The Institutional Legacies of Rebel Governance

Theorising the Political Stability of Post-Insurgent States

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Abstract

This paper focuses on what remains of rebel modes of governance when war ends. In particular, it pays attention to victorious insurgents that became recognised as sovereign rulers of a state. Some regimes consisting of former rebels quickly relapse into civil war, while others consolidate their rule and dominate post-war politics for decades. The paper explores the conditions that can explain these different outcomes. The central argument of the paper is that the degree of wartime institutional consolidation affects the political stability of post-insurgent state trajectories. This is shaped by the degree to which rival armed actors persist, the extent to which rebels control territory, the organisational structure of a rebel movement, and the interaction of rebel modes of governance with pre-existing institutions. Secondary sources on various post-insurgents states in sub-Saharan Africa illustrate the argument. Ultimately, the paper demonstrates how the political stability of post-insurgent states is deeply affected by the institutional legacies of rebel governance.
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Introduction

In sub-Saharan Africa, several governments consist of victorious insurgents that became recognised as sovereign rulers. This is a rare outcome of insurgency. Most civil wars are either won by the incumbent government, or end in a negotiated settlement (de Rouen Jr & Sobek, 2004, p. 314). Yet, when rebels win, the consequences are far-reaching (Woldemariam, 2018, p. 28). In some states built or captured by insurgents, political order fragments quickly, but in other cases, the new order is consolidated. Said differently, some regimes consisting of former rebels show a quick relapse into civil war, whereas in other cases they dominate post-war politics for decades (Lyons, 2016b, p. 160). Thus, we can observe a difference between ‘state-subverting’ and ‘state-consolidating’ insurgencies (Clapham, 1998a, p. 8). This paper aims to disaggregate and understand this fundamental difference in post-insurgent state trajectories. Reviewing the literature, I examine existing explanations for differences in post-insurgent statehood, and advance a new argument, called the institutional legacies of rebel governance.

The paper departs from the premise that the past trajectories of victorious insurgents significantly influence how they govern as an incumbent government (Clapham, 2012, p. 4; Dorman, 2006, p. 1086; Huang, 2016, p. 177; Lyons, 2016b, p. 170). It proposes that the diversity in the political stability of post-insurgent state trajectories hinges on the ability of rebels to overcome the condition of multiple sovereignty and effectively preside over political, economic, and social interactions in the areas they control (Bal-thasar, 2015, p. 34; 2017a, p. 480; North, 1991, pp. 108-111; Tilly, 1978, pp. 191-193). While some insurgents manage to reshape the societal ‘rules of the game’ in civil war, others have to settle for a more limited form of rule (Arjona, 2016, p. 2). Recent scholarship has shown that the extent and ways in which rebels govern civilians in the areas under their control varies significantly, leading to different institutional outcomes when war ends, which in turn shapes the political stability of post-insurgent states. In some cases, rebels intervene deeply in civilian life through the enforcement of institutions and the provision of public goods, ranging from security and justice, to education, healthcare, humanitarian relief, and diplomacy (Arjona, 2014, p. 1377; Cog-gins, 2015, p. 99; Mamplilly, 2011, p. 9). Other examples show more limited forms of rebel rule akin to a protection racket (Reno, 2015, p. 282; Rolandsen, 2005, p. 29). Rebel organisations that consolidate their rule during war are more likely to reach military victory, and create a new state or capture an existing one in which they dominate post-war politics (Huang, 2016, pp. 177-178; Lyons, 2016b, p. 170). Paradoxically, however, in a range of cases, fragmented rebel groups have also managed to overthrow incumbent regimes, or gain de jure statehood through secession, in spite of their limited ability to govern (Landau-Wells, 2018, p. 135; Lyons, 2016b, p. 170; Reno, 2011, pp. 19-20). When this happens, post-insurgent statehood is characterised by institutional fragmentation, and more vulnerable to civil war recurrence and forced regime change. In both scenarios, the variegated institutional legacies of rebel governance (or the lack thereof) are likely to carry over to the post-insurgent period. In sum, the degree of wartime institutional consolidation affects the political stability of a post-insurgent state.
It would be wrong to assume that rebel modes of governance continue in a linear fashion after insurgents attain de jure state power. At these moments of transition, the context in which victorious rebels operate changes significantly. Becoming a de jure government affects how the former insurgents are perceived, what is expected from them, and which resources they can draw on (Clapham, 1996, p. 240; Herbst, 2014, p. xix; Pool, 2001, p. 159; Reno, 2011, pp. 18-20; Sprenkels, 2018). Consider how from a relatively marginalised position in world politics the former rebels can now acquire legal access to international markets, draw on funding from foreign donors, and get a seat at the United Nations and other multilateral organisations. This new role as ‘gatekeeper’ of the state (Cooper, 2002) provides opportunities to stay in power by managing relations with foreign rather than domestic actors; through what Bay- yart (1983, 2000) has famously called ‘the politics of extraver- sion’: it subsequently creates new inequalities between members of the former insurgent movement. While some get accommodated in high-ranking government positions, others get sidelined, marginalised, or hedge their bets outside the realm of government (Dorman, 2006, p. 1094; Hensel & G readiness, 2017, pp. 180-181; Piccolino, 2016, p. 506; Sprenkels, 2018). As such, the institutional legacies of rebel governance provide the roots that post-insurgent rulers build on, but these wartime institutions get repurposed in ways that represents both continuity with the wartime past, and change induced by the movement’s new role and associated conditions. Still, I argue that the degree of wartime institutional consolidation affects the ability of post-insurgent rulers to deal with these new conditions, maintain their power, and prevent civil war recurrence. Explaining the stark difference in the political stability of post-insurgent states thus requires an analysis that does justice to the wartime development of rebel governance as well as its institutional legacy in a post-insurgent context.

The argument presented in this paper to explain differences in the political stability of post-insurgent state trajectories is by no means prescriptive. Indeed, politically stable centralised dictatorships can be equally violent towards civilians, if not more, than systems of fragmented political authority. As Debos (2016, p. 178) points out, ‘A state may be both stable for external analysts and violent for its people.’ Moreover, the international community has adopted a wide range of (questionable) practices aimed at the ‘stabilisation’ of fragile states (Bayart, 2000, p. 229; de Vries, 2015; Demmers & Gould, 2018, p. 376; Hagemann, 2016), Bachmann (2014, p. 130) explains that the contemporary interventionism in these so-called ‘ungoverned spaces’ in the global south constitutes a mix of preventative welfare issues and reasonable force aimed at establishing today’s version of “good order”, called stability. Likewise, African rulers themselves have often offered promises of stability to outsiders in exchange for resources and recognition of their sovereign status (Reno, 1998, p. 222). Illustrative is the assertion by the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, himself a former insurgent: ‘Have we created a perfect democratic system? No, it’s a work in progress. Are we running as fast as our legs will carry us? Yes. (…) Unlike previous governments we have really created a stable country in a very turbulent neighbourhood.’ In a more ominous tone, the late Congo- lese President Mobutu warned foreign officials when insurgents challenged his rule: ‘Après moi, le déluge’ [After me, the floods].

This paper should be strictly distinguished from the promises of African rulers and the stabilising aims of the international community. It does not look at political stability as a strategic goal, but rather aims to understand the variation in political orders crafted by former insurgents that attained state power. This is a worthwhile endeavour because the political stability of post-insurgent state trajectories is directly affected by the control over violence and resources (Reno, 2003), which in turn strikes at the heart of security needs of local populations (Lukcham & Kirk, 2012). In other words, studying variation in the political stability of post-insurgent states matters for disaggregating the different forms of violence experienced by those living under the rule of these regimes. Additionally, it may help in identifying conditions under which less unjust political orders emerge.

Although this paper is not policy-oriented, the argument has a clear policy significance. I see two sets of implications for policymakers. First, as Cramer (2006) points out, states are not build upon a ‘blank slate’ after war ends (see also Huang, 2016; Piclard, 2019). Rather than assuming that civil war merely represents chaos and destruction, policymakers should pay explicit attention to the ability of rebels to govern civilians. Observing rebel governance in practice can be a daunting task however. It is important to take into account that during war rebel movements have incentives to present themselves in ways that are in line with what the external observer wishes to see. Sometimes, rebel governance unfortunately amounts more to a public relations strategy than a reality on the ground (Coggins, 2015). Yet, in other cases, insurgents create order in the territories they control (Arjona, 2016), and govern with a reasonable degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the population they claim to represent (Terpstra & Frerks, 2017). Policymakers ought to take this variation seriously. Second, in the relatively rare cases where rebel organisations become recognised as a de jure government, it is important to acknowledge that rebel modes of governance get repurposed in a post-insurgent context. It is then vital to consider in a conflict-sensitive way how outside intervention affects the institutional legacies of rebellion (Handschin, Abitol, & Alluri, 2016). Does external support help to improve existing governance arrangements? Alternatively, does it further cement or exacerbate existing conflicts and inequalities? Asking these difficult questions is vital to better attune external peace- and state-building interventions to local realities.

The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows. First, I examine existing scholarly explanations and identify a number of gaps that remain in our knowledge on post-insurgent states. This is followed by describing the paper’s conceptual approach as well as the variation in the political stability of post-insurgent states it aims to explain. Given the wide range of countervailing mechanisms, institutional consolidation and institutional fragmentation, to understand rebel-induced wartime institutional change. The paper isolates four plausible factors that push towards institutional consolidation or fragmentation. These include the degree to which rival armed actors persist, the degree of rebel territorial control, the structure of a rebel organisation, and interactions of rebel modes of governance with pre-existing institutions. Secondary sources on various post-insurgent states in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Africa illustrate the argument. As such, the paper provides a theoretical contribution to the literatures on institutions, rebel governance, and state formation. Ultimately, the paper demonstrates how the political stability of post-insurgent states is deeply affected by the institutional legacies of rebel governance.

2 Existing Explanations

The complex phenomenon of post-insurgent statehood in Africa defies moncausal explanations. The process from rebellion to statehood is the outcome of multiple intersecting forces, actors, interests, interactions, and events that may have been unimaginable to those who organised and carried out insurgency in the first place. Rather than an outcome of a set goal and implementation, it is a process that is subject to a variety of influences that push toward a trajectory of statehood or away from it. Statehood is thus a nonteleological outcome reached through a dynamic variety of pathways that is dependent on the complex interplay between the agency of insurgents and structural constraints posed by geographical conditions, available resources, past experiences of governance, developments on the battlefield, and relations to civilians and other political actors (see also Debos, 2016, p. 91; Reno, 2003, p. 48).

Existing scholarly explanations have made significant inroads into understanding the logic of political stability in post-insurgent states, but they nevertheless hold important limitations. The effects of insurgency on the strength of the state have been hotly debated (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Skocpol, 1979; Zartman, 1995), but how competing governance structures set up by rebels affect state trajectories is poorly understood. Moreover, few studies address the continuities and changes in rebel rule when war ends (Huang, 2016; Sprekelks, 2018; Uležic, 2018). Research that does study the interconnections between insurgency and state formation can be broken down into approaches that focus on the politics of peace- and state-building, rebel governance in civil war, and the aftermath of insurgency. While existing studies are fascinating in their own right, they only partly explain the striking variation in the political stability of post-insurgent states.

2.1 The Politics of Peace- and State-building

In the immediate post-Cold War era, the African continent witnessed an upsurge in civil wars (Straus, 2012, p. 184). The most dominant explanation for the rise in civil war violence was located in the institutional structure of the post-colonial state (Peclard, 2019, p. 9). Scholars and policymakers increasingly labelled states in Africa as weak, fragile, failed, and collapsed (Ignatieff, 2002; Jackson, 1990; Krasner, 1999; Rotberg, 2002; Zartman, 1995). Zartman (1995, pp. 1-13) suggested rebellion is one of the main consequences of ‘state collapse’, and Fearon and Laitin (2003, p. 75) found that ‘financially and bureaucratically weak states’ favour insurgency. Post-9/11, policymakers and academics alike have suggested weak states are ‘breeding grounds’ for insurgency, terrorism, and organised crime (Bhatia, 2005; von Einsiedel, 2005). Civil wars were thus seen as a consequence of state weakness, while simultaneously, authors pointed to how insurgency reinforces weak statehood (see e.g. Gettleman, 2010; Kaldor, 1999; Kaplan, 2000).

State-building became viewed as the best way to address state decay and build peace in war-torn countries (Paris & Sisk, 2008). The guiding logic was to create states with liberal market-oriented democracies that would no
longer endanger the international order (Bliessmann de Guevara, 2008; Chandler, 2006; Duffield, 2001; Mac Ginty, 2008). The transformative ambitions of what is now commonly referred to as ‘liberal peacebuilding’ (Paris, 2004), encompassed in relation to insurgencies a mix of programmes aimed at disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), countering violent extremism (CVE), democratisation, and good governance.

Various aspects of liberal peacebuilding have been criticized over the past decades. Some scholars focus on practical issues, such as coherence and coordination problems between donors (de Coning & Friis, 2011). Conceptual critiques question, amongst others, the liberal underpinnings of contemporary peacebuilding (Selby, 2013), and highlight the contradictions and incompatibilities between peace- and state-building (Balthasar, 2017a). More fundamental criticisms concern the issue of local ownership (Bojicic-Dzelilovic & Martin, 2018; Donais, 2009), the problem of the Weberian state as a model (Lemay-Hébert, 2006), and the implicit neo-imperialism in liberal peacebuilding (Dandler, 2006). Several authors suggest the need to take local actors into account in peace- and state-building (Auteesserre, 2010; Boege, Brown, Clements, & Nolan, 2008; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013), yet it often remains unclear who these actors are, and how to incorporate them (Hellmüller & Santschi, 2014). Finally, recent studies have shown how local actors may appropriate international resources for their own parochial interests, thereby undermining the very aims of peace- and state-building interventions (Barnett & Zürcher, 2009; Münch & Velt, 2018).

Although scholarship on peace- and state-building has advanced significantly, it has largely neglected how the “survival” of rebel modes of governance affects the stability of state trajectories after open hostilities end (Péclard, 2019). As Péclard (2019, pp. 10-11) convincingly argues, “if we are to understand how stable political institutions can be built in the aftermath of civil war, it is essential to study the institutions that regulate political life during conflict. This implies a need not only to look at how (and if) state institutions survive once war has broken out, but also to take into account the institutions put in place in areas beyond the control of the state.” Research on governance in areas of limited state control has focused disproportionately on ‘traditional institutions’ (Lund, 2006), ‘informal systems of governance’ (Boege et al., 2008), and a broad array of ‘non-state actors’ (Risse, 2011). Until recently, it has often overlooked the specific influence of rebel organisations.

2.2 Rebel Governance in Civil War

The rebel governance literature fills an important part of the void left by peace- and state-building scholarship. It provides detailed insights in variation between rebel groups and their modes of governance (Arjona et al., 2015; Duyvesteyn, Frekers, Kistemaker, Steil, & Terpstra, 2016; Mampilly, 2011). As a field of inquiry, it focuses on cases that meet the scope conditions of insurgents that use violence or the credible threat thereof, and control territory with a resident population (Kasfir, 2016). It builds on insights about “guerrilla government” (Wickham-Crowley, 1987), ‘stationary bandits’ (Olson, 1993), and ‘government in areas of limited statehood’ (Risse, 2012), and draws on several disciplines, as well as a wide range of case studies from Africa and beyond (Fisher, 2017). It shows how pre-conflict factors, wartime contextual factors, the behaviour of insurgents, and the responses of civilians influence rebel governance as it evolves, expands, or runs aground (Arjona et al., 2015, pp. 289-296).

Studies on African insurgencies show a similar development to an interest in insurgent governance. Clapham (1998a) pioneered a fascinating comparative study on ‘African Guerrillas’. Although it did not purposefully adopt governance as an analytical lens, it did show compelling evidence of how insurgents ruled the areas under their control during war, and how this shaped post-war politics. His work was later followed up in two volumes by Bæs and Dunn (2007, 2017), of which the 2017 volume pays explicit attention to “insurgencies as alternative modalities of governance” (Bæs & Dunn, 2017, p. 238).

The burgeoning field of studies on rebel governance has advanced significantly in recent years, but several important questions remain unaddressed. Arjona et al. (2015, p. 297) point out that ‘one of the most fertile areas’ of future research is studying ‘the legacies of governance by armed groups’ (see also Mampilly, 2011, pp. 240-241; Weinstein, 2006, pp. 340-341). These legacies are rarely discussed in existing research, with only a few notable exceptions (Burihabwa & Curtis, 2019; Clapham, 2012; Dorman, 2006; Müller, 2012; Rolandsen, 2015; Wittig, 2016). As Uležic (2018, p. 2) summarises, little attention has been paid to ‘the remnants of rebel governance’, even though ‘the post-conflict fate of rebel governance regimes is highly diverse and a worthy area of research.’ Arjona (2014, p. 1388) argues that ‘future research needs to theorise the specific ways in which civil war in general, and wartime institutional change in particular, impacts the quality, the strength, and the evolution of the state.’ More specifically, Huang (2016, p. 178) posits that “future research should more systematically study the impact of rebels’ wartime organization and governance on post-war statebuilding.” Recent attempts to broaden the debate on rebel governance include works on ‘armed groups and multi-layered governance’ (Kasfir, Frekers, & Terpstra, 2017), and ‘a governmentality perspective’ on rebel rule (Hoffmann & Verweijen, 2018), but the institutional legacies of rebel governance remain understudied in comparative politics.

2.3 The Aftermath of Insurgency

Finally, scholarship on the aftermath of insurgency broadly focuses on the transition from armed rebellion to non-violent politics. Within this literature there are important differences between quantitative and qualitative scholarship. Several quantitative studies conclude that rebel victory produces the most stable war outcome (Quinn, Mason, & Gurses, 2007; Toft, 2009, 2010). It...
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is suggested that civil wars ending with a rebel victory are less likely to recur than those that conclude with an incumbent victory or a negotiated settlement. According to Quinn et al. (2007, p. 174), ‘a rebel victory is less likely to be followed by a recurrence of civil war than either a government victory or negotiated settlement because rebel victory is more likely to eliminate the condition of dual sovereignty.’ In a similar vein, Toft (2010, pp. 35-36) finds that ‘negotiated settlements have tended to lead to a greater likelihood of war and repression, whereas rebels who win civil wars seem better able to keep the peace and allow for more democratization.’ The study of Mason, Gurses, Brandt, and Quinn (2011) slightly nuances their earlier finding on the relationship between rebel victory and post-war stability. The authors still claim that ‘rebels produce a more durable peace than government victories but only if the new rebel regime can survive the first few years following their victory’ (Mason et al., 2011, p. 186). They explain the initial instability after rebel victory by pointing to the limited governance capabilities of victorious rebels. Without substantiating their claim, they assert that ‘unlike victorious governments, victorious rebels have to build from scratch the machinery of a new state; at the very least, they have to staff the machinery of governance they now control’ (Mason et al., 2011, p. 175).

Qualitative studies have largely neglected the findings of large-N studies on post-war stability following rebel victory. Qualitative and mixed-method scholarship on the transition from insurgency to non-violent politics is mostly concerned with if and how rebel movements can transform into democratic political parties (Clapham, 2012; de Zeeuw, 2007; Deonandan, & Prevost, 2007; Dudouet, 2014; Huang, 2016; Manning, 2007; Marshall & Ishiyama, 2016; Söderberg Kovacs & Hatz, 2016). While arguably noble from a liberal point of view, it is also problematic exactly because of the implicit or explicit prescriptive nature of what post-war politics ought to be. For example, Deonandan et al. (2007) are interested in the ‘success and failure of […] former politico-military movements within their new democratic contexts.’ Some policy-oriented studies even go so far as sharing ‘lessons learned’ on ‘successful political transformations’ of former insurgents into ‘peaceful and democratic actors’ (Dudouet, Lundström, & Rampf, 2016, p. 65; Dudouet, Planta, & Giessler, 2016, p. 4). Obviously, such transitions from a rebel movement to a democratic political party only work out in some cases. Hence, authors often mention problems such as ‘façade transformation(s)’ from rebel movement to political party (Rufyikiri, 2017), and state power remaining militarized after war ends (Walraet, 2017, p. 201). Clapham (2012, p. 8) points out that many of such issues result ‘from the simple fact that running a liberation struggle is a very different kind of exercise from running a government.’

Recently, qualitative scholarship on the aftermath of insurgency has gone beyond the canonical focus on democratisation (see e.g. Buhrhabwa & Curtis, 2019; Curtis, 2015; Hensell & Gerdes, 2017; Podder, 2014; Thaler, 2018). Some analysts have started to explicitly question the relationship between rebel victory and political stability (Lyons, 2016b; McDonough, 2008; Piccolino, 2018; Wassara, 2015). Taking issue with the quantitative war termination literature, Lyons (2016b, p. 161) cautions that ‘not all rebel victories result in the same types of political outcomes after the war ends.’ Comparing four African cases, he finds that protracted wars in a relatively confined territory with little external support favour the establishment of cohesive insurgent leadership and rebel governance. In Uganda and Ethiopia, this wartime legacy helped victorious rebels to transform into powerful authoritarian parties that sustained stability for decades. Conversely, in short wars over large swathes of territory with a high degree of external assistance, rebels tend to be indisciplined and unequipped to govern civilians. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Libya, this led to an unstable post-insurgent political order where the victorious rebels failed to consolidate their rule (Lyons, 2016b). Piccolino (2018) also critiques the war termination literature by pointing to the heterogeneity of political orders following rebel victory. In a case study of Côte d’Ivoire, she demonstrates how the winning coalition of former rebels was at the risk of implosion in 2011, but was held together by the political maneuvering of the Ouattara government. In another case study, Wassara (2015, p. 634) shows that while South Sudan ‘fulfilled the declarative requirements of a state in international law’, it ‘was born prematurely’, and after independence, ‘descended rapidly into another civil war and disorder.’ Although recent scholarship on the aftermath of insurgency has signalled the variety of political orders crafted by victorious rebels, little has been theorised about how the prior existence of rebel governance affects the stability of post-insurgent state trajectories.

Reviewing the literature, this paper builds on several key findings from existing scholarship. These include: peace- and state-building scholarship has generally overlooked the influence of (former) rebel movements on governance; the rebel governance literature shows there is in fact a great variety in how insurgents govern in civil war; studies on the aftermath of insurgency disproportionately focus on the transformation of former rebels into democratic political parties, and wartime processes significantly affect the relationship between rebel victory and political stability.

Existing scholarship also leaves important questions unaddressed. Although various authors claim that ‘insurgency can best be understood as a process of competitive state building’ (Clapham, 1998b; Kalyvas, 2006, p. 218; Staniland, 2012), the diverse effects of rebel governance on the political stability of post-insurgent state trajectories remain understudied. The striking variation between regimes consisting of former rebels that show a quick re-lapse into civil war, and cases where they dominate post-war politics for decades leaves us with an important analytical puzzle.
3 Variation in the Political Stability of Post-Insurgent States

12 Following Risse (2012, p. 4), I underline that whether states actually enforce rules in practice is an empirical, not a definitional question.

13 There are exceptions to the rule however. For example, in Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels captured Freetown in 1997, but foreign diplomats continued to recognise a government in exile, and eventually the RUF was driven out of the capital by a multinational intervention force (Reno, 2011, p. 20). Reno (2011, p. 20) argues that overthrowing democratically elected governments likely disqualifies rebels for recognition.

After having outlined the main puzzle and existing scholarly explanations, this section turns to defining the paper’s core concepts and the outcome this paper aims to explain: variation in the political stability of post-insurgent states. Defining statehood is complicated however, as some scholars accentuate its de jure nature, while others emphasise its de facto characteristics (Jackson, 1990; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). Again, others have emphasised the differences between ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ sovereignty (Krasner, 1999, p. 4), or between the ‘image of the state’ and ‘practices of the state’, as mutually influencing dimensions of statehood (Midgall & Schlichte, 2005, p. 15). Collectively, scholarship on statehood draws attention to the legalistic aspects of the state, its symbols, language, idea and imagery, and its actual practices (Bliesernann de Guevara, 2015).

For the purpose of this paper, I follow a school though that focuses its definition on the de facto tenets of consolidated statehood (Baltasar, 2017a; Mann, 1984; Risse, 2012; Tilly, 1975, 1990; Weber, 1919). Peculiar to states in relation to other forms of social organisation is that institutions are enforced in a demarcated territory (Mann, 1984; Tilly, 1985; Weber, 1919). As Baltasar (2017a, p. 478) points out, ‘within their territories, states claim to be the highest and ultimate instance of rule-making and champion the task of hierarchically organising all alternative sets of institutions in such a way as to preclude them’. Risse (2012, p. 4) adds, ‘while no state governs hierarchically all the time, states at least possess the authority to make, implement, and enforce central decisions for a collectivity.’

3.1 Post-Insurgent Statehood

As stipulated, some rebel organisations manage to create a new de jure state, or capture an existing one. The recognition of victorious rebels as sovereign rulers of an existing state generally follows when they capture the capital city (Landau-Wells, 2018, pp. 133–135). Rebels are commonly able to convince foreign officials to recognise their sovereign status as government, even if they do little to actually govern (Herbst, 2014, p. 261; Reno, 2011, pp. 19–20).13 The recognition of rebels as sovereign rulers of a new state through secession is a more lengthy and complicated process, which generally depends on the parochial political preferences of other states in the international system and – importantly – the consent of the ‘home state’ (Coggins, 2016, pp. 7–8; Fazal & Griffiths, 2008, p. 206). Notably, also in these cases, de facto governance is no strict requirement for getting the de jure recognition of sovereignty (Coggins, 2016, p. 32; Herbst, 2014, p. 108).

When victorious rebels become recognised as a de jure government by other states in the UN system, we may speak of ‘post-insurgent statehood’, a term first coined by Clapham (1993, p. 184; 1996, p. 242). He argues that the most distinctive feature of post-insurgent states is the experience of warfare by the rebels-turned-incumbents, and the ‘constant reference to the legitimating myth of “the struggle”’, which shapes ‘the regime’s approach to government and in turn its relations with other states’ (Clapham, 1996, p. 242). Put simply, it implies the transition from a rebel organisation to an incumbent government. It is important to caution that the transition from insurgent movement to incumbent government does not necessarily imply the end of civil war. Indeed, in various civil wars where rebels were recognised as sovereign rulers, war continued as the new incumbents took office (Lyons, 2016b, p. 170; Reno, 2011, pp. 196–199). Hence, I prefer the term ‘post-insurgent’ over the term ‘post-war’ or ‘post-conflict’, since it describes the phenomenon this paper seeks to explain most accurately.

The degree to which post-insurgent states exhibit the de facto tenets of consolidated statehood varies across cases. Apart from consolidated states, we can observe areas of ‘limited statehood’ that ‘lack the capacity to implement and enforce central decisions and a monopoly on the use of force’ (Risse, 2011, p. 2). Although the de jure recognition of statehood by other states in the UN system is intact in these areas, there is a lack of what Krasner (1999, p. 4) describes as ‘domestic sovereignty’. This variation significantly affects the political stability of post-insurgent states.

3.2 Political Stability

Political stability is a somewhat fuzzy and contested concept (Ake, 1975; Huntington, 1973; Margolis, 2010). Yet, it generally refers to the ability of a political actor to curb violence and internal conflicts on the one hand, and to maintain its authority patterns on the other (Arrriola, 2009; Gates, Hegre, Jones, & Strand, 2006; Gurr, 1974; Levitsky & Murillo, 2009; Sheaffer & Shenav, 2012, p. 234). In the case of rebels-turned-incumbents, this points to their ability to control the use of violence within the state’s territory, and the durability of their rule. Two indicators measure the political stability of a post-insurgent state:

1. The non-continuation or non-recurrence of a civil war that threatens the central control of the state:14


Each of these indicators is grounded in our intuitive as well as academic understanding of what politically stable statehood entails (Gates et al., 2006; Gurr, 1974; Sheaffer & Shenav, 2012; Toft, 2010). The relapse of civil war and a forced removal of the post-insurgent government is most likely in the first few years after rebel victory (Call & Cousens, 2008; Collier & Sambanis, 2002; Mason et al., 2011). The most commonly used threshold for civil war recurrence is five years, but I agree with Toft (2009, p. 32) that a longer-term analysis of ten years allows for a more comprehensive grasp of stability after rebel victory. When rebel-turned-incumbent governments pass this ten-year threshold, I characterise the post-insurgent state as politically stable. Conversely, I characterise post-insurgent statehood as politically unstable when in this timeframe, civil war goes on or reoccurs, or the rebel-turned-incumbent is forcefully removed from power.
3.3 Governance

Delineating that civil war and forced regime change are not associated with political stability is insufficient to explain the striking variation in post-insurgent state trajectories. We also need to inquire into the causes of political stability. This is a more complicated endeavour, but there is a large body of scholarship that points to the quality and strength of governance structures (Hegre & Nygård, 2015; Sisk, 2013; Walter, 2015; Worrall, 2017). Following Risse (2011, p. 9) this paper understands governance as ‘institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods.’ This broad understanding of governance is particularly useful for the study of the political stability of post-insurgent states, because it allows for transcending state-centrism while concurrently capturing the ways in which a particular organisation governed during both its insurgent and post-insurgent period. To further unpack how governance provides stability we need to dissect two critical components of governance: organisations and institutions.

3.3.1 Organisations

Governance is dependent on organisations that have the power to govern. Organisations, understood as a group of individuals who in spite of their diverging preferences are ‘bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives’, range from internationally recognised governments to armed rebels and from multinational organisations to private companies and civil society groups (North, 1990, p. 5). The focus of this paper lies with rebel organisations, but I acknowledge that other organisations influence how governance structures are created and distributed (Kasfir et al., 2017, pp. 262-263). Building on the works of Kalyvas (2006, pp. 218-220), Duysters and Fumento (2010, p. 28), Mampilly (2011, p. 4), Kasfir (2015, p. 23), and Woldemariam (2018, pp. 23-24), I define a rebel organisation as a political-military non-governmental organisation that uses violence to challenge the authority of another political actor.15

3.3.2 Institutions

Organisations govern individuals through institutions, the part of governance that is most significant for understanding political stability (Arjona, 2014; Kohler & Zürcher, 2003; North, 1990, 1991). Why do institutions matter? In short, institutions matter because they are the rules of the game that structure human interactions. They consist of both formal rules, and informal norms and behavioural patterns that reduce uncertainty in political, economic, and social life. In the words of North (1990, p. 83), institutions ‘allow people to go about the everyday process of making exchanges without having to think out exactly the terms of an exchange at each point and in each instance.’ He furthermore argues that the combination of formal rules and informal norms and behavioural patterns ‘provides us with the comfortable feeling of knowing what we are doing and where we are going’ (North, 1990, p. 83). Together, these formal and informal constraints create order and predictability in human exchanges.

An important feature of institutions for the study of post-insurgent states is that they regulate conflict (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 726; Kohler & Zürcher, 2003, p. 247). Institutions offer rules and procedures to channel competing interests, and offer a structure to determine the outcome of those interactions. Consider how political institutions such as multi-party democracies, monarchies, autocratic political dynasties, and clientelism all create rules and procedures, albeit in different ways, to regulate who has the authority to rule. Importantly, institutions enforced by political actors such as national governments, local authorities, or indeed rebel movements, usually have means to punish defiance, thereby preventing conflicts to escalate into large scale violence. Policing bodies, and dispute institutions such as courts regulate social order within societies and can punish non-compliance with established rules and regulations (Arjona, 2018, p. 12). In addition to regulating conflicting interests, institutions also provide an incentive structure for different actors in society, and they structure the access to resources. Economic institutions such as barter, money, taxation mechanisms, and contracts channel ‘who gets what’ in society (Kohler & Zürcher, 2003, pp. 247-248). Reno (2003, p. 6) summarises that institutions, whether state or non-state, ‘are central to regulating who is prestigious, who gets resources, who is considered legitimate, and most important, who exercises coercion.’

3.4 Civil War and Multiple Sovereignty

The causes of civil war are multidimensional, but one key similarity across civil wars is that the existing framework of formal and informal institutions was unable to channel and regulate competing political interests in a non-violent way. Moreover, the institutions that make up North’s (1990, p. 3) societal rules of the game are often the main ‘object of violent contention’ (Balcets, 2015, p. 379). When insurgency gets off the ground, the control over territory becomes fragmented (Arjona, 2014, p. 1382; 2016, p. 43; Kalyvas, 2006, p. 88; McColl, 1968, p. 614). This condition of twofold sovereignty (Trotsky, 1965, p. 224), or ‘multiple sovereignty’ (Tilly, 1978, pp. 191-193), between government-held areas and rebel-held areas within a de jure state can hence be seen as a violent competition over rule hegemony.

The fundamental question for rebel movements is whether they can overcome the condition of multiple sovereignty. Can they expand their military power and transform it into political domination? Are they able to preside over political, economic, and social institutions that regulate competing societal interests? A close look at the past trajectories of victorious rebels shows that in some cases they are indeed able to build a functioning de facto state, after which, at a later point in time, the rebels got recognised as sovereign rulers. Yet, in other cases, rebels get de jure recognition in spite of their limited ability to govern. I argue that post-insurgent political stability is likely to prevail under the condition that rebel organisations manage to overcome the condition of multiple sovereignty, and establish a consolidated rule framework. Post-insurgent political instability on the other hand is to be expected under the condition that insurgency ends with a fragmented rule framework where the condition of multiple sovereignty persists.

15 Within the scope of this purposefully broad definition, rebel organisations display enormous heterogeneity in how they emerge, organise, and fund themselves, as well as the ideologies they adopt, the relationships they develop, the goals they pursue, and the tactics and strategies they use to achieve these ends (Arjona, 2016; Mampilly, 2011; Staniland, 2012, 2014; Weinstein, 2006). For a more elaborate definition of a rebel organisation see Woldemariam (2018, pp. 23-24).

16 Civil war can be defined as ‘armed combat taking place within the boundary of a recognized sovereign entity between parties that are subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities’ (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 5).
4 Theorising the Political Stability of Post-Insurgent States

In the previous section, I presented how the political stability of post-insurgent states varies. According to my analysis, there are essentially two possible outcomes when rebels are recognised as de jure rulers. Either rebels are able to overcome the condition of multiple sovereignty by establishing a consolidated rule framework that in turn causes political stability, or the condition of multiple sovereignty persists, which perpetuates a fragmented rule framework and political instability.

In this section I theorise under what conditions these forms of post-insurgent political order are likely to emerge. First, I illustrate how the institutional legacies of rebel governance affect post-insurgent political stability through various examples from sub-Saharan Africa. This is followed by the identification of two mechanisms that account for the different rule frameworks: institutional consolidation and institutional fragmentation. I provide a general theory of how these two countervailing mechanisms are linked to the identified outcomes. Thereafter, I explain in detail how the individual components of these mechanisms influence the direction of wartime institutional change (consolidation vs. fragmentation).

The first two factors consist of battlefield developments. These include the degree to which rival armed actors persist, and the degree of rebel territorial control. The latter two factors consider how rebel governance develops within areas under rebel control. These include the rebel movement’s organisational structure, and the interactions between rebel policies and pre-existing institutions. While these four factors may not be the only elements that affect the direction of institutional change, I find compelling evidence in both the insurgency and state formation literature that these factors are of major importance to explain variation in the political stability of post-insurgent statehood (Arjona, 2014; Balthasar, 2017a; Clapham, 1998a; Kalyvas, 2006; Kasfir, 2015; North, 1990; Olson, 1993; Risse, 2012; Staniland, 2014; Tilly, 1985, 1990; Woldemariam, 2018). To be sure, the identified outcomes are ideal types. In reality, political stability is a matter of degree. Yet, as I will demonstrate, these different ends of the spectrum do capture distinct realities of post-insurgent states.

4.1 Post-Insurgency and the Institutional Legacies of Rebel Governance

Rebel modes of governance need to adjust to new conditions when victorious insurgents get recognised as de jure rulers of a new or already existing state. The new dispensation changes societal expectations, politics gets a new degree of formality, if only because of the entry into the international state system, and the access to international markets and foreign donors increases the availability of external resources. This then creates new inequalities between the former insurgents. Some get accommodated in important government offices, while others get sidelined, or leave politics altogether. In short, my theory contends that the degree of wartime consolidation has important downstream effects for whether the victorious rebels can manage the transition to stable post-insurgent politics.

Consider how in Eritrea, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) defeated a rival rebel movement, expanded its territorial control, developed from a fragmented into a highly centralised organisation, and presided over pre-existing institutions in their base areas, all before defeating the Ethiopian Mengistu regime and claiming independence (Pool, 2001, p. xiv; Woldemariam, 2018, pp. 74-75). Pool (2001, p. 160) points out that after the de jure recognition of Eritrea, ‘the dual pressures arising from accommodating to broader social forces and the process of absorption into the international economy would severely test the [EPLF’s] principles of autonomy and self-reliance.’ However, ‘the gathering attributes of stateness by the EPLF during the liberation struggle provided some preparation for independence’, and the EPLF effectively remade Eritrea ‘in its image’ (Pool, 2001, pp. 159-160). Contrast this to South Sudan, where in the years prior to independence, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) did not fully defeat its armed rivals and instead tried to buy them off and co-opt them into an increasingly factionalised army (de Waal, 2014, pp. 355-356). Although the SPLM/A controlled substantial amounts of territory in Southern Sudan towards the end of the war (Arnold & LeRiche, 2012, p. xii), for governance it relied to a large extent on local chiefs and foreign NGOs (de Simone, 2018; Rolandseck, 2005). When the oil revenues to distribute patronage dried up, the SPLM/A leadership split, and two years after independence the world’s youngest state plunged into renewed civil war (de Waal, 2014; Wassara, 2015). While in Eritrea the EPLF effectively overcame the condition of multiple sovereignty and consolidated its rule prior to independence, in South Sudan multiple sovereignty and institutional fragmentation persisted.

The pathways from rebellion to post-insurgent statehood in Uganda and Ethiopia fall somewhere in between the experiences of Eritrea and South Sudan. In Uganda and Ethiopia, the disciplined, hierarchical wartime organisational structures of the National Resistance Army (NRA) and the Tigre People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) paved the way for the development of powerful authoritarian political parties that dominated politics after rebel victory (Lyons, 2016a, p. 1028). Post-insurgency, this facilitated amongst others the capture of resources from foreign donors by the government elite (Hagmann & Reynjó, 2016). Dorman (2006, p. 1097) explains that in such post-insurgent contexts, ‘access to spoils is (...) controlled and centralised. Promises made to fighters and civilians during the struggle need to be met, but it is the state, controlled by the liberation elite, which prioritises and accommodates the demands for meeting developmental goals. Their ideological legitimation, reinforced by the struggle and embodied in the reconfigured state, further structures their quest for hegemony.’ At the same time, both post-insurgent governments have struggled with controlling regions outside the state’s core areas and zones where they did not establish wartime territorial control, fueling ‘post-liberation contestation and instability’ (Dorman, 2006, p. 1093). The reign of Museveni in Uganda has been challenged by various insurgencies, most prominently by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda. In Ethiopia, the TPLF-dominated government coalition fought low-intensity conflicts with armed groups in the regions of Afar, Oromiya, and Ogaden. Although the post-insurgent rulers of Uganda and Ethiopia did not fully overcome the
condition of multiple sovereignty, they managed to control the state’s core and their regional support bases in large part due to their experience with wartime governance.

These cases show how different degrees of wartime institutional consolidation shape post-insurgent political stability. In abstracting the process that leads to these divergent outcomes, I identify two mechanisms: institutional consolidation and institutional fragmentation.

4.2 Institutional Consolidation

If consolidated rule frameworks foster post-insurgent political stability (Gates et al., 2006), we need to identify the conditions under which institutional consolidation by rebel organisations takes place. By institutional consolidation I mean that a rebel movement comes to preside over the societal ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990, p. 3), thereby shaping ‘the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction’ (North, 1991, p. 97). Along the lines of Przeworski (1991, p. 26), consolidation in short implies that the particular system of rebel-induced institutional arrangements has become ‘the only game in town’, irrespective of whether this is democratic, authoritarian, or a combination of both. It signifies that people within the rebel’s polity act according to their rules, including those political actors and supporters that previously (violently) opposed them.

The challenge for rebel organisations of consolidating their rule is enormous. Even though rebel organisations may aspire to become the political hegemon that presides over the societal rules of the game, other armed actors and civilians are likely to push back in civil war, hindering the rebels to consolidate their rule (Arjona, 2016, p. 63). Kalyvas (2006, p. 38) stipulates that the political competition in civil war is far greater than in peacetime, and ‘the stakes are incomparably higher for everyone involved.’ As I will demonstrate, overcoming these constraints requires rebel movements to defeat, coerce, or co-opt rival armed actors, control territory, establish an integrated organisational structure, and preside over pre-existing institutions. Each of these four factors pushes towards institutional consolidation, which in turn causes post-insurgent political stability.

It is worth pointing out that the mechanism of institutional consolidation facilitates what Podder (2017) refers to as ‘quasi-voluntary’ compliance, ‘a willingness to comply (...) [that is] backed up by coercion, in order to ensure that others will obey the ruler’ (Podder, 2017, p. 688). A key consequence of this compliance with rebel rule is that it makes governance less costly, and over time fosters a rule framework that is self-enforcing (Gates et al., 2006, p. 895; Podder, 2017, p. 687; Risse & Stollenwerk, 2018, p. 408). The self-enforcing logic implies that political actors and civilians are prone to follow the rebel-induced institutional framework, and lack the capacity to undermine or subvert it. Institutional consolidation thus effectively constrains the behaviour of the governed. The compliance with rebel rule can develop into what Gramsci sees as the hegemony of the modern state. Hegemony, in his view, refers to ‘the “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12). People then broadly come to accept the political authority of a ruler, in this case a rebel organisation. When rebel movements manage to become recognised as a de jure government, the mechanism of institutional consolidation is likely to curb violence and diminish the chances of civil war recurrence. It is also likely to shield the post-insurgent government from being forcefully removed from power. Hence, it facilitates politically stable post-insurgent statehood.

4.3 Institutional Fragmentation

At the other end of the spectrum of civil war outcomes, we find fragmented rule frameworks. If we accept that this outcome is prone to post-insurgent political instability (Gates et al., 2006), it is important to identify which conditions lead to institutional fragmentation. The key lies in the condition of civil war. As stipulated, a defining characteristic of civil war is that the control over territory becomes fragmented, generally resulting in government-held and rebel-held areas (Arjona, 2014, p. 1362; 2016, p. 43; Kalyvas, 2006, p. 88; McColl, 1969, p. 814). Although in some cases rebel organisations manage to overcome this situation of multiple sovereignty, and consolidate their rule, in other instances they fail, only do so in part, or are not interested in institutional consolidation altogether, but get de jure recognition nevertheless. For example, in south-central Somalia, various armed factions provided little if any governance during war, and when they overthrew the crumbling Siad Barre regime in 1991 they were unable to establish a durable central government in Mogadishu (Clapham, 1998a, 2017).

We can observe the mechanism of institutional fragmentation when rival armed actors prevail, rebel movements have limited territorial control, are unable to create an integrated organisational structure, and receive effective resistance from actors with interests in pre-existing institutions. This institutional fragmentation can operate across two axes, namely 1) in terms of the territorial reach of institutions within the state’s territory, and 2) in terms of specific policy areas (see also Risse & Stollenwerk, 2018, p. 408). A plethora of studies have referred to fragmented rule frameworks with concepts such as ‘hybrid political orders’ (Boege et al., 2008), ‘twilight institutions’ (Lund, 2006), ‘mediated statelessness’ (Menkhau, 2006/07), ‘negotiated statehood’ (Hagmann & Péclard, 2010), and ‘limited statehood’ (Risse, 2012). Although these concepts each have their own distinctive features, in essence they all signal that the behaviour of people under such conditions is guided by a plurality of overlapping, and at times, competing set of rules and governance actors.

These fragmented systems of governance can provide a modicum of stability as long as a ruler is able to control the state’s core, but it is important to point out that the space for people to ignore, undermine and subvert post-insurgent rule is far greater than under consolidated rule frameworks. Ceteris paribus, when in spite of this fragmentation of political power rebel...
organisations manage to turn into an incumbent government, post-insurgent statehood is politically unstable with a greater likelihood of civil war recurrence and forced regime change.

4.4 Between Consolidation and Fragmentation

Empirical pathways from rebellion to post-insurgent statehood do not unfold in a predictable linear fashion. Rather, we may expect both forces pushing towards institutional consolidation and institutional fragmentation across space and time within one civil war (see also Balthasar, 2017b, p. 68). Therefore, it makes sense to depict in more detail how exactly rival armed actors, the control over territory, the organisational structure of a rebel movement, and the interactions between rebel policies and pre-existing institutions affect the direction of institutional change (consolidation vs. fragmentation). As I will demonstrate, for all these factors there are influences that push toward institutional consolidation or away from it.

4.5 Battlefield Developments

The first two factors, rival armed actors and territorial control, consider battlefield developments. They shape whether and to what extent it is possible for rebels to govern civilians and consolidate their rule.

4.5.1 Rival Armed Actors

Defeating or co-opting rival armed actors such as incumbent governments, paramilitary forces, or other rebel organisations is vital for rebel organisations to consolidate their rule. If successful, it facilitates institutional consolidation. As Levitsky and Murillo (2009, p. 122) point out, ‘new institutional arrangements are most likely to endure where rule writers either (a) gain the acceptance of powerful actors and groups who remain outside the rule-writing process or (b) decisively defeat major opponents, thereby destroying their capacity to overturn the rules in the future.’ They furthermore point out that if neither occurs, ‘powerful actors who lose out under the new institutional arrangements are likely to work to overturn them as soon as they are in a position to do so’ (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009, p. 122). As many scholars have argued, militarily defeating rival armed actors is the most secure position for rebel movements to consolidate their rule, and hence provides for political stability. As Zeigler (2016, p. 24) demonstrates, ‘the combination of competitive alliances and a military victory strongly precipitates a resumption of hostilities.’ This perpetuation of the ‘conflict trap’ proves especially pronounced when rebels win wars. This illustrates that in addition to defeating or co-opting rival armed actors, establishing an integrated organisational structure is vital for rebel movements to consolidate their rule and secure political stability (see also Piccolino, 2018). This aspect will be further addressed in the later section on the organisational structure of rebel movements.

4.5.2 Territorial Control

The enforcement of rebel institutions is key to the consolidation of rebel rule. For enforcement to be effective, rebel organisations need to control territory (Arjona, 2016, p. 11; Kalyvas, 2006, p. 132). As Kalyvas (2006, p. 132) put it, ‘control has a clear territorial foundation: rule presupposes a constant and credible armed presence – a fact well understood by practitioners.’ Areas where rebels have full territorial control facilitate institutional consolidation. In these territories, often referred to as ‘liberated zones’ or ‘base areas’, rebels can most effectively govern civilians through a mix of coercion and persuasion, because other conflict parties cannot easily interfere with rebel rule (Förster, 2015, p. 204; Kasfir et al., 2017, pp. 269-270; Wood, 2003, pp. 236-241).

Conversely, a lack of rebel territorial control or influence facilitates institutional fragmentation, because other armed political actors are able to govern civilians in ways different from the rebels. Indeed, without some degree of territorial control, enforcement is extremely difficult – if not impossible (Kalyvas, 2006). It simply leaves too much room for civilians to ignore or violate the rebels’ institutions, and hence facilitates institutional fragmentation.

In between zones of full and no territorial control, we can find zones of contested control (Kalyvas, 2006). In these areas the enforcement of rebel rule is more challenging than in areas of full control, because the rebels’ adversaries will compete over who presides over societal institutions (Kasfir, 2015, pp. 38-39). However, sometimes, somewhat counterintuitively, rebels cooperate with state agents in these areas and mutually benefit from co-managing state institutions (Staniland, 2012, p. 248; Stel, 2017, p. 349; Sweet, 2017, p. 422). If the rebel organisation succeeds in winning over the support of the civilian population it may contribute to the consolidation of rebel rule, but as long as other armed actors persist the insurgent movement is vulnerable to be challenged militarily.

17 Although e.g. private organisations may enforce rules without any territorial control, the key is that they can only do so because an armed organisation (the incumbent government, rebels etc.) that presides over the institutional framework allows them to.
A clear example comes from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, who created ‘the one person per family rule’ as a recruitment mechanism, which in effect tied every family to the movement, and in turn induced civilian compliance (Terpstra & Fearns, 2017, p. 288; 2018, p. 1018).

### 4.5.3 Shifts in Territorial Control

During civil war, territorial control shifts because of gains and losses on the battlefield. In these highly adverse conditions, the core objective of civilians and combatants that overrides all others is survival (Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 116-117; Woldemariam, 2018, p. 42). When rebel organisations lose significant territory, they are more prone to organisational fragmentation, because the credibility of the movement to protect its members is imperilled (Woldemariam, 2018, pp. 43-44). As a result, the ability of rebel movements to shape political, economic, and social interaction naturally diminishes.

However, also when rebels win significant territory, their movement is prone to organisational fragmentation. The incentives to cooperate in a rebel movement change significantly when the danger emanating from the rival armed actor diminishes. Divergent preferences of members of the movement emerge that heretofore had not, because the core objective of survival tied them together (Woldemariam, 2018, p. 42; Zegler, 2016, p. 39). The organisational fragmentation resulting from these divergent preferences negatively affects the ability of rebels to dominate the institutional framework in their newly conquered areas. In sum, both scenarios of significant territorial gains and losses facilitate institutional fragmentation.

### 4.5.4 Territorial Control Stalemates

Periods of a territorial stalemate, or slow, marginal shifts in rebel territorial control, tend to promote cohesion and stability in rebel organisations (Woldemariam, 2018, pp. 44-45), which in turn allows them to govern people’s behaviour in a fairly predictable manner that facilitates institutional consolidation. Under these conditions, cooperation between members of a rebel movement is incentivised, because they perceive that there is significant insecurity emanating from their armed rival and they are uncertain about their survival. At the same time, however, the members perceive there is a reasonable chance that the rebel organisation can meet the goal of survival as long as they work together (Woldemariam, 2018, p. 44). This organisational cohesion positively affects the rebels’ ability to intervene in political, economic, and social interactions. Moreover, civilian compliance is also incentivised under these conditions, which over time, creates a rule framework that is self-enforcing.

When rebel movements effectively shield civilians from other armed actors, protect them from threats within the territory controlled by the rebels, and adjudicate disputes among civilians, it facilitates the emergence of a social contract between the rebels and civilians (Arjona, 2016, p. 48; Wickham-Crowley, 1987, p. 473). Moreover, when control is sustained, the rebel organisation has exclusive access to recruit new fighters from the people in the territory they administer. This often ‘generates cascades of support because the families of fighters tend to support the armed factions where their younger members are fighting’ (Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 125-126). When rebels preserve territorial control, civilian compliance can be further strengthened when civilians form the expectation that the rebels will likely win the war. Civilian compliance is then directly related to the perceived dominance of the rebels and the calculation of civilians that obeying them will increase their chances of survival (Kalyvas, 2006; Woldemariam, 2018). In addition, preserving territorial control makes possible the provision of a wide range of public goods to civilians, which in turn can generate loyalty and a sense of legitimacy to the rebels as rulers (Kasfir et al., 2017, p. 269; Mampilly, 2011, p. 55). Under these conditions, we can observe the two main tenets of governance: the enforcement of rules, and the provision of public goods to protect its members (Risse, 2012). The rules may include things such as penalties on denouncing the rebels, taxation, a curfew, and recruitment mechanisms, while the public goods may encompass the provision of education, healthcare, and humanitarian aid (Arjona et al., 2015). Finally, controlling territory makes it possible for rebel organisations to develop administrative systems that facilitate monitoring, surveilling, and controlling the civilian population. For example, by setting up detailed lists of who lives where it becomes easier to crush dissent, and punish defectors, thereby putting significant costs on civilian non-compliance (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 128). Altogether, the condition of a territorial stalemate or slow shifts in territorial control facilitates institutional consolidation that over time becomes self-enforcing.

### 4.6 Rebel Governance

Within rebel-controlled territories, insurgents can establish rebel governance. The character and scope of rebel governance depends firstly on the organisational structure of a rebel movement, and secondly, on the interactions between rebel policies and pre-existing institutions.

#### 4.6.1 The Organisational Structure of Rebel Movements

The organisational structure of a rebel movement significantly affects its ability to rule. This structure is in essence a reflection of the horizontal ties between the leaders of a rebel organisation and the vertical ties to their followers (Staniland, 2014, p. 9). When these ties are strong and rule-bound, we can observe cohesion and discipline within the movement, reflected in an integrated organisational structure. This is first and foremost important for the rebel movement’s endurance. Woldemariam (2018, p. 183) emphasises that ‘rebels’ organisations are, at their core, institutions designed to mitigate risk and guarantee survival in war.’ Moreover, as Huntington (1968, p. 23) points out, ‘numbers, weapons, and strategy all count in war, but major deficiencies in any one of those may still be counterbalanced by superior cohesion and discipline.’ The importance of maintaining cohesion when organising insurgency is also recognised by its most illustrious twentieth-century practitioners, such as Vladimir Lenin, Mao Tse-Tung, Che Guevara, Amilcar Cabral, and Vo Nguyen Giap (see Woldemariam, 2018, pp. 7-11). Illustrative of this concern is Mao Tse-Tung’s number one rule of guerrilla warfare: ‘All actions are subject to command’ (Tse-Tung, 1989, p. 92).

In addition to survival, insurgent leaders have recognised that an integrated organisational structure is also essential in order to gain civilian support in rebel-held areas. Mao Tse-Tung explains the relationship of rebels and
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...discipline in securing civilian support for the rebels’ cause (Guevara, 2001, p. 108). Inspired by the works of these insurgency practitioners, as well as those who fought colonisation and white-minority rule, a generation of late-twentieth century African rebels came to fight military dictators across the continent (Fanon, 1963; Reno, 2011). Educated at the University of Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Addis Ababa University, insurgent leaders such as Yoweri Museveni, John Garang, Isaias Afwerki, and Meles Zenawi came to recognise that disciplined rebels are best equipped to reach military victory and win over the popular support of the civilian population (see e.g. Museveni, 1997; Reno, 2011).

In Uganda, for example, a Code of Conduct was developed for NRA fighters in 1981, which defined clearly ‘the organizational relationship between the various constituent parts of the movement’, as well as ‘the relationship between the insurgents and the civilian population’ (Ngoga, 1998, p. 102). Harsh public penalties were imposed on those NRA members that mistreated civilians.

The recognition of these rebel leaders that they needed to gain the social acceptance of the right to rule reflects what Risse and Stollenwerk (2018, p. 412) refer to as ‘empirical legitimacy’, which they see as a key condition for effective governance. An integrated organisational structure facilitates the process of gaining this acceptance, because members of the organisation can be held to account for their actions. An integrated organisational structure also makes it easier to rule in a similar fashion between localities, because central decisions can be implemented locally. In sum, integrated organisational structures facilitate institutional consolidation when rebel movements are interested in gaining the support of civilians.

Not all rebel leaders are able or interested in developing an integrated organisational structure and gaining the support of civilians in the areas under their control (Reno, 1998, 2011, 2015; Weinstein, 2006). The reasons for fragmentation in rebel movements may be grounded in a reliance on material resources rather than civilian support (Weinstein, 2006), pre-war networks (Staniland, 2012), patronage and foreign involvement (Reno, 2011), or significant territorial gains and losses on the battlefield (Woldemariam, 2018). These dynamics result in weak ties between either the leaders of rebellion and/or to their followers. When there is open conflict between the leaders of rebellion, or they have trouble with controlling their fighters, it becomes more difficult to keep the movement together, let alone rule in a similar fashion across territories and over time (Staniland, 2014; Woldemariam, 2018; Zeigler, 2016). Moreover, rebel fighters can more easily get away with predatory behaviour towards civilians, which in turn makes it harder to enforce institutions based on more than mere coercion (Weinstein, 2006). This is an unpromising position to shape and enforce institutions that govern people’s behaviour. In short, fragmentation in the organisational structure of a rebel movement facilitates institutional fragmentation.

4.6.2 Rebel Policies and Pre-existing Institutions

The policies and institutions rebel organisations seek to enforce in the territories they control interact with pre-existing institutional frameworks (Arjona, 2014; 2016; North, 1990; Sweet, 2017). These rules in place prior to the arrival of the rebel group essentially consist of formal state institutions, and local informal institutions. The rules imposed by rebel organisations can diverge from, or converge with, these pre-existing institutional frameworks (Helmeke & Levitsky, 2004), which in turn facilitates either institutional consolidation or institutional fragmentation.

When thinking about the rules rebels enforce we intuitively assume institutional change, since rebel movements themselves are often the prime advocates of ‘revolution’. If the case, the rules and role relationships they enforce would depart significantly from older institutional arrangements, especially from those purported by the government they are fighting. Also in relation to communities in the areas they control we would expect changes in for example land reform, wealth distribution, and a rearrangement of political power at the local level. Following Helmeke and Levitsky (2004), I call these changes institutional divergences, which can either be competing with, or accommodating pre-existing institutions.

At the same time, somewhat counterintuitively, we can see institutional continuity in zones under rebel control (Stel, 2017; Sweet, 2017). North (1990, p. 36) observes that ‘revolution or military conquest and subjugation, certainly produces new outcomes. But what is most striking (although seldom observed, particularly by advocates of revolution) is the persistence of so many aspects of a society in spite of a total change in the rules.’ In addition, Hoffmann (2015, p. 159) points out that ‘no matter how radical the political vision of a rebel group, its practices are always embedded in historically contingent values, norms, beliefs, and forms of governance.’ Apart from divergences we can thus also expect institutional convergences, which can either be complementary to, or substitutive of, pre-existing institutions (Helmeke & Levitsky, 2004). How do these divergences and convergences facilitate institutional consolidation or institutional fragmentation?

The rebels’ perception on the relative strength of pre-existing rules and the organisations that enforce them incentivises different rebel strategies. This does not imply that members of a rebel organisation act in fully rational ways. Indeed, they operate in a context of incomplete information; in what von Clausewitz has famously called ‘the fog of war’ (Clausewitz, 1899). In spite of the limited information, and differences in individual skills of insurgent leaders, they will generally seek to employ what they view as the best course of action to survive and manage risk, and adjust their strategy accordingly (Woldemariam, 2018, p. 44). In the writings of Mao, references to these strategic calculations in civil war are omnipresent. As a general guideline, he asserts, ‘we must not attack an objective we are not certain of winning’ (Tse-Tung, 1989, p. 112). It is important to note that how rebel leaders view the relative strength of their movement is likely to change over time, depending on developments on the battlefield. What may have seemed as an impossible course of action at the onset of civil war may become more feasible as war progresses.

20 Strick van Linschoten (2016, p. 132) argues in a similar vein in his study of the Afghan Taliban that, ‘Despite the common adage that the Taliban were a revolutionary movement, a closer look at the governance structures they attempted to put in place shows much continuity as well. The Emirata’s government echoed the government system of King Zahir Shah’s era, the state apparatus of Burhanuddin Rabbani and even the Communist-era government.’
I isolate four different strategies that emanate from a calculation between the intentions of rebel rule vis-à-vis the relative strength of pre-existing institutions (convergence vs. divergence). The strategies rebel leaders adopt based on these assessments are to compete with, substitute, accommodate, and/or complement pre-existing institutions. These interactions lead to different mechanisms and outcomes in terms of political stability.

4.6.3 Weak Pre-existing Institutions

Under conditions that rebel leaders see pre-existing institutions as relatively weak they will seek to compete with, or substitute, pre-existing institutions. Rebel commanders are likely to compete with a pre-existing institution when they calculate that it creates incentives that directly violates rebel rules, and the actors that enforce them are seen as weaker than the rebel movement. Kasfir (2005) explains how the NRA in Uganda ousted Obote government institutions in the areas it came to control. ‘To demonstrate its political credentials in opposition to an unpopular government, the NRA forced chiefs, UPC officials and youth wingers to flee. Some were kidnapped and others killed’ (Kasfir, 2005, p. 280). Moreover, ‘with the departure of government chiefs, [NRA] clandestine committees had become the only form of civilian governance in the villages (…)’ (Kasfir, 2005, p. 287). Competing with pre-existing institutions that directly violate rules of the rebels is a costly strategy for rebel organisations, as it always requires some degree of violence or coercion. However, if effective and sustained, it fosters institutional consolidation and politically stable post-insurgent statehood, because it allows rebel organisations to intervene deeply in political, economic, and social affairs.

Rebel organisations do not always manage to win competitions over diverging rule frameworks. In most civil wars, civilians resist part of rebel rule, and in some cases, they manage to effectively resist rebel institutions altogether. Partial civilian resistance is common in all civil wars, akin to what Scott (1985) labels ‘everyday resistance’. Under these circumstances, rebels may not even note all the ways in which civilian resist them. It can include things as a youngster disobeying a curfew, a shopkeeper closing his shop to not sell goods to a rebel, or a person demanding to stop the harassment of fighters towards civilians (Arjona, 2015, pp. 183-184). These minor challenges to aspects of rebel rule is not a threat for the institutional consolidation of rebel organisations, as it always requires some degree of violence or coercion. Under conditions that rebel leaders see pre-existing institutions as relatively weak they will seek to compete with, or substitute, pre-existing institutions. Rebel leaders are likely to opt for this strategy when they see that although the pre-existing institution creates incentives to behave in ways that alter the effect of rules imposed by the rebels, it does not directly violate them. Especially, when it is a deeply socially embedded local institution, allowing the institution to persist is stability enhancing (at least in the short term) as it dampens civilian demands for change and secures popular support (Helms & Levitsky, 2004). The relation of the TPLF to the Ethiopian church clearly illustrates this dynamic. Berhe (2006, pp. 301-302) notes that ‘there was no doubt that [the TPLF] wanted to subdivide the church to its cause’, but the ‘pragmatic TPLF [also] understood the church’s role in village social life and its support for the unity of the country.’ Although the TPLF wanted to nationalise the land owned by priests, ‘threatened by mass resistance, the TPLF tolerated [their] continued ownership (…) and in fact used it as a means of justifying its recognition of the importance of the church.’ Pool (1998, p. 30) finds in a similar vein that EPLF cadres in Eritrea ‘despite their clear programme, were relatively cautious in introducing reforms of traditional village social and economic structures, and pragmatic in the timing of their introduction.’ Pragmatically accommodating pre-existing institutions that do not match the rebels’ exact vision on how to govern, but also do not directly threaten the movement can thus foster political stability.

Strong Pre-existing Institutions

A second strategy for rebel organisations is trying to substitute pre-existing institutions. Rebel movements will likely choose this strategy when they see pre-existing institutions as relatively weak, but their own intentions of ruling converge with these pre-existing rules. Rebel institutions then seek outcomes compatible with what pre-existing rules were designed for, but failed to achieve (Helms & Levitsky, 2004). The implementation of a public health programme by the EPLF in Eritrea is an illustrative example. Connell (2001, p. 387) explains that ‘perhaps the most effective project [of the EPLF] in the first half of the 1980s (…) was the public health programme under which scores of traditional village health workers and midwives were given special training and linked into a national network of preventive and curative medicine. Throughout, the watchword was self-reliance: doing more with less.’ This example shows that when a pre-existing institution is weak, rebel organisations can effectively implement rules that converge with, and substitute the pre-existing institution. It achieves what the earlier institution intended to do but could not achieve, and facilitates institutional consolidation, which in turn fosters political stability.
secure popular support (see also Kasfir, 2005). The ‘institutional layering’ (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; van der Heijden, 2011) that results from such accommodating arrangements creates an ambiguous direction of institutional change however. While theoretically, we may claim the rebel movement has less control over shaping people’s behaviour in a certain realm, at the same time it can dampen resistance that would arise if rebels would actively compete. The space this opens up is likely to lead rebel organisations to consolidate their rule in other realms of human interactions deemed more important, such as the control over violence and resources.

A final strategy rebel movements adopt is to complement certain pre-existing institutions. They will likely do so when they calculate that existing rules are relatively strong and converge with their own intentions. The pre-existing institutions then “fill in gaps” in the rebel’s institutional framework. Under these circumstances, pre-existing institutions do not merely exist alongside rebel institutions, but they play a key role in making effective the rebels’ modes of governance, even though they do not directly shape them themselves (Holmke & Levitsky, 2004). A clear example is the use of local chiefs in the system of governance established by the SPLM/A in South Sudan.Rolandsen (2005, p. 29) explains that in the period 1983-1991, the SPLM/A relied mostly on the old colonial system of indirect rule for governing the civilian population. ‘The SPLM/A had to rely on the chiefs and their authority for government at the local level: the chiefs collected taxes, presided over local courts, and provided recruits and labour’ (Rolandsen, 2005, p. 32). Moreover, at the movement’s first National Convention in 1994, the position of the chiefs was formalised in the administrative structure of the SPLM/A (Johnson, 1998, p. 69). In addition to the local chiefs, the SPLM/A has repeatedly sought the support of foreign NGOs and governments to complement its system of rule. As de Simone (2018, p. 409) points out, ‘the “lack-of-capacity” and the “lack-of-resources” have become mantras for justifying the SPLM elite’s continued requests of support from the donor community to strengthen the movement’s structures and presence on the ground.’ The SPLM/A system of governance has been complementary to the local chiefs and the support from foreign actors, and the movement’s elite has for the most part effectively subordinated these other institutions to its rule. As may be clear, this is a cost-effective strategy for rebels, since it requires relatively little effort on their behalf. Yet, also here, the institutional layering of rebel rule with pre-existing institutions creates a risk for institutional fragmentation to occur because the insurgent movement has less control over these institutions. At the same time, outsourcing the enforcement of certain institutions to other actors may lead rebels to consolidate their rule in other realms. The key with both accommodating and complementary institutional arrangements is that the rebel movement needs to preside over them for institutional consolidation to take place. When rebel organisations rule civilians in the areas they control, we can expect the rule framework to consist of a complex configuration of competing, substituting, accommodating, and complementary institutional arrangements between policies and rules introduced by the rebels, and institutions in place prior to the rebels’ arrival. Forces pushing towards institutional consolidation and institutional fragmentation are hence likely to take place alongside each other in different realms of political, economic, and social life. Importantly, rebel strategies towards pre-existing institutions may vary geographically, and can change over time, from complementary to substituting arrangements, for example, or from accommodating to competing arrangements. In the end, presiding over pre-existing institutions is a necessary condition to facilitate institutional consolidation.
When victorious rebels transform into a de jure government, either because they take over power in an already existing state or manage to create a new one through secession, the institutional legacies of rebel governance shape the post-insurgent period. These institutional legacies of the ways in which rebels governed during war provide the constraints and opportunities for post-insurgent governments to regulate political, economic, and social interactions. As I have argued, post-insurgent political stability is likely to prevail under the condition that rebel organisations manage to overcome the condition of multiple sovereignty and establish a consolidated rule framework, while post-insurgent political instability on the other hand is to be expected under the condition that insurgency ends with a fragmented rule framework and multiple sovereignty persists. Studying this variation in post-insurgent political order is important as it captures distinct modes of politics and violence that are experienced by those living under the rule of these governments.

We can observe the mechanism of institutional consolidation when rebels effectively defeat or co-opt rival armed actors, control the state’s territory, establish an integrated organisational structure, and preside over pre-existing institutions. These conditions contribute to politically stable post-insurgent state trajectories. The countervailing mechanism of institutional fragmentation can be observed when rival armed actors persist, when the rebels’ organisational structure is fragmented, when they have limited territorial control, and when they do not manage to preside over pre-existing institutions. The combination of these conditions paves the way for unstable post-insurgent state trajectories that are more vulnerable to civil war recurrence and forced regime change. Between these two ends of the spectrum of possible outcomes, there is a broad middle ground in which we can expect certain developments to push towards institutional consolidation while others push towards fragmentation. Assessing the identified factors first individually, and then in relation to each other and over time, allows us to see the different trajectories from rebellion to post-insurgent statehood.

The paper’s main contribution to the literatures on institutions, rebel governance, and state formation is theorising the connection between insurgent governance and degrees of post-insurgent political stability. Moreover, it shows what rebel governance does as an independent variable, rather than a dependent variable. In other words, instead of analysing the causes of rebel governance it turns the analytical lens to its consequences. Future comparative empirical research is needed to reveal which institutional legacies remain, why, and how they transform after insurgency ends. This can include analysing how political institutions evolve, such as party structures and local authorities, but also economic institutions related to revenue collection and taxation, or institutions regulating social order such as courts and local dispute mechanisms. Although this paper primarily draws on cases from sub-Saharan Africa, the framework may also be of use for cases elsewhere.

The paper also raises a number of questions. Most importantly, for how long does the echo of rebel victory resonate after war ends? After all, while the stability that wartime institutional consolidation can bring about is real, it is by no means permanent, nor necessarily positive for the citizens of post-insurgent states. Several post-insurgent rulers in sub-Saharan Africa are haunted by the inevitability of political succession, but their unwillingness to institutionalise succession mechanisms, has led in several post-insurgent states to an increasingly exclusionary form of politics (Clapham, 2012, p. 11; Dorman, 2008, p. 1099). Clapham (2012, p. 10) points out that ‘movements that were themselves non-democratic in origin, regardless of the popular aspirations that they embodied, can scarcely be expected to promote democracy.’ While exactly this institutional legacy of rebellion, authoritative leadership, is vital to secure military victory, over time it becomes difficult to reconcile with societal demands and expectations. As the memory of rebel victory fades, clinging on to the mythical achievement of liberation and grand visions of state development has its limits when political reforms are evaded. The Achilles’ heel of several post-insurgent rulers is that by clinging on to power by whatever means necessary they eventually undermine the states they were supposedly building. Peaceful political protest, as witnessed in recent years in several African post-insurgent states, may — although not without risks — provide a countervailing force to hold such rulers to account.

5 Concluding Remarks

When victorious rebels transform into a de jure government, either because they take over power in an already existing state or manage to create a new one through secession, the institutional legacies of rebel governance shape the post-insurgent period. These institutional legacies of the ways in which rebels governed during war provide the constraints and opportunities for post-insurgent governments to regulate political, economic, and social interactions. As I have argued, post-insurgent political stability is likely to prevail under the condition that rebel organisations manage to overcome the condition of multiple sovereignty and establish a consolidated rule framework, while post-insurgent political instability on the other hand is to be expected under the condition that insurgency ends with a fragmented rule framework and multiple sovereignty persists. Studying this variation in post-insurgent political order is important as it captures distinct modes of politics and violence that are experienced by those living under the rule of these governments.

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