urgently called upon the EU to "condemn the presence of Rwandan troops in the RDC and take immediate diplomatic and budgetary sanctions against Rwanda". This is unlikely to happen, however, because Rwanda still draws major dividends from its "genocide credit", because it has some dedicated supporters in high places (such as Patrick Mazimhaka, Vice-President of the AU), and because no one wants to take the risk of confronting the most formidable army in the region. After providing Rwanda with almost unlimited financial assistance over the last decade, the international community finds itself caught in its own trap.
- Rwanda's brazen disregard of its international obligations is not likely to come to an end in the foreseeable future. It has staked out its economic claims to North Kivu and made clear its commitment to support its Congolese allies through thick and thin. Its expressed concern about the security threats posed by Hutu militias offers a convenient pretext for reinforcing its military presence in the region. In so doing it also has the additional benefit of contributing to the Congo's reputation as a failed state.

Appendix : Description of indicators used | Page 7

Variable Name	Description / Definition
All Actions	WEIS categories: a count of all coded events with cue categories ranging from 1 to 22 (all WEIS cue categories).
Civil Sector	
All Civil Actions	A Count of all coded events belonging to the WEIS cue categories (1 to 22), that involve only non-governmental, or civil sector actors.
Relative Civil Direct Actions	Proportion of Civil Direct Actions compared to All Civil Actions. Civil Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors.
Government Sector	
All Government Actions	A Count of all coded events belonging to the WEIS cue categories (1 to 22), that involve only the political sector, or government actors.
Relative Government Direct Actions	Proportion of Government Direct Actions compared to All Government Actions. Government Direct Actions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. These categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors.
Conflict Carrying Capacity	The Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. The CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability.
Country Stability	The country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country.
Conflictual	Proportion of all actions belonging to all conflictive categories reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize, and force to all actions (all Events belonging to the 22 WEIS cue categories).
IDEA Scale	
IDEA	IDEA indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a IDEA rating (value), ranging from -7 (extreme conflict) to 13 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations.
Average Domestic Conflict	The Average Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (IDEA) values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative IDEA values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).
Average Domestic Cooperation	The Average Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (IDEA) values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive IDEA values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events).
Average International Conflict	The Average International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative (IDEA) values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative IDEA values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). For interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values).
Average International Cooperation	The Average International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive (IDEA) values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive IDEA values divided by the total number of cooperative international events).

Who are we?

FAST (German acronym for “Early Analysis of Tensions and Fact-finding”) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, Switzerland. In 1998 the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations.

What do we want?

FAST aims to enhance political decision makers’ ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding.

How do we work?

FAST uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. The centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural Survival (PONSACS) at Harvard University. The logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. These values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. The quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, FAST sets up its own local information networks (LINS) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). A unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. For qualitative data analysis, FAST contracts internationally renowned country experts.

What are our products?

FAST products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers’ needs. The standard product (“FAST Update”) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. As the time-series of collected data grow, FAST analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. FAST Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer.

Which countries do we monitor?

Africa: Angola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia

Asia: Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro

Middle East: Palestine