Conference Report
The Transformation of Intractable Conflicts
Perspectives and Challenges for Interactive Problem Solving
A conference held in honor of Professor Herbert C. Kelman at Harvard University
March 27-29, 2014

Edited by
Augustin Nicolescu
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June 2014
The Transformation of Intractable Conflicts
Perspectives and Challenges for Interactive Problem Solving

This report is dedicated to Herbert and Rose Kelman, who are an inspiration to us all.
About the Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation

The Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation is the successor of the Institute for Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding (IICP), which was founded in 2005 by Mag. a. Gudrun Kramer and Dr. Wilfried Graf as a non-profit organization. Since 2011 the Kelman Institute is a cooperation partner of the Centre for Peace Research and Peace Pedagogy – ZFF of the University of Klagenfurt – one of the partners of the Conflict Peace Democracy Cluster (CPDP) for pooling conflict, peace and democracy research in Austria. Starting in 2015, the Kelman Institute will be enter a cooperation partnership with the Faculty of Law at the University of Graz.

The Kelman Institute works in peace mediation, dialogue facilitation, training, research, and conflict-sensitive development cooperation in international conflict regions. It has experience working in Sri Lanka, Israel-Palestine, Kyrgyzstan, Colombia, Ukraine, the Great Lakes Region, the South Caucasus, as well as the Austrian Province of Carinthia. The Institute provides the basis for the integration of 40 years of experience in international, social-psychological oriented conflict resolution in Israel-Palestine by Professor Herbert C. Kelman, the experience in international and European diplomacy by Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, and the wide-ranging experience in unofficial and official diplomacy of its Board and Institute Affiliates around the world.
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The Kelman Institute is very grateful for all those who made the conference possible, especially the

- **Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation** for its generous grant which made this conference possible.

- **Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development** at the University of Maryland and **Beyond Conflict** for their financial support and cooperation in implementing the conference.

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- **Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies** at Harvard University for granting the conference the use of its wonderful venue.

And all the members of the **Conference Organizing Committee** and the **Local Arrangements Committee** for their commitment and effort which went into implementing the conference.
The Transformation of Intractable Conflicts: Perspectives and Challenges for Interactive Problem Solving conference was held at Harvard University on March 27-29, 2014.

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- The Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation, Vienna-Jerusalem
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Introduction

This report is based on the conference *The Transformation of Intractable Conflicts: Perspectives and Challenges for Interactive Problem Solving*, which was held in honor of Professor Herbert C. Kelman at Harvard University from March 27–29, 2014. The conference was made possible by a grant from the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation, and by additional support from the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, The Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard University, and Beyond Conflict.

The conference was opened by Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch, President of the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation and Schumpeter Fellow at Harvard University. He welcomed the speakers and participants, and thanked Professor Herbert Kelman for being the *spiritus rector* of the conference, noting Professor Kelman’s Viennese roots and the tradition of neutrality linked with a proactive Middle-East policy of the late Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky.

Ambassador Petritsch thanked the conference funders, the Organizing Committee, and the Local Arrangements Committee for making the conference possible. He also read from a message to the conference from Professor Oliver Vitouch, rector of Klagenfurt University, which together with the Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, organized the conference.

Professor Vitouch noted in his message, “Being a psychologist by academic training myself ... I am overjoyed to see Herbert Kelman’s approach applied to one of the most persistent problems of our times. ... Austria as a nation and a member of the European Union has both a unique historic responsibility and a long tradition of political expertise in fostering conflict resolution. It is a pleasure and a privilege to see that the University of Klagenfurt can, together with leading national and international partner institutions, contribute to this endeavor.”

Over 90 participants were in attendance for this opening session, implemented in cooperation with the Middle East Seminar of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. The theme of the session was *Reframing Negotiations: New Approaches to a Two State Solution for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, chaired
by Sara Roy, with Herbert Kelman, George Assousa, Jerome Segal, Ruham Nimri as speakers and Ian Spears as a discussant.

One of the functions of interactive problem solving – and other track-two efforts – is to reframe unproductive negotiations in a way that makes them more capable of producing an outcome that is acceptable to both parties and can elicit the support of their general populations.

The panel speakers offered examples of new ideas, formulas and efforts to re-frame negotiations of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The speakers discussed one of the central goals of interactive problem-solving – and other Track Two efforts – which is to create ideas, new peace formulas, to energize and revitalize the unproductive or failing negotiations, and to come up not only with new ideas, but also with new innovative processes and strategies.

The opening session was followed by a formal reception and dinner held at Harvard University’s Museum of Natural History. The keynote address was given by Minister Josef Ostermayer, the Federal Minister of Austria for the Arts, Culture, Constitution and Public Service. Minister Ostermayer shared his own successful experience of mediating an agreement to Austria’s identity-based Ortstafel conflict in the southern Austrian province of Carinthia, between the German speaking majority and the Slovene-speaking minority. The Minister’s negotiated compromise would most likely not have been achieved so successfully were it not for a well prepared Track II process which had been ongoing for several years before the agreement was reached, led by a consensus-building group including the influential leaders of the Slovene- and German-speaking civil society organizations.

The facilitators of this process included a team from the Herbert C Kelman Institute in Vienna, which is continuing its engagement there to foster further reconciliation. Although the Carinthian conflict was not marked by violence in recent times, a volatile situation had endured for many years. Reconciliation efforts were
and are needed to deal with the tragic past of National-Socialism, anti-Semitism, Stalinism, World War II, and the Cold War.

The conference continued on Friday morning with a panel on **lessons learned from Interactive Conflict Resolution**, rooted in the experiences of participants from interactive problem-solving workshops organized by Professor Kelman over his decades of engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The panel was chaired by Christopher Mitchell, and the speakers were Sami Aburoza, Colette Avital, Shibley Telhami, and Yuli Tamir.

A main goal of problem-solving workshops is to redefine and transform the relationship between adversaries in identity conflicts, to discover the underlying needs and fears of workshop participants as representatives of the macro conflict, as well what they can tell us about the collective needs and fears in both societies and their manipulation and politicization through politics.

Further insights were shared by the next panel on **intra-national dialogue and internal mediation**, which also focused on the Middle-East. The panel was chaired by Augustin Nicolescou, and the speakers were Gudrun Kramer, David Barak-Gorodetsky, and Jay Rothman. The speakers explored another goal of problem-solving workshops and conflict transformation: **How can we, as peacebuilders, overcome intra-societal obstacles, and how can we work with actors which are overlooked, excluded or neglected in traditional peacebuilding efforts?**

The discussion focused on old and new actors in Israel and Palestine, their needs and fears, as well as the manipulation and politicization of their needs and fears—such as the identity needs of Palestinian refugees, marginalized and excluded, and the identity needs and fears of national religious Israelis and settlers, who have come to dominate the political mainstream in Israel.

In the afternoon, speakers in the fourth panel of the conference turned their focus on a range of important issues related to problem-solving workshops and interactive conflict resolution, including **dignity, trust, and reconciliation**. The panel consisted of Donna Hicks, Mariska Kappmeier, Tamra Pearson d’Estrée, and Ilja Sichrovsky and was chaired by Jorje Zalles. The speakers explored how to overcome inter-societal contradictions and obstacles, how to come up with a more integrative approach of conflict resolution, and especially how to link conflict resolution with reconciliation,
with respecting dignity, and building trust between conflict parties, drawing on experiences from different conflicts ranging from the Middle East, Sri Lanka, Moldova/Transdniestria among other regions.

The fifth panel of the conference explored the lessons learned with regard to the relationship between unofficial dialogue and official diplomacy, with contributions from both perspectives. It was chaired by Timothy Phillips, with Rick Barton, Gabrielle Rifkind, Jeff Seul, and Shibley Telhami.

The speakers addressed the challenges encountered when trying to transfer ideas and insights developed in unofficial dialogues to the official diplomatic process, and to the political process and the public debate within the conflicting societies. US Assistant Secretary of State Rick Barton brought in the official diplomacy perspective and shared the experience of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations since it was established in 2012.

On Saturday, the final day of the conference, leading researchers and pioneers in the field of Conflict Resolutions shared their general insights into the lessons learned to date and the challenges facing the field of interactive conflict resolution and problem-solving workshops going forward, as well as ways of addressing those challenges with new ideas about how to expand and improve both theory and practice. The sixth panel of the conference was chaired by Maria Hadjipavlou, with Peter Coleman, Ronald Fisher, Christopher Mitchell, Oliver Ramsbotham.

The final panel examined the contribution of the conflict resolution field to peace research. It was chaired by Oliver Ramsbotham, with Luc Reychler, Werner Wintersteiner, and Sidonia Gabriel. The speakers presented and discussed ideas about how to expand and improve the knowledge-base of interactive problem-solving workshops, with regard to newer theories of peace and conflict resolution and peace research in general, while also placing an emphasis on Kelman’s concept of the scholar-practitioner model.

At the end of the conference Wilfried Graf, Co-founder and Co-director of the Herbert C. Kelman Institute, proposed some follow up activities of the conference and facilitated a brainstorming session among the participants about ways of continuing the dialogue started at the conference, and exploring possibilities for deeper cooperation.

Professor Herbert Kelman closed the conference with remarks and words of thanks.

* * *

This report is based on the presentations made by the speakers and the contributions of the participants. The editors alone are responsible for the content of this document, unless noted otherwise.
Reframing Negotiations: New Approaches to a Two-State Solution for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

A One-Country / Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

by Herbert C. Kelman

After the failure of the Camp David summit in 2000 and the onset of the second intifada, the discourse in the two communities was dominated by clashing narratives. Opinion polls on both sides revealed a pattern of mirror images: people on each side expressed the view that their side had shown its readiness to make major concessions in order to reach an agreement, but that the other side had not responded in kind.

In the absence of trust in the other side, there was little willingness to pay the price and take the risks that an agreement would entail.

To address this dilemma, Shibley Telhami and I began to explore the idea of forming a new joint Israeli-Palestinian working group on the theme of rebuilding trust in the availability of a negotiation partner on the other side and of a mutually acceptable formula for a two-state solution. We actually held two meetings with a group of politically influential Israelis and Palestinians in 2001—one in Cambridge and one in Jerusalem. But for various reasons—including the sudden death of Faisal Husseini (who was a key member of the Palestinian team)—we did not begin our work until 2004.

We agreed that the key issue was not so much the terms of an agreement. These were addressed in the Clinton parameters of 2000, the Taba deliberations, the People’s Voice Campaign of Nusseibeh and Ayalon, the Geneva Initiative, and of course the subsequent negotiations. The formulas for resolving the outstanding issues are fairly well understood and they are capable of negotiation—although not easily. But the critical need has been how to frame a negotiated agreement in a way that would elicit public trust and wholehearted support. Framing negotiation—or reframing negotiations that have become paralyzed—is one of
the functions that track-two efforts, like interactive problem solving, can perform. As it happened, our working group chose not to produce the framing document that we had envisioned earlier. So, in my remaining remarks, I will present my ideas about what such a framing document might look like—which are obviously influenced by the deliberations of this and other Israeli-Palestinian groups.

I am arguing that a significant step toward reconciliation—which we usually think of as a post-settlement process—needs to be taken now, in order to produce momentum for the negotiations and engender public trust and support for the outcome. To this end, the terms of the proposal agreement need to be framed by a joint vision of a principled peace, based on a historic compromise, whereby the two peoples agree to share the land they both claim by enabling each to establish a national state within that land. I have come to call this vision the One Country/Two State solution—as my entry into the debate between the Two-State vs. One-State solutions. This approach has much in common with some of the other ideas that will be discussed on this panel—notably Jerome Segal’s concept of the “common homeland.”

What are some of the ways of giving concrete substance to the concept of one country? First, there would be no taboo on sentimental attachment to parts of the country that are not part of your state. For example, Palestinians could write poetry about Jaffa and Israeli Jews could trace the origins of their religion to Judea, without the other side feeling threatened. Second, there would be free movement across the border, so that Palestinians could enjoy the beaches in Jaffa and Israeli Jews could pray at Abraham’s tomb in Hebron. And third, control of it has led to violent conflict over decades and may ultimately lead to mutual destruction. They therefore agree to share the land by establishing two independent states that allow each people to exercise its right to national self-determination and express its national identity in a state of its own within the shared country (the common homeland, in Jerome Segal’s terms).

A central feature of the one-country/two-state solution is that it makes a clear distinction between the political level and other levels of societal functioning. At the political level it envisions a two-state solution—more or less along the lines of what has been outlined in various proposals, such as the Geneva Initiative, with some differences in nuance. A key feature of my formulation of a proposed statement of principles is that it phrases the elements of a solution in terms of the logic of the historic compromise. But, beyond the political level, the agreement I have in mind would have important implications for the nature of the relationship between the two states, based on the concept of one country.

I am proposing that the framework for negotiations—ideally proclaimed in a joint statement by the two leaderships—start out with the proposition that the country—the whole country between the river and the sea—belongs to both peoples: both have historical roots in it, both are deeply attached to it. The effort by each to gain sole
there would be a range of cooperative activities that would treat the country as a whole as their basic unit, including activities in the economic sphere, and in the spheres of public health, environmental protection, water management, telecommunications, and cultural and educational programs.

Cooperative activities can be institutionalized in a variety of ways. As soon as possible the two states could form an economic union together with Jordan, along the lines of the Benelux model. Such a union was advocated years ago by Abba Eban and by Lova Eliav and it was endorsed by Arafat in my first meeting with him in 1980 and again in our last meeting in 2004–both times with the suggestion that Lebanon be added to the union. Over time, cooperation might extend to the political sphere, in the form of confederation or federation, but that should be left to future developments, including the experience of cooperation in non-political domains, as well as growing equality between the two states in their levels of economic and institutional development. I would avoid, however, specifying such expectations in a peace agreement. I feel strongly that at this historical juncture each people needs to have a state of its own.

I believe that a joint declaration by the leaderships of the two sides, framing the negotiation in terms of a one-country/two-state solution, could have a dramatic impact on the two publics. It has the potential of reassuring and energizing the publics in a way that would elicit their wholehearted support for the process and outcome of the negotiations. Let me, in conclusion, cite several reasons for this assertion:

1. Such a declaration would reassure the two publics that the negotiations are safe, because the leadership on the other side is tying its own rights to your rights, its own claims to your claims.

2. The declaration by the leadership on the other side that this land is your land – just as it is my land – represents an affirmation of your national identity and an acknowledgment of your national narrative that have been systematically denied over the decades. The significance of such an affirmation is brought home on the Israeli side by the demand that Israel be recognized as a Jewish state, which—although it is stated poorly and Netanyahu’s motives are questionable—has found a lot of traction in the Israeli public. On the Palestinian side, the significance of such an affirmation was brought home in a discussion of the right of return in one of the meetings of our working group; it became clear that one of the motives (among others) behind Palestinian insistence on the right of return is that the denial of this right means that we don’t belong here.

3. The one-country/two-state solution activates the sense of justice in the two publics: justice toward your people is restored, while at the same time you are acting justly toward the other.

4. Framing negotiations along the lines I am proposing provides a rationale for the painful concessions that you have to make. The concessions are not merely what you have to do because you have no choice, but a necessary part of a historic
compromise that is fair, just, and meets both sides’ needs.

5. The positive vision of a common future is the shared land helps to compensate for the inevitable costs of an agreement. Above all, you are not losing your land by agreeing to share it with the other people.

6. Finally, an important point that Ruham Nimri brought to my attention at an earlier meeting: the One-Country/Two-State solution speaks to the situation of the Palestinian citizens of Israel. They can feel that they are living in their own country, even though they are citizens of a state defined by another people. By the same token, Jews remaining in the state of Palestine—which in George Assousa’s model, for example, may be a sizable number—can feel that they are living in their own country, even though they are in a state defined by the Palestinian people.

Dual Democracies: A Personal Palestinian Perspective

by George E. Assousa

We Palestinians will never be able to make peace with Israel, nor achieve our own independence and freedom, until we internalize and proactively address the fact that Israel is an anxious state. Equally, Israel must recognize that the Jewish people’s need for a secure home and refuge has both willingly and unwillingly engendered the suffering of the Palestinian people. Both are realities that Professor Kelman, in whose honor this conference is taking place, has long advocated.

We must understand and build on these emotional foundations, but how? As a physicist, I have always believed in the search for simple and elegant solutions: solutions that work, based on reality honestly perceived, not as we wish to see it.

If the Kerry process and Arab Peace Initiative are to become the effective route for peace, the overlapping emotional link of both peoples, respectively, to all of the land between the River and the Sea must be built into the solution. But, as tempting a prospect as it may be to some, we cannot remove national identity from the conflict: both peoples respectively need their own state.

I would therefore like to humbly propose a simple paradigm which I believe addresses these imperatives: a dual democracies framework for final status negotiations.

Unless the respective claims to the whole land are resolved, there will never be a secure and lasting solution. Through quiet
and systematic Track 2 exploration of fresh thinking on the conflict among our peoples over recent years, on the ground and in the Diaspora, I have become convinced that the increasingly discussed notion of parallel minorities – an Arab presence in Israel, and a Jewish presence in Palestine – offers the key to harnessing, instead of ignoring, the mutual sense of belonging of both our peoples to all of the land.

In the right circumstances, the treatment of minorities can be the agent that transforms mutual claims into mutual acceptance. Let us envision two co-operative democracies: each democracy with historic and ethnic connection to all of the land; each accepting the other through the medium of its own minority; and each peacefully expressing attachment to its own irredenta (i.e. its emotional connection to the other’s land) through the medium of the other’s minority. This takes us to the Dual Democracies in the full sense of the word “democracy” because of the full rights each state, respectively, accords to all of its citizens, in practice as well as in theory. In order to make this work, there is a need for a new political framework incorporating the following thinking.

Logical realities and compelling statistics stare us in the face and tell us that the obstacles to reversing the settlement process are too large now if they weren’t already a long time ago. In fact, in order to break the vicious cycle of occupation, domination, and dehumanization – which will never lead to security for either side – we must do even more than simply call for the reversal of the settlement process.

The new reality of Dual Democracies which is being mooted here is one of exploring the option of continued presence of Jews in a Palestinian state. They would stay not as settlers in enclaves, but as a fully integrated minority under Palestinian sovereignty, such presence to be reflected and conditioned by Israel’s full commitment to its Arab minority. However, it is not enough to merely consider this as a mechanism to reach a final status agreement. Rather, in order to reach a sustainable and mutually secure and prosperous outcome, we should explore and build upon the idea as a means of creating value within the two-state solution for both sides.

So let us consider a continued Jewish presence in a Palestinian state as a potential catalyst for energized and more equitable negotiations, empowering the Palestinians over the full range of final status issues: borders, swaps, Jerusalem, refugees, and natural resources. After all, if we are to sincerely talk about win-win, i.e. involving a true give-and-take, a more equitable process will serve both sides. If we look to extract the bee’s honey, and not only avoid its sting, we can form the basis of the new political framework, allowing for accommodation, through a dynamic and interlinking system of trade-offs, across the full range of issues in dispute, issues which otherwise present themselves as insurmountable obstacles.

If we explore this new modality for peace, it could become an engine for reconciliation, and lay viable economic foundations for the future Palestinian state. Building trust through actions and not only words, we can flip the settlement presence on its
head by transforming existing settlement infrastructure so that, under Palestinian sovereignty, it benefits all of Palestine’s citizens.

I deeply believe that this “emotionally rational” Dual Democracies formula, if I am permitted such an expression, emerges as the only achievable and sustainable model on the political horizon, as indeed other models for either two states or one have demonstrably failed. The annotated references included in the appendix (see page 58) show that inroads have already been made in the development of the discussion, but also that this idea has vast unfulfilled potential and requires vigorous mainstream debate.

Moreover, the wider international community, and, in particular, the EU, which has invested so much in underwriting the peace process, but could play a more active diplomatic role, should be called upon to endorse and promote a Dual Democracies-based framework for final status negotiations.

Two States Within the Common Homeland
by Jerome M. Segal

At a time when many Israelis and Palestinians are losing hope about the possibility of achieving peace through the two-state solution, it is important to realize that there is no such thing as “the” two-state solution. Rather, there are a variety of two-state solutions, and it may well be that policy discourse has been unduly focused on one particular paradigm, to the disadvantage of an alternative and possibly more promising approach to two-states.

The purpose of my presentation is to lay out such an alternative. I call it “the Common Homeland” conception. It should be seen in contrast to the standard paradigm, which I term “Strict Separation.” It this talk, I will not try to evaluate these two conceptions, but they should be compared with reference to three main criteria: negotiability, difficulty of implementation, and sustainability. Though I shall not argue for it here, I believe a reasonable case can be made that the Common Homeland approach is superior to Strict Separation.

At the heart of the Common Homeland approach there is a vital distinction between a state and a homeland. This distinction has been glossed over by formulations such as can be found in the Clinton Parameters:

“A new State of Palestine is about to be created as the homeland of the Palestinian people, just as Israel was established as the homeland of the Jewish people.”
Similarly the Geneva Accords stated:

“The parties recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples.”

This is confusion. A state is a corporate entity, not unlike a business corporation. It comes into existence through specific actions, at a specific point in time. It is an actor in international and national affairs, doing this deed and that. A homeland is most fundamentally land, land that stands in a certain relationship to a people in virtue of their history and sense of identity. The homeland is not created by diplomats, and it doesn’t do anything.

When the State of Israel was created, its founders were clear on this distinction. The Israeli Declaration of Independence reads:

“Eretz-Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped.”

And we are told:

“Impelled by this historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every successive generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient homeland.”

In its operative paragraph it states:

“We ... hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel.”

With similar clarity, the PLO Covenant which did not call for a Palestinian state, affirmed, “Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinian Arab People.”

Using this distinction between state and homeland we can now articulate the Common Homeland Paradigm for the Two-state Solution. It starts with a recognition that the same land is the homeland of both peoples, and then goes on to affirm the establishment of two states within that homeland. For instance:

It is agreed that:

1. “All of the land between the River and the Sea, is the common homeland of both the Jewish and Palestinian peoples.”

2. “This common homeland will be divided into two zones of sovereignty, one exercised by the State of Israel, the other by the State of Palestine.”

This however is insufficient. The core of the paradigm requires a third principle:

3. “The two states pledge to honor the oneness of the homeland to the fullest extent practicable.”

What might this mean? With respect to political forms, one possibility is that the two states could form a confederation, with some similarities to the United States under the Articles of Confederation. Here each state would retain its sovereignty, and each would be able to secede from the Confederation. There might however, be a joint body with power over select areas, for instance, certain environmental issues. Or there might be certain joint security units, operating under a Confederal flag with responsibility for monitoring the Gaza coast or the border with Jordan.

In principle, once it is recognized that all of the land is the common homeland of both peoples, anyone should be able to freely live, work or visit within any part of the homeland, even if there are two states. But
clearly today, and perhaps into the indefinite future, such openness is not possible. With two distinct sovereignties, each state will determine the extent to which it will be open to citizens of the other state.

To what extent would Palestinian refugees be allowed to live in Israel as citizens of Palestine? To what extent would Israeli settlers be allowed to live within Palestine as Israeli citizens? There are no fixed answers to these questions. What is envisioned is that both states will be open to going as far as possible in this direction. It can be expected that this would vary considerably over time and that it would be strongly influenced by experience. Possibly at first there would be only small experimental programs. If they succeeded, they could be enlarged. Alternatively, initial efforts may reveal insurmountable problems, and further attempts shelved for quite some time.

The key point is that there would joint recognition that all of the land is the homeland of both peoples, and a commitment to continue to explore the possibilities of open borders between the two states.

A fuller comparison of the Common Homeland paradigm with its main alternative, the Strict Separation paradigm, is detailed in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Standard Paradigm (strict separation)</th>
<th>Common Homeland Paradigm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core Rights/Recognition</td>
<td>1. Israel is the nation state of the Jewish people.</td>
<td>1. Mutual recognition of all of the land from the river to the sea as the common homeland of both peoples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Palestine is the nation state of the Palestinian people.</td>
<td>2. Mutual recognition, in principle, of the right of all to live anywhere within the common homeland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State/homeland distinction</td>
<td>Blurred as in Clinton parameters: “A new State of Palestine is about to be created as the homeland of the Palestinian people, just as Israel was established as the homeland of the Jewish people.”</td>
<td>Sharpened. A homeland is a matter of history and identity. States are political entities created at a specific moment in history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of separation sought</td>
<td>Maximal. “We are here and they are there.”</td>
<td>Only what is necessary. Both states will commit to seeking to find ways to honor the fact of the common homeland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of citizens of one state residing within the territory of the other: Settlers/Refugees</td>
<td>Zero/Minimized. After land swaps remaining settlers must be evacuated.</td>
<td>* Open to testing state-to-state programs which will allow Israeli citizens (e.g. settlers) to live as residents in Palestine and will allow Palestinian citizens (e.g. refugees) to live as residents within Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights of Transit and Visit</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>* Yes, subject to security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach towards Jerusalem</strong></td>
<td>Clear delineation of sovereignty</td>
<td>Open to removing the Old City from political sovereignty, as symbol of common homeland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Swaps</td>
<td>Yes, with a priority towards smooth borders</td>
<td>Yes, with greater openness to irregular borders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional tone</td>
<td>Painful compromise. Permanent giving up of part of the homeland.</td>
<td>Hope that in the future there will be expanded opportunities to share the homeland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Palestinian citizens of Israel</td>
<td>Under a cloud. “Why don’t they live in their own homeland?”</td>
<td>The live in Israel by right. They represent what is possible with respect to implementation of right of all to live anywhere within the homeland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of Conflict/End of Claims Accord</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanence of political forms</td>
<td>Assumed to be permanent</td>
<td>Recognized as subject to the lived experience of relations between the two states and two peoples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core of support</td>
<td>Leftist and Centrists</td>
<td>Seeks to bring in the Israeli religious-right. Also may win some support among those Palestinians who presently reject two-state framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of Regional Acceptance of Israel</td>
<td>Hopes to build on end to the conflict</td>
<td>Hopes to build both on end to conflict, and on explicit recognition of the historical place of Jewish people in the homeland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach toward reconciliation</td>
<td>It would be nice if it occurs, but not a focus. Key is divorce.</td>
<td>Requires both peoples to strive toward reconciliation after an agreement in order to more fully implement sharing of the homeland. Offers an inspiring ideal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations Between the Two States</td>
<td>Mutual Recognition of fully independent states</td>
<td>Mutual Recognition. Possible Confederation of the two states, with retention of a right to secede. Possible joint Parliament with jurisdiction over specific subject areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to Israeli security</td>
<td>Extended troop presence in Jordan Valley; Israeli monitors on borders of Palestinian state</td>
<td>Possible use of a joint homeland protective service, or Confederal military units.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Economic Union                | Not contemplated. | * Long term possibility:  
  - shared currency  
  - shared airports/road  
  - shared power/water facilities  
  - shared economic projects |

* = Element present in Partition Resolution of 1947
Deciding between these two approaches is not a matter of determining that one is more attractive than another. Rather an evaluation should be based on three practical questions:

1. Is there greater possibility of successfully negotiating an agreement on one paradigm or the other?
2. Which paradigm would face greater problems of implementation?
3. Which paradigm if implemented, promises greater likelihood for a stable peace?

Mutual National Recognition in a Common Homeland
by Ruham Nimri & Mario Schejtman

Throughout the evolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict many proposals were raised for resolving the conflict. These proposals received, correctly, wide criticism. Some were based on inadequate assumptions that prevented both peoples (and sub-groups within them) from accepting the proposals and translating them into an agreement and then the agreement into reality.

In order to reach a transformative breakthrough, the assumptions of these proposals and the arrangements created upon them need to be revised. Instead of looking at current events and at the steps towards an agreement through the lens of deterrence and separation, we attempted to imagine a situation in which the basic needs and rights of both peoples are legitimized. Under this different approach we tried to envision which implementable arrangements need to be put in place to reach a sustainable, long-term, solution of the conflict.

In this paper we present an alternative scenario. This scenario can become a reality only if its guiding principles are adopted by a conscious decision of both peoples and their leadership. Here, to open the discussion, we bring the guiding principles of our transformative approach and how these principles might be translated into practical solutions for some of the core issues in the conflict.

Guiding Principles

- Mutual national recognition: two peoples, the Palestinian and the Jewish ones, recognize the national character of the other. Therefore the resolution of the conflict necessitates the creation of a Palestinian nation-state, the recognition of
the legitimacy of the Jewish nation-state and the recognition of the Palestinian national minority within Israel.

- **Common Homeland:** both peoples recognize the linkage of both to the whole area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. This territory is for them their historical, national and religious homeland. Both peoples recognize the inability of the other to renounce this linkage. As a consequence, all Palestinians and all Jews, as individuals and as groups and regardless of their place of residency in the world are “Homeland Peoples”. This definition expresses their deep connection to the homeland, despite historical developments that constrained many of them to live for long years outside the boundaries of the homeland, and despite the fact that groups from both peoples choose to live outside the homeland.

- The State of Israel will acknowledge the injustices that it, and the Zionist movement, caused during the duration of the conflict. Among them the colonialist practices employed by the Zionist movement to seize lands, its part in the events that led to the Nakba and the creation of the issue of the Palestinian refugees, the occupation and settlements, the policies of discrimination and exclusion implemented towards the Palestinian citizens of Israel and the legitimacy of these practices.

- The Palestinian State will acknowledge the injustices that the National Palestinian movement caused during the duration of the conflict. Among them the acts of violence, including murder, that were consequence of refusing to recognize Jewish nationalism and the negation of the historical linkage between the Jewish people and its homeland, and from the unwillingness to accept any international resolution to end the conflict until the acceptance of UNSC Resolution 242 after the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in 1988.

- Both people adhere to the principle that past injustices will not be corrected by creating new ones.

- Both peoples recognize that each has a right to establish a nation-state in its homeland. It is therefore impossible to create a total overlap between the borders of the homeland and those of the sovereign state. The nation-state of Israel and the nation-state of Palestine need to exist side by side on the same common homeland of both peoples.

- All Jews and all Palestinians, both as individuals and as groups and independently of their place of residency (inside or outside the Homeland) will possess Homeland Rights. These rights will be implemented in both states according to the agreements between them.

- Palestinian Citizens of Israel will be recognized by the Jewish majority in Israel as well as by the State and its institutions as a National Minority. Jewish Citizens of Israel will be recognized by the Palestinian minority and as well as by the State and its institutions as the National Majority. This recognition will regulate the collective and individual rights and obligations of both the National Minority and the National Majority.

- In a reality of peace and mutual recognition the borders between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine will be open and free movement to citizens of both states will be allowed.

### Solutions and Implementation

- Based on their Homeland Rights, Jews that will request to become residents in the State of Palestine and Palestinians who are not Israeli citizens at the moment of the peace agreement’s signature that will request to become residents in the State of Israel will be subordinated to the laws of the hosting state. They will be granted there collective rights in the areas of culture, education and worship, and their national identity will be expressed at the municipal level although maintaining the original characteristics of the communities in
which they will reside. Their participation in state affairs (voting for the executive and legislative authorities, employment in ministries) will be implemented only in their own nation-state. (This article has two qualifications: refugees and settlers).

• Security and access arrangements, both at the border between the states and at the external borders will be based on principles of cooperation instead of deterrence.

• Jerusalem will be the capital city of both states. In order to reach this while keeping the city open and undivided for all its residents, the division of sovereignty will be implemented by the establishment of two parallel municipalities. All arrangements regarding the municipal management of the city and its security will be agreed by both sides on the principles of reciprocity and the unity of the city through an overall joint coordinating committee.

• The issue of Refugees: the State of Israel will recognize the right of return of the Palestinian refugees, although this recognition will not harm the character of the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people. The number of refugees that will return to its borders will be agreed by both sides. Other means to solve this issue will include: citizenship in the State of Palestine; return to Israel as residents in a number to be agreed upon by both states; financial compensation for all refugees; recognition of their historical suffering; the possibility to settle in the states where they live now; and also receiving the status of Homeland People that allows them future capacity to be homeland-residents in the State of Palestine. Specific arrangements will be agreed as part of the general peace agreement and according to the principles of the new approach. Again here, like in the article regarding refugees, it is important to stress that any settlers that will request to be residents and/or citizens of the State of Palestine, from the moment of signing the agreement will present their request from the perspective of being part of the Homeland People and not as settlers.

The rest of the core issues of the conflict will be solved under the inspiration of the new paradigm.

As mentioned, this is a scenario of how reality might change after both sides will reach an agreement based on the new guiding principles. In a longer version of this document we present also a series of practical steps that will help both peoples and their leadership to create the conditions for such a reality to emerge.

Authors’ Note: This set of principles is based on our experience in workshops with Israelis and Palestinians, about national identity, needs and rights in conflict situations, and the inspiring work of Jerome Segal, Edward Said, and Herbert Kelman.
Interactive Problem-Solving Workshops

Lessons Learned from Israel and Palestine

based on the conference presentations by Sami Aburoza, Colette Avital, Yuli Tamir, and Shibley Telhami

In the interactive problem-solving workshops held by Professor Herbert C. Kelman, the participants have had an opportunity to engage with each other over a longer period of time. This experience has led to changes in understanding and perception, as well as giving rise to lessons learned from the process.

One aspect is that of the convener or facilitator of a problem-solving which is a critical dimension for ensuring that the process functions well. In the participants’ experience, the focus on relations between participants rather than on focusing on the relationship and position of the convener within the group, has proven to be very important. Therefore the convener is not the center of attention. It is something which requires empathy and patience. Taking time to connect the participants, this has a positive impact on the often unequal positions of the participants which is the reality outside of the workshops.

The speakers noted that Kelman, while avoiding being the center of the process and keeping more to the background, nevertheless expected a lot from the participants to come up with creative ideas. This brought participants together, realizing that whatever differences may exist, they were tied by a love of the same land where both Palestinians and Israeli Jews have rights. This process, and similar ones held by other conveners, showed that there was a possibility to meet with the other side and find a partner for resolving the conflict.

In the current context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the risk of accusations of ‘normalization’ against participants is largely proportional to the threat of the situation on the ground. Currently apathy is very high, and there is largely a disinterest
in the peace process. These more escalated situations mean that the mediator/convener of a workshop needs to take greater care for ensuring a protective environment, confidentiality, and taking care of participants individually. Nevertheless, although there are now concerns for participating in joint activities, especially among Palestinians who do not wish to be seen as ‘normalizing’ the status quo, things have gone a long way from the 1970s, when it was considered risky to speak to the other side and meet with them. Professor Kelman was early on even accused of being a traitor for organizing problem-solving workshop with Palestinian participants.

The work of the group must be taken in the context of the broader situation in order to identify what a group in a workshop setting can actually achieve. One strategy has been to focus on individuals who have a political voice or can influence political actors who are in power. The challenge in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that those from the political Left who generally participate in such activities have been out of power for a long time. There is a recurring issue of the gap between the micro-level of the group, and the macro level of the societies in question. This has been an ongoing challenge for those engaged in problem-solving workshop and similar dialogue activities in different conflicts around the world. So it may be that the purpose of a workshop group is more modest than full-fledged peace. There can be a move from the technical issues (for example of land, natural resources, borders) and towards adaptive and complex issues which address deep seated social and psychological barriers.

The Herbert C. Kelman Institute, working with members of past workshops, is exploring new directions and strategies for increasing the effectiveness of problem-solving workshops in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on a critical-constructive assessment of lessons learned through its team in Vienna, Jerusalem, and Ramallah.

One strategy is to focus on upcoming leaders – not necessarily on the basis of age, but on those who have potential and courage to take personal risk and promote the necessary processes of change and ideas which support a peaceful resolution to the conflict. They can influence a change in the expectations of what is possible. This can be done through articles, university programs, conferences, and organizations by the
participants who take on this responsibility and risk for going outside of the mainstream and the usual paradigms which dominate the various conflict parties’ discourses. So it is also about focusing on the intervention itself, the process of the intervention, rather than focusing solely on solutions and proposal.

Within an problem-solving workshops, one of the most important things is to get participants to stop asking of the other side what they could do to improve the situation, and instead ask themselves what they can do to make it easier for the other to do what they hope will happen. This is a technique for reframing the situation by shifting the agency to themselves. If they want the other side to do a certain thing, then what can they do to help the other side, to remove some of the obstacles to that outcome.

Having an impact on the political level is challenging. The benefits which arise from an agreement do not tend to come right away for a political leader, whereas the political price can be immediate. Furthermore, small groups can have significant power to impede peace even if they do not have a strong political representation. This is a problem of incentive – people may wish their government to do the right thing, but at the same time they do not give political leaders the incentive to do so. So there are attempts to structure incentives to allow leaders on both sides to take steps, on a quid pro quo basis, such as is the case with prisoner releases, although this is a very limited approach.

Another lesson which has emerged from the experiences of the workshop participants is that things can change quickly – even if for a long time nothing appears to be changing. When the Oslo Accords were signed, it was a surprise. An absolute truth can change a moment later.

There are many feelings and sentiments linked to national narratives which do not get a chance to be expressed. There are deep seated barriers which have not been addressed in the Israeli, Palestinian, and also European societies. This more complex dimension of the conflict, and bringing in the European role and perspective is an idea which has come out of the experiences of some of the participants in the workshops.

After decades of conflict, Israelis and Palestinians are tired and feel that there is little they can do. If there is a fair and reasonable deal, the sides can regain energy and hope, giving the civil society impetus to mobilize and vote for it. So under the current situation, it may be for the government to decide, but it is up to the societies to give them the feeling that if they do the right thing, they will be supported.

It is clear that problem-solving workshops are not only about finding potential solutions, but also about the process, and about the interpersonal dimension. One of the aims of these workshops is to create a sense of empathy. However, a number of factors can impact empathy, especially on the level of a society. Looking at polling-based research on empathy, a number of factors emerge. Reactions to a story of suffering by the other side could be expected to
elicit empathy. However, it can also elicit resentment because it creates sympathy for the other side. And of course there are often mixed feelings. The results show that people who resented the story trumped the people who had more empathy. Those having friendships with individuals from the other side showed greater empathy, but still resentment was stronger than empathy as a primary reaction among these individuals as well.

Furthermore, between 8–10% of respondents stated that they had engaged with individuals from the other side. Among Palestinians in particular, those who had participated in such activities were less likely to have a propensity for reconciliation. This reflects the reality that it is increasingly difficult to bring Palestinians to joint events with Israelis. There is a sense of betrayal among these individuals, and their sense of betrayal takes them backwards rather than forwards. The sense of betrayal arises from the fact that the conflict situation has gotten worse rather than better. This challenges the People-to-People approach’s hypothesis that such encounters create reservoirs of positive experiences.

Yet the absence of empathy is also a result of the assumption that there is little likelihood of there being a sustainable peace agreement. The worse the assessment for peace is, the more likely one is to engage in dehumanizing the other, as events move more towards greater confrontation and potential escalation. Dehumanization of the other is a means of preparing for confrontation with the enemy.

It is a dynamic relationship, in terms of whether one empathizes or not is a function of the assessment of how likely a successful peace agreement is. One of the challenges which has faced the most recent American mediation effort is that it started out with low expectations, so as to reduce pressure on the negotiations. But at some point it worked against the initiative, because if people do not believe in its eventual success, they are not going to compromise, as they have little reason to do so if they think they’re going to be in conflict tomorrow.

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Intra-National Dialogue and Internal Mediation to Overcome Resistance to Change within Societies in Conflict

The Importance of Vertical Integration for Peace

based on the conference presentation by Gudrun Kramer

For several decades, peacebuilders such as John-Paul Lederach have noted the tendency in the field to prioritize establishing and fostering horizontal relations between the conflict parties. Bringing, for example, Israelis and Palestinians together was the main focus of activities in the region, with people-to-people initiatives being the classic example. As Lederach and others have pointed out, we in the field tend to neglect the importance of vertical relations and fostering vertical integration within each conflict society. It is often the case, and particularly in situations of protracted conflict, that the leadership becomes disconnected from the grassroots. Vertical ties within the society often break down in times of conflict. So it may be that leaders sign a peace agreement, but that this is not accepted by the wider society, or by particular key groups within the society.

There has been a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan, as well as with Egypt, yet there has been little in the way of reconciliation between Israel and Jordan or Egypt. Without an exchange between the people of Israel and Egypt or Jordan, the peace remains dependent on the will of the governments in power. A further reason for the lack of reconciliation, it should also be noted, is that the peace agreements which were signed were supposed to be part of a broader peace and the resolution of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.

Intra-group dialogue and work with conflict parties separately is also important because the processes of inter-group dialogue and engagement tends to be dominated by moderates, while hardliners within the societies in question tend to be excluded or unwilling to participate. Reaching out to these more hard-line groups remains very important, as they can jeopardize whatever agreement is reached – with a tragic example being the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. As these more hard-line groups are generally not ready or willing to engage with the other side, a first step must be to engage them within an intra-national dialogue, which can then complement the inter-group dialogue work.

Facilitating a dialogue within a society, for example between Hamas and Fatah, can be a similar task to facilitating dialogue between conflict parties, such as between Israelis and Palestinians. When one of the conflict parties is in the room, the task for the conflict worker may be not so much about mediation but about accompanying the conflict party in a process of self-reflection. It is about providing a safe space for the conflict party to start thinking about...
its own assumptions and attitudes. And it is then up to the conflict worker to bring in some of the perspectives and voices of the other conflict party, but in a very careful way. In violent conflicts one dehumanizes the other side. So peacebuilding is then also about re-humanizing the other. That means that bringing in the voice of the other side gives the conflict party an opportunity to recognize the other side as human beings.

In practice, the concept of Basic Human Needs has proven very valuable. It is something that conflict parties can meet on, recognizing that the other side also has some basic needs which should be acknowledged. Ensuring that one’s own goal can be achieved in a sustainable way requires that the needs of the other, as well as one’s own needs, should be fulfilled. It is a first step towards the conflict party putting themselves in the shoes of the other and developing empathy which is essential for re-humanizing the other. This may well be easier to achieve without the other conflict party in the room, as the fear of losing face in front of the other is not an issue, positions do not need to be defended, and negotiation strategies can be put aside.

In this safe space, working with conflict parties is also about fostering a deeper self-reflection process not only on the cognitive issue level, but also for dealing with the emotions, the fears and insecurities which are there. It is this emotional level which can be critical in protracted conflicts, more so than issues of borders or the like.

**Intra-Palestinian Work**

based on the conference presentation by a Palestinian Scholar-Practitioner

There are now 5.6 million Palestinian refugees in the region, facing a range of conditions in neighboring countries, in addition to the West Bank and Gaza. However one issue is relevant to all of them. They are on the one hand regarded as the heroes who keep up the Palestinian struggle. Yet on the other hand, they are a marginalized group, and the fault-line between refugees and non-refugees has increased significantly. Refugees fear that a peace agreement will mean jeopardizing
the Right of Return. As a result, their voice was marginalized during the negotiation process.

The status quo, with endless negotiations and no peace deal in sight, contributes to the many intra-societal contradictions which have emerged among Palestinians. There are, for example, conflicts between the political parties Hamas and Fatah, contradictions based on geographical segmentation between refugee and non-refugee, between Area C and Area A, as well as significant discrimination against women. The Oslo Accords were to result in a final status agreement in 1999. Instead, there has been 15 years of status quo, lack of progress, and a fragile Palestinian jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza.

Intra-group dialogue is necessary to address all these issues in order to challenge some of the dominant concepts and collective assumptions about the Palestinian society. If Palestinians are concerned about ‘normalization’ in the context of Israel, then the refugees are also concerned about ‘normalization’ regarding the Palestinian society. As a result, social cohesion and the social fabric have been dramatically affected, in turn creating deeper layers of complexity—that can lead the community towards more antagonistic behavior. This will also be reflected in a potential agreement, in both the short and long-term.

A new mainstream requires challenging current patterns of thinking, specifically by empowering marginalized segments of the society and overcoming the conflicts within the society, and by ensuring that there is a platform for them to be able to act towards their future and to ensure their needs are reflected and fully satisfied. At this time, with the escalation taking place on the ground, it does not look like either society is ready for a peace deal.

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Intra-Israeli Dialogue

based on the conference presentation by David Barak-Gorodetsky

The issue of religion is a vital one today, despite what secularization theories may have predicted. There is a lot of discourse about political theology and of religion in politics and what the implications of this is. Religion is often perceived as an obstacle to peace, yet it is problematic to think of religion in terms of fundamentalism. In Israel, religious Zionism is far more segmented and complicated a phenomenon than just fundamentalism. One can consider three groups within religious Zionism. One segment is messianic, another is statist, and the third group is largely liberal. The statist group is of note. This constituency follows the state because they consider the state to be sanctified, and therefore will follow the decisions made by the state.

Conflict resolution is a generally liberal field. It looks at possible solutions, and largely takes a view that people make rational decisions. It is an approach that does not resonate well with those who have a religious understanding. In the case of
Israel, it is not possible to gain a majority within the society without religious actors. Therefore finding a means of engaging with the religious community is essential.

A new actor which has emerged in Israel is the Jewish Renewal Movement, which can be understood as a movement for Jewish pluralism. It is an attempt to reconnect with Judaism by essentially liberal values, reconnecting with religious sources and texts without giving authority to the text in a fundamentalist sense. It is also characterized as being more cultural than political, which is an obstacle in trying to politicize this group. But by moving the field of Jewish Renewal from a cultural actor to a political actor, a bridge could be created in the gap between the religious Zionists and the secular constituencies in Israel. Jewish Renewal has the ability to understand and speak in the language of religion.

In the work of Kumu! *For the Politicization of Jewish Renewal in Israel*, one of the most important activities is a group that is run between Zionist religious rabbis and the leaders of the Jewish Renewal movement. The idea is to create intra-Israeli dialogue around the sphere of religion. While there is a need to address issues internal to Israel, many players have a suspicion of the motivation of someone who comes in saying that internal dialogue is needed in order to deal with external dialogue. So the focus is less on the need to resolve the conflict, but more on the internal rift in Israel regarding religion and connecting the state with a pluralistic meaning of religion, so that Jewish denominations can have a say, which is not the case currently.

Looking at South Africa, it is often underestimated that the entire idea of forgiveness in the truth and reconciliation committee is essentially a religious idea. Finding the proper framework for this in Israeli language and context is an important task.

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**From Intra-Group Conflict to Inter-Group Cooperation**

based on the conference presentation by Jay Rothman

In exploring ways of improving inter-group cooperation, one hypothesis is that by successfully engaging internal conflicts about out-groups within in-groups, sides may separately become more willing and able to successfully and interactively solve shared problems and achieve superordinate goals between them. There have been many attempts
at cooperation between antagonistic groups, whether through negotiated agreement, functional cooperation, promoting positive contact, or through IAPSWs, which have led instead to worsening attitudes and renewed confrontation. Even when polarized groups choose to cooperate they are often unable to make this leap for conflict cooperation. This may be in significant part because inadequate attention is paid first to intragroup conflict dynamics regarding the out-group.

Therefore, instead of seeking to foster cooperation between conflicting groups, it may be more beneficial to look inward with each group and help condition eventual cooperation between the groups. Intergroup conditioning could be possible based on three components: buffering, complexity and intersectionality.

They are useful and overlapping ways of fostering intergroup conditioning to help in-groups successfully reach across and bridge the divide. Groups need to prepare for cooperation with out-groups by developing internal strength, by first engaging on these differences about the other side. Usually the intragroup conflicts have to do with attitudes towards intergroup conflicts and the other. This is a process called buffering where groups are encouraged to focus on their internal strengths not in opposition to other groups, but on their own positive terms. Social identity theory that says that groups are organized for internal solidarity and self-esteem and for defense against the other. This instead says groups are formed and could be more robust on focusing on their own strengths. And the possibility of buffering is not a wall, hermetically sealed, but rather a safe space.

Building on the work of narrative and complexity, thick narratives and complex dynamic thinking about out-groups, shared internally, will help prepare in-groups for a more effective encounter with the other. By articulating internal diversity among supposedly unified groups - or intersectionality - linkages and correlations can be made and natural budges discovered.

If one of the reasons that intergroup conflicts protract is that intergroup conflict are avoided, the converse could also be true: if intragroup conflicts are effectively engaged the process could help condition constructive intergroup conflict engagement. Intergroup cooperation can become a viable source of meaningful bridge building between different groups. Engaging intragroup conflict pro-actively may be the very constructive in helping groups across the table come together and work on shared concerns and a common agenda for the future.
Initiating a Process of Reconciliation between Conflicting Parties to Support Conflict Resolution

Dignity: An Essential Element of Peace

based on the conference presentation by Donna Hicks

In interactive problem-solving workshops, we are often faced with members of conflict parties who have been significantly affected by conflict. The conflict has not only caused material loss, but also wrecked emotional havoc on the conflict parties. Very often, participants in problem-solving workshops are among the best and brightest, and so there is rarely a shortage of intellectual ideas. One reason these ideas are not implemented is that there are also very strong emotional undercurrents which also need to be addressed. It is not only about politics, but it is about what it means to be a human being. The emotional dimension therefore plays a very important role, and when conflicts escalate significantly, there are always underlying dignity issues which need to be addressed. Dignity is about inherent value and worth, but also about vulnerability.

Dignity is vulnerable to be wounded and harmed. Neuroscience has now provided the data to back this up. The research shows that when someone is in the position to be violated harmed psychologically, it shows up in the brain in the same area as physical wound. The brain doesn’t know the difference between the wound to dignity and a physical wound. Physical wounds can be treated in a hospital, but wounds to dignity also need to be treated, but there is no place one can turn to for treatment.

Working with conflict parties, bringing them together, the focus in a dignity training is not about the conflict. It is about sharing the experience of exploring dignity and understand what it is and how it feels when it is violated, as human beings. It is a process of experiential learning. It is an educational approach to healing and reconciling. After several days together, participants see each other in a different light. And then it becomes clearer how to move forward on the technical issues.
Understanding Trust in Conflict Settings
based on the conference presentation by Mariska Kappmeier

Trust is a core concept of conflict resolution. Lack of trust seems to be a hindrance to reaching peace. Security building and confidence building measures have been developed in order to address this, however there is no consistency in the measures, it is not systematically addressed. There is an intuitive understanding of what trust is and what happens when it is not there. But trying to define it and to build it systematically it becomes elusive, particularly in conflict contexts.

Trust can be seen as a multidimensional construct, capturing not only the characteristics which one ascribes to the other group, but also the relationship in which trust is embedded. This can be broken down into seven dimensions. Competence is about how capable one considers the other side to be, and how able they are to perform a requested task. There is also integrity, does the other have a moral code. Are they honest? Do they have good intentions? Predictability is about whether one can predict what the other party will do.

Relationships need to be taken into account when talking about trust. Does the other treat us fairly and with respect? There is then the opportunity to identify elements of compatibility finding points which are shared with the other party, including cultural elements such as music or food, or on a common role in society, such as when mothers are brought together. And on these issues participants can relate on an emotional level.

Beyond contact with the other is the element of collaboration. Contact alone is not enough. It is not enough to bring people together, there needs to be some meaningful contact, some way to build towards the future. Security issues cut across the dimensions of trust. Trust between groups were just hurting each other cannot be built over night.

By using this model, it allows the facilitator to see what is going on in a seminar room on a more generalized level and to then go back to the intervention. In this way, the facilitator can discuss what to do with the situation. Trust-building is so challenging because it is always implicit and one needs to look at what context relationships and situations appear. Simply put, the situation one is in matters and needs to be taken into account.
The Role of Reconciliation in Conflict Resolution

based on the conference presentation by Tamra Pearson d’Estrée

Often reconciliation is about post-conflict or post-settlement processes, but at other times it can be used to build trust, restore dignity, and support and energize the process of negotiation and conflict resolution. The term ‘energizing the process’ seems to be used in the context where a conflict situation is considered to be stuck, in a protracted phase, or when the situation is not ‘ripe’ for resolution.

However, for William Zartman, ripeness is not inherent in a situation, but rather lies in the perception of the parties and therefore can be modified. This is a role for third parties. One of the issues is to help modify the perception of the parties regarding the ripeness. It is not just the perception of pain, the ‘hurting stalemate’, that is needed, but also of the way out. There should be sense of knowing where to go out of that situation. Dean Pruitt notes that optimism needs to be cultivated so that a conflict party not only recognizes that they have incentives for going forward, but also realizes that they have a path and a party on the other side with which they can work. This process is what can reenergize negotiations and dialogue.

Building trust and restoring dignity may be part of a different process. One cannot reconcile a group or community without mutual dignity and respect. Looking at studies of reconciliation, one definition relates to both past and future. It serves to ‘undo’ previous events with an eye to future relationships. This comes out of research on primates. Primates seek social stability as well as psychological stability. It points to reconciliation being very deep in our genes, an evolved mechanism for survival in groups and maintaining relationships.

Some of the earliest discussions of reconciliation were in theological literature, rather than social science literature. Reconciliation between God and humankind had an element of the miraculous or the transcendent, rather than being based on logic and rationality. It is not explained by a rational actor model.

There are several authors who have wrestled with the notion of reconciliation and how to achieve it. Jean-Paul Lederach describes how relationships can be the basis for conflict and also for its long-term solution. Parties must address the past without using the mutual
exclusiveness of the past. Acknowledgement of past harm is key, but reconciliation must also look forward to a shared future. It is “where past and future meet.” Wrestling with the past and the future also means wrestling with the self and other.

An extensive study by William Long and Peter Brecke across many historical examples of reconciliation, both intrastate and interstate, showed that reconciliation requires the recognition of harm and truth telling, justice short of revenge, and the redefinition of the self and the other. So across these definitions there is dealing with the past and looking to the future, and a shift in the redefinition of the self as well as the other.

Herbert Kelman notes that,

“Conflict resolution refers to the process of achieving a mutually satisfactory and hence durable agreement between the two societies, while reconciliation refers to the process whereby the societies learn to live together in the post-conflict environment... It may be useful to conceive of conflict settlement as operating primarily at the level of interests, conflict resolution at the level of relationships, and reconciliation at the level of identity.”

One has to engage in these processes in the renegotiation of identity. Identity plays a central role in reconciliation in all intractable conflicts, where identities are often perceived as zero-sum. It is not clear that conflicts begin that way, but polarization dynamics capture how an adversary’s gain is taken as a loss for one’s own side. Identities are defined relatively, thus shifts in the perception of the other involve shifts in our own self-definition. Processes are needed to help parties to engage in self-examination and self-definition. One path involves the connection between evolving narratives and identity.

There are some relevant traditions that look at how one can shift narratives. Insights from narrative therapy and narrative mediation focus less on accepting the others’ narrative but on loosening the current narratives of both parties and the implications of those narratives. Once those are loosened, incorporating past examples where these parties may have successfully coexisted and cooperated helps build a new narrative going forward. IAPSWs also can provide place-based opportunities not just for building relationships or understanding interests and needs, but for parties to see the other differently and in the same moment to begin to see themselves differently.
Experiences of the Muslim Jewish Conference in Dialogue between Upcoming Leaders

based on the conference presentation by Ilja Sichrovsky

The reality today is that most Muslim and Jewish youth have not had constructive contact with each other. If a young Jewish student who goes to Harvard for a Model UN conference and meets a young Pakistani student who attends the same Model UN conference, both may think that they are well-read diligent students. But if they meet for coffee, they realize how very little they know about each other. Everything comes from secondary sources, whether from parents, one’s environment, but not from real interaction with the other.

That was a starting point. With further meetings arranged informally around international conferences over time, a decision was made to try to institutionalize these encounters, giving rise to the first Muslim Jewish Conference, with the idea of going beyond the borders of dogmas and enter a phase where Muslims and Jews can once again see each other as allies and together face the issues that lie ahead.

The Muslim Jewish conference itself started in 2010, bringing together 65 participants from about 35 countries. In these conferences students come together and start by thinking of topics for committees that the participants from Israel, Pakistan, Canada, the US, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and many other countries can work on, discuss and hopefully find some level of agreement. Topics range from ‘Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia’, ‘Back to the Basics: Everything you wanted to ask never dared to’, ‘Conflict Transformation’, ‘Countering the Politics of Hatred’, ‘Hate Speech’, ‘Muslim Jewish business ventures’. Topics are identified where there is a legitimate chance for the participants to come together.

Through their interactions in the committees and in informal encounters, participants not only come to the understanding that the other is not the enemy they had imagined, but also that they can speak to the other on a level on which they can be comfortable with. They realize that most of the information that they have in their minds is based on stereotypes.

The goal goes beyond just dialogue, and participants are encouraged to conceptualize joint projects based on their discussions, so that they have the experience of creating something together. Not all projects work
out or get implemented, but the process of creating these projects together is an experience which can be transformative. One powerful project was bringing a joint delegation to the Holocaust Memorial at Babi Yar (Ukraine) and then to Srebrenica.

A Muslim participant noted,

“I felt a great pain in my core as we walked down to the ravine at the edge where so many lost their lives. I questioned the humanity of those who would commit such atrocities. I think we all felt a deep connection that was solidified when we prayed together. […] I was again captured by the idea of how much was shared as a people that were brothers and sisters in faith and tradition in many ways and experience too. I felt the need to change our communities, open their eyes, and bring them together.”

A Jewish participant reflected,

“That day one hundred Muslims and Jews came together as one. That day we represented the conscience of the world. That day we took our part of the responsibility as human beings and vowed that we would do everything in our power to not let this happen again. Contemplating the innumerable tombs of the Srebrenica-Potocari Cemetery, the infinite list of those fallen at the genocide memorial, our delegation was filled with unity and dignity.”

Participants come from numerous countries which are not usually represented, including Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and Israel. As an organization that is not affiliated to any Jewish institution or Muslim institution or Israeli institution or Palestinian institution the Muslim-Jewish Conference has found itself in a position to provide a safe space to come and sit and listen openly to the other. The experiences of the participants getting to know each other on a very human level has had impacts beyond the conference. One participant became the president of the European Union of Jewish Students, which went on to host its first ever interfaith seminar in Morocco in 2012.

By its example and its positive results, the Muslim-Jewish Conference is pushing other established religious-oriented organizations to engage more in interfaith activities. Other organizations are asked as a result why they do not engage in interfaith activities, pointing to the results of the Muslim-Jewish Conference.

The initiative is more than just an interfaith project, it is also a way to influence an entire generation of upcoming leaders, attracting increasing numbers of participants who will have a say in their own countries. The similarities of this generation within this globalized world are striking. Religious participants tend to have an even easier time than secular participants, as they recognize many similarities across religious practices.

An ambitious project is now to come up with an archive, similar to that of the Spielberg Foundation, to interview the older generation which has had experience living with the other, who remember a time when coexistence was possible.

Bringing these people into personal environment and sharing stories, into surroundings where their personal experience is much stronger than the idea of hatred towards the other, often preached by those who have never even had contact with the other, is something is a success.

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From Unofficial Dialogue to Official Diplomacy

Geopolitics and the Human Dimension: Experiences in Iran and Gaza

based on the conference presentation by Gabrielle Rifkind

On the level of states and international relations, interests tend to dominate, and issues of trust, dignity and reconciliation tend to be discounted. This is the classic view that states do not have friends, they have interests. The question is whether states can have ‘emotions’? Are they inanimate objects or are they peopled by human beings, whether presidents and prime ministers or voters and citizens. Being human, to discount the role of emotion is to discount the largest part of what drives our behavior as humans.

The issues is not only the role of dignity, the impact of narrative on our behavior, the role of culture, the interest of trust and interest, but whether they can be transferred. The interaction in small groups is very local and personal. How can this process, which is considered so essential for success, be transferred to the national and international level?

In the documentary about Robert McNamara, he points to the Vietnam War in which 3 million Vietnamese were killed and 57,000 American soldiers died, and in which the two sides were fighting very different wars, misunderstanding the intentions of the other side. This was a failure to empathize, to understand the other side. The lessons of that war seem to be largely forgotten.

The marginalization, the lack of dignity, and accompanying human emotions play a powerful force in driving conflicts. These need to be put back into the center in spite of interests and geopolitics in order to be able to resolve conflicts.

There is a space for private initiatives to engage in off-the-record meetings with certain actors and governments, such as Hamas and Iran, when governments are not in a position to do so. Such private diplomacy actors can often go in places where governments may not be able or willing to go.

In Iran in 2005, two years after the Axis of Evil speech, there was an opportunity for the Oxford Research Group to see whether space had opened up in Iran for some kind of communication between Iran and the West, particularly the US, between which there has been a reciprocal dehumanization of the other. This was very challenging, and the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad brought a change in the mood. It was a very sensitive time, when speaking to Westerners could mean being taken to prison.
In difficult situations such as this, trying to put together a meeting, a lot of it is about timing. It is important to put out as many feelers as possible and build as many webs of relationships as possible, and be open to what could happen. What comes out of this process can be something unexpected and take years.

In the case of Iran, the Oxford Research Group was approached and asked whether they would consider doing a series of meetings on what the deal on the nuclear issue could look like. This would take place at a retreat in the countryside, off the record, and behind the scenes with no publicity. The idea was to get all the previous diplomats who had been around the table in 2003 together to look at the possible makeup of a deal. This meant bringing together a small group of people who had been there on an official level, but were no longer there in that capacity. They felt quite strongly that there is still a deal to be done. This was in a climate of significant suspicion, in which the mistrust was reaching such a high level that there was talk of military strikes.

It was not a meeting about the trauma of the conflict or how each side saw each other. The group was very clear they wanted to look at where the red lines were and what a deal could actually look like. After each meeting they prepared a paper that was shaped in government speak, of two pages. The aim was that everyone would be able to go back to their ministries and present those ideas. The composition of the group was fortunate. They were not focused only on interests, but examined the positioning of all the different sides.

The goal is to make a container, to make a particular kind of environment to do the very difficult work that has to be done. The work of the facilitator is then to create the group and keep it as a working group. It is often the informal settings where a lot can happen; in this case, a retreat in which participants could spend time informally together, sharing meals. There is a formality to official negotiations which leads to people around the table talking in platitudes, and concerned about not losing face. Being in the informal setting, off the record, and far from the media, allows for a different kind of exchange.

One problem is that a lot of these efforts are quite piecemeal, without a comprehensive coherence to how they are done. A case was going to Gaza to speak with Hamas, and realizing that there were two other teams trying to do the same thing at the same time. It should not be such a random process. Coordinating and strengthening these kinds of initiatives does not take a large sum of money. So a challenge is how to do this kind of work on a much bigger scale.
The Peace Appeal Foundation, together with its partner organizations, has for several years helped local stakeholders catalyze and sustain several national dialogue processes, including processes in Lebanon and Myanmar/Burma.

The term ‘national dialogue’ has come to describe very broad scale, coordinated conflict resolution processes. They often are launched to help end, or avert, a civil war. Katia Papagianni of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue recently described the national dialogue concept this way:

“National dialogues are negotiating mechanisms intended to expand participation in political transitions beyond political and military elites. Their ambition is to move away from elite-level deal making by allowing diverse interests to influence the transitional negotiations ... National dialogues ... try to escape the elitism of peace negotiations, but do not provide for full-fledged democratic process to carry out that negotiation.”

A national dialogue process may be launched after a ceasefire has been achieved, but it is often a key condition on which the ceasefire is premised. In some cases with which I am familiar, a ceasefire agreement or another, interim agreement, sets forth a high-level, aspirational vision for new political, social and military order, the details of which are to be developed through the national dialogue process. In practice, national dialogue processes typically combine elements of what conflict resolution scholars and practitioners are accustomed to thinking of as pre-negotiation and elements we think of as formal negotiation.

National dialogues are one example of the type of sustained, stakeholder-driven peace building mechanisms that fall within the rubric of what is sometimes called ‘peace architecture’, ‘peace infrastructure’, or ‘peace structures’. The promotion of linkages between official and unofficial conflict resolution processes has long been a central tenet and goal of common approaches to conflict resolution. In practice, however, effective linkages—whether among Track 1, 2 and 3 process elements, among stakeholders from disparate social, civic and political sectors, or among issues at play in a conflict—are seldom effectively established and maintained.

The extreme emphasis on forging links “vertically” (among political and social “levels”) and “horizontally” (across the political spectrum, civic and business organizations, and social sectors, encompassing all major conflict issues), and of creating structures to secure those links and to ensure that their usefulness is maximized, are the signal traits of a national dialogue. Stakeholders in a conflict create a robust national dialogue process to the extent they succeed in generating quality, deliberative interaction among all significant actors on
all major conflict issues and in linking these interactions effectively in pursuit of solutions to national problems that fuel, or could fuel, violent conflict.

National dialogues link and coordinate actors and issues structurally to a degree that might seem improbable, or perhaps even unwise, when viewed from the traditional perspective of distinct (but hopefully mutually-supportive) conflict resolution tracks—the multi-track diplomacy paradigm that has dominated the field for the past couple of decades.

In the national dialogue paradigm, determining, achieving, and sustaining the optimal, or at least the minimum, number of effective/high quality linkages among actors and issues through each phase of the process, and creating structures to forge and maintain those links, is a chief concern of those responsible for stewarding the process, and of all stakeholders active in it.

Most national dialogues share certain traits, but the signal trait, in my view, is the idea of linkages. There is not a ready-made kit, or off-the-shelf tools for constructing a national dialogue; it is more a paradigm than a model. There are, however, common elements, and a strong emphasis on structures. They typically have an official mandate, coming possibly from the top-down, such as the Lebanese national dialogue that started in 2008 and grew out of the 2006 Doha accord. Or they may come more from the bottom up, as is beginning to be the case in Burma.

Perhaps ideally, support for a national dialogue develops from the top down, bottom up, and outside in, if you will. Very broad scale participation or representation is encouraged, with stakeholders across a society engaging official and unofficial actors from different levels and sectors of the society, in what might be thought of as a loosely-coordinated multi-track diplomacy paradigm. An effective national dialogue process may function as a series of concentric circles, with official negotiation processes in the middle, or with an unofficial central core that is linked to, and which informs, the official process. Around that core process are processes that reach deep into the social fabric of the country, with each official and unofficial element of the macro-process ideally informing and supporting the other elements. Sometimes lines between official and unofficial negotiations will become blurred in a national dialogue process. Officials may participate in unofficial dialogue working groups, for example.

Concentric circles of participation allow a large number of people to be involved. There are 900 appointed delegates involved in one national dialogue process with which we are involved, and these delegates are themselves accountable to a vast number of other stakeholders. Any process of this scale must be thoughtfully structured and managed.

Opportunities and challenges are presented by national dialogues when compared to conflict resolution processes conceived of and approached along more familiar—by which I mean more separated and less coordinated—multi-track diplomacy lines. Opportunities include more durable peace agreements and more significant social change, due to greater public participation in the peace process.

The challenges are many, including achieving meaningful, broad participation; coordination challenges; and maintaining confidentiality at those points in the process where restricted access to information is necessary or appropriate.
Transmitting Information to Public Policy: Experiences from the US and the Kerry Negotiations

based on the conference presentation by Shibley Telhami

There are many factors that go into whether information is transmitted effectively into official policy or not. A big part of it is whether the administration feels it has ownership of this Track Two process. Often the connectedness of any given government or administration with Track Two is sometimes empowering or unofficial. And sometimes it is completely detached.

Often the restrictions of ideas is more political than based on inadequate information or analysis. An administration or mediation team can get stuck in a situation of group-think and discount differing opinions which may come up. Based on insights gained through polling, the US Administration was offered an alternative terminology to ‘Israel as the state of the Jewish People’, which was ‘Israel as the State of the Jewish People and all its citizens,’ a formulation accepted by 70% of the Israeli public, more in line with the US position, and more compatible with democratic values. Not accepting the alternative formulation was likely a political decision.

When ‘failure is not an option’ becomes an official position, in order to make people believe that there is a possibility of success, there can be no sign that contingency plans are being examined. So unable to conduct an internal study, governments turn to think-tanks who can bring conflict parties together. This is also important when the efforts are serious, as it becomes necessary to frame ideas for the first time and to explore the limits.

One way to do this is through simulation, presenting a draft plan to Israelis and Palestinians which represent the consensus in Washington, and seeing how it is interpreted. The participants were given the option of take it or leave it, that this is the best the negotiators can do, and they were given a list of arguments for the agreement and against it. In both cases, the reasons against supporting the agreement got more votes than those in favor.

Across the specific points of the proposal there were more against than in favor on both sides. But asked how they would chose if the other side had accepted the agreement already, the numbers go up to a majority in favor. Asking them what would happen if there is no option anymore for a two state solution, most believe that there will be violence for years to come or that the status quo will continue. On both sides, less than 10% are in favor of a one state solution with equal citizenship.

This gives the insight that the people are willing to support an agreement if it is presented by the two governments. However, they are not going to push for an agreement without both governments leading the way.
The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations: A Perspective from Official Diplomacy

based on the conference presentation by Rick Barton

Key events over the past decades have been missed entirely by some of the brightest minds, including the fall of the Soviet Union, the Arab Spring, and the global economic crisis. In the daily demands of government, it is difficult to find the time and perspective to think about things properly.

The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations was established in order to address the recognition that the United States has not done as well as it could in conflicts and crisis situations in order to break cycles of violence. Some of the approaches taken by the Bureau are very close to the kind of work done by private diplomacy actors, but within the government. It is important to institutionalize this kind of capacity inside government structures as well.

There are a number of examples of initiatives taken by the Bureau on the continuum of conflict, from conflict prevention to the more difficult and costly post-conflict situations. One approach is the use of indirect issues to advance peace processes. In Burma, this has been done with the land-mine issue as a way to take reluctant parties from the government, military, and ethnic militias and bring them together around an issue of mutual concern. And it turns out that one can push a conflict party quite far when it is an issue of great concern to them. This is also the case in an initiative called Abraham’s Path, using cooperation on a historical religious site that is important to all of the religions in Middle East as one of the building blocks when some of the bigger concepts run into the political cross-fire.

A second way to do it is to surround an issue and to insist on its role in a series of planned events. In Honduras the challenge was the explosion of homicides throughout the country and the loss of government control. Honduras has the highest levels of homicide outside of violent conflicts. In the run-up to the election it was important to keep this issue of widespread social violence front and center. The core concept was that there was a lot going on inside Honduras that was quite promising, yet the likelihood of success was only around 20%. So the question was whether by investing a modest amount of money could help improve the chances of success from 20% to 51%. That would be phenomenal contribution to the political space. And it succeeded.

A third way that you need to create this transfer of insights is to give a conflict party a ‘nudge’ in the right direction. In the case of Senegal, a new government would come in and say peace in the southern Casamance region is its top priority. After three months, it would drop to around five or ten, and within six months it would be in the bottom twenty. In 2012, a new president made a commitment to peace. Our question was how to support it and make sure that this issue stays at the top of the priority list. A retired ambassador served as the daily...
interface for the president's office, and the president appointed a counterpart to be there. As a result, meetings are being held and coaching was offered to the various rebel forces.

A fourth strategy is empowering new players, to try to expand the political space. The simple way to do it is the most demographically clear, to involve women and youth, who make up the 75% of the people who are not usually allowed to engage. They can create the pressure on the elites that generally control the political sphere.

In Kenya, out of the $800 million in aid programs spent there each year by the US, nothing was being directed towards preventing the likelihood of violence returning in the electoral process. By bringing Kenyan development partners together and asking them a series of fairly simple questions relating to what they consider to be the most important problem facing the country that year, it became clear that the big concern was election-related violence. When asked whether they were doing everything possible to address this, they were not. They needed some modest assistance, and with that they were able, over a period of four months, to galvanize their existing networks and turn them into a champions of peace initiative, and produce the activism of millions of people who had otherwise never been able to take part in the political process. It is taking the apolitical and putting them into the political space.

Another thing that works is the public popularization of submerged issues, such as corruption in Nigeria. A report, however brilliant, on the issue may only be read by a handful of people. Nigeria has a marketplace which is extremely socially active. Information about corruption can be taken and put into the popular media. It can even be commercially viable, with for example advertising by Coca-Cola. Since Nigeria has its Nollywood film industry, it is also a powerful avenue which can be used to spread the message.

Most of all, it is essential to link policy to practice in very practical ways, or it does not have an impact. The two need to come together
Limits and Possibilities of Interactive Conflict Resolution

The Complexity of Deeply Protracted Conflicts: Challenges for Problem-Solving Workshops

based on the conference presentation by Peter Coleman

Over the years a lot of work, theoretical and practical developments, have furthered John Burton’s controlled communication process into an inter-societal peacemaking process called Problem-solving workshops. It was an idea which was radical when it emerged and critically important. There is ongoing work which has continued to develop the field in very useful directions. Yet there the ability to resolve intractable conflicts remains at times elusive, such as in the Israeli-Palestinian context.

It is therefore also important to examine some of the limitations which the approach faces, and what constrains its impact. Four particular limitations are worth examining. The first is the underlying theory of change of the problem-solving workshop. Dealing with processes of change, it is important how we understand it. François Julien talks about two basic approaches to change. One is the Western approach which he calls “fixing one’s eye on the model.” It is about developing a sense of what is needed to help the process and the desired outcome, and working to overcome whatever resistance and obstacles emerge along the way. This is a somewhat linear, rational approach towards efficacy and change. It contrasts that with what Julien calls a Chinese approach which he describes as attempting to read the propensity of a system. It is about attempting to identify in any situation the energy and flow of the situational conditions and then to go with them, and learn from them, in a way that allows us to eventually improve well-being. It is an approach that is much less expert focused and much more locally focused; it is much more holistic and nonlinear.

Lauren Laura Chase talks of ‘networks of effective action’, and Gabriella Blum of
‘islands of agreements.’ There are always people doing good effective work on the ground, so it is about working with them instead of imposing a new process or vision on the third party’s vision. The first task should be to listen to them.

A second limitation may be that the target of change of problem-solving workshops are mainly influential people. The approach a normative re-educative process of encounter, of re-framing cognitive understanding, and of identifying subordinate goals. These have all been shown to be immensely effective under many conditions, but not particularly effective in conditions of tightly coupled systems where you have problem sets that are not comprised by a few issues, but rather are a constellation of issues. In these contexts, focusing intervention on particular components of the constellation seem to only have a limited effect, and they may have unintended consequences which are surprising. It is a chronic pattern and it is important to think about change in a different way.

The third limitation is the focus of problem-solving workshops on solving problems. One of the things learned from decades of research in the social sciences is that the conditions and processes that can predict positive outcomes like constructive relationships and peace, are very different from the conditions of a processes that could predict the end of a conflict or the mitigation of a problem. They are not opposites, but fundamentally distinct.

Research was conducted in the Palestinian Territories and Israel into the motives that drive people to support negotiations to end the conflict and the motivations that would drive people to work actively for peaceful relations and enhancing communal relations. The results was that these have very different motivations.

Very different types of motives operate among people who want to work for peace than those who want to mitigate conflict. The focus on the conflict and the focus of the discourse on the pain-and-suffering which result from the conflict motivates about 56% the population to work for peace, but it repulses about 44%. They do not want to think about pain and suffering. They want to think about what they can do and what their future is. So how issues are framed and the need to focus on both conflict mitigation and building peace, is a nuance that is sometimes misunderstood.

A fourth limitation is the temporal scope of interventions. Problem-solving workshops face the difficulty of temporal limitation of convening mid-level influential either for one session or a few sessions over a period of time. Dietrich Dörner, is a professor of psychology, who worked with leaders and decision makers working in complex environments. He found that many who are well-intentioned and go work with communities that are complex and evolving often times end up causing more harm.

This is because they are not aware of the consequences of their actions, and they fall into certain types of traps. They may do a very thorough analysis of the problem and then set the course and just follow it. There is a tendency to fall in love with a
particular procedure or particular outcome, and as a result one can lose the sense of the whole. What is then necessary is for decision-makers to make more decisions over time, to be very open and adaptive to changes in a situation as they arise. That kind of decision process allows for a more responsive and locally reactive approach to a situation. Given the hundred plus years of the conflict in Israel Palestine, what may be needed is perhaps a Track Two mechanism that has a long-term vision and enhances the capacity to adapt to change.

Even though problem-solving workshops as essentialised here are somewhat limited by the assumptions, by the targets, and by time, the good news is that they can work. Sometimes they can have a profound impact. There have been anecdotes and illustrations of times where people who were involved in a problem-solving workshop found themselves in a place of influence and actually affected structural differences. So they do and can have an effect. What is not as well understand is how problem-solving workshops and such mechanisms can have an impact on the broader system, and what the mechanisms for that is. It can be hard to see the linear effect of these initiatives, but if by understanding the nonlinear nature of the context in which they operate there is evidence that some types of interventions can affect probabilities of change over time. So what is then needed is to have a much better understanding of the role and function of such initiatives on macro-level nonlinear change over time.

The Growth and Diversity of Conflict Resolution

based on the conference presentation by Ronald Fisher

The conceptualization of the factors that are central to both conflict analysis and conflict resolution keep diversifying. Not only is the theory of understanding increasing, but so is the theory of practice. The big challenge in the field is adequate integration in this proliferation. The theory of practice is actually quite strong. The theory and practice of problem-solving workshops can be applied in different ways and in different settings, taking the core of it and adapting it for different levels, for different sectors and challenges. At the same time there is a diffusion that is hard to capture.

For example, going from a small problem-solving workshop with six or eight influentials to a national dialogue of 900 people. Some of the processes are the same, and some are different. This is not really tracked in terms of theory of practice. This shows that there is a continuing need for a focused definition of interactive conflict resolution and a broader definition of conflict resolution. The focused one is essentially a problem-solving workshop and the broader one is a wide range of interactive activities of communication, education, dialogue, and exchange that brings a variety of people and societies in conflict together for different kinds of interactions—usually more educational and cultural than political.
The difficulty is knowing what others are doing and communicating with each other, with funders and gatekeepers. There continues to be a lack of institutionalization and a lack of networking among scholars and practitioners in the field of conflict resolution. It is clear that conflict resolution makes a contribution, but what is less clear is how the contribution impacts the wider system. There has been a contribution to conflict analysis and resolution, but the focus needs to be on relationships. The agreement is important, but in conflict resolution relationships need to be at the center, including work on reconciliation.

Transfer is a very difficult process by which the products of workshops move to the policy-making level, the discourse, and the culture.

Evaluating impact is a challenge, not only on a practical level, but also on a moral and ethical level, dealing with constraints about treating participants as research subjects. It may be that the exact contribution of this work on the policy-making or other level is largely unknowable, but this means that great care must be taken in engaging in this work. Institutionalizing the practice and furthering the professionalization of the field is therefore particularly important.

The Challenges of Follow-up

based on the conference presentation by Christopher Mitchell

Early on, controlled communication, which eventually led to the development of problem-solving workshops, was intended as means of overcoming impasses in formal processes. The idea was that the contributions of the informal unofficial meetings were supposed find a way around an impasse in the official process, when there was no possibility of doing so on the official level.

Over the years the field has developed and branched out into numerous directions. Yet there are some common challenges and limitations. One issue in particular is conducting adequate follow-up. What happens after a group of people sits down around a table and recognizes the other as human and recognize each other as potential negotiating partners.

On many occasions the workshop comes to an end and there is not adequate follow-up. There are many reasons for this. There is the stress of preparing a meeting, which can be exhausting and difficult, and during which many things can potentially go wrong. In the aftermath there is a natural exhaustion of energy and attention, and also of resources. Most of the resources go into getting participants to a venue and covering the costs of the meeting, with very limited funds remaining for follow-up work.

It is also quite difficult to anticipate the outcome of a particular workshop. There are however some likely outcomes which can be prepared for. A successful workshop will have a set of individuals who’s perceptions have begun to change and with somewhat changed aspirations and expectations. There
A second outcome which emerges from a workshop is having a network of people on both sides of the divide. They cannot just be left on their own, they need support to be able to maintain the network in some way; otherwise the network will likely fall apart.

The third outcome which may happen is that there may be a desire to go beyond a network and to establish some kind of institution. Participants who will have become enthusiastic about talking with people on the other side may want to set up an organization. That is the most difficult thing of all, because it is very difficult to get funds for an institution in many of these conflict-affected countries.

The Challenge of Radical Disagreement: When Dialogue is not Possible

by Oliver Ramsbotham

In this part of the conference we consider some of the limits of the field. What happens when interactive problem-solving (IAPS), and other conflict resolution approaches so far do not work?

Given the complexity of human conflict, and its deep economic, political and psychological roots, it is not surprising that many attempts to manage, settle and transform violent conflicts fail. That is why the founders of the field emphasized the importance of ‘second order social learning’. An IAPS workshop may have great success locally, but this may be difficult to transfer to the core of the conflict. Among other reasons for intractability the emphasis in this presentation is on the communicative dimension where IAPS operates and is sometimes confronted by an absolute blockage. This can be termed ‘linguistic intractability’. At its epicenter lies the challenge of ‘radical disagreement’, the chief verbal manifestation of intense political conflicts.

Coming up against a buffer, second order social learning teaches that we should (a) acknowledge the failure and take it seriously, (b) try to understand it, and (c) in the light of this look for new ways to respond to it.

Acknowledging the significance of radical disagreement is something that is rarely done in our field. The general response is not to take it seriously. It is regularly dismissed as

is a diminishing of mistrust even if trust cannot be built up over one or a few sessions. On many occasions, because the participants have suddenly found people on the other side with whom they can talk to, they really want to another meeting.
oppositional debate, competitive debate, or adversarial debate. It is often contrasted with dialogue. The aim from the beginning is to overcome radical disagreement, not to learn from it. This can be a mistake. Taking radical disagreement seriously can add another option for dealing with conflicts. Not as an alternative to problem-solving workshops, but as an additional tool – another ‘string to the bow’.

The second requirement, understanding the failure, is something that has to be done with the conflict parties themselves. It is soon discovered that the radical disagreement is not ‘all-too-familiar’, but perhaps the least understood aspect of the conflict. Often the result is the realization that conflict parties are, not nearer, but much further apart than was realized, sometimes light-years apart. And this can only be uncovered by developing the exchange not suppressing it. Radical disagreement starts off by being about what it is about. The conflict parties do not agree about what they disagree about. Radical disagreement is not a terminus to dialogue, but rather the characteristic dialogue of struggle. This can be called ‘agonistic dialogue’, or dialogue between enemies - the ‘war of words’ at a very deep level. It is not a mere coexistence of subjective narratives, rationalizations of interest, sociological constructions, psychological projections, or cultural-historical posits (although these third party descriptions are no doubt applicable on their own terms). It is, rather, a life-and-death struggle to occupy the whole of discursive space.

So what can be done about this, once the challenge is acknowledged and understood?

In these circumstances one needs to begin where the conflict parties are, not where the facilitator might like them to be. In intense conflicts everything is politicized – including the facilitators and the whole third party intervention. In these cases conflict parties (not all, but many) do not want to start doing negotiations. They are not interested in doing dialogue for mutual understanding. So the suggestion is to go with the grain of the conflict rather than against it by promoting a ‘strategic engagement of discourses’ (SED) within, across and between conflict parties and involving third parties – not less radical disagreement, but more. And the key move here is to begin, not between conflict parties when this is not yet possible, but within them.

What do conflict parties want, even in the most intense periods of political conflict? Based on work with Israeli and Palestinian partners conducted in recent years by the Oxford Research Group, in most cases they are ready to support inclusive internal strategic thinking that addresses the question: Where are we now, where do we want to go, and how do we get there? The reason for us doing
this is not in order to understand the other side, nor to be reflexive about ourselves, but in order to overcome internal divisions so as to get where we want to go.

But is inclusive internal strategic thinking of this kind only attractive to conflict parties because they think it can help them to win? Is this not the antithesis of conflict resolution and interactive problem-solving?

In fact, for quite subtle reasons that would require more space to spell out in detail, strategic thinking of this kind mimics conflict resolution. For example, it looks forward not back. Its inclusive nature tempers the tendency for ‘extremists’ to take over – although they are also included. It takes note of the systemic complexity of the current situation. It analyses possible future scenarios, not just in terms of desirability but also in terms of attainability and likelihood. It distinguishes short-term, medium-term and long-term goals. It evaluates strategic means in terms of effectiveness, thus discriminating between different forms of power. It looks at the chessboard from the perspective of the opponent because otherwise it loses. It is aware of the importance of shaping strategic messages for multiple audiences. All of this gives IAPS facilitators plenty of purchase.

On this base promoting strategic engagement can keep channels of communication open that are not otherwise available, link levels that are otherwise not bridged, help to empower the weaker party in asymmetric conflicts, and bring issues into the open that are not otherwise on the radar screen.

This may make things worse rather than better, for example if a conflict party decides for strategic reasons to wage war rather than make peace. But it does offer an opportunity to engage with a conflict party when other approaches are not possible. For that reason, promoting a strategic engagement of discourses (SED) in this way could be well worthwhile adding to the toolbox of IAPS practitioners.
The Contributions of Interactive Problem Solving to Peace Research

The Landscape of Foreign Policy and Peace Research in the 21st Century

by Luc Reychler

Interactive problem solving has made a contribution not only for peace research, but also to the study of international relations, which itself was created at the beginning of the 20th century to address the failure of the Great War. It has added unofficial diplomacy and psychological insights to international relations and formal diplomacy. It has deepened the understanding of the software of peace building, addressing the mental and emotional dimensions. One aspect which needs greater attention is official diplomacy and the debate or lack of debate about foreign policy. In the post-Cold War period, especially after 9/11, the diplomatic landscape changed drastically. This is particularly the case of the diplomacy of the West in the Middle East.

First, Western diplomacy altered into a ‘coercive diplomacy’ with sanctions, interventions, threats, and warfare. The prime goal in the Middle East is to achieve absolute security by means of offensive and defensive dominance. The coercive diplomacy and military interventions led to some temporary successes, but not to lasting successes. Instead, they caused destruction, casualties, and left weak and unstable regimes, chaos and gave rise to more resistance and new terrorism.

Second, there is a greater emphasis on covert and public efforts focusing on government to people, rather than government to government relationships. Part of the ‘people diplomacy’ is the support and manipulation of square democracy—as we have seen in Iran, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Ukraine. The scenario is always the same. In all these places, protests took place on a square surrounded by the international media, the opposition was recognized, supported and depicted as the voice of the people, and the regime was sanctioned and asked to step down. When the new regime was not what was expected, it was eliminated by a coup d’état, repression, and a newly staged square democracy protests (think of the removal of the elected Hamas in Palestine, or of the Morsi led government in Egypt). The hard and soft interventions overlook the peace aspirations of target countries.

Interviews of more than of nearly 300 diplomats for more than 100 countries made clear that the definition of peace...
is influenced by a country’s position in the international system. All diplomats correlate peace with the absence of war. The next two indicators of peace however differ significantly. Strong and developed countries stress cooperation and stability; weaker and less developed countries emphasize non-interference in their domestic affairs and the absence of international structural violence. This means that the same world can be perceived by one side as peaceful, but by the other side, as violent. I would call the interventions in the Middle East a ‘Failed Foreign Policy’, but for a powerful minority of decision-makers and shapers it is a success. It is better to have weak and unstable states than stable regimes that resist the interference of the West in the region.

Third, foreign policy is the least democratic decision-making sector in the West and Europe. The decision-making is not transparent and many external democratization efforts are not genuine.

Finally, this diplomacy is characterized by temporal inadequacies or misconduct. Temporal misconduct is wrongful, improper temporal behavior motivated by intentional purpose and/or by obstinate indifference to the consequences of one’s acts. Examples of misconduct are: criminal neglect, exaggerating threats, missing opportunities, not investing in proactive conflict prevention, corruption, wasting or killing the time of others, etc. In my upcoming book ‘Time for Peace: The essential role of time in conflict’, I give an overview of the prevailing temporal inadequacies in conflict management and plead for the development of a more adaptive ‘temporament’ in conflict transformation and peace building.

At first sight, the impact of unofficial diplomacy may look irrelevant. Yet official diplomacy looks even less successful. Another perspective is much more rosy and optimistic. There have been considerable numbers of people who have participated in a wide range of unofficial dialogues, and as these individuals become decision makers in the future, the impact will be felt. Reality is somewhere in the middle, and transferring insights of unofficial diplomacy to official diplomacy is of crucial importance. Herbert Kelman’s strategic optimism is the essence of sustainable peace building.
Reflections on the Emergence of Peace Research and Conflict Resolution

based on the conference presentation by Werner Wintersteiner

The purpose of peace research is always both a practical one, as well as a theoretical one. How can our discipline (if it is any) become complex and comprehensive enough to help understand the complexity of reality, the reality of wars and violent conflicts, especially deep protracted conflicts? How can peace research develop practical methods and strategies which are interactive, multidimensional and comprehensive enough to solve and transform those conflicts? In one word: How can peace research contribute to a creative, just and sustainable peace practice?

The war in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s was a turning point not only for the peace movement, but for peace research as well, with regard to the relationship of research and resolution, theory and practice. This war challenged some tacit basic assumptions of traditional Cold War peace research. It questioned not only the traditional “realist” concept of peace, meaning rational actors struggling for power and spheres of interests of states, but it also questioned the alternative, critical, idealistic and structuralist concepts of peace of the 1970s and 80s.

This evolution was accompanied and reinforced by other developments: Almost at the same time, the predominance of the political science approach in peace studies was challenged. From then on, not only the new predominant concept of liberal peace and humanitarian intervention, but also the new “post-structural” criticism on this liberal peace concept came up, emphasizing again the social questions underlying the political dimension of conflict, but especially the aspects of cultural conditions and possibilities of conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Trauma, myths and realities of a violent past, local and cultural conditions and resources of conflict resolution, cultural, symbolic and epistemic violence, etc. became part of the discourse.

However, it should not be forgotten that at the very beginnings this discipline has already had a much broader view of the field. In the early history of peace research, there was a common sense that peace research has to be a holistic endeavor. In 1944, the Austrian refugee and US immigrant, the author and philosopher Hermann Broch, drafted the plan of an international peace university: His idea was to assemble and combine all academic disciplines in order to put them into the service of peace research. In his later years he taught at Yale University until his death in 1951, the same year another refugee and immigrant from Vienna, Herbert C. Kelman, received his Ph.D. from Yale.
Since his days as a graduate student, Kelman came up with compatible and complementary ideas to those of Broch, namely what he has called “a systematic research on human behavior in foreign policy”, based on sociological-psychological transdisciplinarity and the cooperation of researchers of different disciplines. As Kelman has noted, “What is needed is a general theory of international relations, one in which analysis for the social-psychological dimensions is not merely an appendage, but an integral part.”

In line with this trans-disciplinary approach was the development of the concept of interactive problem-solving, based on Burton’s theory of human needs as a major source of social and intractable conflicts; and finally the concept of the researcher-practitioner.

The Environment of Peacebuilding

by Sidonia Gabriel

As we are talking about problem solving workshops and other methodologies and all important peacebuilding approaches, I would like to shed light on the actual international peacebuilding environment. In my opinion there are still gaps for it to meaningfully work on peacebuilding even though some considerable progress has been made. The question today is where and how process-oriented (and not results-oriented) approaches such as problem-solving workshops, but also conflict analysis and other methodologies, are institutionally embedded.

Some observations based on my working experience: It is not new that peacebuilding contexts, or conflict-affected and fragile contexts are changing very dynamically. Social media, new actors of conflict and also new social movements render these contexts very complex. Well known and accepted models such as the track level model of Jean Paul Lederach do no longer work as before, actors change zones of influence very quickly, relations and conflict lines shift. Conflict analysis and a serious engagement and deep understanding (also at personal level) of the grievances, the conflict causes and the living conditions of the people is key. To engage means becoming part of the context and not being an external actor. Practitioners know that their approaches have to be adapted to the new realities. How to communicate that in these highly volatile contexts results are not achieved as stated in the program logframe?

If context analysis and work based on context needs are to be the basis for engagement,
this also means that power of interpretation and decision-making needs to be given to the local level. A technical peacebuilding plan to address, for example, security sector reform or disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, cannot be imposed from the outside. In order to effectively identify and address the needs in the local context, power of interpretation needs to shift to the local populations, and this is not something which most institutions are ready to do.

There is still the ongoing contradiction between project thinking and process orientation, claiming to have a long-term peacebuilding process, while also expecting to show results within a short time frame. The evaluability of peace work is often put in question because objectives are formulated vaguely and not by local populations, but by their external partners. Impact is too often measured in terms of how much funding has been spent. This approach to evaluating impact is disconnected from the reality of process-oriented peacebuilding approaches. It is important to show impact and frame results in a different way, to make those results visible, as otherwise institutional support for the often called ‘soft’ peacebuilding field will be lost.

A further issue of concern has been the shrinking space for civil society and the local context. On the one hand international donors increasingly distribute funds to local organizations, but restrict how and what they can do based on the donor’s priorities. Additionally in some countries governments restrict international funding going to local organizations. Despite the fact that we can see an increase in donor funding to international and local NGOs, the space for civil society for political participation in decision making processes is not just an issue of implementing development and peacebuilding projects locally. In donor countries as well, the space for civil society engagement has to be actively maintained. For example, the Center for Peacebuilding (KOFF) at swisspeace is a platform that brings together people particularly from civil society and state actors but also academia and business actors in order to discuss and work together on meaningful roles for civil society in policy processes in Switzerland and on peacebuilding in their respective countries of engagement. It remains essential for civil society organizations in donor countries to critically accompany the policies of their governments and of international organizations.

The challenge is that there are a lot of conflicts within organizations, whether they are multilateral, bilateral or civil society actors. The same values that we claim for peacebuilding activities in the field need to be applied in our own (“donor”) contexts: Openness, transparency, creativity and the courage to question power relations. This is where we as external partners can connect to our partners in local conflict-affected contexts and where we have to apply the methodologies of problem solving, active listening, stakeholders analysis and conflict transformation. It is important to engage in internal dialogue in order to be more effective and more coherent in the field and not to become professional peace technocrats but to remain human beings.

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Conference Follow-Up

At the closing of The Transformation of Intractable Conflicts conference in Cambridge the co-founder and co-director of the Herbert C. Kelman Institute, Wilfried Graf, proposed some follow up activities of the conference. Oliver Ramsbotham and Wilfried Graf facilitated a brainstorming session among the speakers and participants about ways of continuing the dialogue started at the conference, and explored possibilities for greater cooperation. A number possible follow-up initiatives were discussed.

The first proposal was to establish a network of the speakers and participants of the conference in order to foster continued exchange and possibilities for cooperation. This is to be circulating the list of the participants and speakers along with their emails. Possibilities for a group list and to have a web-platform should being evaluated, but ideally this would be a space to share documents internally and to have a shared calendar for events, conference, and other opportunities for cooperation between the members of this group.

A second initiative which was proposed is a follow-up conference which would include working-groups on key themes and issues of problem-solving workshops identified at the conference, and to engage with each other in a more work-shop setting.

A third initiative which was discussed is an edited book with contributions from the speakers and participants, based on their inputs at the conference and other research and material which they are working on in the wider field of conflict resolution and conflict transformation, dialogue, as well as problem-solving workshops.

A fourth initiative would be to create a set of trainings or workshops for senior officials, diplomats, and practitioners, which would draw on the expertise of the speakers and participants, and centered on problem-solving workshops and the various approaches and further developments in the approach which have been made by the members of this group.

Related to both the third and fourth activities mentioned, a fifth idea proposed was a tool-kit drawing on the various approaches of the speakers and participants in order to assist practitioners in the field. This could be available in either a hard-copy or as an e-book.

The conference concluded with closing remarks and words of thanks from Professor Herbert Kelman.
Appendix 1: Report Notes and References

References and links from Dual Democracies: A Personal Palestinian Perspective

- The Chair of the Knesset Caucus for Ending the Israeli-Arab Conflict, MK Hilik Bar, at a conference at the European Parliament “New Paradigms for Israel and Palestine” on November 6, 2013 proposes the dual minorities approach at 2:00:26 – 2:12:00, and, at 2:36.06 – 2:36.45, Ambassador Leila Shahid responds with openness to the proposal.
  

- Prime Minister Netanyahu on the dual minorities approach at the end of January 2014.
  

- Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Ya’alon on the dual minorities approach at the beginning of February 2014.
  
  [http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4483909,00.html](http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4483909,00.html)

- Secretary Kerry on a settler right of choice on 20 February 2014.
  

- Special Envoy Martin Indyk on the dual minorities approach at the end of January 2014.
  
  [http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4483232,00.html](http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4483232,00.html)

- At the end of January 2014, former head of military intelligence, Amos Yadlin, stating that there is no diplomatic impediment to leaving settlers under Palestinian rule, and Dr Hanan Ashrawi responding with openness to the idea.
  

- At the end of January 2014, Israeli journalist, Dan Margalit backing Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statement and arguing that the idea of settlers staying under Palestinian sovereignty is a good one and here to stay.
  

- At the beginning of February 2014, Palestinian journalist, Daoud Kuttab, arguing that settlers staying under Palestinian sovereignty is a serious idea which Palestinians should think through and also attempt to build a national consensus on the issue.
  
Appendix 2: Conference Program

The Transformation of Intractable Conflicts
Perspectives and Challenges for Interactive Problem Solving

A Conference in Honor of Professor Herbert C. Kelman

March 27-29, 2014

Thursday, 27 March 2014

4:00–4:15 pm  Welcoming Remarks

• Wolfgang Petritsch, Schumpeter Fellow at Harvard University and President of the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation. Former EU Special Envoy and European chief negotiator for Kosovo, High Representative for Bosnia, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, the UN in Geneva and the OECD in Paris

4:15 – 6:15 pm   Panel 1 | Reframing Negotiations: New Approaches to a Two-State Solution for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The opening session of the conference is in cooperation with Middle East Seminar of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. Please note that this session will be off the record and under the Chatham House Rule.

Panel chaired by Sara Roy, Senior Research Scholar at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University

• Herbert C. Kelman, Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics, Emeritus, Harvard University


• Jerome Segal, President and Founder of The Jewish Peace Lobby, Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland’s Department of Philosophy

• Ruham Nimri, Analyst, Co-Director and Co-Founder of Challenge - An Organization for Critical and Integrative Strategy (Jerusalem)

Discussants:

• Ian Spears, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and in the Collaborative International Development Studies Programme at the University of Guelph
6:30 – 9:00 pm  Formal Opening of the Conference: Reception and Dinner

The opening reception and dinner will be held at the Harvard Museum of Natural History, 26 Oxford St, Cambridge, MA. Please note that this event is by invitation only.

- Opening and introduction by Wolfgang Petritsch, Joseph A. Schumpeter Fellow, Harvard University and President of the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation
- Keynote address by Josef Ostermayer, Federal Minister of Austria for the Arts, Culture, Constitution and Public Service
- Herbert C. Kelman, Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics, Emeritus, Harvard University

Friday, 28 March 2014

9:00 – 9:30 am  Welcome
- Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park, and nonresident Senior Fellow at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution

9:30 – 11:00 am  Panel 2 | Interactive Problem-solving workshops: Lessons Learned from Israel and Palestine

Panel chaired by Christopher Mitchell, Professor Emeritus of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, School for Conflict Analysis & Resolution, George Mason University

- Sami Aburoza, Political Advisor and Consultant, including for the Palestinian President’s Office, the Palestine Investment Fund, the Ministry of Education, and UNDP Affiliate of the Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation
- Colette Avital, Chairperson of the Center of Organizations of Holocaust Survivors in Israel. Former Member of the Knesset, former Ambassador and Deputy Director in Charge of Western Europe
- Yuli Tamir, a founder of Shalom Achshav (Peace Now). Former Minister of Immigrant Absorption and Minister of Education, former Member of the Knesset
- Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park, and nonresident Senior Fellow at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution

11:00 – 11:30 am  Coffee Break

11:30 – 1:00 pm  Panel 3 | Intra-National Dialogue and Internal Mediation to Overcome Resistance to Change within Societies in Conflict

Panel chaired by Augustin Nicolescu, Co-Director of the Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation (Vienna-Jerusalem)

- David Barak-Gorodetsky, Department of Jewish History, University of Haifa. Co-Founder of Kumu! for the Politicization of Jewish Renewal in Israel
• **Gudrun Kramer**, Program Manager for the GIZ (German Development Cooperation) and Head of the Regional Social and Cultural Fund for Palestinian Refugees and Gaza Population. Co-Founder and former Co-Director of the Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation

• **Jay Rothman**, Associate Professor, Graduate program in Conflict Management, Resolution and Negotiation, Bar Ilan University, Israel. Co-editor, International Journal of Conflict Engagement and Resolution

1:00 – 2:00 pm   Lunch Break

2:00 – 4:00 pm  Panel 4 | Initiating a Process of Reconciliation between Conflicting Parties to Support Conflict Resolution

Panel chaired by **Jorje H. Zalles**, Professor and Department Chair of Conflict Resolution and Leadership Studies at Universidad San Francisco de Quito in Ecuador

• **Donna Hicks**, Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Founder of Declare Dignity

• **Mariska Kappmeier**, Post-doctoral Scholar, Intergroup Relations Lab, Department of Psychology, Harvard University. Affiliate of the Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation

• **Tamra Pearson d’Estrée**, Henry R. Luce Professor of Conflict Resolution, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, and Director of the Center for Research & Practice, Conflict Resolution Institute at the University of Denver

• **Ilja Sichrovsky**, Founder & General Secretary of the Muslim-Jewish Conference (Vienna)

4:00 – 4:30 pm   Coffee Break

4:30 – 6:30 pm   Panel 5 | Transferring Insights from Unofficial Dialogue to Official Diplomacy and Public Debate

Panel chaired by **Timothy Phillips**, Co-Founder and Chairman of Beyond Conflict (Boston), Member of the Advisory Committee of the Club of Madrid

• **Rick Barton**, Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations and the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

• **Gabrielle Rifkind**, Director of the Middle East Human Security Programme, Oxford Research Group

• **Jeff Seul**, Chairman of the Peace Appeal Foundation (Boston)

• **Shibley Telhami**, Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park, and nonresident Senior Fellow of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution
Saturday, 29 March 2014

9:15 – 11:15 am  Panel 6 | Limits and Possibilities of Interactive Conflict Resolution
Panel chaired by Maria Hadjipavlou, Associate Professor, Department of Social and Political Sciences, University of Cyprus.

• Peter Coleman, Professor of Psychology and Education and Director of the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution at Columbia University, Chair of the Advanced Consortium for Cooperation, Conflict, and Complexity

• Ronald Fisher, Professor of International Relations in the division of International Peace and Conflict Resolution, American University

• Christopher Mitchell, Professor Emeritus of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, School for Conflict Analysis & Resolution, George Mason University

• Oliver Ramsbotham, Professor of Conflict Resolution at the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Oxford Research Group

11:15 – 11:45 am  Coffee Break

11:45 – 1:00 pm  Panel 7 | The Contribution of Interactive Problem Solving to Peace Research
Panel chaired by Oliver Ramsbotham, Professor of Conflict Resolution at the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Oxford Research Group

• Luc Reychler, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Leuven. Former Director of the Center for Peace Research and Strategic Studies

• Werner Wintersteiner, Professor of German Pedagogy, Founder and Director of the Center for Peace Research and Peace Education at Alpen-Adria University Klagenfurt (Austria)

• Sidonia Gabriel, Project Director of the Center for Peacebuilding of the Swiss Peace Foundation

1:00– 1:30 pm  Further Steps and Closing Remarks

• Wilfried Graf, Senior Researcher at the Center for Peace Research and Peace Education, Klagenfurt University (Austria) and Co-Founder of the Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation

• Oliver Ramsbotham, Professor of Conflict Resolution at the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Oxford Research Group

• Herbert C. Kelman, Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics, Emeritus, Harvard University
Appendix 3: Speaker Biographies

Herbert C. Kelman

Herbert C. Kelman is the Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics, Emeritus, at Harvard University and was (from 1993 to 2003) Director of the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Harvard's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. He received his Ph.D. in Social Psychology from Yale University in 1951. He is past president of the International Studies Association, the International Society of Political Psychology, the Interamerican Society of Psychology, and several other professional associations. He is recipient of many awards, including the Socio-Psychological Prize of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (1956), the Kurt Lewin Memorial award (1973), the American Psychological Association’s Award for Distinguished Contributions to Psychology in the Public Interest (1981), the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order (1997), the Austrian Medal of Honor for Science and Art First Class (1998), and the Gold Medal of Honor of the Federal Capital of Vienna (2012). His major publications include International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis; A Time to Speak: On Human Values and Social Research, and Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility. He is the Honorary President of the Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation (Vienna- Jerusalem) since 2011. For many years, he has been engaged in the development of interactive problem solving, an unofficial third party approach to the resolution of international and intercommunal conflicts, and in its application to the Arab-Israeli conflict, with special emphasis on its Israeli-Palestinian component.

Sami Aburoza

Sami Aburoza has worked as a legal and policy advisor and consultant in the Middle East, West Africa and South America, including for the Palestinian President’s Office, the Palestine Investment Fund, the Ministry of Education and UNDP. He has been engaged in several legal, economic and communications functions within the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict and is affiliated with the Herbert C Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation. He provides consulting and coaching services in the area of organizational transformation, adaptive leadership, and social complexity for private and public sector clients. He is the co-founding managing partner of Y-Motions International. He graduated from Harvard Kennedy School of Government with a Master in Public Policy and Administration and holds a LLM degree from the University of Graz, Austria and Universidad de Valladolid, Spain. Aburoza also studied as a Chevening fellow sponsored by Shell in energy economics and geopolitics in the UK and is currently pursuing the International Master in the Practice of Management at McGill and Lancaster University.

George Assousa

George E. Assousa holds a Ph.D. in experimental nuclear physics from Florida State University. He has pursued an extensive and multifaceted career in atomic and nuclear physics and astronomy, and later, in different settings, in international economic development and technology-related business in Europe and the U.S. He is founder and past chairman of the London-based Multi-Technologies Group (MTG), a boutique consultancy established in 1991 in response to the needs of the post-Soviet central and eastern European states. Born in Jerusalem in Mandate Palestine, Assousa has, in parallel with his professional career on both sides of the Atlantic, pursued a personal commitment to conflict resolution over the past four decades, beginning with a detailed Stanley Foundation paper in early 1974, titled Peace in the Near East: the Palestinian Imperative. Dr. Assousa subsequently launched a number of initiatives in the U.S., Europe and the Middle East, including The Foundation for Arab Israeli Reconciliation (FAIR), the British not-for-profit London-based Trust for International Development and Education (TIDE). Today, Dr. Assousa continues to pursue quiet and informal advocacy initiatives toward a fair, honorable, and lasting resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Colette Avital
A former Member of Knesset on behalf of the Labor Party, Colette Avital served as Deputy Speaker of the Knesset and as Chairperson of the Lobby for Holocaust Survivors. She also served as the International Secretary of the Israeli Labor Party. Avital formerly served as Israel’s Ambassador to Portugal and as Consul General in New York City. Additionally, she is co-founder of the “One Home” movement, promoting the legislation of an evacuation-compensation law for Jewish settlers in the West Bank. In 2007, she was a presidential candidate, withdrawing from the race following the first round and endorsing Shimon Peres. Avital holds an M.A. in Public Administration from Harvard University and a B.A. in Political Science and English Literature from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

David Barak-Gorodetsky
David Barak-Gorodetsky is the co-founder of KUMU! For the Politicization of Jewish Renewal in Israel. He is a PhD candidate in the Department of Jewish History at the University of Haifa, specializing in Political Theology, American Judaism and the History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. He is a translator, editor and publisher, and formerly the director of Hillel (The Foundation for Jewish Campus Life) in Haifa.

Rick Barton
Ambassador Rick Barton of Maine is the Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations and the Secretary of State’s senior advisor on conflict and stabilization. The Bureau is responsible for driving the State Department’s efforts to improve U.S. government effectiveness in preventing cycles of violent conflict and addressing crises. Previously Ambassador Barton served in New York as the U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC). Mr. Barton has worked to improve the U.S. and international response to conflict in more than 40 of the world’s most unstable places. He led independent reviews of Iraq reconstruction; developed civilian strategies for Iraq, Sudan, and Sri Lanka; created new measurements of progress in Iraq and Afghanistan; and initiated path-breaking approaches to conflict reduction in Pakistan and Nigeria. He has been the director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), deputy high commissioner of the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in Geneva, and founding director of the United States Agency for International Development’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). Mr. Barton taught for five years at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School, where he was the Frederick Schultz Professor. Ambassador Barton has a B.A. from Harvard College and an MBA from Boston University, and he was honored with a doctorate by Wheaton College of Massachusetts.

Peter Coleman
Dr. Peter T. Coleman holds a Ph.D. in Social/ Organizational Psychology from Columbia University. He is Professor of Psychology and Education at Columbia University where he holds a joint-appointment at Teachers College and The Earth Institute and teaches courses in Conflict Resolution, Social Psychology, and Social Science Research. Dr. Coleman is Director of the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution (ICCCR) at Teachers College and Chair of Columbia University’s Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict, and Complexity (AC4), and a research affiliate of the International Center for Complexity and Conflict at The Warsaw School for Social Psychology. He currently conducts research on optimality of motivational dynamics in conflict, power asymmetries and conflict, intractable conflict, multicultural conflict, justice and conflict, environmental conflict, mediation dynamics, and sustainable peace. In 2003, he became the first recipient of the Early Career Award from the American Psychological Association, Division 48: Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict, and Violence. Dr. Coleman edits the Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice and his other books include The Five Percent: Finding Solutions to Seemingly Impossible Conflicts; Conflict, Justice, and Interdependence: The Legacy of Morton Deutsch; Psychological Components of Sustainable Peace; and Attracted to Conflict: Dynamic Foundations of Destructive Social Relations.

Ronald J. Fisher
Ronald Fisher is Professor of International Peace and Conflict Resolution in the School of International Service at American University, Washington, DC, USA. His primary interest is interactive conflict resolution, which involves informal third party interventions in protracted and violent ethno-political conflict. He has worked on the long-standing dispute in Cyprus and similar conflicts in other parts of the world. His publications include The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution;
Interactive Conflict Resolution; and Paving the Way: Contributions of Interactive Conflict Resolution to Peacemaking, as well as numerous book chapters and articles in interdisciplinary journals in the peace and conflict resolution field. In 2003 Dr. Fisher received the Morton Deutsch Conflict Resolution Award from the Peace Psychology Division of the American Psychological Association, and in 2011 he received the Nevitt Sanford Award from the International Society of Political Psychology. He has been elected as a Fellow in both the American and Canadian Psychological Associations, and holds a B.A. (Hon.) and M.A. in Psychology from the University of Saskatchewan and a Ph.D. in Social Psychology from the University of Michigan.

Sidonía Gabriel Picarat graduated in Sociology, Modern History and International Relations from the Universities of Basel and Zurich and specialized in conflict resolution (Coventry University, UK) and organizational development (MDF, Netherlands). She currently heads the Center for Peacebuilding (KOFF) at swisspeace. KOFF is the networking platform for Swiss state and non-governmental peacebuilding actors, promoting policy dialogue, capacity building and processes of joint learning. From 2004 to 2006 she worked with the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Human Security Division, on the peace processes in Sri Lanka and Nepal. Local conflict transformation and human rights initiatives, youth peacebuilding projects were at the heart of her assignment with the German Civil Peace Service as well as with UNICEF. From 2010-2013 she worked for the Peacebuilding Analysis and Impact team at swisspeace KOFF. Her practical expertise lies in the areas of conflict analysis, strengthening the participation of local stakeholders in peace processes, strategic planning of peacebuilding interventions of bi- and multi-lateral partners, design, implementation and evaluation of projects, capacity building for conflict transformation as well as for conflict sensitivity in development programs. She is currently pursuing her PhD research at the University of Basel. She focuses particularly on how institutional realities and power structures of external actors influence local peace processes and peacebuilding practice in general.

Wilfried Graf

Wilfried Graf is Co-Founder and Co-Director of the Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation, and Senior Research Affiliate at the Centre for Peace Research and Peace Education at the Alpen-Adria-University of Klagenfurt. He received his PhD in Sociology from Vienna University. Between 1983 and 2005 he was a researcher at the ASPR—Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution. He was then a senior researcher at the Institute for the Sociology of Law and Criminology until 2009. He has been engaged as a conflict transformation consultant for various initiatives in Central Asia, South Caucasus, South East Europe, Sri Lanka and Israel/Palestine. From 2002-2010 he was the co-facilitator of the Kelman Institute's Track 1.5 problem-solving workshop dialogue project in Sri Lanka. Since 2012 he has been engaged problem-solving workshops in the Middle-East, working with Herbert Kelman. He lectures on a regular basis at the University of Vienna, University of Graz, University of Klagenfurt and the OSCE Academy in Central Asia.

Maria Hadjipavlou

Maria Hadjipavlou is associate professor at the Social and Political Science Department of the University of Cyprus where she teaches Comparative Politics, Gender Studies, the Cyprus Conflict from a multi-disciplinary perspective, feminism and Conflict Resolution theory and practice. She received her PhD in Comparative Social and Political Change from Boston University. She was a lecturer at Boston University, adjunct assistant professor at Bentley College, the Cyprus Pedagogical Institute, and at the Pedagogical Academy. From 1991-93 she was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University where she was trained by Herbert Kelman in the Interactive problem-solving approach. In 1991 she became an associate of the Program in International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR) at Harvard University. She was a visiting scholar at the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) Columbia University, New York, (1996–1997). She is a co-founder of the Center of International Conflict Resolution at Columbia University and continues to be a research associate. She is a founding member of the Cyprus Peace Center (1991) and a founding member and president of the first international Cypriot Women's NGO, “Hands Across the Divide.” She is also a cofounder of the bicommmunal Gender Advisory Team. She has published widely in the fields of conflict resolution, Cyprus, and gender issues. Her book, Women and Change in Cyprus: Feminisms and Gender in Conflict has become a reference book for women in Cyprus and beyond.
Donna Hicks
Donna Hicks is an Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. She has been involved in numerous unofficial diplomatic conflict resolution efforts including projects in the Middle East, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Colombia, Cuba, and Northern Ireland. She was a consultant to the BBC where she co-facilitated a television series, Facing the Truth, with Archbishop Desmond Tutu, which aired in the United Kingdom and on BBC World in 2007. She has taught conflict resolution at Harvard, Clark and Columbia Universities, and conducts training seminars in the Dignity Model, a human-centered approach to rebuilding conflict relationships, in the US and abroad. She is the author of the book, Dignity: The Essential Role it Plays in Resolving Conflict, published in 2011 by Yale University Press, and founder of declaredignity.com.

Mariska Kappmeier
Mariska Kappmeier is a post-doctoral scholar in the Intergroup Relations Lab in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University. Her main research focus is on intergroup conflict and the assessment of trust between conflict parties. In order to understand how trust can be built systematically as an academic field and as a practice, she is particularly interested in what dimensions shape trust in conflict. In a related line of research, Mariska focuses on conflict assessment and the preparation of conflict interventions, particular conflict mediation. She has worked as a trainer and facilitator in numerous conflict settings and is also part of an international conflict facilitation team that works with municipal delegates from ethnic conflict regions such as Cyprus, Israel, Ireland, Iraq, and Kosovo. Mariska received her PhD from the University of Hamburg, Germany in July 2012. Mariska received for her dissertation the Gert-Sommer Award for best thesis in Peace Psychology.

Gudrun Kramer
Gudrun Kramer is Program Manager for the German Development Corporation, heading the “Regional Social and Cultural Fund for Palestinian Refugees and Gaza Population”. From 2005-2010 she was the Executive Director of the Institute for Integrative Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding – IICP, now the Herbert C Kelman Institute (HKI) Vienna. In this function she was engaged in international peace processes as mediator and facilitator on behalf of the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Another focus was the reconstruction of 3 villages after the Tsunami in Sri Lanka’s war-torn areas. Kramer is now a board member of the Herbert C. Kelman Institute.

Christopher Mitchell
Christopher Mitchell is currently Emeritus Professor of Conflict Research at the School for Conflict Analysis & Resolution [S-CAR] in George Mason University, Virginia. Prior to this, he has held teaching and research appointments at University College London, the London School of Economics, the University of Southampton, the University of Surrey and City University, London. He has written extensively about the analysis of protracted and intractable social conflicts and about the practice of conflict resolution. Initially his focus was on the study of international mediation but later he switched his interests to the study and practice of “Track Two” facilitation and the activities of unofficial intermediaries. Dr. Mitchell has been involved as a consultant and facilitator in conflicts in Cyprus, Spain, Northern Ireland, the former Soviet Union (Moldova–Trans-Dniestria and Armenia–Azerbaijan), Africa (Liberia and the Horn of Africa) and Latin America.

Augustin Nicolescu
Augustin Nicolescu is the Co-Director of the Herbert C Kelman Institute, working on the development and implementation of the Institute’s Middle East program, as well as training and consulting in conflict transformation, dialogue, and conflict sensitive development. He joined the institute when it was founded in 2005, and worked as project coordinator of its Sri Lanka Track 1.5 problem-solving workshop and dialogue project. From 2011-2012 he worked with Crisis Management Initiative to support the development of mediation policies in regional organizations such as ASEAN and the EU. He delivers trainings on conflict transformation, dialogue, and conflict sensitivity in Europe and Central Asia. He is a graduate of McGill University, with a B.A. in Political Science, and an M.A. in Peace and Conflict Studies from the European University Centre for Peace Studies in Austria.

Ruham Nimri
Ruham Nimri is co-founder and co-director of Challenge - An Organization for Critical and Integrative Strategy and for Inclusively Addressing Social Conflicts, and the daily news service officer at the JMCC - Jerusalem Media and Communications Center, holds a BA
degree in Political Science and Statistics from Haifa University, served as projects manager at “the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy – MIFTAH”. Nimri is considered one of the local analysts and specialists in media monitoring and media coverage in conflict areas, he is a trainer and facilitator in Social Transformation in Conflict and Participatory Strategic Planning and Evaluation, Nimri has lengthy experience in facilitating and training working groups in areas of conflict, and has also participated in developing a methodology of Social Transformation in Conflict.

**Josef Ostermayer**

Josef Ostermayer was sworn in as Chancellery Minister of Austria by President Heinz Fischer in December 2013. From 2008 to 2013 Ostermayer had been active as State Secretary for Media and Coordination at the Federal Chancellery. Prior to taking over his new position, he was Head of Office at the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology. He was previously the managing director of wohnfonds_vien, a fund for urban renewal.

**Tamra Pearson d’Estrée**

Tamra Pearson d’Estrée co-directs the interdisciplinary Conflict Resolution Institute at the University of Denver, and is the Henry R. Luce Professor of Conflict Resolution in the Josef Korbel School of International Studies. She has led trainings and facilitated interactive problem-solving workshops in various inter-communal conflict contexts, including Israel-Palestine, Ethiopia, US intertribal disputes, and US regional Muslim-Christian relations. She also has directed projects aimed at conflict resolution capacity-building in Israel-Palestine, the Caribbean, Ukraine, and Georgia. She has served as an evaluation consultant to community, academic, and non-governmental organizations as well as to UNESCO, UNDP, USIP, USAID and USIECR. Dr. d’Estrée’s research areas include identity dimensions of social and ethnic conflict, procedural justice, and the evaluation of international, community and environmental conflict resolution. She is co-author, with Bonnie G. Colby, of Braving the Currents: Evaluating Conflict Resolution in the River Basins of the American West, as well as numerous book chapters and articles in various interdisciplinary journals. She has a PhD in Social Psychology from Harvard University, where her supervisor was Herbert Kelman.

**Wolfgang Petritsch**

Wolfgang Petritsch has had a distinguished diplomatic career. He was ambassador and permanent representative of Austria to the OECD, to the specialized UN agencies in Geneva, to the WTO, and to the Conference on Disarmament. He was also president of the UN Mine Ban Treaty and Chair of the negotiations for the Cluster Munitions Ban Treaty. Early in his career, he was the press secretary and subsequently the chief of cabinet of the Federal Chancellor of Austria. He then served as minister-counsellor at the Austrian delegation to the OECD. In 1984, he was appointed director of the Austrian Press and Information Service in the United States and minister plenipotentiary at the Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York. Dr. Petritsch also served as ambassador to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. During his tenure as ambassador, he was appointed special envoy of the European Union for Kosovo and EU chief negotiator at the Kosovo Peace Agreement talks at Rambouillet and Paris. From 1999 to 2001, he was chair of the “Succession Commission for the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” in charge of distributing the public assets and liabilities among the successor states, resulting in the Vienna Agreement of 2001. In 1999, Dr. Petritsch was named high representative of the international community for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**Timothy Phillips**

Timothy Phillips is Co-founder of Beyond Conflict (formerly the Project on Justice in Times of Transition), a pioneering and widely respected conflict resolution and reconciliation initiative that has made important contributions to the consolidation of peace and democracy around the world. Beyond Conflict brings together leaders from a broad spectrum of countries to share firsthand experience in ending conflict, building civil society and fostering peaceful coexistence and is currently active in Bahrain and Cuba. Beyond Conflict has achieved international recognition for its significant contributions to the Northern Ireland peace process, national reconciliation in El Salvador and Nicaragua, the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, and its catalytic role in helping launch the field of transitional justice. Tim Phillips has taught courses on the critical role of leadership in conflict transformation. He has published on transitional justice, conflict resolution and national reconciliation and is a frequent adviser.
to governments, nongovernmental organizations and international organizations such as the Council of Europe and the United Nations. He also serves as a strategic consultant to a number of early-stage nongovernmental organizations on issues of democratization, civil society, conflict resolution and technologies to bridge the digital divide in the developing world.

**Oliver Ramsbotham**

Oliver Ramsbotham is a Consultant on Oxford Research Group’s (ORG) Middle East Programme. He was Chair of the Board from April 2007 until July 2013. Oliver is a specialist on conflict resolution and designed an original approach to handling ‘intractable’ conflict, which he calls ‘radical disagreement’. This approach both informs—and is informed by—ORG’s ongoing work with the Palestinian Strategic Group and the Israeli Strategic Forum. Oliver is Emeritus Professor of Conflict Resolution at the University of Bradford (UK) and President of the Conflict Research Society. He is series co-editor of *Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution*. In addition to many articles, he has published books relevant to all three areas of ORG’s program activity. These include books on nuclear deterrence, alternative defense options, and peacekeeping in the area of sustainable security, as well as books on dialogue and the management of radical disagreement in the Middle East, including *Transforming Violent Conflict: Radical Disagreement, Dialogue and Survival*. He is also the author of *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, with Hugh Miall and Tom Woodhouse.

**Luc Reychler**

Luc Reychler is emeritus professor for international relations at the University of Leuven and director of the Center for Peace Research and Strategic Studies (CPRS). He taught courses on: Peace Research and Conflict management / Strategy and global security analysis / Sustainable peace building architecture / Multilateral diplomacy and negotiation-mediation techniques. His research deals with sustainable peace building architecture, Planning and evaluation of violence prevention and peace building interventions, comparative evaluation of peace negotiations and time. His recent books include *Le défi de la paix au Burundi; Democratic Peace Building: The Devil is in the Transition; and Peace building: A field guide*. Dr. Reychler was secretary general of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) from 2004-2008. He is currently writing a book on the role of time in conflict and peace *Time for Peace*.

**Gabrielle Rifkind**

Gabrielle Rifkind is the Director of the Middle East program at the Oxford Research Group. She is a group analyst and specialist in conflict resolution. Gabrielle combines in-depth political and psychological expertise with many years’ experience in promoting serious analysis and dialogue. Her special areas of interest are Iran and the Palestine-Israel conflict. As a political entrepreneur, she has a deep understanding of human behavior and motivation. Gabrielle is the convenor and founder of the Middle East Policy Initiative Forum (MEPIF) and has facilitated a number of Track II roundtables in the Middle East on the Israel-Palestine conflict, as well as on the Iran conflict. Committed to trying to understand the mind-set of the region, she has both facilitated meetings with and spent time talking to the leadership in Syria, Iran, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and ‘Western’ states. Gabrielle is author of *A Standing Conference Table: A Process for Sustainable Peace in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict; The Arab Peace Initiative: Why Now?; Pariahs to Pioneers: Report on the Israeli Settler Movement; Talking to the Enemy: Creating New Structures for Negotiations, and Making Terrorism History*. She has recently completing a book, titled *The Fog of Peace: The Human Face of Peace-Making*, with the former senior UN diplomat Giandomenico Picco.

**Jay Rothman**

Jay Rothman was appointed Associate Professor in the Graduate Program on Conflict Resolution and Negotiation Graduate at the Bar-Ilan University in Israel in 2012. He is co-editor of *The International Journal of Conflict Engagement and Resolution* (IJCER). He is the author/editor of four books, including *Resolving Identity-Based Conflict: in Nations, Organizations and Communities, and From Identity-Based Conflict to Identity-Based Cooperation*. He has published extensively on Identity-Based Conflict, Conflict Resolution, and Evaluation.

**Sara Roy**

Sara Roy (Ed.D. Harvard University) is a senior research scholar at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies specializing in the Palestinian economy, Palestinian Islamism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Dr. Roy is also co-chair of the Middle East Seminar, jointly sponsored by the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, and
co-chair of the Middle East Forum at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. Dr. Roy began her research in the Gaza Strip and West Bank in 1985 with a focus on the economic, social and political development of the Gaza Strip and on U.S. foreign assistance to the region. Since then she has written extensively on the Palestinian economy, particularly in Gaza, and on Gaza's de-development, a concept she originated. In addition to her academic work, she serves on the Advisory Council of American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA), and has served as a consultant to international organizations, the U.S. government, human rights organizations, private voluntary organizations, and private business groups working in the Middle East.

**Jerome Segal**

Jerome M. Segal is the Director of The Peace Consultancy Project at the University of Maryland, and he is the founder and President of The Jewish Peace Lobby. Dr. Segal holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Michigan (1975) and a MPA from the Hubert Humphrey School of Public Affairs, Univ. of Minnesota (1979). Coming out of graduate school, he taught for several years at the Philosophy Department of the University of Pennsylvania. Subsequently he shifted from the academic world to government, starting as an aide to Congressman Donald M. Fraser and then as Coordinator for the Near East at USAID. In 1988 he left government work to return to the academic world. In 1987, Dr. Segal was a member of one of the first American-Jewish delegation to meet with the PLO leadership in Tunis. In 1988 his writings in Al-Quds and other publications played a catalytic role in promoting the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, issued in Algiers in November 1988. Dr Segal is the author of six books, two of them on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, *Creating the Palestinian State: A Strategy for Peace* and *Negotiating Jerusalem*, as well as over 100 articles and op-ed pieces on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

**Jeff Seul**

Jeff Seul serves as chairman of the Peace Appeal Foundation, an international NGO that helps catalyze and support broad-scale peace and national dialogue processes to end or prevent wars. He is a partner in the law firm Holland & Knight, a large, US-based law firm, where he co-leads the venture capital and emerging companies practice. Mr. Seul taught and published in the fields of negotiation and conflict resolution at Harvard Law School for several years. He has served as an arbitrator, mediator, facilitator or adviser in a broad variety of conflict contexts, from commercial disputes to civil wars. Mr. Seul was a senior associate of the Program on International Conflict Analysis and Resolution at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs while at Harvard.

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**Ilja Sichrovsky**

Ilja Sichrovsky is the Founder and Secretary General of the Muslim Jewish Conference (MJC). He is completing his master’s in international development from the University of Vienna. He was a counselor in Vienna’s Hashomer Hatzair youth movement and was a founding member of Gescher, the youth party within the Austrian Jewish Community. Ilja represented the University of Vienna three times at international Harvard student conferences. On each occasion, he won the Harvard Award for Exemplifying the True Spirit of Diplomacy. Later, he acted as faculty adviser and coach for the Viennese delegation at several conferences and he chaired the peace-building commission at EURASIAMUN. Ilja wrote a scientific article about being a Jewish student studying at an Austrian University six decades after the Holocaust. It was published by the University of Vienna and integrated into the curriculum.

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**Ian Spears**

Ian Spears is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and in the Collaborative International Development Studies Programme at the University of Guelph. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from McGill University in 1998 where he examined civil wars in Ethiopia, Somalia and Angola. His interests focus on the twin issues of conflict resolution and state formation where, in collaboration with other scholars, he developed the concept of “states-within-states.” His most recent book, *Civil War in African States: The Search for Security* (2010), examines conflict resolution techniques and their prospects in the context of war-fighting strategies of belligerents. He has published book chapters as well as articles in the Journal of Democracy, Third World Quarterly, The Review of African Political Economy, African Security Review, and the International Journal. Ian is working on a book-length examination of conflict resolution, tentatively titled *Why Conflict Resolution Fails*. This work critically examines the prospects and problems of international conflict resolution.
Yuli Tamir
Yael (Yuli) Tamir is the President of Shenkar College. She was a deputy speaker of the Knesset and a member of the Finance committee, the Education committee, and the Security and Foreign Affairs committee; she served as the Minister of Immigrant Absorption (1999-2001) and as Minister of Education (2006-2009). Tamir received her BA and MA from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem (Cum Laude), and her Ph.D. in political philosophy from Oxford University where she wrote her thesis under the supervision of Sir Isaiah Berlin. She was a professor at Tel-Aviv University and a scholar-in-residence at Princeton, Harvard, the University of Pennsylvania, the European University in Florence, and the Central European University in Budapest. Tamir is the author of Liberal-Nationalism, as well as numerous articles in the fields of moral and political philosophy, philosophy of education, feminism and human rights. She is the editor of Democratic Education in a Multicultural State, and Moral and Political Education, with Professor Macedo. Professor Tamir is a founding member of Peace Now, the Israeli peace movement, and served as the chairperson of the Association of Civil Rights in Israel.

Shibley Telhami
Shibley Telhami is the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park, and non-resident senior fellow at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. Professor Telhami has also been active in the foreign policy arena. He has served as Advisor to the US Mission to the UN (1990-91), more recently as senior advisor to George Mitchell, President Obama’s United States Special Envoy for Middle East Peace (2009-2011) and has served as an advisor to the United States Department of State. He has served on the US Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, which was appointed by the Department of State at the request of Congress, and he co-drafted the report of their findings, Changing Minds, Winning Peace. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and serves on the board of the Education for Employment Foundation, several academic advisory boards. His best-selling book, The Stakes: America and the Middle East was selected by Foreign Affairs as one of the top five books on the Middle East in 2003. His other publications include Barreras al diálogo y al consenso: Diagnóstico y posibles respuestas (2004); Liderazgo: Un concepto en evolución (2010); and Introducción a la teoría del conflicto: Orígenes, evolución, manejo y resolución (2013). He has in addition published extensively in academic journals on conflict management and resolution, leadership and education, and is a regular columnist for El Comercio, Quito’s leading newspaper.

Werner Wintersteiner
Werner Wintersteiner is the founding director of the Center for Peace Research and Peace Education at Klagenfurt University and the director of the Global Citizenship Education program. Professor Wintersteiner holds a PhD in Education from Klagenfurt University, focusing on peace education and a postdoctoral lecture qualification in Cultural Studies. His research fields include peace education, peace theory with a focus on culture and peace, narratives and conflict transformation, globalization, post-colonialism, transculturality and literature. He is the co-editor of the book series Klagenfurt Papers on Peace Research and Peace Culture Yearbook. He has also co-edited several other works, including the International Handbook on Tourism and Peace, and Culture of Peace. A Concept and a Campaign Revisited. He is the author of Hätten wir das Wort, wir bräuchten die Waffen nicht. Erziehung für eine “Kultur des Friedens” [Education for a Culture of Peace] and Pädagogik des Anderen. Bausteine für eine Friedenspädagogik in der Postmoderne [Pedagogy of the Other].

Jorje H. Zalles
Jorje H. Zalles is Professor and Department Chair of Conflict Resolution and Leadership Studies at Universidad San Francisco de Quito in Ecuador, and was appointed a Permanent Associate of the Program for International Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. In addition to his academic activities, Zalles intervenes as an impartial third party or as an advisor to one or more parties in social, political, and environmental conflicts of various kinds. His published works include Barrares al diálogo y al consenso: Diagnóstico y posibles respuestas (2004); Liderazgo: Un concepto en evolución (2010); and Introducción a la teoría del conflicto: Orígenes, evolución, manejo y resolución (2013). He has in addition published extensively in academic journals on conflict management and resolution, leadership and education, and is a regular columnist for El Comercio, Quito’s leading newspaper.