Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Post-Transition DRC – Prospects for Stability

Country Risk Profile 2006
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Abstract

This Country Risk Profile discusses the main challenges which a newly-elected government in the DRC will face. It also looks at the successes and failures of the transition government, and how its performance will influence the post-transition period in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This paper argues that the transition government’s failure to complete the process of integrating the various rebel factions into one national army has created a dangerous legacy for a new government. While the DRC lacks a unified, trained and properly-sourced national army, domestic armed groups such as the various Ituri militia will continue to undermine stability. Spoiler armies will also continue to present a threat to the consolidation of democracy in the country. This problem is already particularly acute in North and South Kivu provinces where elements of the former Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) remain opposed to the transition and peace process. The absence of a strong domestic armed force will also leave the DRC vulnerable to interference from its neighbors, especially Rwanda and Uganda.

This paper argues that whoever wins the election will face an uphill battle to out the country back on track. Much will depend on how a new president constitutes his new government; a strongly technocratic government that is also inclusive of the main political factions is most desirable; however it is doubtful that either Joseph Kabila or Jean-Pierre Bemba will choose to out national interests above their own and those of their main political supporters.
1. Preface

The present report is a Country Risk Profile published by FAST International, the Early Warning Program of swisspeace. In the following lines, we would like to point out briefly the focus and main aim of this paper.

FAST International’s core task is the early warning of violent conflict with the aim of linking it to early action in order to prevent crisis situations from deteriorating and to identify “windows of opportunity” for the purpose of peacebuilding. FAST uses a combined methodology in order to analyze developments in the countries/regions of concern, and regularly produces three types of publications on the 25 countries/regions monitored:

FAST’s Analytical Frameworks point out the single factors – root, proximate causes and intervening factors - which may negatively or positively impact on a conflict situation. By applying this tool, the analysts of FAST continuously update the status of developments in the countries/regions monitored.

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FAST’s annual Country Risk Profiles are in-depth studies which focus on core issues that influence the development and shape the degree of conflictivity in a country/region. Country Risk Profiles also place emphasis on discussing strategic options. These options are directed at end-users of FAST International products and shall hopefully be incorporated into their ongoing decision making process.

We wish that this paper will provide you with food for thought on the further developments and the necessary steps to take in order to resolve current problems and crises by peaceful means.
2. Introduction

The last year has been one of enormous transformation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the country is now only weeks away from the end of the transition period, which will culminate in the second-round of presidential elections, due to be held on October 29. New institutions have been gradually put into place over the course of the last twelve months, starting with the constitution which was adopted by a majority of voters in a national referendum at the end of 2005, and which was officially adopted in parliament in February 2006.

In late July, the first round of presidential elections was held in tandem with parliamentary elections, resulting in a run-off between President Joseph Kabila and Vice-President Jean Pierre Bemba which is now scheduled to take place on October 29. Parliamentary elections did not yield a majority for any one party, and the creation of alliances is ongoing. The new constitution stipulates that the majority party in parliament appoint the prime minister, a position that has been created by the new constitution, so competition to win the majority remains fierce. The 500-person parliament was inaugurated in September, and is the first democratically-elected parliament since 1960.

The run-up to the presidential run-off is expected to be tense. The announcement that Mr Kabila did not win the elections outright, was followed by two days of fighting between the rival camps in the capital Kinshasa in which over 20 people were killed. Subsequent calls for calm have been heeded so far and the city has been declared a no-weapons zone. The European Union Force (Eufor) and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) will start night patrols in the coming weeks to prevent opportunistic clashes between rival troops loyal to the candidates.

While these are prudent measures to take, and the residents of Kinshasa have been reassured of their safety, there is little doubt that no matter who wins the presidential election, the loser will engage in spoiler behavior, most likely by resorting to violence. This will have both short and long-term repercussions for the country, which are outlined in greater detail in the scenarios section of the report. Either way, the winner will have his work cut out for him. Huge tasks lie ahead, such as the completion of the military integration programme, and the longer-term aim of creating a professional army; the reconstruction of the country’s destroyed health and education services; tackling large-scale and deeply-entrenched corruption; jump-starting the economy; ensuring that the booming mining sector is managed to the benefit of the country; and, above all, creating a national government of unity prepared to tackle these many challenges. The success of the latter project depends on the new president’s willingness to include representatives of the various political parties and camps in his government, and to ensure that there is a critical mass of technocrats capable of managing the many tasks ahead.
3. Step by Step Towards Elections

3.1 The New Constitution

The referendum on the new constitution was held in late 2005. An estimated three quarters of the close to 24 million registered voters participated in the referendum. In early January, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) announced that 845 of votes had voted to adopt the new constitution. The adoption of the constitution did not come as any great surprise; however, there was some controversy about whether or not the population had been sufficiently informed about the details of the constitution. Only several hundred thousand copies of the draft constitution were circulated and the information campaign only ran for two weeks, prompting many to say that the population did not know what it was voting for or against.

Aside from the transition constitution, this is the country’s first constitution since Laurent Kabila took power in May 1997. Although Mr Kabila constituted a committee charged with elaborating a new constitutional text, the document was never completed or adopted. The biggest innovation of the newly-adopted constitution is the division of the country into 25 provinces and the city of Kinshasa. Currently there are eleven provinces, including the city of Kinshasa. The new provinces are: Bas-Uele, Equateur, Haut-Lomami, Haut-Katanga, Haut-Uele, Ituri, Kasai, Kasai Oriental, Kongo central, Kwango, Kwilu, Lomami, Lualaba, Luluwa, Mai-Ndombe, Maniema, Mongala, Nord-Kivu, Nord-Ubangi, Sankuru, Sud Kivu, Sud Ubangi, Tanganyika, Tshopo, Tshuapa. According to the new constitution, these new provincial divisions will come into effect within 36 months of the inauguration of a newly-elected government. In spite of this delay, the 2006 national legislative elections will already be contested on the basis of the new provincial make-up. The date for the provincial elections has yet to be set.

Once the new territorial divisions have been put in place, each province will have a provincial assembly which will have the jurisdiction to deliberate in the domain of competence reserved to the provinces. The provincial assembly controls the provincial government as well as the province’s public services. The provincial governor will be composed of one governor, one vice-governor and the provincial ministers. The governor and the vice-governor are elected by the provincial assembly for a five-year mandate, renewable once. The governor designates the ministers in the provincial government which are limited to a total of ten. The composition of the provincial government must be geographically representative.

Responsibilities of the national and the provincial assemblies are divided as follows:

Responsibilities lie exclusively at the national level for such matters as National security, foreign affairs, national planning and legislation for commerce and the accreditation of private companies. Economic legislation, including laws concerning mining, minerals and mineral oils, industry, energy sources and the conservation of natural resources is made at the national level.
Responsibilities are held jointly by the national and provincial governments in such matters as: Land and mining rights, land and water use.

Responsibilities are held exclusively at the provincial level in such matters as: The elaboration of mining, industrial and energy plans relevant to the province, in accordance with the norms of national planning.

The governors of the country’s 25 provinces and the city of Kinshasa will establish a governor’s conference which will also include the president of the DRC, the prime minister and the minister of the interior. The conference, which is presided over by the president, must meet at least twice a year.

3.2 Organizing the Elections

The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), led by Abbe Apollinaire Malu Malu has been the lead institution in the electoral process. Funded mainly by the European Union and bilateral donors, the IEC has had the job of coordinating everything from voter education to the distribution of ballot boxes to the training of polling station workers. Malu Malu himself has been the frequent subject of criticism and accusations of bias in favor of one or another party, but this was to be expected given his high-profile position.

Registration of presidential and legislative candidates began in March. The initial registration period was two weeks. Presidential candidates had to make a $50,000 deposit while deputies running for parliament had to deposit $250. Although most presidential candidates registered within the designated timeframe, only 100 parliamentary candidates had registered and made their $250 deposit by March 23 and the registration period was extended by a further ten days. A total of 33 people were officially registered as presidential candidates, while 9,650 contested the 500 seats in the National Assembly.

Malu Malu subsequently announced that as a result of the extended registration period, elections would not take place as planned on June 18, and that a new date would be announced at a later date. The new election date was not made public until May 1, when it was announced that the first round of presidential and parliamentary elections were to take place on July 30. Dates for a possible presidential run-off and provincial elections were to be set later.

The election ballots were printed by the South African government, and were delivered five weeks before the vote. They were distributed to an estimated 53,000 polling stations throughout the country by MONUC and the IEC. The ballots were extremely complicated, in some instances containing over 50 candidates. A total of 300,000 electoral workers were employed during the elections, supported by over 50,000 police. The total cost of elections was close to $500 million, much of which was provided by the European Union (EU). It should be noted however that the cost would have been much higher if MONUC had not been there to organize the logistics. MONUC’s annual operating budget is $1 billion.
3.3 Eufor helps out

Advance units of the EU military force in support of the elections in the DRC started to arrive in the country in early June. A total of 800 soldiers are now on the ground in Kinshasa, with an additional 1,200 on stand-by in Gabon. A total of 18 countries have contributed to the force which is led by German Lieutenant Karlheinz Viereck. In addition to providing general security support to MONUC, the EU forces mandate allows it to intervene if the security situation deteriorates. According to Mr Viereck, the EU force has the mandate to use force if necessary, but its area of operations is limited to Kinshasa and surrounding areas. Eufor’s mandate expires at the end of November, however an extension of that mandate is currently being discussed and it is likely that Eufor will stay until the end of 2006.
4. Challenges of the Peace Process and their Implications for the Elections

4.1. Overview of the Military in the DRC

There is little doubt that the creation of a cohesive, competent and regularly-paid national army is the single most important step that the DRC can take towards establishing lasting peace in the country as well as in the region as a whole. Many of the DRC’s current woes can be attributed to the fact that it has not had a competent army for at least fifteen years. Mobutu Sese Seko, the father of the modern Zairois army, steadily lost control over the military in the last six years of his reign, and by the time his regime was challenged militarily by the coalition of Rwandan-backed forces – the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL) led by Laurent Kabila - Mobutu’s troops were throwing down their weapons and abandoning villages and towns without the slightest fight.

In the months after the overthrow of Mobutu, Rwanda dominated the Congolese security apparatus, and few efforts were made to reconstitute a national army. Most of the fighting had been conducted by the Rwandan army and a ragtag bunch of young men, some of them children, as well as traditional Mai Mai warriors whom Kabila and his allies had recruited as they traversed the country. Many of the army’s most competent leaders – members of Mobutu’s Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) - fled the country for fear of retribution, depriving the military of much-needed competence and leadership.

When Kabila’s relations with Uganda and Rwanda ruptured in July-August 1998, he was left with a largely incoherent military which had little real loyalty to either him or the country. The Ugandans and Rwandans quickly gained control of the areas which they attacked – the eastern DRC, as well as a wide swathe of the north – and forced local troops to subsequently fight alongside them. Kabila was forced to ask Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and, briefly, Chad for military assistance to defend his regime. Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia stayed in the country until 2002-2003.

When the transition government came to power in June 2003, there were effectively three different armies in the country: the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) created by the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – Goma (RCD-G), the army of the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC), and the Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC) who had fought on the Kabila side of the conflict. In addition, there were several smaller armed groups such as the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie Nationale (RCD-N) and the RCD-Kisangani / Mouvement de Libération (RCD-K/ML) who also has sizeable troop numbers. Finally, the Mai Mai, whom Laurent Kabila had recruited to fight alongside the FAC, had become increasingly fractious and only certain groups remained nominally aligned to Joseph Kabila.

During the talks leading up to the signing of the all-inclusive and global peace agreement in Sun City, South Africa in late 2002, the various armed signatories – the RCD-G, RCD-K/ML, MLC and
the presidential camp indicated that their combined military strength surpassed 300,000 troops. This is the figure that subsequently became the basis for both the military reintegration programme as well as the calculation of the total amount needed to pay the troops meagre monthly wages, which were set at US$10.

4.2 The Slow Pace of Military Reform

Military integration — although a key task of the transition period — received little more than lip service in the first year of the transition. While senior officers of the various factions arrived in Kinshasa, and the leadership of the military represented the various armed groups, on the ground the situation barely changed. In North and South Kivu, where the RCD-G had been concentrated, the troops on the ground remained those who had fought for the RCD-G during the war. The same situation prevailed in areas previously controlled by the MLC or the government. The extent to which this presented a serious threat to the stability of the transition, and the country as a whole was amply demonstrated when Laurent Nkunda, a renegade RCD-G commander who had refused to join an integrated command in Kinshasa, managed to gather several thousand troops and attack Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province in May-June 2004. Although his siege of the city only lasted several days, the fact that he had been able to rally such support from the mostly Banyamulenge troops stationed in North Kivu provided a string wake-up call that the transition government has failed dismally in its task of integrating the Congolese army.

In spite of this obvious failure, it was not until early 2005 that serious efforts to make progress on military integration got underway. In May 2005, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) finally elaborated their strategic plan for the military integration process. According to the plan, the first phase involves the creation of up to 18 light infantry brigades which will help secure the elections. To date, a total of 14 integrated brigades have been formed. In the second phase, due to be completed by 2007, a rapid reaction unit will be formed, while the third, and longest phase will involve the formation of a cohesive and trained national defence force by 2010.

The delay in elaborating the plan was quite clearly the result of a lack of political will to move things forward, and it were the international donors who finally provided the much-delayed push to make concrete progress. In the first half of that year, six reception and reintegration centers which had been in a pitiful state, received injections of donor funds, and subsequently started functioning. Troops are transported to these centers, disarmed and briefly retrained. They are then regrouped in standard-sized brigades of 4,200 troops.

The delay in the start of the military integration project means that the process has been severely abridged. A number of key aspects, such as re-orientation, and a more refined selection process for those wanting to rejoin the military, were dropped. MONUC has been attempting to make up for some of this, working with the integrated brigades which have been deployed to the eastern areas of Ituri and North and South Kivu. MONUC has focused in particular on improving combat techniques as well as on providing crucial human rights training for the brigades. The first
integrated brigade, which was formed and trained by Belgian military instructors in Kisangani, was deployed to Ituri in January 2005, and has since been conducting joint military operations with MONUC troops. Other integrated brigades deployed to the region have joined these operations since then.

4.3 Inflated Size of Military Forces

Thanks to a census conducted by the South African government in 2004-2005, it has become clear that the various armed factions grossly overstated the size of their military forces. This is not surprising considering that military power equaled negotiating power during the peace talks; however it has presented the military leadership with huge opportunities for corruption.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armed force sizes</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RCD-K/ML:</strong> declared to have 8,000-10,000 troops in the Beni-Lubero area of North Kivu. More likely to have 3,000-5,000.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FAC:</strong> Kabila claimed to have 120,000 troops, but half of those are believed to be ghost soldiers. Most of these troops remain in areas previously controlled by the Kabila government. Kabila’s Garde Spéciale de Sécurité Présidentielle (GSSP) is estimated to number 12,000, none of whom have been integrated into the military. The bulk of these troops are concentrated in Kinshasa and Katanga province, Kabila’s stronghold.</td>
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<td><strong>MLC:</strong> the weakest of the three main armies – the MLC won its territory thanks to its support from Uganda – the MLC claimed that it had 20,000 soldiers at the Sun City talks. It is more likely to have no more than half that, at least 5,000 of which were deployed to the east following Nkunda’s attack on Bukavu, while another 2,000 have been integrated into the newly-formed brigades and another 1,500 demobilizing. It is estimated that at present, the MLC has 1,500 troops in Equateur province, and another 800 in Kinshasa.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RCD-G:</strong> the RCD-G is believed to have between 11,000-20,000 troops scattered in North and South Kivu provinces, northern Katanga province and Maniema, Orientale and Kasai Oriental provinces. An estimated 3,500 RCD-G troops have joined the integrated brigades. Laurent Nkunda is estimated to have control/access to close to 2,000 former RCD-G troops in North Kivu.</td>
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4.5 Corruption

The monthly salary bill of $8 million was calculated to pay over 300,000 soldiers; however, the vast majority of this amount was embezzled. Shockingly, not even all of the estimated 130,000 troops are actually receiving their regular pay of $10 a month. It is estimated that over $100 million have already been stolen. The European Union’s security sector reform mission in the DRC, EUSEC, has been tasked to help resolve some of the issues, and a total of 50 military advisors will eventually
be integrated into the FARDC’s financial and administrative infrastructure. The aim of the cooperation is to ensure that existing troops are regularly paid their monthly $10 salary, as well as to improve overall conditions of service for the FARDC. To date the 27 experts seconded to EUSEC have been unable to make little concrete difference in ongoing high-level corruption. This is largely due to logistical constraints faced by the mission, and it is hoped that these can be remedied as soon as possible.

Corruption, inefficiency and lack of training are serious obstacles to the formation of a coherent national army. Unpaid soldiers lack motivation, as well as equipment and training to properly execute their duties. Even when they are paid, the $10 stipend is grossly insufficient to support one person, much less a family. Aside from salary issues, poor logistics also plague the FARDC. While MONUC has sought to provide assistance in this area – evacuating wounded troops and allowing them to use MONUC hospitals, providing transport to reintegration sites, etc. – it is clear that MONUC cannot provide a substitute for the type of logistical infrastructure and support that an army in this vast country requires. In the long run, this will have to be the job of the FARDC themselves.

Undisciplined troops continue to represent a major threat to the civilian population which is often at the mercy of their whims. Unpaid soldiers help themselves to food and whatever else they need; looting is common, as are theft, rape and murder. MONUC has repeatedly threatened to halt joint operations with the FARDC over concerns about ongoing major human rights abuses. Senior FARDC commanders have said that they will remedy the situation; however this cannot be done by issuing a simple order. Although there have been a number of trials of FARDC troops on charges such as rape, theft and looting, a far larger number of crimes go unreported and unpunished. While there is never any excuse for this type of behavior, there is little doubt that similar disregard for human life, property and ethics on the part of senior commanders at the local, regional and national level strongly encourages an overall feeling of impunity within the FARDC. One such example is the appointment of General François Olenga to the post of auditor general of the military in 2005. Olenga, who hails from the presidential camp and was the Kabila government’s main weapons buyer, is one of the most corrupt members of the military. In addition, he has committed gross human rights violations which have gone unpunished in spite of the fact that they are widely known. His appointment to the post of auditor-general is a slap in the face of any real progress towards eliminating corruption or improving discipline in the FARDC.
5. Regional Implications of a Weak Military in the DRC

5.1 Uganda

Relations between Uganda and the DRC – never the greatest – have deteriorated since mid-2005, when Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni complained to MONUC and the Congolese government that they were doing too little to limit the activities of anti-Ugandan rebels which were using the DRC as a base. In particular, Museveni pointed to the Allied Defence Forces (ADF) and the National Liberation Union (Nalu), both of which had bases along the countries borders in eastern DRC. The accusation was generally seen as extremely audacious given that the Ugandan government had nurtured and encouraged the ongoing conflict in the Ituri region which has killed over 50,000 people and displaced several hundred thousand. In contrast, the ADF and Nalu, neither of whom numbered more than a 100 fighters, had not staged a major incursion into Uganda or killed more than goat in years. Many felt that the timing of the Museveni’s complaint – it came on the heels of a successful demobilization of the Ituri militia – may have been intended to provide Uganda with a new excuse to assert control over the mineral-rich area. Relations deteriorated further in late 2005 when elements of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Ugandan rebel group which has been fighting the Ugandan government in northern Uganda for close to two decades, took refuge on the Congolese side of the border between Sudan and the DRC. Museveni immediately offered to send Ugandan troops to the area to dislodge the LRA, but the Congolese government refused. After attempts to negotiate with the LRA failed, MONUC and the FARDC went into the area in an attempt to break down their bases. This operation ended disastrously when eight Guatemalan UN peacekeepers were killed in an ambush, putting an end to MONUC operations in the area. For the moment the matter remains unresolved, but there is some hope that the peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA may put and end to their presence in the DRC. If it does not, it cannot be ruled out that the Ugandan army may step in regardless of whether or not it has the Congolese government’s permission to do so. Unfortunately, the reality at the moment is that the FARDC are not capable of handling the matter on their own, which threatens not only the stability of the DRC, but also neighboring countries. For as long as this situation prevails and regional rebel groups continue to use the DRC as a base, Uganda – as well as Rwanda – will have a legitimate excuse to intervene in the DRC even if they have ulterior motives. This is why it is paramount to regional stability that the FARDC become a well-trained, unified, and properly-supported military force as soon as possible.

5.2 Rwanda

Relations with Rwanda appear to have improved somewhat over the past year, but they remain fundamentally tense as a result of Rwanda’s role in backing the RCD-G and in occupying the eastern DRC with its own troops for five years. There is also a widespread feeling that Rwanda continues to support Laurent Nkunda’s operations in eastern DRC. While Rwanda appears to be on its best behaviour at the moment, there is no way of knowing how long this will last. At the same
time, even more than Uganda, Rwanda has some legitimate security concerns in the DRC, notably the presence in eastern DRC of an estimated 8,000 militia of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) including elements of the Iterahamwe and former Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR). Since political negotiations with the FDLR have been effectively ruled out for the moment (see below for details), the only remaining way to neutralize the FDLR is through military means. While MONUC and the FARDC have been conducting joint operations aimed at destroying the FDLR’s bases in the Kivus for the past year, and they have had some success in doing so, there has not been a large-scale reduction in the FDLR troop’s numbers and their forces remain scattered throughout the two provinces. Once MONUC has gone, the FARDC will have to attempt to track down the FDLR on their own, a task of which they are incapable at present. This is well known to the Rwandan government, which can, at any moment, argue that its security is threatened by the FDLR and that because the FARDC are not up to the task, it must send in its own troops. In fact it is highly doubtful that the FDLR do really represent a threat to Rwanda – there have been no major incursions for many years – while it is equally doubtful that the more efficient Rwandan army would be able to accomplish the task of rooting them out. Considering that there is almost no chance that a Congolese government would allow Rwandan troops into the country – this would be political suicide given strong popular resentment of Rwanda – an unauthorized military occupation would mean the start of a new war, in which the FDLR will obviously take the Congolese side. Little in the way of a resolution could be expected from that scenario; however that may not actually be what Rwanda wants anyway. Rwandan troops spent five years in control of eastern DRC and did not manage to track down significant numbers of FDLR, and there have been suggestions that they happily turned away from opportunities to do so. At the same time, it is well-known that many Rwandan individuals benefited greatly from the economic opportunities in eastern DRC, and might like to continue to do so. Whatever the case, as long as the FARDC remain as weak as they currently are, Rwanda can easily justify sending in its own troops to handle the situation. Again, this is why a strong military force in the DRC is the cornerstone of regional peace and stability.
6. Ongoing Armed Conflict Situations

6.1 Ituri

The situation in Ituri has been in flux for the past three years in spite of a number of cease-fire agreements, the arrests of key militia leaders, a demobilization programme and ongoing joint military operations between MONUC and the FARDC.

In spite of signing a ceasefire agreement in which they agreed to end their militia activities in May 2004, the various Ituri militia groups subsequently failed to comply with a September 2004 disarmament deadline, and fighting in the region continued unabated. By this time, most militia leaders had moved to Kinshasa where they spent most of their time wooing members of the transition government in the hopes of getting a government position.

In February 2005, the situation suddenly became more serious when the Front National Integrationiste (FNI, see below) killed nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers in an ambush. William Swing, the United Nations Secretary General’s special representative in the DRC and head of MONUC subsequently issued an ultimatum to the troops, giving them until the end of March to disarm or face arrest. The threat worked, and an estimated 15,000 militia disarmed in the following months.

Who is Who in Ituri

**Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC)**

Thomas Lubanga is the leader and one of the founding members of the UPC. Mr Lubanga formed the UPC after falling out with the RCD-K/ML in which he held the position of minister of defence. The UPC is led by the Gegere - Hemas from the northern part of Ituri – and purports to represent the interests of the Hema/Gegere communities. With the help of the Ugandan army, the UPC seized control of Bunia from the RCD-K/ML in August 2002. It later fell out with Uganda and subsequently concluded an agreement with the Rwandan-backed RCD-G which included provisions for military and political cooperation. As a result, Uganda ousted the UPC from Bunia in March 2003, two months before it withdrew its forces from the Ituri region. In the wake of the withdrawal, the UPC again seized control of the city, sparking heavy fighting and massive human rights abuses. Mr Lubanga was offered the post of general in the FARDC, but was subsequently arrested on charges of involvement in the killing of the Bangladeshi peacekeepers. He was transferred to the International Criminal Court in The Hague in April 2006, and has subsequently been charged with recruiting child soldiers.

**Parti pour l’Unité et la Sauvegarde de l’Intégrité du Congo (Pusic)**

Pusic was formed by Chef Kahwa Mandro in February 2003 after he and Mr Lubanga fell out. Pusic is dominated by Hema from the southern part of the Ituri district. Mr Kahwa was arrested in Bunia
in early April, also on charges of involvement in the killing of the Bangladeshis. He was found guilty and condemned to a lengthy prison sentence in June 2006.

**UPC-K**
The UPC-Kisembo is a splinter group formed by Floribert Kisembo, a former senior member of the UPC, in December 2003 after he failed to oust Mr Lubanga from power. Like other Ituri militia leaders, Kisembo was appointed to the position of general in the FARDC in 2005.

**Front National Integrationiste (FNI)**
The FNI is a Lendu militia grouping led by Floribert Njabu. At various times the FNI has had alliances with the Ugandan army as well as the RCD-K/ML and the Kinshasa government. Njabu was also arrested following the killing of the nine Bangladeshis and is currently in prison in Kinshasa. The military leader of the FNI, Etienne Lona, surrendered in Bunia shortly thereafter. The FNI is the largest of the Lendu militia groupings.

**Forces de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri (FRPI)**
The FRPI is led by Dr Adirodo and composed of Ngiti who are Lendu from southern Ituri. The FRPI are a distinct group, but have a close alliance with the FNI in their battle against the UPC.

**Forces Armées du People Congolais (FAPC)**
Led by Jerome Kakwavu, reportedly a Banyamulenge from North Kivu province, the FAPC are a multi-ethnic force which is based in the northern town of Aru. The FAPC has switched alliances on many occasions, siding with the RCD-ML, the UPC and the Ugandans at various times. Kakwavu was one of the militia leaders who were accorded a post as general in the FARDC, a position he occupied before being arrested in 2005.

**Forces Populaires pour la Démocratie au Congo (FPDC)**
The FPDC is composed mainly of Alur and Lugbara from the northern towns of Mahagi and Aru. It was formed to counter the UPC and is headed by Thomas Unen Chan, a former member of the Zairean parliament.

As the demobilization process was winding down, a new group, composed of rump elements of the Ituri militias, formed in neighboring Uganda, which had long been a support point for the leadership of the various militia groups. Calling itself the Mouvement Révolutionnaire Congolais (MRC), the group claimed that it was fighting for regional autonomy. It has been able to maintain its momentum since then in spite of the presence. Military operations aimed at containing the MRC have not had much success. The failure to contain the new group is due to the fact that the FARDC troops in the region are undisciplined and have themselves become involved in the gold smuggling which has so long sustained the conflict in the region. In addition, an incentive scheme for disarmed militia members has failed to deliver and many of those who disarmed in 2005 are again being recruited. In mid-May, Innocent Kaina, also known as India Queen, the deputy commander of the MRC was captured during an FARDC ambush north of Bunia. Kaina subsequently appealed to his followers to put an end to their fighting. In the lead-up to the elections, renewed efforts
were made to contain the MRC, and on May 20, Operation Ituri Explorer, a joint MONUC-FARDC military campaign was launched with 2000 FARDC troops and the support of 500 MONUC troops. MONUC also issued a new disarmament ultimatum to the outstanding militia elements, telling them to disarm before July 25 or face arrest. A total of 3,924 militia surrendered by July 25. However various militias continue to operate in the region, attacks are frequent and joint operations by MONUC and the FARDC in the region are ongoing. MONUC has come under considerable criticism from NGOs about high civilian casualties and the destruction of towns and villages during its joint operations. MONUC has denied being involved in the deliberate destruction of villages and has said that it cannot be held responsible for the actions of the FARDC. MONUC has also repeatedly warned that ongoing human rights violations by the FARDC threaten continued collaboration between the two.

Meanwhile, the fact that the leaders of the Ituri militia groups are the only military leaders in the country to have been pursued for their actions during the war is essentially due to the fact that they are politically expendable. None of the Ituri leaders participated in the Sun City peace talks or signed the 2002 peace deal and what happens in the Ituri district or to the Ituri leaders will have little impact on the stability of the national political process. Their arrests were motivated by the transition government’s desire to comply with MONUC’s request to do so after the Bangladeshi peacekeepers were killed, rather than by a desire to demonstrate that impunity will not be tolerated. As the Ituri leaders are irrelevant to all those who are in the transition government, the international community could for once be appeased without the transition government having to make any costly political compromises. As the following situation in Katanga demonstrates, the culture of impunity is not only alive and well in the DRC, it is essential to the political survival of all the main belligerents.

6.2 Katanga

The surrender in mid-May of the mystical Mai Mai leader Gedeon has had an enormous impact on stability in the central Katanga region - which came to be known as the “triangle of death” - where Gedeon and his band of Mai Mai militia had been wreaking havoc for several years. Following several months of intense negotiations between Gedeon and MONUC, Gedeon eventually surrendered in May. His surrender was at least in part due to the fact that he was aware that he had become a liability for the Kabila camp which had supported his military activities in the region for years and which had decided that it was time to get rid of him. Following his surrender, MONUC handed Gedeon into the custody of the Congolese attorney general in Lubumbashi, where he remained for several months. Although it was widely believed that Gedeon would eventually be charged with crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC) – many of his soldiers were young children who told of being made to eat human flesh – in a surprise move in June, Gedeon and his soldiers were released and instead of being charged, were allowed to join the FARDC. This decision was met with much outrage, especially from MONUC, which complained that integrating Gedeon into the FARDC sent the message that impunity still reigned in the country. The general feeling is that the Kabila camp organized his integration in exchange for his silence, as a trial at the ICC, or anywhere else would likely have exposed the extent to which
Kabila and his cronies were involved in supporting Gedeon. In spite of great disappointment in Katanga that Gedeon has been allowed to get off essentially scot-free, his surrender has brought the fighting in the central Katanga region to an almost complete halt. As a result, humanitarian agencies are again able to access the region, and life has started to return to normal after many years of terror.

6.3 North and South Kivu

There are two existing military threats in North and South Kivu provinces: Laurent Nkunda and his troops, and the FDLR.

Laurent Nkunda is an RCD-G hardliner, himself a Banyamulenge – ethnic Tutsi – from North Kivu. He was a senior military commander in the RCD-G and was implicated in the summary executions of civilians in Kisangani, following a botched mutiny in the city in 2002. The RCD-G appointed him to a senior position in the integrated military command after the installation of the transition government in 2003, but he refused to take up his post. Left to his own devices in North Kivu, he managed to rally several thousand, mostly Banyamulenge troops in an attack on Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu in mid-2004, ostensibly to halt genocide of the Banyamulenge living in the town. Although FARDC forces routed him several days after he captured the town, and he retreated back into North Kivu, there were ongoing clashes between his troops and the soldiers of the 11th military zone (which encompasses South Kivu) for several months thereafter. An arrest warrant was issued for Nkunda, however it was never enforced in spite of the fact that his whereabouts are generally known and he is frequently in and out of Goma. Although they have denied it, there is evidence that Nkunda operated with the support of the senior military and civilian leadership in North Kivu, all of whom were senior members of the RCD-G. A UN panel set up to monitor the arms embargo to the eastern DRC also found evidence that Nkunda had been recruiting young men in the Congolese refugee camps in neighboring Rwanda with the tacit support of the Rwandan army and government. Since the incident in 2004, Nkunda and his troops have caused trouble on a number of different occasions, although not on the same scale as in 2004. Early this year, Nkunda’s forces attacked the fifth integrated brigade of the FARDC in the Rutshuru district of North Kivu, but they were eventually routed by MONUC forces. The incident led to the displacement of 50,000 people. There was also a brief incident several days after the elections in the town of Sake in North Kivu province, but this seems to have been a misunderstanding and was quickly resolved. Nkunda is estimated to have up to 2,000 troops; many of them rogue elements from the 83rd brigade. While Nkunda has surprised observers by remaining quiet during the electoral period, this should not be taken as a sign that he has laid down his weapons for good. The new government must take immediate action to arrest Nkunda and discipline his renegade troops if it wants to stabilize the situation in North Kivu.

The FDLR

In early 2005, Kabila initiated dialogue with representatives of the FDLR in the hopes of finding a negotiated solution to ending their presence in the DRC. Talks were subsequently held in Rome under the mediation of the Sant Egidio community – a Catholic layman’s organization which
assists in conflict resolution. Ignace Murwanashyaka, the leader of the political wing of the FDLR declared at the meeting that the FDLR were willing to end their armed struggle and enter into dialogue with the Rwandan government about returning home. Briefly, it appeared that a major breakthrough had been made. However, days after the conclusion of the talks, Murwanashyaka declared that one of the prerequisites for his forces’ return to Rwanda was the Rwandan government’s willingness to discuss the possibility that the FDLR could operate as a political party once its forces has returned to the country. Amongst other things, he also demanded that FDLR troops be given amnesty for the crimes they may have committed during the Rwandan genocide. The Rwandan government categorically rejected these conditions, as it had always ruled out any type of political negotiations with the FDLR. There was also no question of granting amnesty to the FDLR fighters just as the Gacaca tribunals, the community-level courts which were set up to help expedite the judicial process in Rwanda were being launched on a national level. Neither those in prison, nor the victims of the genocide would have accepted that the FDLR be exonerated for their actions. Having reached the usual sticking-points, any further mention of a negotiated return of the FDLR to Rwanda was dropped. The whole exercise probably ended up doing more damage than good, as it demonstrated once and for all that the Rwandan government will not, at any cost, accept negotiations with the FDLR. This will have brought many to conclude that ongoing armed struggle is the only way forward and is likely to have radicalized certain elements of the group. Meanwhile, Murwanashyaka has since fallen out of grace with the rest of the movement. Earlier this year he was also deported from Germany, where he had been living for years, on charges of violating immigration laws.

In the absence of a voluntary return, MONUC and the FARDC have stepped up their attacks on the FDLR over the past year. Concentrating on Bunyakiri territory in South Kivu, MONUC claims that the joint operations successfully split the movement’s hierarchy. According to the twenty-first report of the Secretary General on MONUC, issued in June, an estimated 1,000 FDLR combatants sought safe-haven in North Kivu, reducing the number of FDLR fighters in South Kivu to 2,500. MONUC estimates that there are a total of 7,000 combatants in North and South Kivu, the bulk of whom are now concentrated in North Kivu.
7. National Politics Towards Elections

7.1 Who is Who

**Joseph Kabila** is the current president of the DRC. Although he is a founder of the Parti pour la Reconstruction et le Développement (PPRD), he chose to run as an independent and created the umbrella alliance Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle (AMP) which groups together over a dozen smaller parties. Kabila, who grew up mostly in Anglophone East Africa and who still speaks French with an accent, is seen by many Congolese as an outsider. Rumors that he is actually of Rwandan origin and that Laurent Kabila was not his real father have also undermined his popularity. Since coming to power following his father’s assassination in January 2001, Kabila has failed to put his own stamp on the presidency or to create a public persona for himself. Most of his father’s close associates remain in senior positions, and continue to exert their rapacious influence over matters ranging from mining to the military. This will only worsen if he is elected president (see chapter on post-election scenarios below). Kabila is greatly disliked in Kinshasa which voted resoundingly against him in the first round of elections. The bulk of his support comes from the eastern part of the country and from Katanga, which he claims as his home province. His support in the east is due to the fact that many there feel that he fought against and liberated them from Rwandan occupation, a sentiment that started with his father. The fact that he is so disliked in the part of the country that he has governed longest – when he came to power in 2001, the country would be divided for another 2 and a half years and his government controlled only the western part of the country – is a sign that those who have experienced his rule are not impressed. In fact, his greatest achievement to date has been to reinvigorate the stalled peace process shortly after he came to power by engaging with the international community and the UN in particular. Other than that his record of governance is fairly weak, peppered with broken engagements, arrogance and cronyism. Those who want to be kind to him suggest that he never wanted to be president and was forced into the job by his father’s friends. While this was probably true in January 2001, it seems that since then he has learned to enjoy the trappings of power.

**Jean Pierre Bemba**, the vice-president for finance in the transition government, and president of the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) has given Kabila an unexpectedly strong run for his money. Originally from Equateur province, Bemba grew up close to the Mobutu family. His father, Bemba Saolouna is a well-known businessman with interests ranging from coffee to airlines. Among other things, Bemba himself owns a number of television stations, a now defunct mobile phone company, as well as extensive coffee and timber concessions in the north-western part of the country. He continues to enjoy the backing of a number of wealthy Mobutistes who have helped him finance his political campaign. He also has strong support in the Congolese business community where he is a well-known quantity who will look after business’ interests. Bemba’s personality is generally seen as extremely difficult; he is arrogant, temperamental and prone to making irrational and emotional decisions. He has fallen out with most of the senior members of the MLC over the past two years, and his strong showing in the elections is somewhat of a surprise. The fact that he was able to garner so much support in Kinshasa, and Bas-Congo and Bandundu provinces is indicative both of a certain nostalgia for the Mobutu era as well as of the
extent to which Kabila has alienated the electorate in these areas. It is hard to say what type of
government he would run; much of that will depend on the quality of advice he receives from
those around him. Bemba campaigned at the head of a broad coalition, the Regroupement
National Congolais (Renaco) which has since been renamed the Union pour la Nation to include
additional alliance partners.

Antoine Gizenga is the leader of the Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (Palu). Gizenga, who is in his
eighties, came in third place in the presidential election, an important victory for him and his party.
He was deputy prime minister in the government of Patrice Lumumba and established a
Lumumbist outpost in Stanleyville (now Kisangani) after Lumumba was sidelined and then
assassinated. Gizenga has had a relatively low-key profile for most of the past two decades.
Although he signed the all-inclusive peace agreement in 2002, he chose to boycott the transition
government for the same reasons as Tshisekedi (see below). He is from Bas-Congo province, where
he won much of his support and recently endorsed Kabila’s candidacy for the second round of
elections.

Azarias Ruberwa, the current vice-president for political and security matters, is also the leader of
the RCD-G. Tainted by its association with Rwanda, the RCD-G has not fared well in the latest
elections, and will lose a significant share of its hold on power once a new government is installed.
Ruberwa came in sixth place in the presidential election. In spite of the fact that his party is so
unpopular, Ruberwa, who is a Banyamulenge, is known to be competent, fair and honest. He has
managed a difficult position for the last three years, straddling the divide between his duties as
vice-president and the demands of the hardliners in his party.

Oscar Kashala, the leader of the Union pour la Reconstruction du Congo (UREC) a medical doctor
educated and resident in the US, he returned to the DRC earlier this year to join the presidential
race. His relatively strong showing – he came in fifth place - is a surprise given that he had no
name recognition only a few months ago. Kashala has aligned himself with Bemba.

Pierre Pay Pay, a former governor of the central bank under Mobutu and one of the main
beneficiaries of his Kleptocratic regime, Pay Pay returned to the country in 2003. He founded the
Coalition des Démocrates Congolais (Codeco) with which he campaigned for the presidency. He
came in seventh place while his party also garnered 30 parliamentary seats. Codeco has not yet
announced with whom it will align itself.

Nzanga Mobutu: Son of ousted dictator Mobutu Sese Seko and his second wife, Bobby Ledawa,
Nzanga returned to the DRC in 2003 after the Kabila camp suggested that it would appoint him
minister of arts and culture in the transition government. This never happened, but he has been in
and out of the country ever since. He campaigned for the presidency with his party l’Union des
Mobutistes (UDEMO) and came in fourth. He has since endorsed Kabila.
Results of the first round of presidential elections 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Kabila</td>
<td>44.81%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean-Pierre Bemba</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoine Gizenga</td>
<td>13.06%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nzanga Mobutu</td>
<td>4.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oskar Kashala</td>
<td>3.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azarias Ruberwa</td>
<td>1.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Pay Pay</td>
<td>1.58%</td>
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</table>

Results of the parliamentary elections 2006

<table>
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<th>Party</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>PPRD (Parti pour la Reconstruction et le Développment)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC (Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo)</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palu (Parti Lumumbiste Unifié)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR (Mouvement Social pour le Renouveau)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces du Renouveau</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-G (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – Goma)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codeco (Coalition des Démocrates Congolais)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC (Convention des Démocrates Congolais)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2 The UDPS – the Famous Absentee

The Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS) led by veteran opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi has made much noise over the past year about the transition government’s failure to meet key aspects of the transition period, which he and his party have boycotted. Although some of the criticisms – such as the failure to make progress on integrating the FARDC – have been extremely valid, Tshisekedi’s main aim seems to have been to whine long enough to be accorded a position of his choosing in the government. Because of his stature and experience, and the credibility that his participation in the first democratic elections in forty years would have lent the process, the international community in particular was willing to listen. However, eventually people stopped caring, and the elections took place without him. Whether Tshisekedi expected this to happen is unclear, but the result is that he looks less like a champion of democracy than a spoilsport who did not get exactly what he wanted.

Tshisekedi, who spent much of the war in exile in South Africa and Belgium, participated in the Sun City peace talks and signed the all-inclusive peace agreement in 2002. However he fell out with the other parties in the political opposition when they were unwilling to automatically accord him his choice of the ministries which the peace accord had apportioned to them. Angry that they did not acknowledge his senior role in the country’s struggle towards democracy – rightly so considering that most of the other parties were less than five years old, lacked a national political base and had strong opportunistic tendencies – Tshisekedi and the UDPS abandoned the entire transition process.
In early 2005, when it was becoming increasingly obvious that elections would not take place in June 2005 as originally planned, Tshisekedi’s grumbling on the sidelines joined with the growing clamor for progress and his profile was raised once again. Successive attempts to cajole him into somehow joining the transition process failed, not least because it was unclear how this would work constitutionally. In addition, the Kabila camp in particular failed to concede even an inch on reopening talks with the signatories to the all-inclusive peace accord, one of Tshisekedi’s key demands. In mid-2005, as the voter registration process was launched in Kinshasa, Tshisekedi called upon the population to boycott the registration process. With the notable exception of his stronghold in Kasai Oriental province, few heeded his call.

In late 2005 Tshisekedi made a sudden turnaround, deciding that he did want to register as a presidential candidate after all. Unfortunately, he would have to do so without the votes of his staunchest supporters who had followed his order not to register. His appeal to the International Electoral Commission (IEC) to reopen the registration process nation-wide so that his supporters could register was rejected on the grounds that it would be a costly logistical nightmare.

### 7.3 Demands for New Talks and the Campaigning Period

Following this defeat, Tshisekedi’s calls for renewed talks between the signatories to the peace agreement gathered pace, as well as the support of many others who had either fallen out with the Kabila government or wanted to hedge their chances in the run-up to the election date. Among the reasons for the holding of new talks, there were certainly some legitimate concerns, such as who has the constitutional right to set the date for the elections, an issue that was raised when Abbe Malu Malu unilaterally changed the date from June 30 to July 29. Other concerns included the unexplained printing of several thousand additional ballots. Bemba and Ruberwa, as well as 17 other political parties added their voices to calls for a return to the negotiating table in the weeks prior to the elections. Kabila eventually agreed to hold discussions with the political opposition and civil society, and preparatory meetings to hammer out the agenda were held in late-June. The main sticking points which were to be discussed were: security for presidential candidates during the election campaign, the finalization of the electoral calendar, equal access to the media for the candidates and the need for the various parties to commit themselves to accepting the official outcome of the elections.

On June 30, Mr Ruberwa and Mr Bemba, as well as representatives of the political opposition and civil society – but not Tshisekedi who decided not to attend - gathered in Kinshasa to discuss the key sticking points. However, in spite of having agreed to the talks, Mr Kabila was instead campaigning in Bukavu. The Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle (AMP), the coalition of 31 political parties supporting the president, later said that the talks had no goal and that the IEC was the body responsible for managing the electoral calendar.

Ultimately, though, the whole matter was simply a storm in a teacup. The international community – represented by the Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition (CIAT) – which has driven and financed much of the electoral process, had grown tired of the repeated calls for talks,
especially as many of those calling for them seemed to simply want another delay in the elections. Kabila had little incentive to engage, and the whole matter fell more or less by the way-side as the campaign period kicked off on June 30.

During the campaign period, the Haute Authorité des Médias (HAM), the media watchdog and one of five transition institutions set up by the peace agreement, was forced to suspend a number of television stations and newspapers which it felt had abused the media edict of impartiality. There were also regular clashes between protestors - UDPS, as well as other parties asking for renewed talks – and security forces in which a number of people were killed and others seriously injured. Nonetheless, in spite of these regrettable incidents, the campaign period did not erupt into large-scale violence as some had feared it might. Neither, for that matter did the elections themselves. On July 30, starting at 5a.m., the Congolese people went to vote for the first time in four decades. There were remarkably few incidents of violence at all, and all in all the Congolese people were able to vote in a free and safe atmosphere - a major feat of logistics and security.

7.4 The Aftermath of the First Round of Elections

The aftermath of the elections was as violent as the elections themselves were calm. Within days of the vote, Kabila had declared that he had won, while Bemba declared both that there had been widespread fraud and that he had won the vote. Ruberwa, whose party was always going to be the biggest loser in the process, also said that the voting process had been fraudulent. Several days later it looked as though this might really have been the case, as reports about chaos at counting stations started pouring in from throughout the country. In spite of this, local and international election observers declared the vote to have been free and fair. Although there do seem to have been incidents of fraud, as well as the destruction of ballot papers, the conclusion seems to have been that such incidents were insufficient to have swayed the outcome in any one direction.

Amid fears that a Kabila victory would lead to an outbreak of violence in Kinshasa – he had been considered to be the front-runner - the results were announced late in the evening on August 20 and were almost immediately followed by an outbreak of gun fighting in the city. Clashes between the Kabila camp and Bemba’s troops escalated, continuing for two days. At one stage the Kabila camp shelled Bemba’s official residence, where he was meeting with the ambassadors of the countries represented in the CIAT as well as William Swing, , destroying Bemba’s helicopter. Eufor and MONUC ultimately managed to calm things down, but the violence cost 20 lives as well as causing significant material damage.

Two commissions of enquiry to look into the origin of the fighting have been constituted, but it is highly unlikely that they will publicize their results before the winner of the presidential campaign is known. The situation is already extremely volatile, and publicizing who was to blame for the violence would only make matters worse. Many have wondered whether Kabila was in command of what was happening – in particular the attack on Bemba’s house – as it seemed to be such a poor political calculation to create problems in a city that had just voted resoundingly against him. Either conclusion – that he was in command, or was not – sheds a poor light on him as a leader. It
also foreshadows the type of reaction one might get from him and the rest of his camp if he does not win in the next round of elections.

7.5 Post-Election Scenarios

Antoine Gizenga, the leader of the Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (Palu) came in third place in the presidential elections, and perhaps shows just how much some Congolese still value their history. Gizenga, who is now in his eighties, was the deputy prime minister in the government of Patrice Lumumba. When Lumumba was side-lined and later assassinated, Gizenga created a government in exile in Stanleyville (now Kisangani), from where he conducted Lumumbist rebellions for many more years. Gizenga, who is from Bas-Congo province, to the west of Kinshasa, has kept a very low profile over the past ten years and, in spite of the fact that Laurent Kabila billed himself as a Lumumbist, the two men never got along. This why it is a bit surprising that Gizenga recently called on his voters to support Joseph Kabila in the next round of elections. Observers attribute this to the Lumumbist link, but that seems hard to imagine, as Kabila is even less of a Lumumbist than his father ever was. More likely he was promised an important seat in a new government if he endorsed Kabila; it is even possible that he would get the job of prime minister. There is some doubt as to whether or not Gizenga’s followers will heed his call; most of his supporters are from western DRC which has strong feelings against Kabila. Following that logic, now that Gizenga has been eliminated from the race, his followers would be more likely to sympathize with Bemba, who won most of his votes in the western DRC. What exactly will happen remains to be seen, and in spite of the regional calculations, Gizenga’s endorsement of Kabila is still seen as an important push for his campaign. In late-September the two men signed an official document in which they agreed to form a coalition which will give them the majority in parliament. Kabila agreed that the prime minister – who is selected by the majority grouping in parliament – will hail from within the Palu.

Both the presidential camp, grouped in the Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle (AMP) and the Union de la Nation have been heavily wooing the myriad political parties in the country. The biggest catch is clearly the UDPS, however there have been splits in the party over who it will endorse and the official position for the moment is that it will remain neutral. It is widely believed that the UDPS is more likely to endorse Bemba than Kabila, although both men represent political camps which Tshisekedi despises. Kabila represents his father’s botched “revolution” and crackdown on multi-party politics, which saw him sent into internal exile for over a year, while Bemba represents the political and financial excesses of the Mobutu era. If Bemba were to get the UDPS’ endorsement, this would almost certainly swing the vote in his favour, as he would be able to pick up votes in the two Kasai provinces, as well as Kinshasa which has a large UDPS support base.

Scenario 1: If Bemba wins

If Bemba wins the elections, the presidential camp is unlikely to accept the results graciously. Having been in power for close to ten years, the Kabila camp has grown accustomed to power which it is not at all ready to give up. There will be accusations of fraud, and violence can be
expected to erupt in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, as well as some of the eastern cities such as Bukavu. While Eufor and MONUC should be able to calm the waters in Kinshasa and the east, it is unclear whether or not they have the same capability in Lubumbashi, the capital of Katanga where Mr Kabila remains popular. Many of his GSSP are stationed here and in the mining town of Kolwezi further north, while MONUC has only a standard number of troops in Lubumbashi to defend UN installations. In addition most of the regular troops in the province are government troops which have not yet been reintegrated into the army, and they are likely to stick by Kabila’s side in the short-term. There is a very real possibility that Kabila and his crowd would attempt to hive off Katanga in a bid for succession, or to use it as a bargaining chip in political negotiations. They have ceded very little power in Katanga since the transition government was installed and, in spite of the fact that the military commander for the region hails from another faction, the real military power in the province is John Numbi, the head of the air force. The secession of Katanga is a worst-case scenario; however it is difficult to imagine either that Bemba would accord the Kabila camp significant power or that the latter would be willing to negotiate for strategic government posts.

Scenario 2: If Kabila wins

If Joseph Kabila wins – this is still believed to be the most likely scenario - there will also likely be some violence, however it is expected to abate fairly quickly. Bemba does not himself have many troops and he will have to rely on popular discontent with the results in order to keep the protests going. Sooner or later he will have to accept defeat. The international community is likely to put pressure on Kabila to include Bemba in the government; however it is not clear whether or not Bemba would accept this.
8. Recommendations

- Accelerate and enhance the process of military integration with a view to creating a strong, unified national army.

- Crack down on the rampant corruption in the military and ensure that troops are adequately and regularly paid and the FARDC have the resources they need to do their job.

- Provide training in human rights and other social issues to the military.

- Create a strongly-technocratic government that can tackle the many post-conflict issues that the DRC will face.

- Ensure that the new government includes representatives of the various political parties in the country – MLC, RCD, PPRD, UDPS, etc..

- Ensure that multilateral and bilateral aid is not siphoned off by corrupt elites.

- Make sure that the political space after the election remains open and free.

- Focus on reestablishing key institutions and services such as the judicial system, the health and education sectors, and the customs and revenue services.

- Reform the civil service, create a new, competent body of civil servants who are regularly and well-paid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMP</td>
<td>Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>Armée Nationale Congolaise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Convention des Démocrates Congolais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAT</td>
<td>Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codeco</td>
<td>Coalition des Démocrates Congolais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eufor</td>
<td>European Union Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC</td>
<td>European Union’s security sector reform mission in the DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Forces Armées Congolaises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAPC</td>
<td>Forces Armées du Peuple Congolais</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Forces Armées du Rwanda</td>
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<td>FARDIC</td>
<td>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</td>
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<td>FAZ</td>
<td>Forces Armées Zairoises</td>
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<td>FDLR</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNI</td>
<td>Front National Intégrationiste</td>
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<td>FPDC</td>
<td>Forces Populaires pour la Démocratie au Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRPI</td>
<td>Forces de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri</td>
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<td>GSSP</td>
<td>Garde Spéciale de Sécurité Présidentielle</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Mouvement Révolutionnaire Congolais</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSR</td>
<td>Mouvement Social pour le Renouveau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nalu</td>
<td>National Liberation Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palu</td>
<td>Parti Lumumbiste Unifié</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPRD</td>
<td>Parti pour la Reconstruction et le Développement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pusic</td>
<td>Parti pour l’Unité et la Sauvegarde de l’Intégrité du Congo</td>
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<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</td>
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<td>RCD-G</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie -Goma</td>
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<td>RCD-K/ML</td>
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<td>Union des Mobutistes</td>
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<td>UDP5</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>UREC</td>
<td>Union pour la Reconstruction du Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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</table>
Appendix

Map of DRC / Kivu