TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

Since the General Peace Accord (GPA), signed in Rome in 1992 between FRELIMO and RENAMO, Mozambique has been widely regarded as a success story in terms of pacification, political reconciliation, and economic recovery. With the end of its civil war, Mozambique embarked on a two-fold transition process: from war to peace, or from violent conflict-resolution mechanisms to peaceful means of conflict management, and from a socialist one-party regime to multi-party democracy. Against this background, the following analysis concentrates on assessing the political transformation and democratisation the country has undergone. At the same time, the author tries to evaluate the risk of an outbreak of violent conflict in the country, from a short- and mid-term perspective.

As violent conflict arises not spontaneously but over time, this analysis concentrates attention on three sets of indicators: root causes, proximate causes, and intervening factors.

The root causes of Mozambique’s conflict structure are found in its Portuguese colonial legacy, the civil war and its repercussions. The socio-economic cleavages between north and south and between urban and rural areas are structural features of Mozambique’s conflict risk-profile, and so fall in this group of root causes as well. Together with socio-demographic factors, they highlight Mozambique’s vulnerability to conflict and the necessity of minimizing potential causes of conflict with targeted responses.

Proximate causes are seen mainly in Mozambique’s institutional framework:

- party system
- centralised political system
- constitutional framework
- weak justice system
- political culture
- party-affiliated civil service
As intervening factors in Mozambique’s conflict risk-profile, the author identifies recent events that aggravated conflict (1998, 1999 elections; political demonstrations) and that must be seen as major challenges for the future (forthcoming elections, economic development).

1 Executive Summary *

After a war of independence against the Portuguese colonial regime (lasting from 1964 to 1974) and more than a decade of civil conflict, 1992 marked a turning point in Mozambique’s history. The former socialist-orientated country faced major challenges as it entered into a peace process. Under the auspices of the United Nations Mission in Mozambique, ONUMOZ (Operações das Nações Unidas em Mocambique 1992-1995), 92,881 ex-combatants had to be demobilized and re-integrated into Mozambican society (Barnes 1997). RENAMO, so far understood as a mainly military movement, had to transform itself into a political party. A multi-party system had to be established and the development of an independent civil society promoted. Finally, in 1994 the country’s first multi-party elections had to be successfully conducted, marking the end of the formal peace process. Despite minor irregularities, the elections were declared free and fair by international observers, and Mozambique succeeded where countries such as Angola had failed.

Mozambique’s parallel transition from a socialist-planned market economy to liberalism and capitalism initiated macro-economic growth rates envied by many countries in the region. However, Mozambique currently offers an example of a third-wave democracy, where the transition from an electoral democracy to a consolidated democracy has not yet been completed. Little progress towards democratic maturity can be noted in party politics, where a discourse on power prevails, rather than a discussion of political alternatives to FRELIMO government. A centralised political and administrative system prevents the formation of power-sharing mechanisms essential for constructive conflict management, sustaining a winner-takes-all atmosphere. Socio-economic north-south cleavages and urban-rural divides in Mozambican society bear conflict potentials that are unmanageable in a non-consolidated but competitive democratic system, particularly when
political institutions (including the justice system) are weak. However, the necessary reform of the 1990 constitution, spearheaded by the GPA, has so far been thwarted by the lack of political consensus amongst the main actors. The state of Mozambican politics today is characterised by paralysis underlined by a tendency towards permanently entrenched democratic minimalism.

2 Risk Assessment

2.1 Supportive Information

The widely held view of Mozambique as a success story leads to the question of how success should be measured. What criteria are applied and how are they correlated? The term “success” is a teleological one, implying that an established norm or objective has been reached. Generally, one speaks less of success when it is merely an alteration in the status quo, but the objective itself has not yet been reached. Under these circumstances one could, at best, speak of progress - but certainly not of success.

Confronted with Mozambican realities, and in the context of the country’s political transition, an evaluation of Mozambique’s “success” requires an academic discourse of how democracy is conceptualised. Any attempt to measure success or failure presupposes a standard, postulates variables and, in the context of democratic transition, requires a clear conception of “democracy”. Conceptualising democracy necessarily leads to an academic discourse that descends from Schumpeter’s definition, which considers procedural elections as the essence of a democratic system.

“[…] the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” (Schumpeter 1950, p. 269)

The most influential elaboration of Schumpeter’s definition came from Robert A. Dahl. His concept of “polyarchy” suggests that political competition and participation presuppose pluralism and political rights (freedom of speech, press, association etc.). People must be enabled to form and express their political preferences in a meaningful way (Dahl 1971, p. 8.)
Taking this notion of “electoral democracy” further, Larry Diamond posits his model of “liberal democracy” (Diamond 1997). In addition to regular, free and fair electoral competition and universal suffrage, a liberal democracy requires the absence of reserved domains of power for the military, or for social and political forces (including external powers) not accountable to the electorate. In addition to a “vertical” accountability of the executive (through regular, free and fair elections), liberal democracy demands horizontal control of the executive by independent institutions, such as the legislature and an independent judiciary. As an aspect of democracy, horizontal accountability gains importance and requires attention, especially in the African context, and especially when considering the challenges posed to any nascent democracy by corruption, cronyism, nepotism and other abuses of power (Waldrauch 1998).

Liberal democracy also provides for extensive political and civic pluralism. This is relevant in the context of electoral competition and participation, and is essential for ensuring a wide range of democratic features (e.g. alternative sources of information and independent media, to which citizens have unfettered access; Diamond 1996, p. 23ff.). Beyond these elements, a liberal democracy provides substantial acknowledgement and protection of personal and collective rights.

When conceptualising democracy, the process of democratic transition also requires close attention. In general, democratisation can be defined as a transition from non-democratic to democratic regimes. However, when distinguishing between electoral and liberal democracy, one must also distinguish between a first transition (from authoritarianism towards the installation of a democratically elected government by founding elections) and a second transitional process (towards a consolidated and institutionalised democracy).

In a teleological interpretation, one could also view Diamond’s criteria for a liberal democracy as pre-conditions for a consolidated democracy. However, in introducing the terminology of consolidated democracy, a clear distinction must be made between consolidation in the classical sense (as used by Samuel P. Huntington, where the survival of a democratic system rather than a backdrop to authoritarian structures is already considered (Huntington 1993, pp. 208ff)), and consolidation in a teleological interpretation, as used in the present analysis. Consolidation, in the present context, refers to its procedural and qualitative character, in the sense of enlarging and deepening democratic structures and moving away from a mere electoral democracy towards a liberal democracy.

Although Huntington’s interpretation of democracy in his analysis of the ‘third wave of democratization’ (i.e. the transition of non-democratic regimes
toward democratic regimes, beginning in the mid-70s in Portugal) must be seen as minimalist, he nevertheless elaborates an important feature of ‘third wave democracies’. According to Huntington, as a classic example of a third wave democracy, the threat for Mozambique is not so much the risk of a coup or a structural implosion, but rather the prospect of a gradual erosion of democratic structures (Huntington 1996, p. 8.).

Confronted with such gradual erosion, it is interesting to note that for the mere survival of a democratic system (short-term perspective or the classical interpretation of democratic consolidation), the same factors (or rather, their non-existence) play a significant role in stabilizing and enhancing democracy (long-term perspective or teleological interpretation).

The survival of a democratic system depends on the support of both the political elite and major parts of the population. Both must agree that democracy must be accepted as the least worse, if not the best, form of rule (Lipset 1963, p. 64f.) In the Mozambican context, this inevitably raises the question of whether the ruling political elite (which is identical to the old elite of the socialist era) embraces a democratic system out of conviction. Or does it do so mainly because a democratic transition was the best way to secure power and influence for the ruling party - and because a move toward democracy also encourages the flow of donor money?

2.1.1 Analytical Monitoring Raster

2.1.2 Map of the Country/Region

2.2 Risk Analysis

2.2.1 Root Causes

Historic and Colonial Legacy

Although the impact of colonial legacies on post-colonial political processes should not be overestimated, and mono-causal explanations must be avoided, the influence of colonial rule in Africa remains evident. Whereas the French and British colonies became independent in the 50s and 60s, Portugal (under the dictatorial rule of Salazar) rejected independence to its “provincias ultramarinas” until the
military revolution in 1974 – revolução dos gramos. While indigenous elites in French and British colonies had access to academic education in their mother countries, and came into contact with democratic values there, Salazar (1932-1968) and Marcelo Caetano (1968-1974) held up an autocratic and corporatist regime supported by the Catholic church, the military and the secret police, PIDE. Strong anti-communism and a violent response to any opposition became characteristic for the Portuguese Estado Novo under Salazar. Additionally, in Portugal’s overseas provinces the concept of assimilação ran contrary to its semantic content, and prevented the proper formation of the indigenous population, the advancement of local elites, and damaged their opportunities for participating in the socio-political field.

But it was not only contact with democratically shaped cultures and their experiences that influenced political developments in Mozambique after independence. Post-colonial power structures have also been shaped by the manners in which states became independent. According to Christian Coulon, for example, Senegal’s moderate and rather democratic leadership style can be viewed as decolonisation without any mass mobilisation or revolutionary liberation struggle (Coulon 1988, p. 161).

In the case of Zimbabwe, however, Masipula Sithole noted that the authoritarian nature of mobilisation and politicisation under clandestine circumstances later gave rise to politics of intimidation and fear (Sithole 1988, p.248).

In the case of former Portuguese colonies, and particularly in Mozambique, the political culture is shaped by the armed liberation struggle. FRELIMO, like MPLA in Angola and PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, still derives major parts of its legitimacy from its historic role in the liberation of the country. Lack of ‘competition’ and ‘participation’ became characteristic of all political systems in Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP). After achieving independence, the new governments never sought legitimacy in elections. Instead, hierarchies of indirect political representation developed in the context of one-party-systems. At each level (local, regional, national), party members elected or announced new cadres for the ‘assembleias populares’ on the next level. But these elections took place only randomly, and only party members could participate. A small circle within the party decided the composition of national governments. As in the cases of Samora Machel in Mozambique and Agostinho Neto in Angola, changes within the political leadership often took place only after the death of the first generation. Socio-political or party-political competition was nonexistent, due to the incorporation of civil-society forces (like trade unions, associations and the media) into socialist one-party structures. Oppositional forces, still existent after independence, were soon forced to go into exile or else decided to enter into armed struggle, as in the cases of Angola and Mozambique. In this context, social pluralism was mainly reduced to
the existing churches.

Civil War and its legacies

When the authoritarian Caetano regime in Portugal was overthrown in 1974, FRELIMO - which had been fighting its war of independence since 1962 - was already in control of three of Mozambique’s ten provinces. With Mozambique’s independence in 1975, a constitution came into force stipulating the role of FRELIMO as the leading force in state and society, and legitimising a one-party regime.

Whereas the 1970s can largely be described as a phase of FRELIMO’s consolidation of power, the 1980s evidenced the first symptoms of a state in crisis. In terms of structural and material economic conditions, the concept of the state as the sole agent responsible for national economic development proved to be a failure. The establishment of communal villages and the resulting resettlement of people by force were met with fierce resistance by major parts of the rural population. The traditional subsistence economy of small peasants had no place in the socialist model of development, and major segments of rural society became further marginalised and totally disillusioned with the ruling government (Cabaço 1995, p. 93). Large segments of the population felt excluded from a political system that bore all-too-familiar patrimonial features. The state became a source of privileges and material resources for those who had access to it.

The enforced re-settlement of people, almost non-existing state services and the eradication of traditional structures eroded the social foundations of FRELIMO. RENAMO capitalised on this discontent to form its own support base within the Mozambican population. While RENAMO continued to gain support in the central provinces of Sofala and Manica, as well as finding new support in the northern provinces, the grouping remained primarily a military movement, characterised by Christian Geffray as:

"La RENAMO n’est certes pas une association de brigandage, contrairement à ce que laisse entendre la propagande du FRELIMO [...] Mais elle n’est certainement pas non plus une organisation politique, elle ne nourrit aucun projet pour les populations du pays qu’elle saigne abondamment depuis près de quinze ans." (Geffray 1990, p. 41).

FRELIMO hoped that after the Lancaster-House Agreement and the overturn of the Smith regime in Zimbabwe (1980), RENAMO would lose its external support and that a military solution of the conflict would be only a question of time. But these hopes did not materialise. Logistical support for RENAMO continued and, in fact, became part of South Africa’s military concept of “Total National Strategy”.
The complexity of Mozambique’s transitional process and its problems - like the situation in Angola - can be attributed to the political situation of a country dominated by civil war and entangled in the conflict structure of southern Africa at that time. Successful democratisation in Mozambique did not merely require changes to the institutional framework and the adoption of a multi-party system. Prerequisites for democratic transition in Mozambique were the end of the civil war and a stable peace process. Analytically, therefore, internal and external factors determined two interdependent.

In contrast to Angola, the civil war in Mozambique has never been a proxy war of the superpowers. Although Mozambique received military aid from the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact, FRELIMO never followed Moscow ideologically as the Movimento Popular pela Libertaçao de Angola (MPLA) did. The Mozambican government always sought to conduct its foreign policy independently and continuously denied the USSR the ability to establish military bases on Mozambican territory (Weitz 1992, p. 85). Moreover, RENAMO never inherited the amount of legitimacy the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) had within the US State Department. In contrast, RENAMO had the reputation of an "African Khmer Rouge" (Crocker 1994, p. 293).

Although the international dimension of the Mozambican conflict remained less developed than in Angola, the regional entanglement of the conflict provided its own dynamics. The growing consciousness of changing regional and international realities -- and thus the growing reality of a military stalemate -- was a decisive aspect of the initial steps towards peace talks. With the change in South Africa’s regional foreign policy, RENAMO’s logistical support ceased, and it increasingly had to rely on weapons captured from FRELIMO. Additionally, RENAMO’s brutal modus operandi was documented in the Gersony Report of the US State Department, thus discrediting RENAMO’s international reputation. The terror RENAMO spread within the rural population reduced societal support for the movement and provoked at least some passive resistance (Roesch 1992, Alden/Simpson 1993, p.122f).

Simultaneously, increasing economic constraints were placed on the government to bring the civil war to an end. Financial aid from abroad dried up, and the Structural Adjustment Programme implemented in 1986 was unable to alleviate the poverty of ordinary people. There was a stalemate militarily. The troops of the Forças Armadas Moçambicanas (FAM) failed to achieve any mentionable success and were, to a large extent, dependent on Zimbabwean contingents. Zimbabwe, confronted with its own fragile economy at the end of the 1980s, considered the withdrawal of its troops. Furthermore, the USSR announced in 1989 that their military advisers would leave in the next two years. It was within this context that a first round of peace talks started in Nairobi in August 1989,
continuing through additional rounds in Rome from July 1990 onwards.

Alongside the peace talks, the government in Maputo went ahead with its process of political liberalisation. It had already separated the state from the party and removed references of Marxism-Leninism from the party statutes at the fifth party congress in 1989.

Slowly, RENAMO’s raison d’être of a continuing war diminished (Simpson 1993, p.331). The constitution of November 1990 finally included everything RENAMO had been fighting for:

- guarantee of individual basic rights, such as freedom of belief, opinion and association;
- party pluralism;
- independence of courts;
- free and secret elections; and
- a presidency determined by direct vote

At first, these unilateral reforms initiated by FRELIMO had a negative impact on the peace talks. RENAMO saw itself caught in a hopeless dilemma with its bargaining position reduced. RENAMO had two choices. It could accept the rules of the game set by FRELIMO and hope for success in the elections, despite its political and programmatic weaknesses. Or, RENAMO could boycott further negotiations and resume hostilities, knowing that the war could not be won and, thereby, encouraging international support for FRELIMO. The path taken has been characterised by Alden and Simpson, “to be as obstructionist as possible, in the hope that FRELIMO would make concessions that might favour them during the elections.” (Alden/Simpson 1993, p. 122f). Despite these difficulties, it was possible to move the peace negotiations in Rome slowly forward towards the General Peace Accord (GPA) that outlined a framework for democratic transition. The treaty also created an environment that enabled a structural transformation of RENAMO and guaranteed the survival of the party in times of peace.

With the lessons learned in Angola, a successful demobilisation of both forces became a precondition for multi-party elections. The United Nations’ mandate encompassed surveillance of the peace treaty, provision of humanitarian aid and the monitoring of the elections. Despite some initial difficulties regarding the implementation of the peace treaty and demilitarisation, the UN successfully demobilised both forces and managed to prepare for national elections in October 1994.

Mozambique’s transition highlights an instance in which external factors were crucial for more than just the initiation of democratic transition. Pressure from the international community shaped the peace process and the subsequent implementation of democratic structures in the run up to multi-party elections in October 1994. The institutional framework of democratisation was primarily
determined by the former belligerents: FRELIMO and RENAMO. As the multi-party conference for the draft of an electoral law showed, other political forces -- the so-called non-armed parties, established from 1990 onwards -- had only a few opportunities to influence and shape the transitional process (Turner 1994). The opposition, feeling excluded, assumed that every political step FRELIMO took was for the party’s own advantage. This feeling of mistrust was not only nurtured but also confirmed by the ruling party, which dictated the conditions and the conduct of the democratisation process.

This mistrust continues today. On RENAMO’s side, it led to the maintenance of Dhlakama’s armed guards who, according to the GPA, were meant to be disarmed after the first democratic elections in 1994. On FRELIMO’s side, the mistrust prevented integration of RENAMO combatants into the police forces. With a new army consisting of militaries from both sides, the ruling party tried to maintain its control of the police, particularly the rapid intervention forces, troops loyal to the party.

2.2.2 Proximate Causes

Political

Structure of the party system

Democracy requires viable and effective political institutions. The structure of the party system plays a particularly decisive role in the functioning of a political system. In a democratic context, political parties ideally present personal and functional alternatives. The impulse and drive of any opposition to come into power normally ensures control over the governing party. However, the existence of a competitive party system is an essential precondition for efficient control. Beyond formal party pluralism, the opposition must have a real chance of winning the next elections.

The crucial question for Mozambique’s democratisation process is, whether the country will be able to develop such a pluralistic and competitive party structure.

Democratisation required the successful transformation of RENAMO from a primarily military movement to a political party. Moreover, RENAMO was confronted with an unusual problem seldom encountered by African political parties: it lacked a support base in the urban centres of the country. In general, African political parties are concentrated in urban areas and focused on the intellectual elite. Most of the time, they struggle to create a support base in rural
areas.

By the mid-1980s, RENAMO had already established a political wing and finally consolidated its political structures at the first party congress in 1989. The new party leadership encompassed well-trained party politicians who had already worked closely with RENAMO-leader Afonso Dhlakama. Furthermore, the new leadership was ethnically heterogeneous and dispelled the stereotype of RENAMO as an ethnic movement dominated by the Ndaus and concentrated in Central Mozambique (Manning 1998, p. 180f). However, the lack of staff with higher education became one of the biggest problems regarding parliamentary work. Administrators in areas formerly controlled by RENAMO and former clandestine RENAMO sympathisers formed an essential human resource base for the party (Cahen 1995, p. 132). The former sympathisers, as part of Mozambique’s intellectual elite, became increasingly important for parliamentary work. In the first democratically elected parliament, only 18 of 112 RENAMO parliamentarians had fought in the bush during the civil war (Manning 1998, p. 187). Quite often those newly recruited technocrats created tensions with long-serving former guerrilla fighters and, in turn, met with accusations of opportunism (Manning 1998, p. 188).

Despite these structural weaknesses and problems with consolidation, it can be argued that RENAMO has succeeded in transforming itself into a political party, for the following reasons:

- far-reaching demobilisation of combatants took place;
- core structures of a political party were developed; and
- the party was able to establish itself in urban centres.

Although the outcome of the Mozambican elections in 1999 showed that the unipolar structure of a de jure multi-party system would dissolve as FRELIMO lost its hegemonic position, the structural and especially financial weakness of the opposition is still striking. As direct financing by external sponsors is prohibited by law, party financing remains problematic. Since the 1990 multi-party constitution came into place, over 30 political parties have registered. Yet most of them seem little more than the result of their leaders’ megalomania. Quite often, parties are reduced to insignificance through split-ups and walkouts due to personal rivalries.

Aside from RENAMO, smaller opposition parties rarely enter the political discourse. But the major opposition party itself has, in the past, been constrained by its lack of political imagination: it can conceive of little other than its well-known boycott strategy. At any rate, consolidation of democracy in Mozambique demands that the current discourse on power be replaced by a discussion on political alternatives.
Centralised political system

If the current stalemate is to be resolved, consolidation also requires a consensual reform of Mozambique’s constitution and the establishment of a decentralised political structure. A reformed decentralisation programme offers one way of limiting regional polarisation whilst at the same time incorporating RENAMO into governance structures. Communal self-administration has already been introduced in Mozambique, in 1994 (Law 3/94, September 1994). The local elections of June 1998 constituted an integral part of the government’s decentralisation programme. The final law on communal self-administration, however, showed the resistance of FRELIMO toward any kind of power sharing. In fact, the capacity of autonomous municipalities to act is rather limited due to technical and financial constraints. The government did not consider financial feasibility when it drew up borders between the new communities. Consequently, most of them stand on weak economic bases and are highly dependent on the central government. Additionally, in the end, district administration remained incorporated in the centralised governance structure. In practical terms, this meant that even in communities where the opposition was the majority, or had the majority in the municipal council, control over economic resources remained with the governing party at the centre. Considering the results of the local elections in 1998, the material content of Mozambique’s decentralisation remains negligible. Conflict burdened relations between institutions, and unclear responsibilities impede both a transparent governmental structure and the emergence of channels of communication and participation. Local government in Mozambique, in its current form, remains highly dependent on support from the donor community and on the emergence of new impulses (both externally and internally initiated) for socio-economic development.

Constitutional framework

In retrospect, a major impediment to political reconciliation is the continuation of the 1990 constitution under the General Peace Agreement. The constitution, elaborated under the one-party regime of FRELIMO, endorsed a Presidential system and made no provision for power-sharing arrangements on national or other levels. Currently, with provincial governors still nominated by the President, self-determination by the provinces remains limited. Also, the independence of the justice system continues to be questionable with Supreme Court judges appointed by the President. However, the attempt to introduce a semi-presidential system in 1999 was brought down by RENAMO’s resistance. After four years of consultation, a proportionally composed parliamentary commission wrote the draft of a new constitution, making provisions for a semi-presidential system with a prime minister elected by parliament and a state president with mainly
representative obligations. The introduction of a National Council, which would include opposition leaders, was meant to advise the President on issues crucial for the nation, such as dissolution of parliament and government, states of emergency, and war. It was also intended to improve the position of social groups. However, the proposal was brought down by RENAMO which, just before the 1999 elections, suddenly considered a semi-presidential system to be inadequate for African societies where the ‘chief’ is supposed to rule.

**Weak justice system**

As Seymour Martin Lipset pointed out decades ago, economic development involving higher levels of education and promoting a reduction of social disparities reduces the possibility of extremist policies, while also supporting the development of a democratic system and a stabilising middle class. However, to accomplish economic reform and development, solid political institutions are needed. To attract foreign direct investment and to advance and support small- and medium-sized enterprises – the pillars of sound economic development – legal efficiency and an unequivocal administration of the law are essential. But Mozambique’s political institutions are still weak, and the justice system in particular has a reputation for inefficiency and corruption. In 2000, for example, 106,251 criminal cases were carried over from the previous year, due to capacity constraints. In the civil courts, as many as 30,359 backlog cases were carried over to 2000, with a new entry of 6,433 cases and a closure of 5,430 (Tribunal Supremo 2000, p. 8).

**Political culture**

Political culture is closely linked to democratic consolidation. Within the multidimensional process of democratic transition, political culture can have either an inhibiting or accelerating influence. Bearing in mind the core elements of democracy (competition and participation), a supportive political culture manifests itself in mutual tolerance, willingness by the main actors to compromise, the ability of the parties to form a coalition, and the acceptance of election results by the defeated party or parties. In contrast, corruption, nepotism and politicised ethnicity impact negatively on any process of democratisation (Tetzlaff 1996, p. 2). In Mozambique, economic liberalisation had a dichotomous effect. On the one hand, African values like social solidarity were replaced by more individualistic and selfish principles. On the other, the Structural Adjustment Programme -- Programa de Recuperação Económica e Social (PRES) -- sustained what Abrahamsson and Nilson call the economy of affection (economia de afecção) (Abrahamsson/Nilson 1998, p. 53). In a liberal environment, the traditional re-distribution system, characterised by its informal, kin-based structure, led to an economy reflecting the neo-patrimonial structures of the state. Within the process of privatisation of state
assets, high-ranking officials have used their public positions as stepping-stones to private entrepreneurship. The ways in which politicians take advantage of their connections, inside knowledge and perhaps direct control over privatisation are widely referred to as ‘silent privatisations’, and were already addressed by the Attorney General in a report to the Parliament in 1992 (Harrison 1999, p. 543f).

As a recent study conducted in three provinces (Maputo, Sofala, Nampula) by the local NGO Etica has shown, corruption is widespread in Mozambique.

Of those interviewed, 22.6% admitted that in the last six months they had asked for or paid money for jobs typically done for free. With such a percentage, Mozambique ranks among the most corrupt regimes, between Bolivia and Paraguay (26% and 19%). With the prevalence of petty corruption in state administration, the faith in government and state institutions is in tatters. 70.2% believe that the police are corrupt, likewise the government and the courts (58.8% and 58.1%). The mistrust in state institutions like the justice sector is especially alarming, as it points to the core of democracy. While mistrust of a government can be expressed in the next elections, distrust of the justice system might provoke a return to non-democratic and violent methods to resolve problems (Etica 2001).

Civil service party-affiliated

Without sufficient and effective control mechanisms, a new liberal environment fostered corrupt practices and impeded the development of functioning public institutions, or what Max Weber calls the essential element of an accountable state: the state bureaucracy (Weber 1976).

Mozambican state bureaucracy is not only still deeply entangled with the FRELIMO party apparatus, it also bears over-formalised and over-bureaucratised features inherited from the Portuguese colonial administration. For Joseph Hanlon, the Mozambican bureaucracy provides a refuge for the incompetent:

"The Portuguese left behind a complex system requiring formal petitions, tax stamps and rubber-stamped signatures. FRELIMO never dismantled this system, and for anything difficult or unusual, the answer is often that the petition is not right, another signature is needed, or someone else is responsible."


Economic

Based on the evaluation of the national census conducted in 1997, Mozambique currently has about 17.3 million inhabitants and is the fourth most populous country within SADC. About 80% of its population works in the agricultural sector, mainly in subsistence agriculture. Particularly in the central and northern regions, with their advantageous climates and topography, Mozambique still has an unexploited agricultural potential. The fishing industry, particularly
prawns and shellfish, accounted for 24% of merchandise exports from 1998-2000 (AISA 2002). Surplus production, however, often cannot be distributed due to a deficient road infrastructure connecting the north to the centre and south of the country. The exploitation of natural resources and minerals (gas, carbon, gold) increasingly gains momentum.

Mozambique’s transition from a socialist-planned market economy to liberalism and capitalism finally brought with it macro economic growth rates that became the envy of many countries in the region. For example, from 1997 to 1999, the country boasted GDP growth rates of around 10%. Furthermore, the 1999 inflation rate (less than 2%) rivalled even those of industrialized countries. Despite limited economic growth (2.1%) due to the floods in 2000, the country’s economy recovered rapidly and hit two-digit rates again in 2001 (13.9%).

Mozambican compliance with the qualification criteria for the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) demonstrated once again the government’s political will to implement monetary and fiscal austerity measures.

**Socio-demographic characteristics**

However, it must be pointed out that this fantastic growth proceeded from a very low economic base. The government report on poverty in Mozambique, “Understanding Poverty and Well-being in Mozambique: The First National Assessment 1996/97” (its publication was postponed several times for political reasons), demonstrates clearly that poverty in the country is still severe, deep-rooted and widespread, with 69.4% of the population living beneath the poverty line. Poverty levels are highest in the provinces known to be RENAMO strongholds, making this report potentially politically volatile (e.g. Sofala Province, with 87.9% beneath the poverty line).

In rural areas, where 80% of the population is concentrated, poverty has spread to an alarming degree and is estimated to be high as 71.2%. The figure for urban areas stands at 62%. Even in Maputo it is estimated that 47.8% of people live below the poverty line (Ministry of Planning and Finance 2000, p. 13). Nevertheless, per capita income rose up to US$ 230 in 2000. Based on indicators gathered by the National Statistics Institute (INE), tremendous GDP growth led to a significant increase in Mozambique’s Human Development Index (HDI), from 0.336 in 1998 to 0.344 in 1999. The UNDP forecast for 2000, taking into account the floods that affected southern and central Mozambique, confirms an upward trend, with an index reaching as high as 0.352. However, even with those steady improvements, the country will remain in the category of “low human development” (UNDP 2000, p. 21).

The HDI figures for the provinces in 1999 demonstrate graphically and particularly well the significant regional disparities. Provinces in the south, like
Maputo Province, Inhambane and Gaza show the highest HDI, whereas Zambezia, Nampula and Cabo Delgado are the worst off.


Nevertheless, the National Human Development Report of 2000 identifies a trend of declining provincial variation around a rising national HDI. This contributes to a concomitant reduction in regional asymmetries. With the exception of Manica Province, the provinces with an index lower than the national HDI enjoyed a rate of growth higher than that of the country, approaching the national average. The provinces with an index higher than the national HDI, with the exception of Maputo Province and Inhambane, had a rate of increase lower than the national average (UNDP 2000, p. 26).

The education index has remained relatively stable during the 1994-1999 period, a fact alarming from a developmental perspective. The adult literacy rate (the least dynamic of the indicators that make up the HDI) has contributed largely to this, as it has remained unchanged at 39.5% since 1994. Large geographical discrepancies can also be detected. Illiteracy among the adult population ranges from 15% in Maputo city to 75% in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. Gender differences are striking. In general, the literacy rate among women remains at 25.9% (men, 55.4%), whereas in rural areas it is stagnant at 14.9% (men, 43.6%).

The ethno-regional dominance of the South is reflected not only in the tremendous economic gap related to investment concentration and developmental indicators, but also in terms of political representation. It is also embodied in the domination of the former Marxist-modernist, nowadays pragmatic-technocratic elite within the state apparatus. Leading positions within the bureaucracy and FRELIMO are mainly filled by people from the South (Gaza Province, Inhambane).

Despite a slow but progressively positive social and economic development, the impact of HIV-Aids will be tremendous in future scenarios. The life expectancy for Mozambicans rose from 41.7 years in 1994 to 43.5 in 1999. With the expected impact of HIV-Aids, within ten years life expectancy could shrink by a third.

But HIV-Aids affects more than just life expectancy. Education and the economic sector both will face severe challenges. For the social fabric and family support networks, the Aids pandemic is already a severe strain. In 1999, approximately 15.4% of the adult population was infected with HIV (1’173’878 cases in the age group 15-49). 93’969 children suffer from HIV. By 1999, the disease had caused 83,648 deaths and left behind about 257,981 Aids orphans (UNDP 2000, p. 26).
2.2.3 Intervening Factors

  a) Increasing the likelihood of conflict

  Political

  As the last series of Mozambican elections (local elections in 1998, parliamentary and presidential elections in 1999) showed, elections are not only an indicator of democratisation but also a source of conflict. Mozambique’s democratic record received its first setback with the local elections of 1998, when the opposition boycotted the voting and 85% of the electorate abstained from the ballot box. Certainly, the lack of alternatives to FRELIMO, the boycott by RENAMO, organisational deficiencies and inadequate civic education (aimed at explaining the background and importance of local elections) contributed to the "elections without voters". However, the poor turnout might also be ascribed in part to a growing apathy and disillusionment amongst the population. The victory of FRELIMO mayors in all communities (independent candidates succeeded only in municipal councils) consolidated existing power structures at the local level and added to a growing alienation between the political leadership and its support bases. Clearly, Mozambique did not pass the first litmus test of democratisation at local government level.

  A year later, in December 1999, the national parliamentary and presidential elections indicated that Mozambique remained far from a consolidated democracy (Fandrych/Ostheimer 1999). Considering the low voter turnout for local elections, it is important to note positively that voter participation in 1999 did reach 68%, thus lending both parliament and the president a sufficient degree of legitimacy. However, it must also be noted that the international community’s certification of the elections as “free and fair” can be attributed only to the balloting itself.

  Interpreting “fair” in the broader sense -- as equal treatment that presupposes the application of political rules to each actor in the same way, and that interprets equal opportunities as equal access to relevant resources -- the
1999 electoral process was more ambivalent. "Fair" in such a sense covers a spectrum that implies:

- abstention from the use of state resources by the ruling party during the electoral campaign;
- equal access of party representatives to polling stations;
- equal treatment of complaints regarding irregularities; and
- acceptance of election results by all participants (Elklit/Svensson 1997).

In Mozambique, however, the late disbursement of opposition campaign funds, biased reporting in the media, and the use of state resources by FRELIMO, all call into question the existence of a level playing field. Furthermore, the credibility of the electoral process was also undermined by technical problems that emerged during the tabulation of votes. A general lack of transparency fuelled political suspicions and led to the split of the Comissão Nacional de Eleições (CNE). The electoral alliance and largest opposition party, RENAMO-União Eleitoral, refused to accept the election results, even when the Supreme Court declared them valid.

Subsequent attempts by RENAMO to revoke the court decision by delivering ultimatums, together with its campaign of intimidation to destabilise the country, clearly indicate that politics in Mozambique still do not function according to the generally accepted rules of the game. Initially, however, RENAMO’s protests at what it claims were rigged elections had indeed been of a legal and political nature (delegates refused to take up seats in parliament until last October) – albeit accompanied by tough rhetoric from its leader, Afonso Dhlakama. RENAMO also continually threatened to form separate governments in the six northern and central provinces where the party had won the majority. In addition, Dhlakama threatened publicly on several occasions to paralyse the country and to make it ungovernable if a power-sharing agreement could not be reached.

On 9 November 2000, RENAMO’s verbal attacks finally expanded into nationwide demonstrations by its supporters. Some of these ended in violent clashes between RENAMO and the Mozambican Police (PRM), resulting in more than 40 deaths. Although all protests were illegal in terms of Mozambican law, the protests were tolerated in places like Maputo and did not provoke any violence. The worst excesses happened in the town of Montepuez, Cabo Delgado province, where former RENAMO combatants and Naparama peasant militia had regrouped.

In Montepuez, the local prison and police headquarters were overrun and weapons stolen. According to an official PRM statement, guns were fired at protesters only when they started to attack the district police command. For 24 hours the town was effectively under RENAMO occupation. Twenty-five people
were killed in the riots, including seven policemen. The district administration offices, the police command and the jail were completely destroyed, as was the telecommunications infrastructure that had been erected just a few months previously.

Whereas the situation in Montepuez and other districts in Cabo Delgado suggest that violent provocations by RENAMO posed a serious threat to law and order, situation reports from other provinces suggest equally that, in some places, excessive police force was used to deal with those who were merely expressing their political convictions. According to the Mozambican Human Rights League in Nampula, the police opened fire without provocation by RENAMO demonstrators. In an attempt to disperse the crowd gathering outside a sports stadium, the police started shooting. The use, in some instances, of lethal ammunition by PRM for crowd control raises the question of whether the circumstances actually justified such means, and whether more appropriate riot control measures would have achieved the same objective. What happened clearly highlights the need to intensify the current re-training of PRM, and to provide sound human rights education in order to limit the still-endemic tendency within PRM ranks to revert to violence when challenged.

The incident in Montepuez and its aftermath (culminating in the death by asphyxiation of 119 detainees incarcerated in a prison cell of 21 square metres) clearly demonstrates the “benign” neglect of civil rights in the country and the fragile state of the rule of law. According to the reports presented by human rights associations and Civil Society (Comissão da Sociedade Civil 2000), most of the detainees were taken into custody after the riots. Police agents went from house to house looking for people who had been denounced by others as riot participants. In these operations, police agents provided neither specific search warrants nor warrants of arrest. Withholding food and water to the imprisoned, it became only a matter of time before they died of dehydration or asphyxiation.

With respect to the Montepuez incident, it would appear that both sides should accept blame. According to a report by local priests (Público 11.01.2001), it was the police who first opened fire, but RENAMO supporters clearly came with the intent and elaborate plan to besiege the town. To translate their intent into action, they enlisted the support of Naparamas (a peasant militia similar to the Kamajors in Sierra Leone), who had fought alongside FRELIMO during the civil war, but who were now promised double their former FRELIMO remuneration to assist RENAMO (Publico, Maparamas 11.01.2001).

In the aftermath of Montepuez, the situation remained tense in Cabo Delgado. RENAMO supporters feared further harassment by the police, while the
provincial governor proclaimed that the police would immediately stop any new, potentially violent protests (Público 13.01.2001). In Montepuez, Alexis de Tocqueville’s age-old warning seemed to materialise: changes in the political system were followed all too rapidly by a revolution of growing social expectations, which in turn was put to use by the political opposition.

In 1994, Graham Harrison had already noted during field research in Cabo Delgado that popular ideas of democracy were mostly marked by the people’s insistence on evaluating it in terms of material change:

"Many people realised that it was not that nothing had changed; rather it was that things had changed, but not for them. There was a consciousness since liberalisation that some were taking advantage of the socio-economic conditions created to begin to accumulate wealth." (Harrison 1996, p. 26)

With an HDI index of 0.216, Cabo Delgado remains the second least-developed province; only Zambezia fares worse on the scale (see graph on previous page).

Cabo Delgado has always been perceived as a FRELIMO stronghold. Here, the party had consolidated its power more thoroughly than in other provinces during the socialist era. The ruling party had prevailed here during the 1994 elections, and had even managed to gain an additional parliamentary seat in the province in the 1999 elections. However, it is evident that the province provided a fertile climate for social discontent and dissent, thereby creating an ideal opportunity for political gain by the opposition.

What happened in Montepuez during the “black November” of 2000 clearly underlines the importance of paying special attention to the nexus between democratic consolidation and development. However, RENAMO clearly has shown a rather immature political behaviour in the past. It tried to take advantage of the country’s north-south divide in ethnic as well as in economic terms. This abuse of regional differences could not only enhance ethnic cleavages, but it might also create new conflict structures. Instead of presenting itself as a credible alternative to the ruling party, RENAMO continues with a confrontational and obstructive style well-known from the past.

In the past, FRELIMO spurned power sharing and would not consider a government in which RENAMO was its equal. Mistrust continues on both sides, hampering the work in crucial parliamentary commissions such as electoral law reform and constitutional reform commissions. Additionally, both parties still carry the burden of war veterans who demand their share of the pie.

**Crime and crime trends**
The weak institutional capacity of the state is reflected not only in the
country’s low development but also in insufficient crime control and prevention. It begins with a lack of information on the country’s actual crime situation.

In order to develop a coherent strategy to fight and control crime in Mozambique, the law enforcement agencies desperately need information beyond those individual cases reported by the media, myths and rumours.

Although the total number of criminal cases reported to the police has generally decreased nationally since 1997 (39,838 cases in 1997 versus 38,555 in 1999), there was a slight increase of property-related crime and crimes against people in 1999 (0.8 percentage points for crimes against property, compared to 1998, and an increase of 0.2 percentage points for crimes against persons).

Whereas in 1996 the percentage of crimes committed in urban areas was higher than in rural areas (55.5% urban; 44.5% rural), this trend has recently been inverted. In particular, crimes against people are now increasingly present in rural areas, and the causes of this alarming trend must be analysed. In 1999, 43.3% of reported cases occurred in rural areas, compared to 31.3% in urban areas.


With the end of the civil war and Mozambique’s weak border control, especially along the coast, organised crime extended its activities within the country. Mozambique has rapidly become part of the complex global drug distribution network. It is estimated that during 2001, more than 1 metric tonne of cocaine and heroin has passed through Mozambique. Besides its growing significance in the drug trade, Mozambique has also increasingly become a privileged market for the trafficking and consumption of hard drugs like heroin, cocaine and synthetic drugs (Gastrow/Mosse 2002).

Car hijacking and trafficking in the region also affects Mozambique. Cars mainly stolen in South Africa end up on the markets of the Central and Northern Provinces or, alternatively, make their way through Mozambique to the black markets in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi (Procuradoria-Geral da República 1998).

Corruption amongst state officials, the police, and other functionaries in the private sector means that crime syndicates can operate without major interference, making the threat of organised crime to state and society particularly profound. To combat organised crime, strategies must first be developed for fighting corruption in state institutions. This requires gathering extensive knowledge about corrupt practices in state agencies.
Economic

The floods in South and Central Mozambique in 2000 adversely affected economic development. Continuous rains in the region led to the overflow of the Nkomati, Umbeluzi (Maputo Province), Limpopo (Gaza) and Buzi and Save (Sofala). About 2 million Mozambicans became victims of the floods and about 50% of them needed immediate food aid. Despite successful rescue operations, 650 people lost their lives. According to Finance Minister Luisa Diogo, the direct and indirect costs of the floods totalled US$ 600 million. The hardest-hit sector was agriculture (farmers lost up to 41% of their harvests), followed by the damaged transportation infrastructure and income losses by private traders and enterprises. Consequently, the goal for 2000 of 6-8% real economic growth and an inflation rate under 10% had to be revised. GDP showed a growth rate of only 3.8%, and inflation amounted to 11.4%.

With the completion of the aluminium smelter MOZAL, foreign direct investment (which in 1999 had showed a height of US$ 742 million) shrank to US$ 488 million. Reduced growth rates in the construction business (a decline of 22%) also reflected the impact of MOZAL on macro-economic data. The decline in agriculture (2.8%; in 1999, 9%) and transport (6.5%; in 1999, 10.1%) could be blamed mainly on the floods.

Mozambique is losing its reputation as an African wonderland, as a report by KPMG also noted. Negative results for banking, the communications sector and the processing industries are related to structural factors (bad transport infrastructures, difficulties in the acquisition of foreign exchange, inefficient government bureaucracy, corruption) which will continue to influence the climate for investments and Mozambique’s competitiveness in the region and the global market.

The banking sector succumbed to a particularly severe crisis. Banco Comercial de Moçambique, the country’s largest bank, had already hit the headlines in 1996, when fraud totalling US$14 million was detected, dating back to the bank’s privatisation. Misappropriation of funds totalling about US$ 460 000, and losses of about US$ 127 million caused severe problems for the bank, making a recapitalisation of US$ 52 million necessary. The fragile state of the banking sector was further reflected in losses by Banco Austral and the re-nationalisation and re-privatisation of the bank, bringing in South Africa’s ABSA banking group.

In addition, Mozambique’s state budget remains heavily dependent on foreign assistance. Currently, 47.9% of state expenditures are covered by financial aid from abroad and only 43.2% by the Mozambican government via tax revenues. Thanks to the HIPC-Initiative by World Bank and the IMF, Mozambican debt service could be reduced to 5% of state expenditure (about US$ 45 million per annum). However, the disbursement of funds (US$ 453 million) promised at the donor
summit in Rome in May 2000 in response to the floods dragged slowly, provoking severe criticism by the government as well as by international NGOs. By October 2000, only US$ 259 million had been re-confirmed and only US$ 69 million had actually been disbursed.

b) Decreasing the likelihood of conflict

Currently, the outbreak of a large-scale violent conflict in Mozambique seems rather unlikely. The experiences of the civil war are still fresh in most memories. As it was an ideological war, instigated by the political elite from both sides and fought with forcibly recruited soldiers, the likelihood of mobilising people on a large scale appears limited nowadays. Mozambicans seem to be busy, interested in finding ways to secure their daily economic survival. Politics are of secondary importance. However, this might not prevent the instigation of violent clashes – of the Montepuez sort – particularly in cases where parts of the population feel continuously neglected and marginalized by the ruling government.

Another factor making a nationwide outbreak of violence highly unlikely is the availability of arms. Although there still might be hidden arms caches (despite Operation Rachel), the question remains whether they are still useable after being hidden for ten years in a climate favourable to rapid corrosion.

Mozambique’s donor dependence constitutes another significant factor. Contrary to their Zimbabwean neighbours, Mozambican politicians are sensible enough to realise that the country will remain reliant on the international donor community for the next few years and that the international community is not likely to remain silent on continuous outbreaks of violent clashes between political antagonists.

2.2.4 Analysis of Major Actors

Internal

The following analysis of major actors tries to abstain from an elaboration of historic factors characteristic of the main political opponents, but instead attempts to concentrate on recent developments among the actors.
FRELIMO party and government

After the death of Samora Machel in 1986, his successor, Joaquim Chissano, sought to replace ideology with technocracy among the party leadership. This enabled the introduction of a structural adjustment programme and the first steps towards peace talks. Political liberalisation and re-orientation led in the early 90s to FRELIMO’s first intra-party schisms. The opposition between orthodox socialists and young technocrats became obvious, manifesting itself in the critical approach to the government’s economic policy and in subordination under the regulations of Bretton-Woods-institutions. The cabinet structure after the 1999 elections and the introduction of a ministry for former liberation fighters clearly highlights the still-unbroken influence of the hardliner faction. The orthodox group receives its support not only from the antigos combatentes, but also from FRELIMO-affiliated public servants. The majority of these fear that reform in public administration will mean the loss of their privileged positions and access to state resources.

In opposition to those conservative, orthodox forces stands a small group of party leaders who benefited from the privatisation process of state-owned enterprises and became members of the economic elite.

In general, FRELIMO managed impressively well its transformation into one party of a multi-party democracy, and was able to retain its dominant position in the political process. Solid party structures, a public administration strongly affiliated with the party, and the access to new resources from a free market economy boosted its position, as did the lack of credible alternatives on the political scene. FRELIMO supporters can be found mainly in the rural areas of the southern region, as well as in Cabo Delgado province and in urban zones nationwide. Particularly in rural areas, FRELIMO still derives much of its legitimacy from its role in the independence struggle.

The party’s future rests on whether it can find a presidential candidate for the next national elections who is able to reconcile both wings of the party, and also has the potential to mobilise large parts of the population to continue FRELIMO’s reign of more than 25 years. To find a successor for Joaquim Chissano, who in December 2001 declared once again that he would not stand for the presidency in 2004, will be a crucial challenge. In December 2001, the Central Comite proclaimed its support for the president of the National Assembly, Eduardo Mulembwe. However, the decision of the party’s 8th party congress in June 2002 to opt finally for the hardliner and antigo combatente Armando Guebuza as new secretary general shows alarmingly that FRELIMO still clings to the past and that orthodox forces are regaining their influence. As secretary general Guebuza (who so far has been leading the FRELIMO parliamentary faction and was a close intimate of Samora Machel, inter alia responsible for the working camps in Niassa in the 80s) will be FRELIMO’s presidential candidate for the 2004 elections. The election of Guebuza as secretary general (as well as the election of Minister for Veterans
Affairs, Antonio Hama Tai, to the party’s highest body, the Political Commission) not only shows that the antigos combatentes regained strength within the party, it raises the question of how much power, President Chissano still enjoys. Chissano had not only favoured young technocrats in his cabinet during the last two legislative periods, he also had announced several times prior to the Central Committee’s meeting that the next presidential candidate should be from the younger generation. Candidates like parliamentary president Eduardo Mulembwe or former Secretary General Manuel Tome therefore seemed to be promising aspirants, with the additional advantage of not having their ethnic roots in the Southern Provinces of Mozambique. However, FRELIMO cadres opted for a candidate who has yet to prove that, despite past rhetoric in favour of nationalising private companies, he will continue with a liberal economic policy. He must also prove that he is dedicated to combating crime and corruption by cleaning up the political elite and Mozambican society.

The selection of Guebuza as the party’s potential candidate for the next elections definitely gave an ambiguous signal to the international community and raised question marks about Mozambique’s potential for consolidating democracy.

Moreover, it might provide new opportunities for the opposition and might even turn away FRELIMO members who would like to break with the past and continue Mozambique’s transition afresh.

RENAMO

The only party who still has the power to overturn government in the next elections is RENAMO. As the regional distribution of votes in the 1994 and 1999 elections showed, RENAMO managed to mobilise voters on the basis of its ethno-regional discourse in the central provinces of Sofala, Manica and Tete, the north-central parts of Zambezia and Nampula, and in Niassa in the North. RENAMO’s support base can best be described as the coalition of the marginalized: comprised of the neglected rural population and frustrated urban elites and dissidents of FRELIMO. With the strategic formation of an electoral coalition, RENAMO also succeeded in broadening its intellectual capacity. However, due to the financial constraints, the party still has not fulfilled its promises to their former combatants and thereby steadily fosters an unruly potential for social destabilisation. Beyond that, intra-party democracy remains a crucial and still-unresolved issue.

Although RENAMO held its first (and long-postponed) party congress in October 2001 and elected its president for the first time, both its methods and the candidates it presented to compete against Dhlakama raise questions about the state of intra-party democracy. Antonio Perreira and Agostinho Murriel ran with Dhlakama for the party presidency. Whereas Perreira became famous for his threats
to expel all Shangana-speaking people from the centre and north of Mozambique, Murriel was unknown both to the public and within the party. With one candidate representing the hardliners within the party and the other a ‘no-name’ candidate, intra-party elections did not represent a true democratic undertaking. It underlined the suspicion that Dhlakama is not willing to run alongside strong people. It was already clear, with the expulsion of Raul Domingos in 2000 under rather dubious allegations, that Dhlakama wanted to rule the party in his own style. This will be a major obstacle to internal renovation and democratisation. Within the party it will create further frustrations for those who might prefer a different political approach but are fearful of emerging rivalry. In the long run, such a stagnant party atmosphere might lead to the departure of more ambitious politicians, ending perhaps in the creation of a third political force (that might also consist of disappointed former FRELIMO members). Or it might lead to such an explosive climate that an intra-party coup against Dhlakama would seem the only viable exit from stagnation.

Other opposition parties

None of the numerous so-called ‘unarmed parties’ has been able to consolidate since their founding in 1994 and enlarge their outreach. With exception of the parties united in the electoral coalition RENAMO-União Eleitoral, none of the small political parties concentrated in urban areas and revolving around solitary public figures made it into parliament in 1999.

The parliamentary representation of UD (União Democrática) in the first parliament was thanks to historical coincidence. The party had – like President Chissano for the presidential elections – the last place on the ballot paper for parliamentary elections. It was widely assumed that many of Chissano’s voters merely voted by association and that that is how UD managed the 5% barrier clause.

It will be interesting to see whether Raul Domingos’ endeavour to establish its own party and use IPADE (Instituto Democratico para a paz e Desenvolvimento) as an advisory think tank is successful. Politically speaking, the time would definitely be ripe for a credible alternative to the established parties and a strong third force in the party spectrum. However, the challenge will be to convince the electorate that any third force is a credible alternative, and not just a pond for disillusioned politicians who lost their sources of income at their former affiliations and are now trying to dig a new well elsewhere.

Civil society

The growth of new non-governmental organisations (approximately 200) since 1991 will not necessarily lead to a vibrant civic society. In Mozambique it has become problematic that civic society groups are neither ‘self-organising’ nor relatively autonomous from the state. Most NGOs consist of urban elites and lack...
clear socio-political objectives. Instead, they are service providers matching their activities to the interests of donor agencies. Their social basis remains limited. In smaller communities, the structures of civic society are often entangled with the ruling party or are attributed to the opposition. A lack of adequate information from local media and the inexistence of a critical and self-conscious public provide fertile ground for political rumours, particularly on the community level. The media landscape beyond Maputo, where a critical trade union of journalists and independent media cooperatives can be found, is still limited. Radio Moçambique is the only source of information outside larger cities such as Beira, Nampula, Quelimane, where local newspapers and private radio stations can also be found.

There is positive news on the NGO side, where the network of women’s organisations, ‘Forum Mulher’, successfully lobbied for and helped create a new family law. Both human rights organisations, Liga dos Direitos Humanos, and Direitos Humanos e Desenvolvimento, have been critical and outspoken on the Montepuez incidents. The government-critical Liga is well known for their legal advice centres, as well as for their regular reports on human rights abuses by the police and the inhuman conditions in Mozambican prisons.

Local patriotic associations became much sought-after. Particularly before the local elections in 1998, these groups took on a political character and lobbied for their ‘indigenous’ candidates.

The churches played an important role in setting up the peace initiative and political dialogue, and by doing so gained back much of the legitimacy they lost with their colonial affiliations. However, in recent political clashes between government and opposition, they remained substantially quiet. Unlike the Catholic Church in Angola, the Catholic Church in Mozambique no longer plays the important, prominent role it once did as a conflict mediator on a national level.

External

As mentioned before in the historical analysis of the conflict, Mozambique was never a puppet of the superpowers during the cold war, and the government always tried to conduct an independent foreign policy. During the civil war, FRELIMO’s closest ally was Zimbabwe, under Robert Mugabe, and RENAMO received much of their logistical support from Apartheid-South Africa. Nowadays the relations between Zimbabwe and Mozambique are strained due to the forceful deportation of Mozambican citizens from Zimbabwe and the outstanding payment of debts (already more than US$ 20 million for the energy supply alone). In the context of South Africa’s self-focused political orientation, Mozambique is of more interest to the business community than it is to the political elite. Against this regional set-up, the main external actor with influence on Mozambican politics is the international donor community. For them, Mozambique is like an infant prodigy with the tendency to overlook its protectors’ serious grievances. Certainly there are
other African countries where corruption and self-enrichment within the political elite are far worse (or at least more evident), where the censorship of the media is more rigid and where opposition is barely tolerated. However, the latest developments around the bank scandals; the assassination of investigative journalist Carlos Cardoso; the assassination of Siba-Siba; the court case of the President’s son against journalist Marcelo Mosse; and the subsequent closing down of the independent news fax Metical, which was owned by Carlos Cardoso, are frightening symptoms of a serious disease in Mozambican political society. Against this, the international donor community has so far kept surprisingly silent. The political will to insist on the values of good governance seems rather weak.

2.2.5 Outlook and Future Scenarios

Mozambique’s political culture increasingly displays neo-patrimonial and corrupt features. Significant change is not likely in the near future. Among those with the power to effect change, rhetoric typically takes the place of action. And those with the desire to act – such as the new Attorney General, Joaquim Madeira – too often are immobilized by political constraints. The ineffectiveness of the whole justice system also contributes to such a fertile climate. In the political arena, Mozambique entered a state of total stagnation in 2001. Parliamentary commissions on important issues like the reform of the constitution and the electoral law are deadlocked. If this state continues, and external impulses that could enliven the process again do not arise, the next local elections (scheduled for 2003) could represent a critical turning point. At the moment, there are no significant attempts to find a compromise on the electoral law. Most likely, a hastily put-together electoral system might be approved shortly before the electoral calendar is due to begin. Due to tight time constraints, mistakes might then be made in the implementation of the electoral process, which the opposition could use to heat up the climate of mistrust. It seems highly unlikely that the opposition will abstain from local elections again this time. However, considering the low voter participation in 1998, it is obvious that efforts have to be concentrated on voter education in the respective communities. A victory of the opposition in some municipalities would give them the opportunity to show they can govern and also to gain some experience as executive.

When looking to the next parliamentary and presidential elections, one must consider what would happen if the opposition managed to win, and which scenario would be likely in the case of another FRELIMO victory. If FRELIMO won, the best-case scenario would be RENAMO continuing its obstructive policy and rhetoric, with ongoing stagnation and counter-productivity. A worst-case scenario would see RENAMO creating a climate of de-stabilisation in the provinces where they won.

In case of a victory of the opposition (assuming that FRELIMO outwardly accepted defeat), the crucial question would be whether the state bureaucracy
behaves apolitically, and, in particular, whether the police, who never integrated RENAMO members into its ranks, remain neutral.

A RENAMO government obstructed by a FRELIMO-affiliated state administration, or a RENAMO trying to purge the state administration from FRELIMO elements, would be fallacy.

2.3 Policy Options

Against this background, in the political realm it becomes necessary to
¬ de-politicise state administration, and contribute by offering specific training modules for public servants (including police officers) to learn neutral and professional behaviour under the law.
¬ create a win-win situation for both parties by modifying the constitution in a way that allows governors to be appointed by the party who won in the respective provinces. Under these circumstances, if RENAMO lost the next national elections they would at least have a share of the cake and the opportunity to gain experience in a government position. The ruling FRELIMO would not only demonstrate its will to share power but would also (in the not-so-unlikely event of losing the elections) still have some influence.
¬ support attempts to establish a third political force that might be able to coerce both parties back into dialogue.
¬ promote the reform of the justice system in favour of efficiency and professionalism; create ownership; and promote thorough reform within the Ministry of Justice.
¬ re-establish the link between political / state institutions and society in order to prevent further disillusionment of democratic procedures (the accountability of the government) and to avoid renunciation of the democratic order.
¬ support the independent media and sharpen their awareness of their specific role in conflict prevention.

In the developmental realm, inter alia attention should be paid to:
¬ the education sector, which is stagnant and where the gender balance is substantially lopsided.
¬ HIV/AIDS awareness training and civic education in key socio-economic sectors.

3 Appendix

3.2 Chronology
24 April 1974 Military Revolution in Portugal – revolução dos gramos
25 June 1975 Mozambican Independence
1984 Nkomati Accord with South Africa
1986 Death of Samora Machel
1987 Start of the Structural Adjustment Programme
1990 Talks begin between RENAMO and CREMIMO
1992 Signing of the Rome Peace Accord
1994 First multi-party elections
1998 Local elections
1999 * Presidential and Parliamentary elections
       * Qualification for HIPC initiative
2000 * Expulsion of Raul Domingos from RENAMO
       * RENAMO-Protests, 119 detainees die in Montepuez prison
       * Assassination of the journalist Carlos Cardoso
2001 * Announcement that President Chissano will not be a candidate in the next presidential elections
       First RENAMO party congress

2002 June 8th FRELIMO Party Congress

3.3 Actors List

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