CONDUCTING CONFLICT ASSESSMENTS: GUIDANCE NOTES
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoSL</td>
<td>Government of Sri Lanka</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoU</td>
<td>Government of Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lords Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>Strategic Conflict Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprises</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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FOREWORD

This booklet aims to provide staff at the Department for International Development (DFID) and partner bilateral and multilateral agencies with a resource to help:

- analyse conflict;
- better assess conflict related risks associated with development or humanitarian assistance;
- and develop options for more conflict sensitive policies and programmes.

A methodology is presented for conflict assessment at the country or regional level, termed ‘Strategic Conflict Assessment’. It is based on DFID’s experience in conducting Strategic Conflict Assessments in seven countries. A separate synthesis report, summarising findings of these assessments, is also available from DFID.

The principal authors of these guidance notes are Jonathan Goodhand, Tony Vaux and Robert Walker. Many people provided advice and support during the course of this work and it is not possible to mention them all. However special thanks are due to the following: Debi Duncan who was responsible for leading the project within DFID and who provided vital support throughout the process; Jo Boyden, Mark Hoffman, Peter Oakely, Brian Pratt and Michael Warner who were involved in the advisory group and commented on earlier drafts of this document.

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January 2002
The objective of conducting conflict assessments is to improve the effectiveness of development policy and programmes in contributing to conflict prevention and reduction. Conflict assessments can be used to assess:

- risks of negative effects of conflict on programmes;
- risks of programmes or policies exacerbating conflict;
- opportunities to improve the effectiveness of development interventions in contributing to conflict prevention and reduction.

Conflict assessment can focus on individual projects and programmes or at a strategic level to focus on a country or region. Strategic conflict assessments have now been conducted by DFID in seven countries. In each country, the approach has been to map out the conflict and current responses to it and to identify future policy and programme options. Conducting a country level conflict assessment has been a valuable means of developing more strategic approaches for contributing to conflict reduction, in collaboration with other actors.

The accompanying booklet to this guide, ‘Conducting Conflict Assessments: An Introduction’, sets out the background to DFID’s conflict assessment work. It considers the links between poverty and conflict, the role of conflict assessments and when DFID may consider conducting them. This guide describes in more detail the methodology that has been used in the conflict assessments.
THE METHODOLOGY

There have been 3 key stages in the strategic conflict assessments conducted by DFID to date:

1. Analysis of the conflict
2. Analysis of international responses to the conflict
3. Development of strategies and options

Sections 1 to 3 of this guide describe the methodology for each of these stages. The approach is summarized below.

THE THREE KEY STAGES OF CONFLICT ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage A</th>
<th>Conflict Analysis</th>
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<tr>
<td>Analysis of:</td>
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<td>Structures</td>
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<td>Actors</td>
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<td>Dynamics</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Stage B</th>
<th>Analysis of Responses</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Mapping external responses</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Mapping development policies and programmes</td>
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<td>• Assessing impacts on conflict and peace</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Stage C</th>
<th>Strategies/Options</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Influencing other responses to conflict</td>
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<td>• Developing/refining DFID policy and programme approaches</td>
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The purpose of conducting the assessments has been to develop a strategy for DFID, working with other organisations, to better respond to a particular conflict situation. The immediate output in each case has been a Strategic Conflict Assessment Report, (SCA). An example of an SCA Report is presented in summary form in Annex 2.
A FLEXIBLE METHODOLOGY

The methodology in the following sections presents guiding principles for conducting an SCA. It should not be viewed as a standardised formula:

Adapt according to the needs and objectives of the end user. Generic conflict assessments may have limited value if they are not linked to the capacities and needs of the end user. Conflict assessments should be customised according to the particular activities of an individual donor – for example is it being conducted for early warning and preventative action, ongoing monitoring, impact assessment, or sectoral programming?

Develop according to the nature and phase of the conflict. The value of conflict analysis from a development donor perspective is likely to vary according to (1) the phase of the conflict and (2) the capacity of donors to influence the trajectory of the conflict. Where the conflict is still at an early stage; and where aid donors are significant actors with some leverage over the conflicting parties, a rigorous conflict analysis could help aid donors work ‘on conflict’. However, where violent conflict has become protracted and aid resources are relatively insignificant, conflict assessment may be most useful in terms of assisting aid donors to be more sensitive to conflict dynamics and enabling them to work more effectively ‘in conflict’.

Develop dynamic forms of analysis. Whereas the standard contextual analysis found in donor country profiles focuses on structural factors, conflict analysis should involve a more ‘dynamic profiling’ of a context with a particular focus on actors, incentives and triggers for violent conflict. The added value lies less in the information gathering than in the analysis, interpretation and prediction of conflict trends. This is not an exact science and never will be – there is no substitute for skilled regional specialists and analysts. One should also be realistic about its predictive powers; at best it is about identifying plausible possibilities.

Encourage ‘joined-up’ analysis. Although analysis is done by different actors and at different locations and levels within the aid system, it rarely seems to reach the right places to influence policy and practice. In Sri Lanka for instance, a range of development and non development actors have conducted conflict analysis, but this has not led to a shared analysis amongst the international community or common strategies in response to the conflict. Shared analysis is therefore a prerequisite for the development of coherent responses.
CONCEPTUAL BASIS

Most conflicts and protracted political crises today do not occur between sovereign states but are of an internal or regionalised type. Of the 27 major armed conflicts that occurred in 1999, all but two took place within national boundaries (Collier, 2000). There are a number of different theoretical frameworks for analysing contemporary conflicts. This guide is based upon a multidisciplinary approach which uses a number of different analytical ‘lenses’ to examine and develop responses to violent conflict.

- Important recent advances in the understanding of conflict come from the ‘political economy’ approach. This focuses on the political and economic interests of those engaged in conflict and draws attention to those who might see an advantage in using conflict for their own ends. If the political economy of war brings opportunities, there will be strong interests in perpetuating and managing war for purposes of personal gain. Interventions which ignore these interests risk fuelling the conflict.

- The above approach has been developed into an analysis of the causes of war in terms of ‘greed’ (meaning opportunities for predatory accumulation) and ‘grievance’ (meaning the negative reactions of those who are disadvantaged). While the greed and grievance framework usefully highlights economic agendas in war, it is only one of a number of ways of looking at conflict and should be complemented by other analytical lens, in particular social, anthropological and gender analysis.

- Comprehensive conflict analysis should combine an analysis of structures and actors and how the two interact with one another. Structural analysis focuses on the institutions (political, economic, social and military) which may predispose a country to violent conflict. Actor oriented analysis involves a ‘fine grained’ analysis of individual incentives and motivations. Conflicts are about perceptions and the meanings that people attribute to events, institutions, policies and appeals for public support.

1 See Collier (2000). The use of the terms ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ should not be taken to imply any wider agreement with Collier’s analysis but simply that they are convenient labels for a political economy approach.
• Contemporary conflicts are complex and multi-leveled. Often we are talking about several conflicts that have become entwined with one another and which may be part of a regionalised conflict system. Analysis therefore needs to encompass the international/regional, national and local dimensions of conflict.

• Finally, the notion that the ‘beginning’ and ‘end’ of a conflict can be identified is inappropriate in contemporary conflicts. Conflict is a dynamic social process in which the original structural tensions are themselves profoundly reshaped by the massive disruptions of war. Therefore ‘root causes’ may become decreasingly relevant in protracted conflicts which have led to the transformation of the state and society.

Underpinning the conflict assessment methodology, therefore, is the supposition that there is no single explanatory framework for looking at such complex conflict systems and the challenge is to blend different conceptual elements. The conflict assessment methodology used in these guidelines attempts to do this by systematically analysing the structures, actors and dynamics of conflict using a multidisciplinary approach.

Developing effective responses to such conflicts needs to be based on a rigorous and systematic prognosis. Development instruments may be well placed to address a number of the structural factors that increase risks of conflict such as bad governance or increasing economic inequalities. But development assistance is just one lever. There is a need to develop comprehensive and coherent approaches, which link development assistance to other policy instruments. Conflict assessments will therefore be most effective when conducted by development and other actors in collaboration.
1. CONFLICT ANALYSIS

The aim of Conflict Analysis is to better understand the historical and structural antecedents of violent conflict and to better understand what converts latent conflict into open conflict or intensifies existing open conflict. The methodology, in conflict assessments conducted to date, has focused on analysis of conflict structures, actors and dynamics. Although for analytical purposes it is useful to divide analysis into these three areas, in reality they are closely inter-linked and should be viewed holistically.

Steps in conducting a Conflict Analysis are summarised in Table 1. As for each stage of the methodology, a set of approaches which have been found useful are presented. This is not intended to be prescriptive and should be seen as tools and frameworks that can be adapted as required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1: CONFLICT ANALYSIS</th>
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<tr>
<td>(i) Structures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Analysis of long term factors underlying conflict:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Political</td>
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<td>• Economic</td>
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<td>• Social</td>
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</table>
1.1 STRUCTURES

The first step has been to analyse the long term factors underlying violent conflict in order to make an assessment of a country’s vulnerability to outbreak or intensification of conflict. This involves identifying the key sources of tension that have led to, or are likely to lead to, open conflict.

Useful approaches have included:

➔ Compiling a broad contextual analysis including history of the conflict to date and physical and demographic features relevant to conflict analysis.

This information can be derived mainly from a desk study of relevant reports and documents. Example of key sources include: UNDP Human Development Report, reports of policy and research organisations (eg International Crisis Group, Economist Intelligence Unit), academic literature, websites, NGO reports, FCO briefings, media reports etc. (See Annex 4 for list of useful contacts and websites)

➔ Mapping out and weighting, in terms of relative importance, the sources of tension and conflict.

The analytical process is to divide these into security, political, economic and social sectors as well as by international, regional, national and local levels. Table 2 lists examples of potential sources of tension in these sectors.

➔ Identifying the linkages and connections between sources of tension in different sectors and levels.

➔ Developing, based on the above, an initial judgement of the key sources of conflict and tension. For example, inter-state tensions, failure of governance, growing exclusion.

An example of a structural analysis of conflict for Kyrgyzstan is provided in summary form in Section 2 of Annex 2.

Key pointers:
The analysis should be based on the collection of a wide range of views about sources of conflict. Conflict can rarely be understood in terms of one simple cause. It is usually the result of complex combinations of factors. The value of the analysis is in the process of recognising connections and overlaps between sources of tension in different sectors and at different levels.
### TABLE 2: EXAMPLES OF SOURCES OF TENSION AND CONFLICT

**SECURITY**
- Security forces have limited capacity and are weakly controlled
- Human rights abuses from security forces/armed groups
- High levels of military spending
- Presence of non state military actors
- Poorly controlled(contested borders
- Unstable regional/international context (e.g. political changes in neighbouring countries)
- Legacy of past conflict
- Proliferation of light weapons

**POLITICAL**
- Weakly institutionalised/unrepresentative political system
- Lack of independent judiciary
- Lack of independent media and civil society
- Corruption
- Weak political parties
- Lack of popular participation, and gender imbalance, in political and governance processes
- Flawed election processes
- Political exploitation of ethnic/religious differences
- Systems for managing conflict weakly developed
- Weak and uncoordinated international engagement
- Destabilising role by diaspora populations

**ECONOMIC**
- Economic decline: trends in poverty, unemployment, inflation, food security, access to social welfare.
- Widening economic disparities – growing Gini coefficient - based on regional or ethnic divisions
- Macro economic instability
- Shift to destabilising external investment patterns or destabilizing international economic policies
- Increasing competition over shared resources
- Growth in black and parallel economies
- Development of war economy

**SOCIAL**
- Social exclusion
- Legacy of unresolved ethnic conflict
- Absence of cross cutting social and civil society organisations
- Tensions over language, religion, ethnicity
- Failure of dispute resolution mechanisms/ decreasing legitimacy of customary authorities
1.2 ACTORS

The next step has been to pinpoint critical actors who influence or who are affected by conflict. This complements the structural analysis – which looks at the long term factors underlying violent conflict – with an actor-oriented analysis focused on the shorter term incentives and interests which often cause latent conflict to become open conflict.

Useful approaches have included:

➔ Mapping out international and local conflict actors: list all relevant actors who can significantly influence conflict or are most vulnerable to it.

➔ Analysing, for each of the actors:
  • **Interests**: what interests do they have in relation to the conflict and how do these interests influence the conflict?
  • **Relations**: what are the relationships between the various actors?
  • **Capacities**: what capacities do they have to influence conflict either positively or negatively?
  • **Peace Agendas**: do they have an interest in peace? What kind of peace do they want?
  • **Incentives**: what kind of incentives could be offered for them to choose peace? Or disincentives to engage with violence?

Box 1 provides an example of an analysis of conflict actors in the Ferghana Valley area of Kyrgyzstan.

**Key pointers:**
Examples of relevant actors to consider include: traditional and community leaders, refugee and displaced communities, local NGOs, local media, religious groups, trade unions, student groups, criminal organisations and networks, security forces, armed groups, local and national political leaders, prominent civil servants, businesses, conflict mediators, diaspora, neighboring governments, donors governments, other interested governments, intergovernmental organisations, transnational corporations, humanitarian and human rights organizations, etc.

There are a range of methods which can be useful in analysing actors, including participatory community assessments, expert workshops, individual interviews and consultations. A visual mapping can be useful in initially trying to understand the relations between different actors, for example those who are allied or opposed, those who have shared interests.
BOX 1: LOCAL CONFLICT ACTORS IN THE FERGHANA VALLEY, KYRGYZSTAN

**Post-Soviet Elites:** Despite the democratic reforms of the post-Soviet era, officials from that time have been successful in retaining much of their former power and have developed sophisticated mechanisms for using the state apparatus for their own gains. In particular they have been successful in directing the benefits of development projects to their own advantage. Because the reform process is exclusive there are risks of alienating ethnic minorities as well as creating general ‘grievance’ in society.

**Drug Traders:** Although the region is poor, spectacular wealth can be made in the drugs trade from Afghanistan. This acts as a magnet for young men who otherwise have very little hope of employment. The trade results in the spread of weapons and violence. It also leads to an increase in drug addiction and more crime by drug addicts. If outside forces attempted to suppress the trade there could be a violent reaction.

**Religious Fundamentalists:** There is widespread depression, especially among young men, because of the economic situation. Many are turning to fundamentalist religion. This might act as a safety valve except that in neighbouring Uzbekistan and widely throughout the region, Islamic Fundamentalists have been viewed as opposition to state power and potentially dangerous. Russian and US perceptions could lead to the suppression of such groups and this could trigger violent popular reactions.

**Military and Police:** The huge imbalance between Kyrgyzstan’s weak military and Uzbekistan’s much larger forces could lead to border incursions. There are already strong tensions over the sharing of resources, notably water and energy. At a more local level, the police offer little help in resolving tensions but often exacerbate them by corrupt practices. Along with a corrupt judiciary, these factors mean that the state has lost its ability to mediate.

**General Public:** Although conditions may not be much worse that in other poor countries, the people of this region had been used to high levels of employment and very good health and education services until recently. The memory of lost happiness exacerbates the sense of grievance and could become the ‘fuel’ on which a conflict is created by those with an interest in doing so. Grievance could be directed against the state, or more probably against vulnerable ethnic minorities.

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2 This is a summary to illustrate aspects of the analysis rather than the comprehensive analysis of actors.
1.3 DYNAMICS

Based on the analysis of structures and actors, it should be possible to list relevant precursors of conflicts. The next step has been to assess the likelihood for conflict to increase, decrease or remain stable. The longer term trends and shorter term triggers which might cause conflict to happen or alter its course are investigated. Based on this, prediction of future conflict scenarios can be attempted.

Useful approaches have included:

➔ Analysing the longer term trends: i.e. are tensions increasing or decreasing?
➔ Assessing the likely shorter term triggers which may lead to the outbreak or escalation of conflict.
➔ Assessing which factors are likely to accelerate or slow conflict dynamics: this includes identifying institutions or processes that can mitigate or manage the tensions and conflicts identified so far.

Examples include cross cutting institutions (such as multi-ethnic religious organisations) that play a mediating role, independent media able to present a plurality of views, continued public confidence in the judicial process etc.

➔ Thinking through a range of potential future conflict scenarios:
   • Review the analysis of actors, structures and dynamics to develop potential scenarios.
   • Describe the indicators that will define these different scenarios and the assumptions they are based on.
   • Make a judgement on which scenarios are most likely and on which planning of future strategies should be based.

Box 2 provides an example of assessment of conflict triggers in Moldova. Table 3 provides an example of analysis of conflict scenarios for northern Uganda.

Key pointers:
It is difficult to predict the onset or escalation of particular conflicts. Structural tensions do not by themselves lead to conflict. The SCAs conducted to date indicate that critical is the interaction between three factors:
1. A society’s **structural vulnerability** to violent conflict: as mapped out in the structural analysis.

2. The **opportunity to benefit from instability and violence** by elite groups: this includes political benefits as well as pursuit of economic agendas.

3. A society’s **capacity to manage or contain conflict**. Weak states lack the resources to contain conflict and are less likely to compromise or address the grievance of disaffected groups. Institutions that might play a mediating role either lack capacity or deliberately marginalise certain groups.

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**BOX 2: CONFLICT TRIGGERS IN MOLDOVA**

**Elections**: election campaigning tends to throw rational discourse to the wind; the more the economic decline, the higher the stakes of winning political power.

**Implementation of the new budgetary rules for local government structures** requiring balanced budgets and evidence of greater efficiencies: could provide an opportunity for rebellion by wealthier areas (for example, Soroca) or poorer areas (for example, Gagauzia), and for the mobilisation of a coalition of regions in opposition to Chisinau (for example, Transnistria, Gagauzia, Balti), for example, for a constitutional change that would polarise Moldovan society.

**Chechen refugees**: Although their numbers are small (64 case files in February 2000, about 145 known), their presence has already polarised the public on issues of citizenship, refugees, separatism, xenophobic attitudes (toward Chechens, Russians, etc.). This could coalesce with a dispute over language rights and discrimination.

**Land privatisation**: Violence has already erupted locally over land disputes, for example, conflict between a local mayor and local head of a collective farm (kolkhoz) led to violence.

**Adoption of Schengen rules on the Romanian border**: accession talks with the EU will require conformity with Schengen rules, leading to visas and border closings with Moldova and a possible panic (exacerbated by mass media presentation) and population movements.

**Withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria**: unlikely, in light of current Russian intentions to replace them with Russian peacekeeping troops.

**A major corruption scandal** that confirms popular suspicions and rumours, further increasing frustration at levels of official corruption, penetration of organised crime in the structures of power, and economic deprivation over the level of popular tolerance.
### TABLE 3: CONFLICT SCENARIOS IN UGANDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Possible benchmarks or indicators</th>
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| 1. Intensified and prolonged conflict | Sustained periods of insecurity in Kitgum and/or Gulu districts one or both districts with frequent and numerous low intensity incidents and increasing numbers of prominent incidents. | • Lords Resistance Army (LRA) attacks on key installations including major military and strategic targets; cutting of major transport routes; sustained attacks in/around district capitals/major trading centres  
• Increased numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in major centres  
• Increasing evidence of further Govt. of Sudan (GoS) backing for the Lords Resistance Army  
• Increasingly ‘hard line’ statements from Govt. of Uganda (GoU) re their position  
• Ugandan army engagements within southern Sudan and/or use by GoS of airpower in northern Uganda. |
| 2. Continued cyclical conflict         | Periods of insecurity followed by periods of quiet during which transport routes secure and IDPs are able to spend considerable amounts of time at their homesteads. | • Mixed messages from GoU re the possibility of a peaceful settlement  
• Little or no evidence of a change in LRA rhetoric or positioning |
| 3. Conciliatory moves                  | Positive statement made by both the LRA and GoU – some evidence that substantive contacts are ongoing, possibly through a third party. Some evidence that GoS is willing to at least allow the process to proceed. | • Gestures by the LRA i.e. release of some children  
• Evidence of increasing frequency/depth of contacts through negotiations between GoU, LRA and possibly GoS  
• Evidence of sanction of senior figures in the GoU and LRA leadership of processes |
| 4. Negotiation                        | Serious contacts/negotiation underway involving senior representatives of GoU and LRA – possible GoS involvement. | • Evidence that issues of concern to both sides are being seriously addressed  
• Increasing involvement of technical experts to help address specific modalities of an agreement  
• Growing confidence in process amongst traditional/religious and political leaders (including those normally sceptical) |
| 5. Transition                         | Peace process under implementation (6-12 months). Some form of weapons decommissioning taking place. | • Combatants returning from ‘bush’ in increasing numbers - more commanders and hard core fighters emerging as confidence grows in the process  
• Independent verification that, over a period of time, most ex combatants being accepted back into their communities  
• No or few reports of ex combatants being picked up/harassed by the authorities (particularly key individuals) |

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3 Extracted from analysis of conflict scenarios in conflict assessment conducted by DFID East Africa in Northern Uganda in July 1999.
2. ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

The second stage of the SCA process has been to consider the role of development interventions and other international responses. International actors and policies are integral to conflict processes and consideration of them should be included in the steps of Conflict Analysis described above. The aim here is to build on this analysis to investigate in further detail the response of external actors across a number of areas. This provides the context within which to then focus on the role of development interventions and their interaction with conflict.

The methodology has involved:

- Mapping responses of international actors
- Analysing role of development actors
- Assessing the interactions between development interventions and the dynamics of conflict and peace

The approach is summarised in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(i) International actors</th>
<th>(ii) Development actors</th>
<th>(iii) Interactions between development interventions and conflict</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Map interests and policies of international actors:</td>
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<td>Military/security</td>
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<td>Diplomatic</td>
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<td>Trade</td>
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<td>Immigration</td>
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<td>Development</td>
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<td>Assess level of coherence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Analyse impacts on conflict dynamics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Map magnitude and focus of development policy/programmes</td>
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<td>Analyse development actors’ approaches to conflict:</td>
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<td>in, on or around?</td>
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<td>Assess capacities to work effectively ‘in’ and ‘on’ conflict</td>
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<td>Assess impact of conflict on development policy and programmes</td>
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<td>Assess impact of development interventions on dynamics of conflict and peace</td>
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2.1 INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

The first step has been to look in more depth at the current responses of the international community (donor countries, other interested countries, regional and international organisations) to assess how they interact with the dynamics of conflict and the potential for more effective, coherent or co-ordinated approaches.

Useful approaches have included:

➔ Mapping the interests and policy objectives/instruments of international actors across the following areas:
  • Military/ security
  • Diplomatic
  • Trade
  • Immigration
  • Development

➔ Analysing the level of coherence and complementarity of these responses – within individual actors and between different actors.

➔ Assessing how these responses interact with the dynamics of conflict.

Table 5 provides an example of mapping of the policy objectives and instruments of donor governments in Sri Lanka. It is not an exhaustive list but shows some of the existing interests and policies of donors. It illustrates a lack of coherence between some policies. For example, promoting sales of military equipment at the same time as an interest in a political settlement to the conflict.

Key pointers:
The SCAs conducted to date have emphasised the multi-dimensional nature of violent conflict. This points to the need for systematic, comprehensive and coherent responses. Development assistance is just one of a number of levers that can be used and is usually not the primary lever. There appears to be considerable scope to address conflict dynamics more effectively if different policy instruments are applied in a coherent and co-ordinated fashion. International policies often undercut one another and undermine the effectiveness of conflict prevention or conflict resolution interventions. For example, there is not always coherence between the objectives of foreign policy, trade and international aid. A critical challenge therefore is to develop greater complementarity between a range of policy instruments.
### TABLE 5: DONOR GOVERNMENT POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND CONCERNS IN SRI LANKA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERESTS &amp; CONCERNS</th>
<th>FOREIGN AFFAIRS</th>
<th>TRADE &amp; INVESTMENT</th>
<th>IMMIGRATION &amp; REFUGEES</th>
<th>HUMAN RIGHTS</th>
<th>DEVELOPMENT</th>
<th>CO-OPERATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political settlement to the conflict within a united Sri Lanka</td>
<td>• Trade relations – exports &amp; imports</td>
<td>• Preventing outflows of refugees</td>
<td>• Promoting respect for international human rights and international humanitarian law</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional security</td>
<td>• Open economy</td>
<td>• Combating terrorism</td>
<td>• Combating human trafficking</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combating terrorism</td>
<td>• Investment opportunities</td>
<td>• Combating illegal activities by transnational networks and diaspora communities eg. arms, drugs, money laundering</td>
<td>• Combating trafficking</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combating illegal activities by transnational networks and diaspora communities eg. arms, drugs, money laundering</td>
<td>• Private sector support, e.g. SME development</td>
<td>• Immigration agreements and border controls</td>
<td>• Monitoring respect for rights</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICIES</td>
<td>First track’ diplomacy eg. Norway and India</td>
<td>• Foreign direct investment</td>
<td>• Bi-lateral agreements with GoSL on immigration</td>
<td>• Advocacy eg. EU statements</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support for ‘Second Track’ initiatives</td>
<td>• Support for liberalisation</td>
<td>• International legal frameworks</td>
<td>• Capacity building &amp; training eg. legal services, judiciary, security sector</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support for anti-terrorism measures eg. US support to GoSL</td>
<td>• Sales of military equipment</td>
<td>• Support for NGOs and aid agencies eg. ICRC, UNHCR, Amnesty International</td>
<td>• Development assistance to support good governance</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Military assistance /security sector training</td>
<td>• US and UK proscription of LTTE as terrorist organisation</td>
<td>• Support for ‘Second Track’ initiatives</td>
<td></td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• US and UK proscription of LTTE as terrorist organisation</td>
<td>• First track’ diplomacy eg. Norway and India</td>
<td>• First track’ diplomacy eg. Norway and India</td>
<td></td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(GoSL) Government of Sri Lanka. (LTTE) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
2.2 DEVELOPMENT ACTORS

The next step has been to analyse, within this context of broader international responses, the approach of key development actors to conflict. The aim is to assess capacity to respond to and potential for influencing conflict.

Useful approaches have included:

➔ Mapping the magnitude and focus of policies and programmes of development actors (bilaterals, multilaterals, international and local NGOs and Foundations).

➔ Analysing their approach to the conflict: assess in terms of whether they are ‘working around’, ‘working in’ or ‘working on’ conflict (see below).

➔ Assessing current capacities of development actors to work effectively ‘in’ and ‘on’ conflict:
   • Which donors are the most or least significant and what is their approach to conflict? What is the overall balance of aid – do most resource go on economic adjustment and liberalisation? What proportion is allocated to targeted poverty reduction or peacebuilding?
   • Which donors have conducted an explicit analysis of conflict, have staff trained in conflict analysis/peacebuilding approaches, or have staff allocated to this issue?
   • To what extent do donors have a shared analysis of conflict issues; to what extent are coordination mechanisms based on a shared analysis?
   • What are the gaps - in terms of coherence and co-ordination of responses to conflict?

➔ Assessing potential to influence conflict and peace dynamics:
   • How significant are overall levels of development funding in relation to other financial flows?
   • How receptive are conflict actors to external pressures?
   • To what extent are the sources of tension and conflict identified in the structural analysis, issues that development interventions can influence (e.g. poor governance, inequitable development patterns)?
**Key pointers:**

It is important to understand the aims and approaches of development actors in relation to conflict and their underlying assumptions about the relation between conflict and development interventions. Broadly three different approaches to conflict can be identified, each with its own set of assumptions and associated strategies:

- **Working around conflict:** treating conflict as an impediment or negative externality that is to be avoided.

- **Working in conflict:** recognising the links between programmes and conflict and making attempts to minimise conflict-related risks, so that development assistance ‘does no harm’.

- **Working on conflict:** conscious attempts to design policy and programmes with a primary focus on conflict prevention, management or resolution.

In the SCAs conducted to date, it was found that the main development actors had tended to work ‘around conflict’ and as a result, inadvertently exacerbated tensions or missed opportunities to mitigate or resolve conflicts.

### 2.3 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS AND THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT AND PEACE

Having analysed the current approaches of development actors towards the conflict, the next step has been to attempt to understand their actual and potential impact on the dynamics of conflict and peace, and the impact of conflict on development policies and programmes. The aim is to identify conflict related risks that need to be mitigated and opportunities for programmes/policies to better contribute to peacebuilding.

**Useful approaches have included:**

➔ Assessing the impact of conflict on development policy and programmes. Types of impact include:
• Macro level changes: for example, the shift from development assistance to humanitarian assistance.

• Changes in aid delivery: for example, donors increasingly rely on NGOs rather than government implementing partners.

• Changes in programming: for example, the adaptation or scaling down of operations, ‘hibernation’, or complete withdrawal.

➔ Assessing the **impact of development interventions on the dynamics of conflict**: The impacts of development policy and programmes at the macro and micro levels should be mapped. The approach is to make connections with the Conflict Analysis and consider whether development interventions have affected sources of tensions identified in the structural analysis; or affected incentives, capacities and relationships between warring groups identified in the actor analysis; or whether they have affected factors likely to accelerate or slow conflict identified in analysis of conflict dynamics.

**Examples of impact include:**

• Creating opportunities for ‘greed’ and fueling ‘grievance’: e.g. privatisation programmes which serve elite interests and generate conflict.

• Distributional effects: e.g. reinforcing regional disparities; privileging certain groups over others.

• Inadvertent impacts due to lack of wider contextual analysis: e.g. literacy programmes radicalising a population when not accompanied by a wider reform process.

• Fungibility of aid: e.g. freeing up resources for military spending; humanitarian intervention which feeds into the war economy.

• Delays in disbursement: leading to missed opportunities and resentment.

➔ Assessing the **impact of development interventions on the dynamics of peace**: In the same way as above, the impacts at both micro and macro level should be mapped.

**Box 3** provides an example of the interaction between latent conflict and a development programme in Kyrgyzstan.
**Key pointers:**

It is difficult to make definitive judgements of ‘impact’ on conflict and peace. The interactions between development interventions and conflict have been the subject of considerable recent research and debate. Further reading is recommended of Anderson (1999) and Leonhardt (2000). (See Annex 4 for full references).

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**BOX 3: EXAMPLE OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN LATENT CONFLICT AND A DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME IN KYRGYZSTAN**

General analysis in Kyrgyzstan revealed that the benefits of an agricultural extension project were mainly going to the local elite. But the conflict perspective pointed questions towards the issue of ethnicity. There had been serious ethnic clashes in the past. The Government was about to lift a moratorium on land sales and tension over land sales was expected to rise. Local political power had been ‘captured’ by an elite group which also controlled the judiciary. There were also border tensions and conflicts over resources which tended to fuel ethnic differences. The Conflict Assessment pointed out that some local persons might perceive a considerable gain to be made by causing conflict. The project tended to favour the political elite and marginalize the ethnic minority. Recommendations included the monitoring of the ethnic composition of projects in the area and the formulation of new projects which more directly reached the target groups.
3. DEVELOPING STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS

The final stage of the conflict assessment has been to identity strategies and options for conflict reduction and for ensuring that current development approaches are conflict sensitive.

The approach is summarised in Table 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 6: STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify possible strategies in terms of:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Developing common donor approaches to better respond to conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Developing conflict sensitive individual donor approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• adjusting current activities – to work ‘in’ or ‘on’ conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• developing new initiatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strategies and options should be based on an understanding of the structural sources and current phase of the conflict, internal and external actors’ interests and capacities, and the impact of development interventions on the dynamics of conflict and peace.

Two different sets of strategies can be identified. Firstly, ways in which development and other actors can develop a more co-ordinated and effective response to conflict. Secondly, individual agencies’ own strategies of working ‘in’ or ‘on’ conflict, based on the conflict assessment.

3.1 DEVELOPING COMMON DONOR APPROACHES

The analysis of conflict and response of international actors, described above, should help identify which actors and policy levers are most likely to have an influence on conflict dynamics. It should identify where there is lack of coherence or gaps in the external response (Section 2.1) and highlight the potential and capacity of development actors to influence conflict (Section 2.2). This can then inform donor strategy in terms of who to work with and who to influence. Critical issues are likely to include:
• Can common donor analyses and joint responses be developed or improved upon? How can coordination mechanisms be tightened? Can common security arrangements and grounds rules for working in and on conflict be established? Can joint or system wide evaluations be conducted to assess the impact and effectiveness of interventions?

• How to sensitise the donor policy environment to conflict issues? What opportunities are there to influence development actors such as the IMF, the EU and World Bank, who may be working around conflict? Can the sequencing and timing of policy prescriptions be adapted to take into account the conflict environment?

• What opportunities are there to work with international actors on external elements of the conflict, for instance with diaspora communities, international regulation of arms trafficking, etc.

• What opportunities are there for donors to develop greater complementarity between their own government departments (ie development, foreign, defence and trade ministries) in attempting to influence conflict dynamics?

• What conditions and incentives can jointly be applied by development actors in the interests of peace? E.g. smart sanctions, political conditionalities, reconstruction packages, etc.

• What opportunities are there for joint capacity building initiatives by donors – to strengthen capacity of local and international actors to respond more effectively to conflict?

3.2 DEVELOPING INDIVIDUAL DONOR STRATEGIES

As well as developing common approaches, donors conducting conflict assessment should focus on how their ongoing development programmes might be adapted to work more effectively in and on conflict and on developing new initiatives to respond more effectively to conflict.

ADJUSTING CURRENT ACTIVITIES

The analysis of interactions between conflict and development interventions (Section 2.3) should identify opportunities to mitigate risks of conflict undermining ongoing programmes or of programmes unintentionally exacerbating conflict dynamics. It may
also reveal opportunities to more effectively contribute to peacebuilding. There are a number of generic issues that should be considered by development agencies in better sensitising their approach to working in areas of latent or open conflict. These include:

- developing sound security procedures.
- reducing intergroup disparities or horizontal inequalities.
- developing a sensitivity to the distributional impacts of development interventions.
- balancing interventions which address short term incentives with those that target long term structural issues.
- limiting private incentives for leaders to accumulate ie. containing ‘greed’.
- better addressing poverty and the needs of particular disadvantaged groups i.e. targeting ‘grievance’.

DEVELOPING NEW INITIATIVES

In addition to the above, there are sector-specific interventions which should be considered in areas of latent or open conflict. To an extent, such interventions merely represent ‘good development practice’ combined with a heightened sensitivity to conflict and peace dynamics. Responses should be matched to contexts and in particular the phase of the conflict. Security sector reform for example may not be appropriate in the middle of a ‘hot’ conflict but should be prioritised in a post conflict scenario. The list below is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive:

SECURITY

- **Security sector reform**: measures to increase accountability to civilian democratic authorities and promote greater transparency of security sector expenditure; training security forces for their role in a democratic society, including respecting human rights and humanitarian law.

- **Addressing arms proliferation and re-integration of combatants**: control of small arms proliferation; demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants.

- **Rule of law and human rights**: protecting the rights of vulnerable and minority groups; community-based policing; sector wide strategies which reflect the interdependence of policing, courts and the penal system in the provision of security.
POLITICAL

- **Political and democratic reform**: promoting and assisting development of democratic institutions and processes (e.g. power sharing structures which enhance political participation of minority/marginalised groups, representative political parties); development of legal framework for minority protection; civil service reform focused on increasing impartiality and accessibility (e.g. strengthening representation of marginalized groups); anti-corruption measures.

- **Systems of justice**: support for an independent judiciary; development of models of accessible justice; legal literacy campaigns; strengthening legitimate customary dispute resolution systems; facilitating access to legal system for the marginalized; justice for victims of war and violence (e.g. truth commissions).

- **The media**: expanding use of media to provide objective information and influence attitudes and behaviour in favour of peace; development of legal framework for free media; support to development of independent media institutions.

- **Civil society**: supporting capacity of civil society groups to impact on public policy; support for civic/religious organisations encompassing political divisions.

ECONOMIC

- **Reducing economic imbalances and inequalities**: redressing regional inequalities; mitigating ethnic/social inequalities; create better economic opportunities for marginalized groups; poverty programmes which reach remote rural areas and regions experiencing chronic instability; support for local infrastructure, which connects remote areas to the market and increases access to state services.

- **Addressing war economies**: providing alternatives to conflict profiteers; reducing profits from war economy through strict controls; encouraging international business to behave responsibly.

- **Supporting resource management systems**: supporting viable customary land tenure and resource management systems, including cross border arrangements; combating deterioration of natural resource base.
SOCIAL

- **Tackling social exclusion and the underlying sources of grievance**: supporting social policies more responsive to excluded groups; supporting stronger focus on the needs of disaffected youth.

- **Promoting dialogue and co-operation**: support to mediation and reconciliation involving civil society; support to credible customary conflict management institutions; exploring role of language and its potential to be a ‘connector’ or ‘divider’; promoting social dialogue on existing areas of common interest.

- **Supporting role of women in conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding**: supporting women’s organisations; promoting participation of women in peace processes; ensuring gender issues are integrated in peace agreements.

- **Enhancing a peacebuilding focus in education**: cross cultural training; exchange programmes for overcoming stereotypes; reducing educational deficits between ethnic groups.

Table 7 provides an example of strategies and options developed following a conflict assessment in Sri Lanka.
### TABLE 7: STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS IN SRI LANKA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues to be addressed</th>
<th>Examples of macro level interventions</th>
<th>Examples of micro level interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECURITY</strong></td>
<td>• Increased military spending</td>
<td>• Protection role of aid agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of accountability and transparency in decision making of armed forces.</td>
<td>• Democratic policing</td>
<td>• Community awareness raising on human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Militarisation of structures and break down of law and order</td>
<td>• Strengthen civilian oversight of armed forces</td>
<td>• De-mining activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Domination by military actors in the North East</td>
<td>• Professional standards and codes of conduct</td>
<td>• Awareness raising and education on child rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of dialogue with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)</td>
<td>• Human rights education with military groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Child soldiers</td>
<td>• Advocacy on child soldiers and rights of the child</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Anti personnel mines</td>
<td>• Initiate process of de-escalation/confidence building as a precursor to talks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Army deserters</td>
<td>• Increase accountability in the armed forces – strengthen legal mechanisms for redress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Insecurity for groups in Colombo</td>
<td>• Explore demobilisation to establish debate on a post conflict scenario</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues to be addressed</td>
<td>Examples of macro level interventions</td>
<td>Examples of micro level interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLITICAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Government legitimacy</td>
<td>• Institutional strengthening of government agencies for example, National Integration Programme Unit (NIPU) and Human Rights Commission</td>
<td>• Support for NGO-government partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Government commitment to finding a solution to the conflict</td>
<td>• Work with the political parties – sharing models and approaches from elsewhere (for example, International Alert’s work with MPs)</td>
<td>• Support for NGO human rights monitoring and election monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of government capacity, declining services</td>
<td>• Build political consensus in the South for peace by promoting dialogue between political parties/clergy</td>
<td>• Strengthen capacity of community based organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Corruption</td>
<td>• Election monitoring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Human rights abuses</td>
<td>• Support for independent media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Political culture, criminality and political violence</td>
<td>• Support for decentralisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of civic engagement</td>
<td>• Support for the judiciary and legal access for marginalised groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ombudsmen for humanitarian and development agencies •</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Institutional strengthening of local government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Developing Strategies and Options

#### Issues to be addressed

**ECONOMIC**
- Inequitable distribution of resources
- Regional imbalances in economic growth
- Growth of poverty and income disparities
- Growth of patronage networks and criminalised economies
- Humanitarian distress

#### Examples of macro level interventions

- Focus on poverty reduction
- More proactive investment in the North East and the deep south
- Rural development, pro poor focus
- Lobby to lift or partially lift the economic blockade in the North East
- Improved targeting and implementation of the Samuthi programme
- Support the profile of peace issues within the private sector for example, businessmen’s peace initiative

#### Examples of micro level interventions

- Support for Chambers of Commerce
- Support for credit and income generation programmes in peripheral areas
- Incorporate Do No Harm criteria into project evaluations
- Investment in community development activities
- Provision of humanitarian relief
## Issues to be addressed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Social exclusion based on ethnicity, caste, gender and religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Growth of competing nationalisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fractured civil society groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of a strong peace constituency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• War-induced trauma</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Examples of macro level interventions

| • Greater focus on education and health, particularly in outlying areas |
| • Place a greater focus on the youth in national policy                |
| • Support for NIPU                                                     |
| • A greater emphasis on social harmony and reconciliation in the education syllabus |
| • Strengthen peace-building focus in the media                         |
| • More support for Regional Universities                              |
| • Strategic support for national level peace constituencies, alliances and media campaigns |
| • Develop linkages between North and South eg. sporting and cultural events |
| • Support for regional workshops and seminars on conflict and peace analysis |

## Examples of micro level interventions

| • Support National Alliance for Peace and National Peace Council       |
| • Support for traditional dispute mechanisms                          |
| • Support for community-based women’s groups                          |
| • Creation of fora for inter-communal collaboration                   |
| • Informational, social and cultural links between NE and South eg. internet access, education exchanges etc. |
| • Work with religious groups                                          |
| • Develop NGO capacities to support and build social capital and reconciliation |
| • Community based psycho-social support                               |
| • Training/workshops for civil society/peace activists                |
ANNEX 1: GLOSSARY OF TERMS

**Coherence:**
Refers to close co-operation and consistency in policy across government departments and between donor agencies in responding to violent conflict.

**Conflict:**
Takes place when two or more parties find their interests incompatible, express hostile attitudes, or take action, which damages the other parties’ ability to pursue their interests.

**Conflict analysis:**
A means of developing a multi-dimensional understanding of the causes and dynamics of conflict as well as the capacities for peace.

**Conflict management:**
Activities undertaken with the main objective to prevent the intensification or spread of existing violent conflict.

**Conflict prevention:**
Activities undertaken by internal or external actors over the short term to reduce manifest tensions and/or to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict.

**Conflict reduction:**
Activities undertaken to reduce the incidence, duration and destructiveness of violent conflict.

**Conflict resolution:**
Activities undertaken over the short term to end violent conflict.

**Early warning:**
Refers to monitoring and analysis of early signals of potential conflict, with a view to anticipating trouble spots in time to respond effectively.

**Greed:**
Refers to opportunities for predatory accumulation during conflict, particularly by political elites.

**Grievance:**
Refers to the negative reactions of those who are disadvantaged (e.g. through political and social exclusion, bad governance, religious or ethnic marginlisation etc.).

4 Taken from Lund and Mehler (1999)
**Human security:**
Signifies not only protection from violence but also from wider threats to physical well being and livelihoods such as environmental degradation, disease and economic collapse.

**Impact:**
The actual effects of an intervention, both intended and unintended, on the lives of its beneficiaries and other stakeholders beyond the immediate project outputs.

**Latent Conflict:**
Refers to potential sources of tension which could emerge as violent conflict.

**Open Conflict:**
Refers to ongoing challenges and disputes; actual, violent conflict.

**Peace-building:**
Refers to action undertaken over the medium and longer term to address the structural bases of violent conflict.

**Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA):**
Methodologies and tools to assess the likely impacts (positive and negative) that development interventions might have on the conflict dynamics at the country, region or project levels.

**Security Sector:**
Those who are responsible, or should be responsible for protecting the state and communities in the state. This can include military, paramilitary, police, intelligence services, militias and private security firms, as well as those civilian structures responsible for oversight and control of the security forces.

**Security Sector Reform:**
Measures taken to assist in making the security-sector more accountable to civilian democratic authorities and ensuring greater transparency of security sector expenditure. Assistance also includes training of security forces for their proper role in democratic society including respecting human rights and humanitarian law.

**Structural stability:**
A situation involving sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures, healthy social and economic conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resorting to violent conflict.
**Track one (or ‘First Track’) diplomacy:**
Official governmental international efforts to settle a dispute or conflict.

**Track two (or ‘Second track’) diplomacy:**
Unofficial confidence-building meetings and actions in support of Track 1. Often private efforts by non-state actors (religions, academic, NGO or other groups) to achieve progress in peace negotiations.

**Triggers:**
Immediate events that accelerate the outbreak of conflict (e.g. the assassination of a political leader).

**Vulnerability/Risk Assessment:**
Frameworks and models designed to assess the potential for violent conflict in a country/region.
ANNEX 2: AN EXAMPLE OF A STRATEGIC CONFLICT ASSESSMENT REPORT

This is a summary of the report of a strategic conflict assessment (SCA) conducted in Kyrgyzstan. It represents an assessment of a ‘pre-conflict’ situation and shows that SCA can have radical implications for donor programmes and strategies.

A. CONFLICT ANALYSIS

1. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

   • **Background:** Kyrgyzstan’s mountainous terrain divides the country into different regions which have closer contacts with surrounding countries than with the capital. Therefore a regional analysis is particularly important.

   • **History:** There is currently no conflict in Kyrgyzstan, but there was a serious ethnic clash near the Uzbekistan border a decade ago and there has been a series of armed incursions from Tajikistan.

2. ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURAL SOURCES

   SECURITY

   • **International:** Drawing on political and academic sources, and specialist organisations such as the International Crisis Group, the analysis focuses on the interests of global powers, particularly whether Russia seeks stability or conflict in the region. An important factor is Russia’s wish to control terrorist groups which might intervene in Chechenya. There is some concurrence of Russian and Western interests in stability. Similarly an examination of China’s position also indicates a desire for stability in order to keep better control on separatists in Xinjiang who have sometimes sought refuge and support in Kyrgyzstan. The US is deeply concerned about terrorism spreading from Afghanistan. The nature of ‘international terrorism’ and its influence on conflict is examined here.

   • **Regional:** Regional security pacts indicate a desire for stability but incursions by Uzbekistan’s forces into Kyrgyzstan represent a possible threat. The section draws attention to the need for flexible definitions of what is regional. The International Crisis Group, for example, has questioned the relevance today of...
‘Central Asia’ and suggested that the issues are better viewed from an ‘Inner Asia’ perspective.

- **National**: The strength and capacity of security forces is assessed.
- **Local**: This section examines the role of police forces and the functions of organised crime at the local level.

**POLITICAL ISSUES**

- **International**: This section examines the competing political influences of global powers. Would conflict serve their political interests?

- **Regional**: There is political tension between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan over resource and border issues. A critical factor is armed incursions by Uzbekistan’s political opposition. This could exacerbate ethnic and political tensions in the shared territory of the Ferghana Valley. Would conflict serve the interests of regional actors?

- **National**: This section looks at the nature of governance and the cohesion of national political power. What political forces threaten national stability? How serious is the North-South divide? What are the implications of the lack of independence of the judiciary and media? Could national government use conflict as a pretext to entrench their position by imposing harsher controls?

- **Local**: Is local political power democratic and transparent? Are local politicians accountable to local people or are they pursuing their own ends (‘greed’)? Does the spread of political power reflect a balance of ethnicity?

**ECONOMIC ISSUES**

- **International**: Western actors have pressed hard for a free market approach. The immediate consequences have included higher unemployment and increasing prices for basic goods. Do these interests now begin to compete with wider issues of security?

- **Regional**: Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the World Trade Organisation has resulted in a regional tariff war. Border controls and tariffs are causing local tensions. Is access to resources, notably water, a possible cause for regional conflict?

- **National**: Indebtedness to Russia may cause Kyrgyzstan to concede political influence. A financial crisis is widely predicted. Could this lead to conflict?
• **Local:** There has been a spectacular collapse in incomes, but also incomes have polarised. This creates a widespread sense of grievance. Local power has been consolidated in the hands of the former communist elite. Will they see opportunities to exploit the imminent lifting of the moratorium on land sales?

**SOCIAL ISSUES**

• **International:** This section examines the impact of global issues such as drugs and HIV/AIDS.

• **Regional:** Religious fundamentalism, especially in Afghanistan, is commonly perceived as a threat to stability. What are the intentions of the militant groups?

• **National:** Structural Adjustment Policies and the economic crisis have caused a deterioration in health and education services. This causes a sense of grievance, but those who have money take a different view from those who do not.

• **Local:** Demographic and economic changes have altered family life and weakened social capital. There are large numbers of unemployed young men, some of them able to make money out of drug-dealing. Overall there is an increase in violent behaviour. Because of out-migration by men the social and economic responsibilities of women have increased.

**3. CONFLICT ACTORS**

• One group with a possible interest in using conflict are the local political elites who could seize land if ethnic minorities were to be driven out. A second group are the drug traders who might be threatened by a stable government in Kyrgyzstan. A third group are the fundamentalist militants whose objectives seem to include the overthrow of state power, especially in Uzbekistan. The only way such an objective could be achieved would be by manipulating conflict, probably of an ethnic character.

**4. DYNAMICS**

• **Critical Events and Triggers:** In the Kyrgyzstan case a trigger in the case of the land issue will be the lifting of the moratorium on land sales. In the case of the drugs/terrorism scenario a critical event would be an attempt by the international community to tighten controls on the drug trade. Actors in the...
region might easily decide that their best defence would be to stimulate conflict in order to create conditions of anarchy in which they could operate without restraint.

- **Scenarios:** The main conflict scenarios derive from the opportunity for a person or group of people to seize assets or power by means of violent conflict. In the Kyrgyzstan case a critical issue is the impending end to the ban on land sales. Local people expressed concern that those who were already very poor would be tempted to sell their land and would then become destitute. But this ‘grievance’ scenario seemed unlikely to lead to conflict, whereas the ‘greed’ scenario was much more threatening. The Uzbek minority in the Ferghana Valley occupies much of the best land but has very little political power. In the past they relied on the protection of the USSR. They were unlikely to sell land willingly but might be dislodged by conflict. Anyone considering this possibility would be aware that in the past, conflict had been a pretext to seize land from another ethnic minority in the same region. The risk is increased by political tensions between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the weakness of security forces and by corruption in the police and judiciary. The factors can be linked together creating a realistic conflict scenario.

- **The Strength of ‘Greed’:** The central issue in the scenario above is the vulnerability of the land resource. Similarly there may be a vulnerability around the highly lucrative drug trade which emanates from Afghanistan and passes through Kyrgyzstan. There are connections with Uzbekistan’s political opposition, with international terrorism and with local mafias. Almost certainly local political elites are also involved. On the other hand, global powers have a strong interest in controlling the trade. Drug-dealers are likely to perceive that their interest lies in perpetuating instability. Local sources indicated that young men were being lured into drug-taking deliberately. Possibly the intention is to stimulate violence and even conflict as a way of counteracting global pressures.

- **The Weakness of ‘Grievance’:** Despite a common belief that grievance ‘explodes’ into conflict it is hard to find scenarios by which this would actually happen. Unless grievance is perceived as the common experience of society as a whole there will be a tendency for those who are disadvantaged to suffer as individuals. But most fundamentally grievance lacks means and focus. In the case of Kyrgyzstan many people were angry about unemployment but lacked even the means by which they could communicate with each other and build up a common purpose. Secondly they lacked a target for their anger. Greed is precise and focused. And it can risk resources now in order to acquire greater
• **Ethnicity as Opportunity**: Ethnicity is the issue over which greed and grievance can unite. The greedy party sees the opportunity to acquire the assets of an ethnic minority, while those with grievances can be persuaded to focus their anger on a supposed enemy. In the Kyrgyzstan case the danger is that local Kyrgyz people could be incited to turn against vulnerable Uzbeks. Grievance might create a justification for what would otherwise be considered unacceptable behaviour.

### B. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING RESPONSES TO THE CONFLICT

#### 5. ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES

• **Response or Cause**: The international community, including aid agencies, may have featured in the analysis of causes of conflict and may be involved in critical events and triggers. In the Kyrgyzstan case, free market policies had exacerbated social and economic tensions. Intervention in drug control could be a trigger for conflict. Ultimately the aim is to draw together the causes and responses sections into a comprehensive review of the options and strategies available to the international community.

• **Security Agencies**: The Kyrgyzstan study revealed that whereas regional powers and Russia had substantial military interests in conflict, the West was primarily focused on economic and political issues. This raised the question whether the Western focus was correct.

• **Political Agencies**: Many international agencies were directing attention to governance issues but their efforts were affecting forms rather than norms in the sense that the formal institutions of democracy were being created but also being subverted. USAID among others had trained judges, but the Soviet concept of the judiciary as an arm of the state, which represented the people, had not changed. Judges did what they were told by their political masters, just as they had done in the past. Arguably, Western efforts could add to grievances because people might expect that this would not be the case. At the same time, the weakness of the judiciary left the way open for those pursuing ‘greed’ to do so with impunity.
• **Financial and Economic Agencies:** The World Bank and others had turned to poverty reduction strategies, mainly because of global policies rather than any specific local analysis. The SCA revealed that the benefits of micro-credit schemes were not reaching the poorest people and that the benefits of rural development programmes were being ‘captured’ by a small and ethnically-defined local elite.

• **Social Agencies:** UNDP was involved in community mobilisation through local organisations. The SCA indicated considerable potential to develop and expand this model as a way of building local awareness. The issue of information at local level was identified as a crucial defence against ‘greed’.

• **The Pattern of Response:** Despite an analysis which showed considerable risk, the SCA found that only one donor was explicitly addressing the possibility of conflict and was doing so in close partnership with what was almost the only NGO (among thousands) specialising in that field. UNDP had recognised conflict but lacked the resources and influence to achieve much.

### C. DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS

#### 6. STRATEGIES AND OPTIONS

• **Conflict Focus:** The political and economic transition in Kyrgyzstan has resulted in cataclysmic changes in Kyrgyz society. The end of collective systems in agriculture and industry caused massive social and psychological effects. People’s ability to understand the pace of change is at breaking point and they may easily cling to what is tried and tested: tradition, religion and autocratic government. Tensions exist between two different concepts of governance; one democratic and the other autocratic. At the economic level, this means that conflict is between free enterprise and state control.

• **Strategic Opportunities:** Because of the dangers that the transition process represents the precursors for open violence, there is a need to balance better the issues of macro-economic reform and state building processes. Aid responses should focus on the political and economic realities on the ground rather than rely on imported forms of governance and economic management. This implies a need for programmes to be informed by a more in depth analysis of dynamics at grassroots level and a focus on developing the independence of civil society.
7. RECOMMENDATIONS

DFID could play a significant role by:

- Including conflict prevention criteria at the project assessment phase which identify circumstances in which vested interests may seek to use conflict as a means to reach their objectives.

- Engaging with Government to encourage wider monitoring of ethnicity in government employment and in the distribution of benefits.

- Engaging with UNDP in its community level activities, and in peacebuilding programmes in the Ferghana Valley and the south, in order to promote and increase public awareness and social cohesion.

- Engaging more closely with actors already working ‘on’ conflict to evolve a common analysis and strategy. This should include developing greater understanding of: the linkages between drug traders and political elites; the involvement of religious and political groups in this trade; internal political struggles and possible challenges to state power.

- Engaging with International Financial Institutions to ensure that poverty reduction frameworks are consultative and representative processes at different levels and based on an analysis of conflict.
ANNEX 3: EXAMPLE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A STRATEGIC CONFLICT ASSESSMENT

SRI LANKA: STRATEGIC CONFLICT ASSESSMENT (SCA)

1. BACKGROUND

1.1 The DFID Country Strategy Paper for Sri Lanka states that a lasting solution to the war is the major priority in eliminating poverty in Sri Lanka. DFID is part of a wider donor community in Sri Lanka who increasingly recognise the need to be more conscious of the impacts of their policies and programmes on the dynamics of conflict and peace. The recent DAC study on aid incentives and disincentives, and the World Bank’s framework for relief, rehabilitation and reconciliation reflect a trend towards more ‘conflict sensitive’ policy and programming in Sri Lanka. In spite of a growing recognition of the need to work ‘on’ the conflict rather than just ‘in’ or ‘around’ the conflict, it is still not clear what this means in practice. It is also not clear how different aid donors can best contribute in complementary ways to conflict reduction and peace-building activities.

1.2 DFID is well-placed to influence current policy debates in Sri Lanka, having identified a need to focus on conflict across all its work in Sri Lanka. The proposed Strategic Conflict Analysis (SCA) exercise would help DFID develop a forward looking strategy in relation to conflict reduction and peace-building. It’s purpose would be both to provide guidance for DFID’s internal programme development, and also to identify opportunities to influence other actors at a time when the aid community appears to be particularly receptive to more innovative approaches which seek to address the dynamics of peace and conflict.

2. OVERALL OBJECTIVES

2.1 Conduct a strategic level conflict analysis which will help DFID to develop policy and programming strategies that are sensitive to conflict-related risks and peace-building opportunities.

2.2 Contribute to the development and refinement of a conflict assessment methodology, which can be applied in other contexts, to support more conflict sensitive policy and programming.
3. PURPOSE OF THE SCA

3.1 The purpose of the SCA is to develop an overview of the programming context and current trends, analyse the key stakeholders, map out conflict related risks and peace-building opportunities, with a view to outlining a number of options for the overall direction of the DFID programme.

4. SCOPE OF WORK

4.1 PRE-FIELD WORK CONSULTATION

4.1.1 The pre-field work consultation begins the process of mapping the overall context and key stakeholders and drawing up an initial list of individuals and organisations to be interviewed during the field work phase. It will involve a perusal of key texts and documents relating to the DFID programme and the wider programming context, and consultation with relevant organisations and individuals which may include: DFID desks; Foreign Office; academics; NGOs; military/security analysts; private sector companies; diaspora communities.

4.1.2 A short perusal of the official and grey literature on the programme context and DFID documentation on the programme itself will help develop understanding of; the historical context and current trends; structural factors contributing to tensions and conflict; the key actors and their interests and agendas; DFID’s and the FCO’s involvement to date; other related initiatives from international or national actors.

4.2 FIELD WORK

4.2.1 Internal Consultation
Field work will begin with an internal consultation with DFID and FCO staff to develop an understanding of the programming context and an initial analysis of the conflict-related risks and peace-building opportunities. The consultation will also help the consultant(s) to identify key questions to be asked in a wider stakeholder consultation.

4.2.2 Stakeholder Consultation
Consultations will be held with a range of stakeholders (in Colombo and the North East) including local and central government authorities, donors, local and international NGOs and community-based organisations. This will help build upon an initial strategic analysis of the context, including sources of tension and conflict, the activities of other actors such as government and donors and their perceptions of current trends, risks and opportunities (see appendix 1 for a more detailed list of questions).
4.2.3 **Mini Workshop**
The mini-workshop will be an informal half-day feedback and brainstorming session with the consultant(s), DFID and FCO staff and a small ‘expert’ group to be identified during the course of the field trip. The purpose of the session is to use the expert group as a sounding board to develop and refine ideas that have emerged during the stakeholder consultation. The mini-workshop will include a brief ‘reading’ of the current situation (sources of conflict and tension, current related development activities etc.), but will primarily focus on developing indicators to assist in addressing conflict related risks that exist in the programme area, and to provide a basis for strategic planning. By the end of the workshop the consultant(s) will have at least the beginnings of a strategic analysis, a basic categorisation of peace and conflict indicators, an identification of the chief conflict and peace-related risks and opportunities for the programme and a number of possible strategies for risk mitigation and conflict management.

4.3 **WRITE SCA DOCUMENT**
A document of approximately 40 pages will be produced which will include the following:

1. **Introduction**

2. **Contextual Analysis**
   - Brief background on the context
   - Structural causes of tension and conflict
   - Proximate events and triggers
   - Key external and internal stakeholders – positions and interests
   - Impacts of conflict

3. **Policy and programming responses**
   - diplomatic/military
   - development/aid
   - stakeholders’ perceptions of donor policy
   - overview of DFID’s programme
4. Risks and Opportunities

- Strategic risks
- Strategic opportunities for conflict reduction and peace-building
- Strategic options for DFID (risk management and peace-building opportunities)

5. Methodological lessons

6. Conclusions and recommendations

5. EXPERTISE REQUIRED

5.1 A CONFLICT ASSESSMENT TEAM OF 6 PEOPLE WILL BE REQUIRED INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS:

- Team leader who will be responsible for co-ordinating the project, and ensuring that lessons from the Sri Lankan case study feed into the wider DFID conflict assessment project [18 working days].
- International consultant with in-depth knowledge of the Sri Lankan conflict and donor policy, who will be responsible for preparing the SCA report [25 working days].
- Two Sri Lankan project advisors who will assist in the field work, contribute to analysis of data and provide input on draft reports [10 working days each].
- Conflict Advisor who will assist in field work and provide technical input in the area of conflict assessment [10 working days].
- Social Development Advisor who will assist in the field work and provide specific input in the area of donor policy and practice [10 working days].
ANNEX 4: RESOURCES

1. REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING


2. LIST OF ORGANISATIONS AND WEBSITES

This resource provides a list of external contacts and information sources. Further information on specific issues relating to conflict can be found at the Internet addresses listed in the following pages.

ACORD (Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development)
Dean Bradley House
52 Horseferry Road
London SW1 2AF, UK
Tel: 44 (0)20 7227 8600
Net: http://www.acord.org.uk/

Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of International Relations)
Clingendael 7
P.O. Box 93080
2597 VH The Hague
Tel: 31-70-3245384
Net: http://www.clingenda.nl/

CODEP (Conflict, Development and Peace network)
6th Floor, Dean Bradley House
52 Horseferry Road
London SW1P 2AF, UK
Tel: 44 (0)20 7799 2477
Net: http://www.codep.org.uk/
Conflict Prevention Network (CPN)
P.O. Box 15 11 20
D-10673 Berlin
Germany
Tel.: 49 30 88007-408
Net: http://www.swp-berlin.org/cpn/

CREATE (Conflict Research, Education and Training)
Hawthorn House
1 Landsdown Lane, Stroud, Gloucester
GL5 1BJ, UK
Tel: 44 (0) 1453 757040

Conciliation Resources (Conflict database)
173 Upper Street
London N1 1RG, UK
Tel: 44 (0) 20 7359 7728
Net: http://www.c-r.org

Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
OECD
2, rue André Pascal
F-75775 Paris Cedex 16
France
Tel: 33 1.45.24.82.00
Net: http://www.oecd.org/dac/

European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation
Secretariat
PO Box 14069
3508 SC Utrecht, The Netherlands
Tel: 31 30 253 7528
Net: http://www.euconflict.org/

Forum on early warning and early response (FEWER)
Old Truman Brewery
91-95 Brick Lane
London E1 6QN, UK
Tel: 44 2(0) 7247 7022
Net: http://www.fewer.org/

International Alert
1 Glyn Street
London, SE11 5HT, UK
Tel 44 (0) 20 7793 8383
Net: http://www.international-alert.org//
International Crisis Group
149 Avenue Louise - Level 16
B-1050 Brussels
Tel: +32 (2) 502 9038
Net: http://www.crisisweb.org

International Development Research Centre
PO Box 8500
Ottawa, ON K1G 3H9
Canada
Tel: 613 236 6163
Net: http://www.idrc.ca/
Also see the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment work in collaboration with
International Alert and Saferworld:http://www.bellanet.org/pcia/

Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex
Brighton BN1 9RE, UK
Tel: 44 (0)1273 606261
Net: http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/

International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC)
P.O. Box 563
Oxford, OX2 6RZ, UK
Tel: 44 (0)1865 201851
Net: http://www.intrac.org/

Overseas Development Institute
111 Westminster Bridge Road
London SE1 7JD, UK
Tel: 44 (0)20 7922 0300
Net: http://www.odi.org.uk/

Relief web
Net: http://www.reliefweb.int/

Responding to Conflict
1046 Bristol Road
Selly Oak
Birmingham B29 6LJ, UK
Tel: 44 (121) 415 5641
Net: http://www.respond.org/

Saferworld
46 Grosvenor Gardens
London SW1W 0DB, UK
Tel: 44 (0)20 7881 9290
Net: http://www.saferworld.co.uk/