Knowledge for Peace: Transitional Justice, Knowledge Production and an Agenda for Research

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Abstract

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Abstract

Transitional justice, like other peacebuilding endeavours, strives to create change in the world and to produce knowledge that is useful (Goetschel and Pfluger 2014: 55). But the politics of how this knowledge is produced, shared and rendered legitimate depends upon the relationships between different epistemic communities, the way in which transitional justice has developed as a field, and the myriad contexts in which it is embedded at local, national and international levels. Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu’s work on epistemic communities of peacebuilding (2014) which operate as “sites of a constant struggle over how to define which qualifies as valid knowledge” (Bush and Duggan 2014: 233) draws our attention to the dynamics of competition and contestation over what legitimate knowledge is. This work can be usefully brought to bear on transitional justice, speaking to current debates in the literature on positionality, justice ‘from below’, marginalisation and knowledge imperialism.

This working paper presents a selection of chapters each dedicated to exploring an aspect of knowledge production or knowledge community either conceptually or in the three cases of Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique or South Sudan. They are each written by members of a research team working together on the project Knowledge for Peace. Understanding Research, Policy, Practice Synergies. We are in the project, and this working paper, most interested in how knowledge is generated, how the boundaries of such knowledge come to be determined, which forms of knowledge are considered to be more legitimate, and how the politics of knowledge production shape the types of policies which are considered, designed and implemented.
In sum, the technical assistance approach to transitional justice encourages de-politicized and de-contextualized engagements. It defines expertise as professionalized and internationally mobile knowledge rather than knowledge that is situated in activist commitments and knowledge of local context; it favours models that are already legible to the field and its ‘best practices’, rather than innovations that may extend or challenge the field as we know it’ (Nesiah 2016: 34 cited in McAliff 2017: 180).

At its heart, peacebuilding is a political issue, having been described as ‘ambiguous, elastic and politicized...as a concept and a practice’ (Bush and Duggan 2014: 306). Knowledge for peace debates turn on some core themes such as the role of external actors in ‘bringing’ peace to local communities (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009; Mohamed Salih 2009; Mac Ginty 2008), the presence of hybrid forms of peace which result from external/local interactions (Richmond 2001; Peterson 2012), critiques of the idea of ‘knowledge transfer’ from the Global North to the Global South as a solution (Cooper and Packard 1996: 2), the structural conditions under which such knowledge is generated (Goetschel 2013), and the dominance of universalised norms in determining perceptions of the ‘correct’ paths (Jones 2015: 250). Many of the critiques contained within these debates refer either implicitly or explicitly to the ‘unprecedented project of knowledge production about armed conflict, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction’ which accompanied the post-Cold War ascendency of what is referred to as the liberal peace (Lewis 2017: 22). Initially this knowledge was generated by certain epistemic communities located in the Global North and its application to the Global South was through external interventions. However, we have seen increasing attention being paid to the politics of knowledge for peace and a ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding has been described by Chambler as focusing peacebuilding interventions on enabling organic systems and existing knowledges, practices and capacities (2015: 77). As he is careful to point out this is not only an impulse of emancipation, of “awakening and engaging” (Ibid: 83), but also has the effect of “tacking intervention out of the context of policy-making and policy understanding out of the political sphere of democratic debate and decision-making” (Ibid: 79). The production, sharing and verification of “knowledge for and of peace cannot be separated from these broader debates and policy shifts.

 Transitional justice, like other peacebuilding endeavours, strives to create change in the world and to produce knowledge that is useful (Goetschel and Pfluger 2014: 55). But the politics of how this knowledge is produced, shared and rendered legitimate depends upon the relationships between different epistemic communities, the way in which transitional justice has developed as a field, and the myriad contexts in which it is embedded at local, national and international levels. Transitional justice, as the sum of processes and mechanisms intended to address mass human rights violations of the past, has risen to prominence in international policy making as an automatic and indeed necessary response in these contexts (Subotic 2012). Its crystallisation in United Nations pillars of the right to truth, the right to justice, the right to reparation and the guarantee of non-recurrence reflects a bureaucratisation of transitional justice (Rübli 2012) and both its material and discursive dominance. However, its privileged position as a framework which shapes discourse and practice is connected with the “post-cold war ascendency of particular, culturally laden narratives about history, society, governmentality and justice” (Kagoro 2012: 10). Such narratives have been criticised as Western in their origin, promoted by advocates and transported to non-Western contexts; a process referred to by Kagoro as “knowledge imperialism” (Ibid: 12). In particular, the forms of ‘expert’ knowledge which are usually promoted through transitional justice tend to be legal, foreign and based on models to be replicated elsewhere (Jones 2013), Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu’s work on epistemic communities of peacebuilding (2014), which operate as “sites of a constant struggle over how to define which qualifies as valid knowledge” (Bush and Duggan 2014: 233), draws our attention to the dynamics of competition and contestation over what legitimate knowledge is. This work can be usefully brought to bear on transitional justice, speaking to current debates in the literature on positonality, justice ‘from below’, marginalisation and knowledge imperialism.

This working paper presents a selection of chapters each dedicated to exploring an aspect of knowledge production or knowledge community either conceptually or in the three cases of Côte d’Ivoire, Mozambique or South Sudan. They are each written by members of a research team working together on the project Knowledge for Peace. Understanding Research, Policy, Practice Synergies1 which is co-funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Swiss Development Cooperation under the Research for Development (R&D) Framework. The starting point of the project is that improved synergies between research, policy and practice will produce better knowledge for peacebuilding. We define ‘better’ knowledge for peacebuilding as reliable, critical, policy relevant and useful knowledge for practitioners. But what counts as reliable, critical, relevant and useful is not a given, and so instead of focusing on knowledge transfer issues, which are of course important, we add to previous work by investigating the process of knowledge production itself. This draws on, but goes beyond, studies which focus on how to translate complex realities to policy actors (see for example Carden 2009; Paris 2011), how research can justify programmes or convince donors (Daines, Nutley and Walter 2005; Bush and Duggan 2014), or on a taken for granted assumption about the importance of the relationship between research, policy and practice. We are in the project, and this working paper, most interested in how knowledge is generated, how the boundaries of such knowledge come to be determined, which forms of knowledge are considered to be more legitimate, and how the politics of knowledge production shapes the types of policies which are considered, designed and implemented.

1 For more information on the project, the team and outputs please see www.knowledge-for-peace.org.
Introduction

yet is also subjective, shaped by prevailing political contexts and the social environments of empirical work. Given this researchers are obligated to think in terms of conflict sensitivity, to be conscious of their role and reflect on aspects of positionality which influence the way in which they interact with the social contexts in which they operate. These insights are particularly apposite for the research discussed in the following case study chapters where researchers both in close proximity, and more distant to, the transitional justice processes are engaged in seeking to produce research which is relevant, useful and ethical. Not only does the positionality of our research team members generate certain tensions but it also blurs the boundaries between research, policy and practice epistemic communities.

Moving to the case study chapters Leben Moro’s contribution follows much of the contemporary peace literature by focusing on the viability of alternative peacemaking processes in South Sudan from 1999 to date. In particular his interest in indigenous peacemaking based on local knowledge and experiences leads him to analyse the people-to-people reconciliation conference of Wunlit in 1999. In doing so he highlights how this tendency to valorise local knowledge is gaining momentum but is never purely ‘local’; instead the process is shaped by externally led peace processes. Moreover this overview of the challenges of the national Dialogue process prompts us to breakdown this notion of the ‘local’ or ‘local knowledge’ as the same actors seen to politicise and/or block the process also include South Sudanese in positions of power. Kuyang Harriet Logo delves deeper into the activities of two actors mentioned in Leben Moro’s piece with her contribution on the competing roles of African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as knowledge communities brokering the August 2015 peace agreement. She commends IGAD on its timely attempt to resolve the conflict in its early days, while at the same time alluding to complimentary and competing roles of other knowledge communities such as AU and Troika who acted outside of the formal mediation process to improve the knowledge exchanges on mediation and dealing with the past. The conclusion highlights how IGAD in fact relied more on experiences, policies and knowledge from other communities in order to broker a deal between the warring parties.

Gilbert Fokou and Yao Serge Alain N’Da’s contribution on Côte d’Ivoire goes into some detail picking up the theme highlighted in the South Sudan articles of a focus on ‘local’ knowledge and processes but also a tension over what exactly counts as local, and what happens when local actors disagree. Indeed, the vision of the Ivorian national government is dominant in shaping recovery ‘from above’ and disagreements with members of the army, contestations over the definition of ‘victim’ to be used by the compensation program highlight how important it is to understand the different structures of meanings of strategies and actions of various actors. The authors claim that the central question of the type of knowledge mobilised by authorities and practitioners remains unanswered. Looking forward they suggest that ‘knowledge for action’ should be multidimensional, multi-source and take into account all segments of society and all actors in their cultures, aspirations, visions and practices.

Concerned also with available knowledge sources in seeking to know a context and to design transitional justice policies Ulrike Lühe focuses her contribution on political research in Mozambique. This comes back to many of the points raised by Laurent Goetschel in the first article: of the importance of broader political and social contexts for shaping the kind of research that can be done and on the importance of the positionality of the peace researcher. In particular in Mozambique Ulrike Lühe observes that researchers need to operate in the three spaces of researcher, teacher/lecturer and consultant/advisor in order to maximise their legitimacy, authority and thus influence in the public sphere. The movement of researchers and their research into and out of universities warrants reflection, telling us about the (de)politicisation of research in Mozambique as well as the lack of representation of African scholars and African research in journal publishing and in theory-making research.

These contributions as a collection highlight some of the threads which we will continue to follow and to interrogate as part of our research project: the importance of context and positionality for determining what research can be conducted; the complex lines surrounding epistemic communities of research, policy and practice; the ways in which actors navigate the politics of knowledge production to ensure they can influence decision-making. Most important of all, we will work from the cases themselves, taking a grounded theory approach, which will not seek to offer advice on how to ‘transfer’ knowledge but will take a step back and engage a variety of knowledge actors in a knowledge network informed by a concern for the politics of knowledge production and how this shapes what we even imagine to be possible in the field of peacebuilding.
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The Interaction of Peace Research and Local Context

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There tends to be a confusion between scientific rigor and social impact: the quality of the results does not necessarily increase their acceptance by stakeholders. This counts for policy makers as well as for social groups. Research is not a socially neutral activity, and decision making does not follow a linear model according to which decision-makers would integrate best suited scientific solutions into their basis of decision (Albaek 1995). Both research and its addressees are embedded in a particular social context, and this context interacts with research and is decisive for the valorisation of results. Thus, whilst scientific research is a particular type of knowledge generation, striving for a high degree of legitimacy and acceptancy based on its methodological and theoretical rigor, it is not void of subjectivity at various levels. Research is, therefore, prone to be perceived as a scientific and yet subjective actor by its social environment. This is all the more true if this environment is characterised by political tensions and conflicts.

The personality of the researcher and the choices of topic, question, theory and methodology are all examples of factors which impact on research and its impact. The process of research is further determined by financial sources, the researcher’s institutional affiliation, the choice of partners and the governance of research teams. All these conditions apply independently of research discipline and context. If the research takes place in a politically sensitive context, the challenges increase. If we take a politically sensitive discipline and topic, the challenges increase further. If we combine both, the challenges are maximised. That is why the interaction of research, context and the related issues are so immensely relevant for peace research.

Peace research is expected to reflect upon its own doing (Weller 2017). On the one side, this is due to its content: peace research aims at transforming the societies it works on (Goetschel 2009). The responsibility which comes along with this activity demands constant questioning and searching for the best possible alternatives to what is already being achieved. On the other hand, the conditions under which research operates affect its content and therefore its results. Thus, reflection on its own modus operandi and on the structures governing peace research is essential, and follows the precepts of critical theory (Horkheimer 1937). In addition to traditional or problem-solving theories, critical theory includes the researcher’s societal environment in interpreting the results (Cox 1981).

Such a critical approach is relevant in terms of both content and power. Researchers run the risk of adopting or even internalising the predominant visions and assumptions of their own societies, forgetting about their subjective and normative nature: typical examples being research agendas shaped under the umbrella of the Cold War or in conflicts such as the Vietnam War in the USA. Researchers should not adapt to any kind of "state of emergency" which could preclude asking certain questions about the fundamentals of particular policies or orders (Lacy 2011). In the contemporary context, the Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE), the liberal peacebuilding agenda (Lidén 2005) or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) also constitute particular political or ideological a priori. Researchers should by no means abstain from analysing these themes and policy fields, but they should critically reflect on the implications these programmes and labels have on their own choices and on the perception of their roles as researchers by their local counterparts.

The more powerful researchers are perceived to be by local stakeholders, all the more relevant such a critical self-reflection becomes. Whilst power can have different dimensions, such as financial resources or access to political or communication networks, ultimately power is seen as a capacity to influence decision making on relevant issues (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950). It seems reasonable to assume that such power will encounter all the more suspicion when political tensions prevail in the local context. This may trigger reactions ranging from 'shrinking spaces' for researchers to the promotion of ‘alternative facts’ as a counter-version to scientific results (or facts). 'Shrinking space' has been used to describe the recently diminishing possibilities for NGOs to act in countries governed by authoritarian regimes or affected by political conflict or both (swisspeace 2016). ‘Alternative facts’ are established and legitimised because influential and powerful persons consider them as such. A political regime may refuse knowledge produced by science and describe it as subversive. This can lead to situations in which both factors intermingle and where the power of the researcher (or the institutions behind him) decides upon the validity of facts. Such ‘power-determined’ research can take various forms and may run under different labels such as the ‘validation’ of research results (KFPE 2015). Obviously, such a way of proceeding contradicts fundamental ethical principles of scientific research.

Moving beyond these general reflections, how should academics researching in politically sensitive contexts deal with these challenges? Researchers are not able to influence the structural challenges mentioned. Nonetheless, they should be conscious of their role, of their framework conditions, and of how these influence the way they interact with the social context in which they operate. These reflections should be part of their general considerations about their positionality.

There is also the concept of ‘conflict sensitivity’ which was introduced for researchers working in contexts characterised by political tensions. It originated in the field of development and humanitarian policy and has only recently been introduced in the field of research (Gabriel and Goetschel 2017). It can be adapted to challenges faced by research in politically sensitive contexts as it concentrates on activities taking place in such contexts which are not directly dealing with the conflict itself. In order to be conflict sensitive, researchers should try to get an understanding of the context, such as by means of a conflict analysis, and they should be aware of their own role as researchers in the respective context. This awareness should build on an assessment about the implications their research activities will have on the local context. Such an assessment should be based on the recognition that every activity in such a context is part of this context and cannot be understood as hors-sol or neutral. As a consequence, even well-intentioned acts can end
up being seen as partisan or having harmful effects. Conflict sensitivity refers
to both what is being done and how things are being done, and it should
include both intended and unintended effects.

Returning to the points raised at the beginning, the framing of a research
question, the choice of research partners and research cases, the use of a
particular method, and the collection of empirical data are all examples among
many others which will directly affect or at least shape the interaction of the
researcher with the context. Because it is impossible to assess all the implica-
tions beforehand, and also because the context may change over time, the
researcher in such a context must foresee alternative scenarios in regard to
methods, cases, and time-frame. He/she should also critically reflect upon
their performance on a regular basis.

This brings us back to the home context of researchers: academic insti-
tutions and funding agencies should encourage researchers to do their
work in terms of positionality and conflict sensitivity. Instead of asking
for unrealistic certainties and securities regarding the feasibility of the
research, they should be flexible for changes and should ask for contingency
planning in case of unexpected developments which might occur in the local
context. The country of origin, the funding agency and the researcher’s home
institution will influence the way the researcher, and also their work and
results, will be perceived.

Now what does this entail in terms of research independence? Should
one still go for research in politically sensitive contexts? The answer, of course,
is yes. The reasons range from more or less egoistic scientific curiosity to the
social responsibility which research, and peace research in particular, has
towards society. Maybe insights from social anthropologists and sociologists
would help to get a better picture of the roles researchers can play in difficult
contexts and how they may have to find a suitable balance on the methodo-
dological scale between more and less activist types of research, being aware
that the definition about what ‘activist’ means may strongly vary from one
stakeholder to the other (Hale 2006).

To conclude: conducting research, and in particular peace research, in
politically sensitive contexts requires traditional scientific rigor in terms of
theory and methods as well as context sensitivity. The latter should be seen as
a condition to achieve academic excellence. The more researchers are con-
scious of their own biases and of the structural constraints they operate in, the
better they will be capable to sense the social and political challenges they
face in the local context. Only if they are aware and understand these conditions
will they be able to adapt their own behavior and research, and, only if they do
so, will they produce research results which might show some local impact.
South Sudan is in the throes of a violent conflict. Commencing in December 2013 as a leadership contest, the conflict has spread to nearly all corners of the country, inflicting suffering on millions of civilians. At a high-level side event of the United Nations General Assembly, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Peter Maurer, captured the suffering as follows: “the impact of the conflict has gone far beyond the frontlines of war: sparking food shortages, an economic crisis and causing massive displacement of people” (ICRC 2017). Uganda alone is hosting over one million of the displaced (Robinson 2017). Yet, efforts to end the conflict, led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), have so far floundered. In December 2016, the government initiated a National Dialogue process to end all conflicts, but the fighting continues. Perhaps an approach that emphasizes both home-grown and external peacemaking efforts, and reinforces the complementarity of both, stands a better chance of widespread acceptability and success.

The armed opponents present the most significant threat to the National Dialogue as they continue to engage government forces. They view the initiative as an attempt by the government to avoid the implementation of the IGAD-mediated peace deal, the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), which was concluded in August 2015. IGAD was also the mediator of the landmark 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which ended the second war, fought from 1983 to 2005, in the former Sudan. The government continues to insist that it is carrying out its obligations mandated by the ARCSS in partnership with the armed opposition group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO). However, the opposition leader who signed the agreement, Dr Riek Machar, is isolated in South Africa and apparently remains doubtful of the government’s intentions. His faction of the SPLM-IO is actively waging war against government forces. As the fighting continues, armed opposition groups are proliferating (Roque and Miamingi 2017). According to David Shearer, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the “splintering of the South Sudan war makes peace more elusive” (Reuters 2017). To reverse the worsening situation, the government turned to National Dialogue, informed by the successes of past home-grown peacemaking efforts that have been premised on traditional knowledge and practices (Mayardit 2016). This is in line with a broader shift in approaches to dealing with the past which increasingly emphasise “local” solutions, both as a principle of inclusivity and as an assumption that such interventions will have a greater chance of success. The shift recognises that “internal actors clearly own the problem and also have the right to oversee the solution” (ACCORD 2015: 70).
In the following sections, I will discuss South Sudan’s past use of home-grown solutions, especially dialogues, to end conflicts, highlighting the success of the Wunlit Peace Agreement of 1999. Then, I will shed some light on the ongoing National Dialogue in the country, focusing on its challenges and successes.

Past Home-Grown Peacemaking Efforts: with a Focus on the Wunlit Conference

The South Sudanese have a long history of dialoguing among themselves so as to peaceably solve conflicts, which are prevalent. In particular, traditional leaders, civil society groups and faith-based organisations have been active in peacemaking from the time the country was part of the former Sudan. During the second war churches and their leaders were actively involved in people-to-people peace processes with some significant outcomes.

In 1999, the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), with the support of the rebel movement, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), facilitated the Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Conference. It brought together traditional leaders, women and youth from Dinka and Nuer counties on the West Bank of the Nile (Kundu 2003: 20). Local administrators, security functionaries, and international observers also took part in the conference. During the proceedings, traditional rites and Christian practices were conducted. After five days, the Wunlit Covenant/Agreement was concluded. This restored peace to the war weary communities. Moreover, some people have argued that the reunification of the SPLM/A factions in 2002 was made possible because of the Wunlit spirit or local reconciliation drive (ibid: 28).1 Invoking that spirit of reconciliation and the success of other local dialogues, based on traditional knowledge and practices, the government turned to dialogue to end the ongoing conflict.

The National Dialogue

Addressing the Transitional National Assembly in December 2016, President Salva Kiir declared a National Dialogue with broader objectives “to end all violent conflicts in South Sudan; constitute national consensus; and save the country from disintegration and foreign interference” (cited in Mayardit 2016). He argued that the ARCSS only “settled political and military aspects of the conflict” but “there remain a number of fundamental issues that require a much broader forum. In particular, our political settlements have often ignored longstanding grassroots grievances” (Republic of South Sudan 2016). Moreover, he asserted that peace was within reach and that “the responsibility to restore peace in South Sudan rests with us, the people of South Sudan” (cited in Mayardit 2016). Furthermore, he claimed that the South Sudanese had an impressive record of settling differences through dialogue, going back to the 1940s.

To begin the process, the President appointed a Steering Committee as well as members of a Secretariat, drawn mainly from major universities, think tanks and faith-based groups, to lead the process while assigning himself the role of a patron. However, this raised serious concerns about the independence, inclusivity and credibility of the process as some saw the whole initiative as an attempt to sustain his rule and avoid reforms. Reacting to these concerns, the President relinquished patronage of the initiative and assured the country that his intentions were honest. Moreover, he declared a unilateral ceasefire, released political detainees, allowed some freedom of expression, and promised to protect members of the opposition who came to Juba to participate in the initiative.

In addition, the President appealed for support from the African Union and the United Nations for the National Dialogue and asserted that the implementation of the ARCSS and National Dialogue was the only way forward (Oduha 2017). Initially, the response of the African Union and the United Nations was cool, if not openly dismissive. There are signs that the mood is gradually changing as the process unfolds as the Steering Committee charts a largely independent course.

Nonetheless, the risk that the whole initiative can end in failure is real. Firstly, the armed rebel groups remain opposed to the initiative and continue to fight. They prefer a revitalisation of the implementation of the ARCSS or a new process led by external actors. Secondly, key donors of the country are yet to be fully convinced of the credibility of the process. Only Japan and Germany have shown some interest in the initiative. All the other major donors have focussed on supporting humanitarian activities and have turned their backs on the National Dialogue. So far, the National Dialogue is funded by the government which has very limited financial resources. And thirdly, the IGAD is engaged in a separate and seemingly competitive process to reenergise the implementation of the ARCSS, which has caused some tensions between some IGAD officials and the Steering Committee.

Despite these difficulties, the initiative is making progress. Members of the Steering Committee have reached out to the armed groups even though most of them continue to fight. Significantly, grassroots consultations have commenced in parts of the country, and the response from ordinary people is encouraging. Moreover, the members of the Steering Committee are engaging with representatives of the United Nations, donor countries, regional bodies and other stakeholders with some successes. For example, the UNMISS is providing logistical support to the teams that are leading the grassroots consultations.

Conclusion

Since December 2013, South Sudan has been suffering from a gruesome civil war that has relegated millions of its people into misery and raised the...
prospects of state collapse. The IGAD, with the support of global powers, has been leading peace efforts but violence persists. Disillusioned by the external peacemaking efforts, the South Sudanese government turned to home-grown solutions, premised on local knowledge and practices, to end the fighting and restore peace to the country. In December 2016, it launched a National Dialogue with these goals in mind.

However, the armed opponents of the government have so far rejected the initiative and have also called for either a revitalisation of the ARCSS or a new externally-led process. Moreover, donor countries have largely withheld their support, especially financial resources, from the initiative despite appeals by the government, and particularly the members of the Steering Committee of the National Dialogue. They have questioned the credibility of the process. Nonetheless, despite these challenges, the initiative is on track with grassroots consultations getting off the ground in parts of the country.

To some extent, the significant doubts about, or disagreements over, the National Dialogue highlight the shortcomings of peacemaking efforts predicated only on traditional knowledge and practices. For peacemaking efforts based on traditional knowledge and practices to succeed, a high level of consensus among key stakeholders is necessary, as was the case in the Wunlit process of 1999. Where key actors or stakeholders, such as Riek Machar, are opposed, the chances of success are poor as the violence will most likely continue. Accordingly, carefully incorporating the efforts of regional or global actors, which often have leverage over stakeholders, is helpful and will be more likely to boost peacemaking efforts.

Reference List


Addressing Accountability and Dealing with the Past – Competing Roles of AU and IGAD in South Sudan

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Introduction

Prior to the eruption of conflict in South Sudan in 2013, increased political tensions and unresolved political issues amongst the top leadership had been brought into the public domain through a series of cabinet reshuffles, the restructuring of the political structure of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and the manner in which key South Sudanese political leaders affirmed their intentions to contest for the chairmanship of the SPLM (Kang 2014). These political tensions erupted into violence in December 2013, barely two years after South Sudan’s independence. The focus of this brief chapter is on the (re)actions of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which had first been established in 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) and was later transformed in 1996 into IGAD with an expanded mandate.

Since 1996, IGAD has engaged in peace and security issues and economic cooperation within the region (IGAD n.d.). Therefore, IGAD member states convened to resolve South Sudan’s conflict as soon as it broke out in 2013. IGAD evolved from the status of an economic community to a regional knowledge community on peace and security in 1996, when it established a fully functional secretariat with the mandate of dealing with the peace and security concerns of the region. The argument presented here is that the work of IGAD as a knowledge community and its interactions with other knowledge communities such as the African Union (AU) and Troika representatives (United Kingdom, United States, Norway and China) went some way to improving knowledge exchanges on mediation and dealing with the past but were not coordinated properly, thereby delaying the resolution of the conflict.

The AU viewed IGAD’s central role as supporting its subsidiary principle that local conflicts should be dealt with by regional actors. Acting outside of the formal mediation process, the AU also established the Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan in order to investigate gross human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity by both parties to the South Sudan conflict (Motsamai 2017). Since the AU inquiry was not strictly a part of the AU mediation process, the AU chairman appointed an AU High Representative for South Sudan to strengthen the IGAD led mediation and to foster interaction with IGAD leaders (Motsamai 2017).

As the mediation became more complicated, two new regional actors, Tanzania and South Africa joined in the attempts to resolve the country’s political problems. When the mediation failed to make headway, IGAD expanded the actors involved to include the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway and eventually China. While the competing interests and transitional justice policies of each actor shaped negotiations, there was significant interest to investigate whether the AU’s efforts complimented IGAD’s work and whether the AU had any leverage, or used such leverage to influence the process. At the centre of the debate was also the question of whether the mediation was effectively managed and coordinated by both the AU and IGAD and whether the weak synergies between the actors’ policy and practice contributed to some of the inefficiencies in the peace process (Cosmas 2015).

The Region’s Geopolitics and Influences on IGAD and AU Roles in the Peace Process

Aside from formal policies and approaches to conflict resolution and peace-making, were the complex geopolitics of the regional actors within IGAD itself. South Sudan became the arena for displaying political interests and for garnering regional influence. The thaw in relations between Sudan and Uganda, tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia, and South Sudan’s new found friendship with Eritrea and deteriorating relationship with Ethiopia constrained the peace process and the transitional justice propositions. The complex geopolitical dynamics resulted in polarised positions, marred with individual interests. As a knowledge actor, IGAD had to constantly contend with regional interests and eventually expanded the mediation to include other sets of knowledge actors, such as the AU and Troika, to reach a peace deal in 2015 (Group 2016).

Uganda’s military intervention in the wake of the conflict in 2013 stalled the negotiations because the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In-Opposition (SPLM-IO) viewed the intervention as denying them a military advantage over the government. The Government of South Sudan also questioned Ethiopia’s neutrality in the talks, when it hosted the rebel leader, Dr. Riek Machar. South Sudan’s government was also concerned about Ethiopia’s close relations with the USA, who it perceived as the architect of punitive measures. One significant anxiety was that Ethiopia, as the seat of IGAD, exerted more pressure and visibility than necessary and that tended to influence IGAD’s actions (Group 2016). When the relationships between Ethiopia and South Sudan became visibly strained, South Sudan pursued a rapprochement with Eritrea with the sole intention of shipping both humanitarian and military confinements. IGAD as a regional block had to deal with the towering presence of Egypt, who despite being out of the IGAD region, ascended to a seat on the United Nations Security Council and often took a non-interventionist stance. The constant wrangling between Egypt and Ethiopia over the volume of the Nile waters led Egypt to engage with South Sudan on how to increase the volume of the Nile water and, in return, South Sudan was assured of an ally in the United Nations Security Council. The regional politics were simply too complex, so both IGAD and AU were often caught up in the politics and interests of the region (Group 2016).
Competing Knowledge Communities – IGAD, AU and Troika

IGAD directly intervened in conflict resolution as an organisation for the very first time in South Sudan, but failed to reach a deal on its own. Upon intervening, IGAD swiftly appointed three envoys to structure the mediation and created a mediation support structure at its Peace and Security Department. The timing of IGAD’s intervention in South Sudan’s conflict was impeccable, as the AU was involved in similar mediations of other Sudanese conflicts. It is yet to be seen if IGAD can transform the temporary mediation structures on South Sudan, its policy documents on conflict prevention, management and resolution and the peace and security strategy (2010) into stronger policies and structures. It is also yet to be seen if IGAD will draft comprehensive transitional justice policies, now that transitional justice is of great concern in the Horn region. IGAD set up a Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) to monitor compliance of the parties to the peace agreement, but the commission barely delivers on its mandate (Albuquerque 2016).

The AU mediation system (2016) and standard operating procedures (2012) were developed in order to strengthen mediation processes, and include studying the experiences of past mediations to improve on future ones. In 2013, both the AU and IGAD sought to resolve the conflict in South Sudan and, as early as 19th December 2013, the IGAD Council of Ministers along with the AU Minister for Peace and the United Nations Special Envoy to the AU visited South Sudan for a fact-finding mission (Motsamai 2017). The IGAD-led processes plunged into regional geopolitics and the neighbours’ interests pitted them against one another. The interests of Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Egypt led to partisan support of the parties to the conflict, with serious consequences. IGAD devised a strategic plan in which a mediation secretariat was established and themed committees on permanent ceasefire, security arrangements and transitional justice were formed. This was a turning point in the mediation because it sought to expand the mediators from an exclusively IGAD-led process to include the AU, United Kingdom, United States of America, Norway, China, and the United Nations. The expanded mediation is referred to as IGAD PLUS (Motsamai 2017).

The AU responded to the crisis by establishing a separate Commission of Inquiry to investigate the human rights violations, in order to make recommendations for accountability, healing and reconciliation (Union 2014). The report which was released in 2015 sought to establish a shared memory to fight impunity and laid the foundation for transitional justice processes, including a proposed hybrid court, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Reparations Commission envisaged in the IGAD peace process (Dersso n.d.).

The AU’s approach was intended to manage differences which might occur amongst the IGAD member states. Yet the extent to which the AU mechanisms helped the IGAD with the mediation was debatable since the Ad Hoc High Level Committee never really functioned and its involvement in the mediation was delayed. The AU ended up playing a behind the scenes role in furtherance of its principle of subsidiary, where regional actors lead and the AU supports. This may explain the delayed involvement of the AU, but barely explains how the roles between IGAD and AU were coordinated and managed and how both their experiences and policies shaped the processes. The peace process was more of a hands on the job experience (Motsamai 2017).

Prospects for IGAD and Other Knowledge Actors in South Sudan’s Peace Mediation

IGAD alone as an actor had inadequate knowledge, policies and experiences to manage a complicated context like South Sudan. IGAD could use its experiences in conflict resolution to develop a transitional justice framework, strengthen both practice and policy and transform the nascent mediation structures into permanent ones. On its own, IGAD, failed to broker a long-lasting peace in South Sudan (Union n.d.). It is now obvious that IGAD will continue to work with other knowledge actors such as AU and Troika countries to resolve the conflict in South Sudan. The complimentary roles of other knowledge actors require a very coordinated approach (Motsamai 2017).
Accountability and Dealing with the Past in South Sudan

5 Social Cohesion in Post-Conflict Côte d’Ivoire: the Fragile Corner Stone of the Peacebuilding Process

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Introduction

After a decade of socio-political crisis that culminated in 2010 with a violent post-election crisis, Côte d’Ivoire embarked on an ambitious transitional justice process marked by the activation of several judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. After disputed presidential elections organised in the country that year between the former president, Laurent Gbagbo, and Alassane Ouattara, a former Prime minister (1990-1993), Côte d’Ivoire experienced a severe political crisis characterised by a military conflict in early March 2011, after months of growing political violence. A devastating armed confrontation took place between the national security and defence forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo and the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FFCI) who supported his rival Alassane Dramane Ouattara (Zournemou and Lamin 2011). The eruption of violence dropped after Gbagbo’s arrest by pro-Ouattara forces, aided by United Nations (UN) and French peackeeping troops in April 2011. By the end of the conflict, large-scale massacre and destruction had been avoided, but some 187,266 Ivorians had fled the country and more than 3,000 people had been reported dead (UNGA 2011a; 2011b). Most of the killings were described as extra-judicial and were committed by supporters of both parties.

The new authorities in power who took office in May 2011, undertook several actions to restore justice and consolidate peace. While the most visible element of this process has been the transfer of former President Laurent Gbagbo to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, other actions have been initiated by the government to attempt to restore justice but also to consolidate peace and social harmony between deeply divided socio-political groups. Even though judicial actions were quickly perceived by some protagonists to be ‘victors’ justice’, judicial proceedings were launched by the Ivorian courts to judge the perpetrators of the post-election crimes. Several other processes have been incorporated into the post-conflict reconstruction process. These include national reconciliation, the securitisation of the country through the establishment of social cohesion mechanisms. Even though it has been recognised from the literature that some types of programmes, policies, and initiatives designed to foster social cohesion may result in more harm than good (Cox and Sis 2017), the concern of the Ivorian Government after the post-electoral crisis was to consider “any option or any means likely to strengthen national cohesion, peace and solidarity between the populations…” [creating] the conditions for unity and cohesion between different components of the nation and consolidate peace, maintain harmony, sustainable social bonds, both between Ivorians, but also between different communities living in Côte d’Ivoire”.

In such a context, the challenge of recovery and reconciliation is the precise form that peace will take, or, for Ivorians, the form that ‘social...
cohesion’ will take (Charbonneau and Parent 2012). One of the initiatives in this direction has been the establishment of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR), other iterations of which have been popular in many other countries. But the political colour of its President was quickly perceived to be an obstacle to neutrality. As a result, this commission had mixed results at the end of its mission in 2015 because it did not lay the groundwork for real reconciliation. This mission was then to continue through the establishment of the National Commission for Reconciliation and Compensation for Victims of Crises in Côte d'Ivoire (CONARIV). The latter was responsible for consolidating the database of victims for their compensation. However, the notion of ‘victim’ is to be questioned. What are the criteria for defining a victim? What are the socio-political determinants of the notion of victim? Beyond the question of compensation, what is the model of social cohesion chosen by the Ivoirian authorities? These are the questions on which this reflection piece focuses, with particular reference to the framing of key issues which are part of the Ivorian process of social cohesion.

Economic Development as a Basis for Reconciliation and Peacebuilding

The National Development Plan (NDP, 2012–2015) adopted by the government in March 2012 clearly aimed to transform Côte d'Ivoire into “an emerging country by 2020”. This has been one of the pillars of the country’s reconstruction alongside national reconciliation and social cohesion. The government planned structural reforms in order to create the right conditions for strengthening the contribution of the international and domestic private sector in the economy, including in the form of a public-private partnership. This will involve creating new opportunities for diversification based on its comparative advantages and sustainable integration into regional and global value chains. This ‘vision of emergence’ structures the current Ivorian political and social discourse and can be defined as an economic model that is socially inclusive (FMI 2013). In this phase of transition, while the wounds of ten years of conflict are far from all healed, the recovery is engaged from above (redressement par le haut), not from a strategic document jointly prepared with donors, but with the internalized vision of the Ivorian government (Gaujime 2013).

For his accession to power, Alassane Ouattara received important support from the international community, who also had influence on the process of reconciliation and reconstruction of the country. Thus, development partners emphasised the need for deep national reconciliation. Visiting Côte d'Ivoire in January 2013, Christine Lagarde, director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), said that Ivorian reconciliation was a “prerequisite” for economic recovery. And yet, reconciliation is stagnant, relative peace remains very fragile (IMF), said that Ivorian reconciliation was a “prerequisite” for economic development. This performance has helped to reposition the country in the sub-region and to increase visibility on the international scene but the social cohesion issue remains. Macroeconomic indicators seem for the moment not to have a social impact (Akindès and Zina 2014). The purchasing power of populations remains low with a poverty rate of 46.3% (INS 2015) and the cost of living is still high for households. This question of the equitable redistribution of wealth has the effect of reviving the feeling of social exclusion between the different social strata. In a context of deep socio-political division, this does not contribute to peace and stability. In the past, social injustice was one of the key issues that led to the conflict. The model of the Ivorian authorities shows its limits as it could hinder the peace process to a certain extent since the debates on inclusiveness through growth are being questioned.

One of the indicators of the failure of this model of recovery and reconciliation through economic development can be seen in the conflicting relations between the government and part of the army. Since the beginning of 2017, a series of mutinies by Ivorian soldiers and demonstrations by demobilised combatants have undermined the efforts made by authorities in the security sector. These former rebels, whether integrated into the Ivorian army or not, have staged demonstrations to claim the payment of war bonuses. Once again, the economic issue is at the heart of these tensions between the government and the security forces. In reality, this category of actors had the feeling of being forgotten by the economic system put in place. The lack of trust between various protagonists has so far precluded a sustainable solution.

The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, which has very often had strong identity connotations and has lasted for more than twenty years, has left wounds that are still too deep and too fresh to disappear with the implementation of an economic programme, even were it to be fair and redistributive. Communities which oppose this elite peacebuilding process base their own views on the context in which they live and on their experiences during the crisis. This is illustrated by the compensation process in Côte d’Ivoire.

The War Victim in Côte d’Ivoire: a Fuzzy Notion

Transitional processes and their various mechanisms such as trials, truth commissions and reparation schemes through which they work tend to be prescriptive and top-down. However, social cohesion and durable peace that seem to be the main goals of transitional justice are broad social goals and are not limited to the system of justice (Corradetti et al. 2015). Transitional justice processes have emerged almost exclusively from elites, with a negligible engagement with the victims who are most impacted by the violations that the process purports to address (Robins and Wilson 2015).
As part of its social cohesion agenda, the government of Côte d’Ivoire has initiated a compensation process for the victims of socio-political crises in Côte d’Ivoire for the period from 2002 to 2011. The decade of military-political conflict has weakened the social fabric and led to the displacement of thousands of people. These displacements, which are sustained by the persistence of intercommunal conflicts, threaten the dynamics of social cohesion and national reconciliation. A National Programme for Social Cohesion (PNCS) was then put in place in 2012 to contribute to strengthening social cohesion in Côte d’Ivoire through national reconciliation, peacebuilding and security. The PNCS mandate is to undertake specific measures to relieve families of the victims, and prepare for medium and long-term opportunities for those families. The work of collecting and consolidating the list of victims was devolved to CONARIV. Its mission was to complete the work of the CDVR, both through research and the identification of victims and beneficiaries of victims who have not yet been identified, as well as through relevant proposals for the redress of prejudices resulting from the attacks on people and property caused by crises in the country. According to the report of the activities of CONARIV submitted in April 2016, out of the 874,056 files submitted to the Audit Unit, more than 64% have been rejected. The agreed upon and consolidated list of victims has to be validated by the President of the Republic, adding a political dimension to the list making. This top-down approach in the compensation process poses the question of its credibility. In fact, what is the definition of a victim in this context? What is the value of financial compensation for the suffering of families who have lost property or loved ones?

The PNCS definition of victims comprises beneficiaries of deceased persons, wounded military and civil persons, households in advanced precariousness, widows and orphans. Even though the list of victims has been consoliated in a participatory way with the contribution of associations of victims and community leaders, contestations persist. The process may be flawed with possible omissions or misrepresentations. However, contestation of victim lists shows that “victimhood” is not perceived in the same way by various actors. Firstly, during the trial of Laurent Gbagbo at the ICC, Paolina Massidda, the legal representative of the victims, spoke on behalf of some 729 victims of the post-election crisis, constituted of victims of pro-Gbagbo forces. This leads to a polarisation of the notion of victimhood and implies that victims of pro-Guattara forces, who do not so far have a legal voice, are not considered by this legal process to be victims. Secondly, the proliferation of associations of victims in the process, often leads to the ‘commodification of victimhood’ (MacManus 2014). Some victims’ associations appear to be in the business of producing victimhood for a fee. The recent exclusion of those associations represented by the Confederation of Organisations of Victims of Ivoirian Crises (COVICI) from the compensation process illustrated the government’s wish to limit corruption and false declarations. Thirdly, in July 2017, some associations of victims organised a press conference to protest against the final list of victims produced by the CONARIV, which, according to them, does not take into account certain categories of persons in their selection criteria, such as amputees and quadriplegics.

Lastly, the concept of victim may not be the same in local cultural contexts. Structures of meaning and significiation with respect to crime and victimhood change from one society to another and in this context, legal and psychological definitions of victimhood do not suffice to understand the whole process of justice and reparation. In traditional societies, victimhood does not only concern the individual, but the social body of which he is a member as a whole. Conflict resolution and justice mechanisms are not only designed to identify individuals who have been physically or psychologically abused for any financial reparation or compensation, but are above all a process to ensure and maintain the stability of the social body (Bagayoko & Koné 2017). Cultural meanings of restoration, reparation or retribution as acts of solidarity, support, compassion and communion with others are important to foster coexistence and social cohesion. To be more inclusive, the social cohesion processes and, beyond them, transitional justice processes, should explore routes to victim engagement with processes such as the mobilisation of victims and victim organisations in an emancipatory approach that seeks to provide a space for victims to engage in transitional justice debates on their own terms (Robins and Wilson 2015). The compensation provided in the Ivorian case consists of providing medical and psychological care to wounded peoples and financial support to beneficiaries of deceased persons. Obviously, the compensation is not only pecuniary and has started with the liberation of occupied houses and farms. Moreover, communities should tap into their respective cultures to lay the foundations of coexistence and social cohesion.

Conclusion

Côte d’Ivoire has been engaged since 2011 in a process of transitional justice aiming at recovery from a decade of socio-political turmoil and consolidating peace between various communities. While its implementation through various mechanisms such as trials, truth commissions and reparation schemes has made significant progress in the search for justice and the reinstatement of dialogue, reconciliation has not yet had significant results. Tensions within the army, the discovery of arms caches, inter-community conflicts and the resentments that persist between the protagonists of the last crisis show that the model of transitional justice remains far from perfect. The example of the social cohesion process in Côte d’Ivoire shows that understanding different structures of meanings of strategies and actions of various actors is critically important to put in place peace building policies. The question of the type of knowledge mobilised by authorities and practitioners remains central and unanswered. However, one could already hypothesise that knowledge for action must be multidimensional, multi-source and take into account all segments of society and all actors in their cultures, aspirations, visions and practices.
Reference List


The Politics and Practice of Political Research in Mozambique

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Introduction

After nearly twenty years of peace, Mozambique has started slipping back into, at best, a fragile ceasefire and at worst, open conflict over the past few years (Reppell et al. 2016). After the signing of the 1992 General Peace Agreement there was peace, despite what many have argued to be a lack of justice and accountability. That has not changed. However, efforts at resolving the current, multi-faceted conflict are driven by two major topics: decentralisation and military questions (Manning 2017). Both are highly political issues and have a major bearing on the future of the country as they are intricately linked to peace, conflict and stability. In light of the continued relevance of these topics, it seems worth exploring who is researching these topics in Mozambique and what conditions and circumstances shape the research environment.

These questions came about as a result of my research stay in Mozambique during 2017. Two observations stood out: very little research is being produced directly through universities, and many of the people I spoke to were involved in several institutions and processes related to knowledge production and dissemination. This article is the result of a first attempt at probing some of the dynamics that surround knowledge production on contemporary political issues and challenges in Mozambique. It is based on existing evidence on universities and academic research in Mozambique, and the broader issue of knowledge production in the African context. Furthermore, eighteen key informant interviews were conducted in addition to a number of informal conversations in May and June 2017 in Maputo, Mozambique with representatives from governmental and non-governmental institutions, as well as education and research institutions. Several of the interviewees themselves occupy the dual space between teaching at a university and conducting research at another institution as described below. The focus of the interviews was on exploring conceptualisations of transitional justice in the Mozambican context and the role of different knowledge actors in this sector. I wish to highlight that this a preliminary analysis of only some of the dynamics at play in the Mozambican knowledge production sector and the politics that govern it.

A Lack of Infrastructure and Incentives

Since the introduction of multi-party democracy and a capitalist market economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Lundin 2000), Mozambique has seen a skyrocketing of higher education institutions (Langa 2013; Mouzinho et al. 2003). This was partly driven by government, which considers higher education an important vehicle for development, but non-governmental stakeholders such as religious institutions, the private sector, and even political parties, have started establishing a plethora of higher education institutions since they have been allowed into the market (Langa 2013; Beverwijk 2005; Mouzinho et al. 2003). A remarkable example is the Catholic University of Beira which was established by the Episcopal Conference of Mozambique under the auspice of Dom Jaime Pedro Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira and one of the mediators in Rome during the peace negotiations which culminated in the 1992 Rome General Peace Accord. Seeing the peace process getting stuck, he proposed that a university be built in Beira in order to bring quality higher education to the Northern and Central parts of the country. The existence of the university is a direct result of the peace process, and thus a token of peace and reconciliation. To this day it remains active in the peace process by hosting meetings between the warring parties (Agencia Lusa 2016).

This is a considerable turn from some earlier developmental policies advocated particularly by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and implemented across the continent, which cut tertiary education due to the ‘low returns’ and instead favored pre-primary and primary education (Mkandawire 2011; Cloete, Maassen 2013; Cruz e Silva 2011). In Mozambique the consequences of these cuts were severe: funding for research was reduced and consequently dependence on external funding increased; academics were transformed into producers of information and reproducers of knowledge produced elsewhere that was of little relevance to the African context; research became individualised and access to spaces of exchange became limited; and publications in international journals remain low in number to this day (Cruz e Silva 2011). These cuts have also had considerable consequences for scholars, whose salaries were cut and who at times struggle to make ends meet leading to disillusionment. The expansion of the tertiary education sector thus took place at the same time as the constraints on the sector grew considerably (Cruz e Silva 2011). In addition, incentives for research and publishing in international, peer-reviewed journals became limited when professors became evaluated based on teaching activities rather than knowledge production and publishing (Cruz e Silva 2011).

This trend continues although “all major policy documents advocate for the need to ‘encourage scientific research as a means of training students, solving societal problems and supporting the development of the country’” (Langa 2014 referenced in Wangenge-Ouma et al., 2015: 134; see also Cloete et al. 2015). Both the government and several universities’ own policies foresee the use of remuneration and incentives to encourage and promote research (Cloete et al. 2015). However, this has not been implemented in practice (Wangenge-Ouma et al. 2015). Whilst academics in Mozambique do not, on average, earn less than other well-paid public sector employees, researchers are underpaid compared to teaching functions (Wangenge-Ouma et al. 2015). This, combined with a lack of direct incentives for research and dissemination, causes a situation in which Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM), the biggest and oldest university country, underperforms in core academic activities when compared to other universities on the continent, such as the University of Cape Town, Makerere University in Kampala or the University of Botswana (Wangenge-Ouma et al. 2015). It performs particularly poorly with regards to research dissemination through the publication of articles and the ratio of doctoral students in 2015 (Cloete et al. 2015). The low number of publications is a phenomenon that reaches well beyond Mozambique: in 2014 Africa’s world share of publications was 2% (Cloete et al. 2015). Evidently, this situation
applies to UEM and other institutions in general. So why is it particularly relevant to political research in this context?

**Political Limitations**

Universities in post-independence Africa were the pride and hope for the development of the continent through their task of training future public servants (Mkandawire 2011; Cloete, Maassen 2015). For a long time after independence, the Mozambican education system has been geared towards its mission “to train the ‘New Man’, the builder of a socialist society” (Langa 2013: 63), indicating tight control of the government over the structure and content of education. For the higher education sector this ostensibly changed with Law 1/33 which emphasised autonomy and academic freedom and less control by the Ministry of Education (Langa 2013). The law started to be implemented with more visible consequences from 1996 onwards (Beverwijk 2005). However, there remain limitations to what university staff and researchers can focus on in their research. Interviewees from both the academic and non-governmental sectors have indicated different ways in which what is asked and said tend to be limited.

Firstly, direct interference, threats of violence and the need for alliances (often with political parties) pose threats to academic freedom in Mozambique (e.g. O’Laughlin 2014). For example, in 2014 Carlos Nuno Castel Branco, principal researcher at the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE), a leading research institution in the country, had a criminal case opened against him for a Facebook post in which he criticized then president Armado Guebuza (O’Laughlin 2014). In 2016, political analyst Jaime Macuane was abducted and shot in the leg (Saul 2016). This violence has not only affected academics, but also journalists12 and has lasted for years, creating a climate in which the freedom of expression and academic freedom seem under threat.

This has led to self-censorship on the side of researchers and academics,13 in order to remain able to partake in the debate at all and to preserve their manoeuvring space (Lorch and Bunk 2016). As one interviewee reports “very often they [are looked at] as people who are backing the opposition because the analysis at some points are very critical. And so they don’t really appreciate (this work). It makes it difficult to use the results of our research in order to feed the policies.”14 This has also been reported by Lorch and Bunk who state that “critical Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), some of them donor-funded, are often villainised as the ‘agents of foreign powers’” by The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) (Lorch and Bunk 2016: 995). Besides physical threats and violence which serve to stop critical activities altogether, labelling is thus also used as a strategy to delegitimise certain actors. In yet other cases the need for (political) alliances and support is much more pronounced. Altogether this has led to a situation where “those who have been doing analysis of the situation in Mozambique, are mostly associated to FRELIMO, so the likelihood of them talking about what is going on, is [small]. Or they’ll be aligned with their political party. Not necessarily contributing to the debate in any form, or the policy making.”15 According to Lorch and Bunk, this has reached a point where there are “blurring boundaries between the state, the ruling party, civil society, and the private sector, as well as to the direct or indirect influence of the ruling party” (Lorch and Bunk 2016: 995; see also Ilal et al. 2014). In brief, there is “too much political control over independent voices,”16 and “academia in Mozambique is not as autonomous as in other countries.”17 Control over the civil society space has tightened particularly after the 2014 elections (Ilal et al. 2014; Klebl, Munk 2016). However, interviewees also reported that this has started changing and more space is opening up again.18

12 For example, well known journalist Carlos Cardoso was killed in 2000 after working on issues of high-level involvement in corruption (Hanlon 2000).
13 Interview conducted on 18 May 2017 in Maputo with civil society member.
14 Interview conducted on 06 June 2017 in Maputo with researcher and lecturer at institution of higher education.
15 Interview conducted on 30 May 2017 in Maputo with researcher and lecturer at Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE), a research institution or an independent CSO respectively. Whilst the CIP focuses on issues of public integrity, the fight against corruption, public financing, the extractive industries, elections and related issues,19 the IESE focuses on three topical areas: economics and development, poverty and social protection, and citizenship and governance,20 and is thus more relevant to the processes explored in this article.
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19 “Control over the civil society space has tightened particularly after the 2014 elections (Ilal et al. 2014; Klebl, Munk 2016). However, interviewees also reported that this has started changing and more space is opening up again.”

Exceptions that numerous interviewees and people consulted in this process have mentioned are the IESE and Centro de Integridade Pública (Center for Public Integrity, CIP), who describe themselves as an independent research institution or an independent CSO respectively. Whilst the CIP focuses on issues of public integrity, the fight against corruption, public financing, the extractive industries, elections and related issues,22 the IESE focuses on three topical areas: economics and development, poverty and social protection, and citizenship and governance,23 and is thus more relevant to the processes explored in this article.

IESE was launched in 2007 and is considered, at least in some aspects, to be the (institutional and ideological)24 successor of the Marxist Centre for African Studies (1976–1990) at UEM (Fernandes forthcoming). Whilst the Centre still exists, it has no funding for conducting research, and rather provides an important platform for exchange among researchers, students and the public.25 The work of IESE has been described by Carlos Fernandes as being guided by a political morality, a focus on a political economy perspective, and independence from the state, in their aim of providing critical research, informing public debate and providing analysis and commentary on political, economic, and societal issues and on Mozambique in the world (Ibid.). IESE fulfils an important role both in terms of advising government and in stimulating and informing public debate about current issues (Ibid.) which, as mentioned above, has put its researchers on the radar of political interference and suppression. As Carlos Fernandes puts it, “organisations like IESE occupy an ambiguous position between the market and the state” (Ibid: 27).

Secondly, when there is space for critical questions in research, there is not necessarily space for open debate on the same topics in the public realm, which could involve stakeholders beyond a limited group of academics or civil society representatives. As one interviewee stated, “the space is there. I mean we can ask questions and we have been asking questions actually. But the problem is that there is no kind of public debate on that. […] and one could imagine there could be a kind of space where you can really discuss, especially..."
with policy makers as well. And there is no space for that because from my point of view they decided to close the space. It seems thus that despite the numerous invited spaces that government has created (Iial et al. 2014) that civil society still needs to play by the rules (Lorch and Bunk 2016). Lorch and Bunk have argued that the government needs to maintain an outward image of this kind as it is highly donor dependent: “It conveys the image of a functioning democracy to the international community by highlighting the involvement of civil society in social service delivery and policy formulation” (Lorch and Bunk 2016: 996). Be that as it may, these organisations through their presence and interaction in invited spaces are still a tangible and often one of the only ways for public participation and feedback (Lorch and Bunk 2016). In a variation of this argument, interviewees have suggested that academics and civil society can partake only in debates that do not touch on the core issues of power and governance, but rather on ‘technical’ and service delivery topics such as education or health.

Thus, the first hurdle to knowledge production and research dissemination is the lack of incentives provided by universities and higher education institutions. The second hurdle is that critical voices have limited space to emerge and partake in public debates on specific issues, especially those that centre on some of the core functions and structures of government, such as questions of decentralisation viewed from a political or at least conflict-resolution point of view. These dynamics arguably have two important consequences.

“Pro-Mozambique Civil Society and Academics: Are the Same Thing”

A widespread phenomenon that emerges out of these dynamics is that many researchers have at least two jobs: they are lecturers at university and researchers at non-governmental organisations or CSOs. Some also hold positions as researchers and part-time teachers at the same institution. Whilst many CSOs are funded by foreign donors, some receive funding that enables their independence and critical research and others have funding that enables research focused mostly on fulfilling the knowledge and practical needs of the donor. As a consequence, “in Mozambique civil society and scholars are almost the same thing: you cannot differentiate civil society from (a) professor” at a public university (Wangenge-Ouma et al. 2015: 135).

This occupation of multiple spaces brings with it various consequences. On the one side, the role of being an academic increases the legitimacy of a civil society voice or a researcher – a dynamic that seems to be used and enforced by the media: “when they come as civil society, they come as civil society. But when it is reported on in the newspaper or the media, they are portrayed as scholars, as academics. It’s like ‘According to academics’ on a meeting organised by civil society, ‘the academics are saying this.’” In turn, scholars also draw legitimacy from being university lecturers. Consequently, the existence of these dual roles, and the utilisation of different social and professional spaces for knowledge production and dissemination, are important aspects of a mutual legitimisation process between universities, civil society research institutions and their respective staff. In addition, the government draws on university scholars for local consultancies, providing them with the possibility of participating in and influencing policy-making processes. Researchers have thus been involved in the peace process as well as various related policy areas as consultants, advisors, or even as mediators and negotiators, expanding their role configuration from a dual space to one where they occupy at least three functions: researcher, teacher/lecturer, and consultant/advisor. It thus seems that scholars need all three of these spaces and roles to be able to maximise their influence in the public sphere.

Whilst some perceive the interlinkages and coalition between scholarship and civil society as a strength, others perceive it as a potential pitfall. As one interviewee described, “academics come in their role in a diluted manner. In a sense of, when they are invited by churches to talk and discuss, or by CSOs, they [do] not by themselves play their role, they always play their role with other stakeholders. That’s why it’s diluted.” Thus, whilst in some cases this collaboration strengthens voice and legitimacy, in others this dilution of scholarship seems to further contribute to the lack of academic autonomy in the country which is driven by the limited space for critical questions and debates outlined above. In addition, there is, at least in some cases, the side-effect that funding for research is donor-driven, which makes it dependent on donors’ agendas, and thus “if you want to really have your project funded you must find something, a topic, that is also interesting to fund as the donor” (also see Ilal et al. 2014). Again, this donor influence over recipients’ research agendas seems to be more pronounced for some recipients than for others. Interestingly, donors are less likely to fund research for institutions associated with UEM, due to its being a state institution and thus perceived as being incapable of conducting independent research. Instead, donors choose to fund civil society-based research institutions where, in a considerable number of cases, the same people are employed as at the university. Donors thus contribute actively to taking research and knowledge production out of the university and into civil society spaces, albeit the fact that those who conduct the research remain engaged in, and dependent on, both spaces.

On the other side control over foreign-funded organisations in Mozambique through bureaucratic regulations and informal means has its limitations due to the high degree of government dependence on donor funding (Lorch and Bunk 2016) and the strong positions donors thus find themselves in.

It seems thus that a combination of insufficient funding at universities, low pay in different research functions, and active political and physical repression of critical voices has led to scholars taking agency in preserving their voice, at least within what is politically possible, by taking their research
responsibilities outside of the realm of direct influence of the government, whilst being able to preserve their standing and voice through their affiliation with universities.

**The Depoliticisation of Political Questions**

The second consequence is a depoliticisation of crucial, inherently political questions, in order to be able to forego political influencing and threats of repression. One interviewee reported his concern, as “we are not really linking the process of decentralisation and peace and conflict. [...] As I see, the process is very much [treated as] technical. Of course it is important to be technical, but more important from my point of view is to capture the political dimension, the historical dimension. The past matters in this case. [...] The discussion of decentralisation is actually also the discussion of state building dimension, the historical dimension. The past matters in this case. [...] The process is very much [...] technical. But then you have to link them. And then link it to the whole process of peace and conflict.”32 This shows a clear concern over the depoliticisation of what are highly political issues.

This depoliticisation process is exacerbated where research agendas are driven by donor requirements, since “donors very often look at the process [of decentralisation] as much more technical rather than political issue, and the argument is that they can’t interfere in political issues because this is much more reserved, let’s say to the Mozambicans, and our role here is just to give a kind of technical assistance.”33 Besides the depoliticisation, donors focus more on gaining legitimacy and political support through the models they put forward based on the evidence they generate, than on the implementability or suitability of these models to specific contexts and scenarios, thus also limiting the space for open-ended learning (Stepputat 2012). As has been shown by Shivji (2007), NGO-driven research tends to be project-focused and issue-based and often it does not allow for long-term research into basic questions. This thus professes a bias against developing theory, as in “the African setting in particular, whatever is left of critical intellectual discourse, largely located in the universities, runs parallel to and is divorced from NGO activism. The requirements of funding agencies subtly discourage, if not exhibit outright hostility to, a historical, social and theoretical understanding of development, poverty and discrimination” (Shivji 2007: 36). It is also a supply-driven rather than a demand-driven approach (Ilal et al. 2014).34 As Thandika Mkandawire points out, this might also explain some of the lack of journal publishing coming from the African continent: the aid establishment today commands much of the intellectual resources devoted to development through its own research agenda, through the consultancy industry and through its selective support of research programs and epistemic communities in developing countries. The reward system that the aid establishment has therefore defined favors the overlap between academia and civil society, and the limited range of questions that can be asked in a restrictive political context (or which are deemed of interest by donors) create an epistemic dependency and impose rather limited boundaries on knowledge production processes. It is an example and product of global and domestic politics of knowledge production in the fields of development and peacebuilding and risks depriving a country like Mozambique of a bigger variety of independent scholarship. However, as O’Loughlin (2014) highlights, there is “a long Mozambican tradition of vigorous and informed political critique under difficult and hostile circumstances.” The creative and strategic ways in which scholars and researchers occupy different spaces for different knowledge production functions is an indication thereof.

**Conclusion**

The dynamics and processes outlined above can and do have potentially positive and negative influences on the scholarship produced in Mozambique with regards especially to political questions that are highly relevant to the country’s current challenges. On the one side, a shift of research to donor-funded institutions has certain implications for the type of research that is being conducted and the type of questions that are asked. The limited options that NGO-driven research offers can arguably contribute to African scholarship’s continued role of providing instrumental knowledge, particularly through case studies, rather than theory making (Odoom, Andrews 2018). Two exceptions seem to exist in the Mozambican context in this regard: the CIP and IEESE, which have, at least to some extent, managed to carve out spaces of independence both from donor agendas and political interference. However, the fact that there are only two such institutions is a clear indication of the limitations that exist in Mozambique for conducting critical, independent research on contemporary political issues.

On the other side, the depoliticisation of clearly political questions is one way for researchers to continue to be able to partake in these critical debates at all. But, besides being a chosen strategy and thus an expression of agency, it is – in the case of donor-influenced organisations – also a side-effect of having to conduct research through non-governmental institutions which have different interests and modus operandi than universities.

Knowledge on issues related to peace and conflict, or decentralisation, is produced through Mozambican universities only in fairly limited ways. Rather, it is being produced, by Mozambican researchers at civil society research institutions within the country or by foreign and Mozambican researchers at institutions and universities abroad.

Mkandawire (2011: 15) has stated that “one thing that has made Africa so opaque has been the severe restrictions that have been imposed on the research communities in Africa, both in terms of material infrastructure and academic freedom.” The above analysis seems to confirm this broader analysis of the problems that African scholarship faces. Through financial dependency, the overlap between academia and civil society, and the limited range of questions that can be asked in a restrictive political context (or which are deemed of interest by donors) create an epistemic dependency and impose rather limited boundaries on knowledge production processes. It is an example and product of global and domestic politics of knowledge production in the fields of development and peacebuilding and risks depriving a country like Mozambique of a bigger variety of independent scholarship. However, as O’Loughlin (2014) highlights, there is “a long Mozambican tradition of vigorous and informed political critique under difficult and hostile circumstances.” The creative and strategic ways in which scholars and researchers occupy different spaces for different knowledge production functions is an indication thereof.
In summary, however, it seems that Mozambican researchers occupy multiple spaces in order to strategically maximise their influence and options for participation in public debates that are relevant to the future of the country. Being associated with CSOS, such as NGOs, foundations, religious institutions, allows them some political manoeuvring space and provides them with the space and funding to conduct research. It also gives them a platform for participating in public debates. Their functions as academics or university lecturers are important sources of legitimacy towards the public and the government, who recruits them as consultants. It also enables them to disseminate their knowledge and findings to potential future academics, leaders or activists. Their role as consultants or advisors are important entry points for partaking in and influencing policy-making processes – albeit under constraints.

Thus, whilst the lack of financial support and incentives, as well as the limited space for critical voices, drives research to donor-funded (albeit not always donor-influenced) institutions, researchers and scholars take agency in their employment choices that enable them to preserve space for critique, participation, and dissemination through their different engagements. As Olufemi Taiwo states for knowledge as for any other product, “production is a precondition for consumption” and thus if scholars in this particular political context want to be able to produce knowledge for consumption by, amongst others, policy makers and the public, they need to create the space for this production. They do so by exercising their agency and occupying multiple spaces of knowledge production and dissemination in strategic ways.

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