F A S T Update

Pakistan

Semi-annual Risk Assessment
May to October 2006
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Country Stability and Forceful Events (relative)

Risk Assessment:
- Squeezed in-between two security relevant territories – Afghanistan and Indian held Kashmir – Pakistan during the last six month has maintained and even improved the overall level of Country Stability. At the same time, Forceful Events gradually decreased since May 2006.
- The main reason for the rise in the Country Stability index is the successful handling of the two main hotspots in the country by the Pakistan government: Waziristan and Balochistan. Waziristan is a tribal area along the border with Afghanistan with a majority Pashtoon population. The Taliban find firm support in these areas because of their likewise predominantly Pashtoon origin. As the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan in those places runs through Pashtoon tribal territory cutting it into two, the border is neither recognized by them nor can it be effectively controlled. The Pakistan government is trying to enforce border security since it has joined the American “war against terror”. A peace agreement signed in September between the Pakistan army and the tribal elders now restores the previous autonomous status of the tribal areas which resulted in a decrease in fighting.
- In contrast, the situation in Balochistan is only to a smaller extent related to the one in Afghanistan and the “war on terror”. The main issue here is the question of provincial autonomy and the handling of the country’s natural resources. Balochistan is territorially the largest province of Pakistan and it has major deposits of natural gas, oil and minerals. It is sparsely populated with only about five per cent of Pakistan’s population living here. With regard to infrastructure it is the most backward province with few roads and electricity lines and health care and education are scarce. The literacy rate among the mostly tribal population is minimal and the Balochis have hardly any prospects to enter the skilled labor market. Consecutive governments of Pakistan have failed to develop the province. The current government now has taken steps to overcome this state of affairs. It is, among other things, constructing a coast highway and a new harbor at Gwadar in order to attract labor force and investors from other parts of the country and from China. This is resented by the tribal leaders and their followers who see their traditional predominance threatened. They are fighting the central government and claim the control over all provincial affairs including natural resources. The government cannot afford to lose control of this province, which has also major military installations, and it is therefore trying to enforce what General Musharraf calls “the writ of the government”. However, after the death of Akbar Bugti, the main leader of the insurgency in late August, the level of forceful action has been contained.
In addition, the level of security in the big cities and especially in Karachi could be more or less maintained. Karachi has a substantial amount of Balochi population and all the tribal leaders have residences there. The killing of Bugti led to riots in the Balochi residential areas of the city but they were prevented from spreading over other parts of Karachi.

In both Waziristan and Balochistan militancy has been controlled but its underlying reasons could not be rooted out. Thus, a solution for the above mentioned problems, which are at the root of the fighting, will take a longer time and new outbreaks of violence are likely to occur in the near future.
**Risk Assessment:**

- The Cooperative Domestic Events curve shows a steady rise from a relatively low level in May to a higher level in August, indicating the efforts of the government to bring the essential problems of the country closer to a solution and topped by the successful conclusion of the peace agreement in the tribal areas of Waziristan. The graph of Conflictive Domestic Events by and large reflects the events that have already been described in the first paragraph.
- There are three major initiatives on the cooperative side in Pakistan politics. These are the negotiations on a solution for the Balochistan crisis and those on the situation in Waziristan, as well as the preparations for the forthcoming general elections later in 2007.
- As mentioned before, the Balochistan conflict is caused by the structural underdevelopment of the province and by the lack of provincial autonomy. Last year two committees had been founded by the Pakistan government to assess political solutions for both issues. The report of the first committee headed by Senator Mushahid Hussain contained proposals to support the socio-economic development of Balochistan. The report was welcomed by some Balochis and criticized by others for not going far enough. In fact its implementation has been very slow. The second commission which was supposed to make proposals for a change in the constitution of Pakistan with regard to autonomy has not produced any report so far, obviously because there was a stiff resistance against any kind of constitutional change in the federal government. After the death of Akbar Bugti and the successful containment of the insurgency in October the federal government has now announced the presentation of autonomy proposals to the parliament by the end of this year. Already in July the “Council of Common Interest”, which had been dormant for several years, was revived. Its task was to handle all disagreements between the four federating units of Pakistan and the federal government. A comprehensive constitutional reform package for Balochistan is under preparation.
- Concerning a Waziristan solution the newly appointed governor of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), retired General Aurakzai, a local Pashtoon, was able to efficiently handle the negotiations with the tribals and militants. In June, the militants of North Waziristan announced a ceasefire in order to facilitate peace negotiations with the governor. The ceasefire was extended until the peace agreement was finally signed in early September. The Pakistan army withdrew from the tribal territories and
imprisoned tribal members were freed. In return, the militants pledged to keep out of Afghanistan and prevent border crossings into Pakistan and vice versa. Though the peace agreement has been criticized by the Government of Afghanistan and the NATO it seems to be the only feasible solution for an otherwise escalating situation in the tribal areas.

• With regard to the stability of the political system of Pakistan President Musharraf has insisted that the current assemblies will complete their term and general elections will be held in late 2007 or early 2008. In order to ensure this, the election commission has started updating the electoral rolls. The ruling party Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML(Q)) has held internal party elections in accordance with the Political Parties Act. Negotiations with the oppositional Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) of Benazir Bhutto seem to be underway, though so far without result. These negotiations seem to be an outcome of President Musharraf’s latest acknowledgement that in order to successfully combat terrorism and militancy its root causes have to be addressed, i.e. socio-economic development, education, and a moderate interpretation of Islam. In a speech on 11 October 2006 he asked the liberal forces of the country to come forward and to help conceiving an atmosphere conducive to this objective. Musharraf had to experience difficulties of dealing with religious conservatives within his own party when the draft to amend the notorious Hudood law was rejected in parliament not only by the religious parties but even by some members of his own party. At the same time, the opposition is split and so far the announced “Great Alliance” has not been formed. Up to now, the Charter of Democracy is a non-binding declaration and a meeting of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in London in mid-October remained inconclusive.

• Internally, the government has been at least partly successful in containing militancy and going ahead with some badly needed reform plans against considerable resistance. Nevertheless, the situation looks positive for stabilization in Pakistan if all the reform plans can be implemented and the elections be held in time. A new outbreak of violence, however, would seriously undermine these prospects.
Confrontational Government and Non-Government Events (relative)

Risk Assessment:

- During the period under review, the level of Confrontational Government Events stayed below the one of Confrontational Non-government Events, as it already did before. Pakistan witnessed a strong rise in confrontation by non-governmental actors in April and an easing of these tensions during the months that followed. The rise in Confrontational Non-Government Events in August is mainly due to the Balochistan situation. A crisis of the Pakistani government with its major coalition partner, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), whose members threatened to resign from their posts, added up the number of Confrontational Non Government Events in that month. The government agencies kept a low profile in Karachi and other places but did check militancy more or less successfully.
- On the non-governmental side the period of early summer was characterized by various protests, such as those of Sindhi and Balochi nationalists against government actions in Balochistan, especially the construction of dams, the disappearances of nationalist activists, and the destruction of illegal Sindhi settlements in Karachi. Quite powerful protests were also going on in Karachi, Sindh and other areas against prolonged power-break-downs during this hot season of the year. Power failures also rendered the water pumps dysfunctional which brought about water crisis in many areas.
- A second type of confrontation arose in the religious field. Shias were protesting against the disappearance of Shia activists and the killing of the Shia leader Allama Turabi in July. The Muttahid Majlis-e Amal (MMA), a religious parties’ alliance, was protesting against the bombings in Nishtar Park, Karachi, in April when more than 50 people died and many more were injured. Another wave of protests was initiated by the death of a Pakistani student in German police custody which was used by the religious leaders for their own aims. Further violent clashes occurred in Karachi on the university campuses between the student organization of the Jamaat-I Islami and the MQM student wing. Moreover, after the death of Akbar Bugti in late August a wave of riots swapped through the country though the government agencies were largely able to keep the situation under control.
- In the combat against terrorism, progress was made through the arrest of the suspected murderers of Allama Turabi. Other suspected militants were arrested in Karachi where an arsenal of weapons was found. Additionally, a man suspected of involvement in the murder of Chinese engineers was arrested.
However, it is a matter of concern that the number of people who are missing after having been arrested randomly by intelligence agencies is high and that neither the Ministry of Defense nor the Ministry of Interior seem to have control over the actions of those intelligence agencies.

- Combating militancy will be one of the main concerns of the government in the near future. As to the long-term perspective new vistas for fighting militancy, including better education and improved economic conditions for the poor, will have to be found.
Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (average weighted)

Risk Assessment:

• In the international context, Cooperative Events have been moving approximately on the same level as during previous months. Meanwhile, the Conflictive Events curve shows a marked increase in June and steadily declined since then.

• For Pakistan, international events are mainly determined by the relationships with neighboring India and Afghanistan, as well as with the USA and China. The initiative to improve Indo-Pak relations and to find a solution for the long-standing Kashmir issue has been under considerable strain during the last six months. With regard to a Kashmir solution no major developments have been achieved and even the usefulness of the so-called confidence-building measures like bus services have come under severe doubt in the absence of any progress in the actual matter.

• Neither has there been progress regarding the negotiations of other issues like the Siachen conflict. The talks held in late May remained inconclusive. Moreover, the Indian Prime Minister Singh announced the delay of his expected visit to Pakistan in June. Negotiations regarding pending problems arising from the Indus Water Treaty also remained unresolved. The lowest point in the Indo-Pak relations was reached after the bomb blasts in Mumbai on 11 July, where more than fifty people were killed. India started blaming Pakistan for involvement in the blasts though no proof for these allegations has been established to date. Peace talks and all other negotiations as well as an ongoing prisoner exchange were cancelled after the incidents. In August, new complications arose. Pakistan expelled an Indian diplomat who was allegedly involved in organizing and financing terrorism in Balochistan. In a tit-for-tat action Pakistani diplomats were restricted to the municipal limits of Delhi. A relaxation of the situation came in September, probably after American pressure on India to proceed with the peace process. In the same month, in their meetings in Havana and New York President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh agreed to resume the dialogue.

• Overall, Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan were under severe strain during the time under review. Afghan President Karzai blamed the deteriorating situation especially in southern Afghanistan and the resurgence of the Taliban in Pakistan.

• At the same time, the US carried out intrusions into Pakistani territory in the form of ‘hot pursuits’, causing the loss of civilian lives. This was a major embarrassment for the government of Pakistan and strengthened anti-American feelings in the country. Furthermore, religious parties took the opportunity to blame the Pakistani government for having ceded away the sovereignty of the country to the USA.
However, the visit of Pakistan’s President to the US was a success: meetings with Afghan President Karzai apparently brought an improvement in the relationship between both states. Moreover, a further estrangement between the USA and Pakistan resulting from certain passages of President Musharraf’s autobiography, which was launched on 25 September, could be prevented. Again, as a result of American pressure a joint meeting was held between Presidents Musharraf, Karzai and Bush in New York. The outcome was the decision to hold a joint Grand Jirga (tribal meeting) of Pakistani and Afghan Pashtoons in the near future to improve the border situation between the two countries. However, the success of such an event remains to be seen.

In contrast, the Pakistan-Chinese relations are developing positively. China is not only an important economic partner and investor in the development of the port in Gwadar in Balochistan, but also going to provide further assistance to Pakistan to solve the latter’s energy problem. After the US refusal to support the production of nuclear energy according to the lines of the US-Indian agreement Pakistan turned to China for support. Subsequently, an agreement for the construction of six nuclear power stations of 300MW each was reached and will officially be signed during the Chinese Prime Minister’s visit to Pakistan later this year. Another sign of the good relations with China was the invitation of Pakistan in June to attend a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization where new vistas for cooperation were identified.

During the last six months Pakistan’s international standing seems to have improved and prospects for the coming months are likely to be positive in this respect. Of course the long-standing problems with India will not vanish; neither will the Taleban disappear. For the time being Pakistan has been able to keep the situation in the country under control. Nevertheless, the balance achieved is a delicate one. There are informations on the Taleban which indicate their intention not to retreat for a winter break this year. A new spill of violence in Afghanistan could endanger the current balance in Pakistan.
Country Stability | The Country Stability index reflects three independent factors: (i) challenges by non-government actors to the state’s monopoly of force; (ii) state repression; and (iii) violence entailing physical force against persons or property. The index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability.

Conflicitive International Events (average weighted) | Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8.

Cooperative International Events (average weighted) | Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) that have a positive value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8.

Conflicitive Domestic Events (average weighted) | Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8.

Cooperative Domestic Events (average weighted) | Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) that have a positive value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8.

Confrontational Non-Government Events (relative) | Number of Events (i) that are of confrontational nature such as ‘Threaten’, ‘Demonstrate’, ‘Reduce relationships’, ‘Expel’, ‘Seize’ and ‘Force’ and (ii) where at least one Initiator is a non-government actor divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.

Confrontational Government Events (relative) | Number of Events (i) that are of confrontational nature such as ‘Threaten’, ‘Demonstrate’, ‘Reduce relationships’, ‘Expel’, ‘Seize’ and ‘Force’ and (ii) where at least one Initiator is a government actor divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.

Forceful Events (relative) | Number of Events (i) that entail the use of physical force against persons or property divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.

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*The IDEA cooperation-conflict scale is a general weighting scale that attaches a weight to every event. The scale has a range from −13 to +8. Event types that are regarded as cooperative have positive values, conflictive event types have negative values.
Who are we?
FAST International is the early warning program of swisspeace, based in Bern, Switzerland. The program is funded and utilized by an international consortium of development agencies consisting of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).

What do we want to achieve?
FAST International aims at enhancing political decision makers’ and their offices’ ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner so that coherent political strategies can be formulated to either prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or identify windows of opportunity for peacebuilding.

How do we work?
FAST International uses both qualitative and quantitative methods, with the combination of methods being determined in each case by customer needs. The centerpiece of FAST International is the collection of single cooperative and conflictive events by means of a web-based software, applied by local staff using a coding scheme called IDEA (Integrated Data for Event Analysis), which is based on the WEIS (World Interaction Survey) coding scheme. The monitoring by FAST International is done independently from Western media coverage, thus providing for a constant influx of information. This information is collected by FAST International’s own Local Information Networks (LINs). The quantitative empirical analysis is based on composed indicators developed within the IDEA framework. Since even the most profound quantitative analysis requires interpretation, FAST International cooperates with renowned country/area experts.

What are our products?
FAST International offers different early warning products tailored to customer needs. The only standard product available to the general public is the FAST Update, which provides the reader with an overview of developments on a semi-annual basis. It consists of three to five tension barometers (graphs), displaying cooperative and conflictive developments, which are analyzed by FAST’s country/area experts on the basis of specific indicators. Whenever major changes occur in one of the countries or regions under scrutiny, FAST releases Special Updates, which follow the structure of the regular FAST Updates. FAST Updates are available in either hard copy, in electronic form on the respective country page or by subscription.

Which countries do we currently monitor?
Africa: Angola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia
Asia: Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
Europe: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro, Russian Federation/North Caucasus region.